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Abstract
This thesis presents a theoretically informed social history of the New Zealand Needle Exchange
Programme (NEP) which has operated since 1988. Close attention is paid to how this ‘harm
reduction’ programme demonstrates a pattern of 'peer-professional' hybridity - a form of quasi-
professionalism developed by injecting drug user (IDU) peers who began operating private needle
exchanges funded by both illicit clients and state agencies. In this hybrid mechanism, the personal
distrust required to pursue 'criminal' motivations has been connected, through the vulnerable yet
influential intermediaries of peers and syringes, to the trust required to 'empower' the health of
marginalised IDU communities. This research has drawn on immersed participant experience and
on accounts from archival documents, supported by interviews. A reworking of actor-network
methodologies has provided a core analytical approach to tracing the critical moments and
boundary-shifts in the development and realignments of the NEP’s hybrid heterogeneous
assemblages. The assembling and reassembling has entangled policy goals, technologies, historical
reviews, stigma, laws, logics, logistic systems, narratives, organisations, sterile and bloody
syringes, monitoring systems, and professional occupations. IDU, health policy officials, peer-
professionals, managers, politicians, HIV/AIDS community organisers, and medical professionals
have prevented HIV transmission by altering key strategic connections and alignments within this
active network, while pursuing their public-private interests. The peer-professionals have publicly
represented IDU, have advocated professionally for inclusive rather than exclusive public health
provisions, while guaranteeing that the monitoring of syringes by state agencies would not harm
IDU. The difficulties in shaping and stabilising the NEP have illustrated the 'messy reality' of its
institutional and policy environment, yet have also led to highly successful and sustainable health
promotion work.
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Preamble: Bio-genesis
“I believe that it is essential for everyone to have a goal in life ... Whether the goal is ever attained is not
important. It is the satisfaction we achieve from striving for it which I believe is the point to life ....
without anything to aim for, life would be extremely dull, regardless of the ultimate reason for our
existence, therefore, is it not better to make that existence satisfying? It is entirely up to the individual
“(Robert David Muldoon, (New Zealand Prime Minister 1974-1984), pers. corr. 1980).
As a youth in the seventies, I experimented with 'mild' illicit drugs. Yet I was not especially 
intrigued by law breaking or law making until I was strangled unconscious by four New Zealand 
policemen during an anti-apartheid protest in Auckland.4 When I complained about the incident to 
police authorities, they declared it had never happened. It did not appear in any record.5 This 
experience triggered an abiding interest in links between injury, illness, reliability of official 
records, law enforcement, resistance, protest, and politics.
After developing epilepsy during the 1980s, possibly due to the strangling incident, I had 
experiences of a medicalised type of stigma and 'mis-fitting'. Epileptic seizures can resemble drug 
experiences such as nitrous oxide, or an orgasm without sexual arousal. At times, reflecting on my 
situation, I compared drug use with the hallucinatory and mood-altering aspects of a seizure. The 
mind alteration of epilepsy could be considered either meaningless or informative, 'mad', or 'bad', 
since when similar changes are achieved through drugs, the mind alteration is supposedly very mad
and bad.6 Epileptics are always aware that they might abruptly have to lie down, perhaps in public 
place, vulnerable to the hazards of being perceived as deviant, not only from strangers but more 
worryingly, from friends who might treat one differently. So, although my rate and type of drug use
did not increase, my awareness of stigma as a sibling of 'sickness' certainly did.
I was initially intrigued by, but not a member of the IV League. However, several injecting drug 
user (IDU)7 friends were members. When they started an after-hours, peer-run needle exchange 
called the Christchurch Intravenous Drug Users Resource Group (CIVDURG), I volunteered to 
help, and became a licensed syringe supplier,8 and was voted onto the Trust Board within six 
months. I had not injected drugs for several years, not because of withdrawing, but because my use 
of anything except alcohol has always been experimental and reflective.9 In 1990 I learnt I had 
acquired hepatitis C. Hepatitis C is a silent, deviant, and devious disease.10 It is mostly acquired 
4. I was left unconscious in a service space behind an anti-apartheid protest. The protest was part of the anti-apartheid 
disinvestment campaign aimed at New Zealand Insurance and South British Insurance corporations.
5. It was not ‘a fact’. It had no number. It did not count. But it had an effect.
6. For an introduction to ‘pharmacopia’ as mixing both illicit and licit substances, and as liminal substances, and as 
mediating public and private conduct, see Persson (2004).
7. IDU is used as both singular and plural, both a noun and an adjective. It can refer to a category or population of 
IDU, or to a specific group of several or more individual IDUs. This range of use is also found in policy and 
academic writing.
8. See Registration approval in Appendix 2.
9. I enjoyed the illegality and transgressive aspects of injecting. However, I preferred hallucinogens, which didn't need 
to be injected to be fully effective, and I had no intention of becoming dependent. 
10. The New Zealand government delayed testing the national blood supply from 1990 to 1992, causing many 
haemophiliacs to acquire Hepatitis C. No explanation has ever been offered, showing how well-evidenced mistrust 
and silence has surrounded HCV transmission and prevalence.
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through blood transfusions from an unscreened supply, or from the sharing of syringes and other 
unsafe injecting practices. 
The key founding members of CIVDURG had been members of the Christchurch Unemployed 
Rights Centre, and most were members of an anarchist11 role-playing network. We knew and 
trusted each other in a different, parallel type of group network, outside of the exchange. This 
aspect was more important than I had realised at the time, with the first two years now seeming 
comparatively harmonious and functional compared with later years. I initially enjoyed working at 
the exchange. It was fulfilling to work with like-minded people in a progressive social experiment. 
It seemed a general step towards treating drug problems primarily as health problems, rather than 
crime or moral problems, while helping to address some of the immediate health concerns that I 
saw around me. 
Picture 1: Myself, while working at CIVDURG in 1989
However, the environment felt uncertain, and we worried 
that the authorities might alter their policies and disestablish
us. After a year, our work felt somewhat more 'normal'. 
During this time I began writing a training manual, but 
found that IDU experiences, in the work environment of a 
needle exchange, could not  easily be formalised. Much of 
what we did involved formal record-keeping as required by 
our funding contracts. Nevertheless much more of the 
networking around peer health and representation was 
highly informal, and the meaning of these connections were
difficult to record, especially in terms of peer 
understandings. Since we had little access to the records of 
other exchanges, and since we were not well-informed of 
policy considerations by our funding agencies, we could not
easily analyse patterns. We soon drifted into a state of 
pragmatic, theoretical, and political forms of dependency on
the output requirements that were specified in our funding 
contracts.
(Photo from personal records)
11. The anarchists associated with the Christchurch NEP were primarily individualists. There are many types of 
anarchism, including academic and libertarian communist. Most types promote the ground-up development of 
organisational forms where any authority is as directly as possible accountable to those affected by the exercise of 
that authority. There is a clear intersection here with research ethics. In a sense, anarchism is similar to a semi-
spontaneous religious movement, without deities or dogma, but with embodied ethics, intense commitment, and a 
highly distributed congregation. For a history of anarchism in Aotearoa/New Zealand, see Boraman (2007). For 
current theoretical work about anarchism written from New Zealand as a locality see Torrance (2007a, 2007b).
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This situation was not helped by the seemingly constant dissolution and new emergences of 
agencies in the health sector environment, within which these funding agencies hovered between 
existence and non-existence, along with their outputs, and along with the outcomes of the NEP. 
The co-ordinator of CIVDURG seemed indispensable as an organisational focal point, and 
attempted to do everything herself. No other models for group work were available, which meant 
that the training for IDU 'peers' became a concept which resisted formal prescription. The co-
ordinator, however, developed private skills in translating between the worlds of health 
professionals and peers. These different moral frameworks and legitimations became woven 
together with the commercial transport web of syringe sales, disposal of used syringes, and 
accounting procedures. 
As our systems in CIVDURG became more formalised, a pattern of problems became apparent. 
The financial constraints made it difficult to try anything new. This created a fatalistic and negative
atmosphere. We couldn't easily evaluate ourselves because we were structurally isolated from the 
other peer groups we might have been able to compare ourselves with. We were also finding out 
how a small community12 organisation actually worked. It became apparent that greater analytical 
and managerial skills needed to be distributed across greater numbers of people to provide 
flexibility and capabilities for expansion. These skills were being sourced by the co-ordinator on a 
personal basis from other organisations, such as drug treatment clinics and AIDS service 
organisations, which held different interests and accountabilities. I, and several other CIVDURG 
trustees, found the consequent unaccountability and the uncontrolled dependency on external 
expertise to be unsustainable and unacceptable. Our desire for enhancing the professional standards
and resources within the Trust led to systemic conflicts within the Board on which the co-ordinator 
sat, and which employed her. In 1992, due to these conflicts, I left CIVDURG.
In late-1994 I was invited by a large group of IDUs to help restore CIVDURG, which had 
collapsed both legally and financially over the preceding two years. Apart from the co-ordinator, 
only one Trustee was evident, though several existed on paper. A recently employed administrative
assistant was keeping the office functioning , but no governance activities were being arranged by 
the co-ordinator or the Trust Board, which was not meeting and could not obtain a quorum. No 
IDUs, nor health professionals, were willing to become trustees while the co-ordinator remained in 
charge. The IDUs who wished to revitalise CIVDURG had concluded that merely glossing over the
systemic problems would risk the local services becoming run by those unfriendly to IDU and 
could conceivably threaten the overall NEP. It would also expose prospective trustees to legal 
hazards, since the Trust had been without a quorum for over a year and had ceased to be a legal 
12. I consider a community, in an analytic sense, to be a group which is represented by its members defining themselves
and their boundaries as ‘self-perpetuating through an internal infrastructure of care’. This definition largely overlaps 
with the conventional definition of the majority, or the mainstream. Nevertheless, these definitions are quite 
different, since the latter is based on comparative numbers, whereas the former is based on relationships.
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employer, despite employing a highly respected person from the IDU community as an office 
worker. Accordingly, surgery seemed indicated.
During a tense, uncertain month this group of IDU established legal and day-to-day control over 
the exchange. We named ourselves the Needle Exchange Consumer Organisation (NECO). NECO 
ran the exchange for several months in partnership with the New Zealand AIDS Foundation 
(NZAF). The NZAF negotiated a short-term contract with the Southern Regional Health Authority,
which had been the previous funders. Our group then became subsumed into a 'new model 
exchange' called the Drug Injecting Services of Canterbury (DISC) Trust. The DISC Trust Board 
was dominated by health and AIDS Service Organisation (ASO) professionals, yet included a 
substantial representation of IDU clients and peer workers. The new model was also supported by 
state funding authorities, the NZAF, the New Zealand Prostitutes Collective (NZPC), and local 
medical practitioners.
After a year working as a DISC volunteer I decided that some aspects of the exchange were far 
better, while others had not changed so much, but were not as dangerous as previously. Yet, I felt 
neither a peer nor a professional. My experiences and perspectives were not conveniently 'whole'. I 
felt 'out of place' in the new structural roles. I asked myself  'Was I an IDU peer?' The past co-
ordinator had claimed I wasn't, since I didn't have a habit. I agreed, in terms of representing drug-
dependent IDU, but felt this attitude undermined NEP health outcomes, since I did have HCV, 
most likely from recreational injecting. There seemed a conflict between the health benefits for 
drug-dependent IDU, and the general IDU benefits of reduced risk from blood-borne diseases 
(BBDs). I also didn't like some aspects of the new Trust Board. There was a distinctly patronising 
feeling hovering about of 'now that the experts are finally in charge, those incompetent junkies had 
better not cause any more problems'. I felt that some more ‘established’ people were alarmed that 
IDU had briefly taken control, since we had shown how the functioning of the exchange depended 
not only on the complex arrangement of state funding and links with other AIDS Service 
Organisations, but also on the goodwill of IDU and their implicit agreement not to organise 
alternative forms of service provision.
It was distressing to feel a partially arrogant edge to the professional power emerging from the new
arrangements. This seemed as potentially harmful as had the previous co-ordinator's stance, only 
from the other side of the professional divide from IDU. I wondered whether the benefits of 
financial health and reputation were worth the cost in IDU autonomy ... and had to answer yes, 
considering the previous shambles which had jeopardised so many people’s health. The problems 
had emerged from an IDU autonomy which had not professionalised except in name, had then 
become frozen as a 'petit hierarchy', then had drifted into isolation, away from supportive links 
with AIDS Service Organisations and regional health agencies. The old system had been open to 
abuse, which had led to rigidity and collapse, yet the new system created narrowed accountabilities 
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and dependencies in more structured ways. Representation and trust felt more connected, yet also 
somewhat erratic, with a machine-like rhythm and alien flavour. I felt accountable, just as all peer-
professionals in needle exchanges are accountable to the community they represent and work with, 
yet also gather information for the state agencies which increasingly fund them.
Holding these motivations and knowledges, I approached this research gingerly. I wanted to 
understand my experiences better, yet also to understand how the whole area seemed inherently 
troubled while also feeling as if accomplishing something genuine and solid. Social life has 
generally appeared to me as a game behind a game, where the obvious set of rules and players 
disguised a different set, so that well-meaning activity merely played into the strategies of well-
connected elite networks. It struck me as a participant that despite such tendencies, the NEP has 
been genuinely original, offering a unique type of value through a very simple yet absolutely 
necessary service in providing syringes. I am even more firmly convinced of the NEP’s originality 
after studying its history and institutional shaping. Yet the NEP has proved very different from my 
expectations in other ways. It suggests that social life is more complex, yet also more raw-edged 
and open to change than a simplistic model of ‘rules within rules’ would suggest. I found 
controlled forms of health co-existing with unpredictable possibilities of desire and risk. These 
forms of loosening and solidifying activity cross our human, object, viral, organisational, and 
institutional boundaries, but not in a very predictable way. The value and principles of the NEP 
clearly inform the heterogeneous interactivities that constitute many other fields.
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Section  1
Introduction: Contexts, Sources & Theoretical Framings
1Strange - yet so strangely fitting
“to set free, in the delirium, this creation of a health or this invention of a people, that is,
 a possibility of life”
(Essays Critical & Clinical.  Gilles Deleuze, 1997: 4)
1   Needle exchanges: A dynamically networked environment
Late in 1987, the New Zealand Labour Government reluctantly authorised a single national Needle 
Exchange Programme (NEP). The consequent legislation attracted bipartisan support in parliament 
and was explained in terms of an urgent public need. The NEP was to provide the range of services
required for supplying sterile syringes to illicit drug users, to promote greater safety in the injecting
and sexual practices of injecting drug users (IDU), and to collect used syringes for safe disposal. 
IDU are private people. They have strong aversions to being publicly labelled as IDU. Nonetheless,
IDU were to regularly visit these public sites where they would be monitored and recorded on 
behalf of state agencies. This type of risk, met by this type of trust, seems strange in competent 
'criminals'.1 It was strange enough in 1987, yet even stranger in 2007 after successive parliaments 
have increased the penalties and difficulties for illicit drug use. Even more perplexing, IDU have 
regularly been held in custody and charged with possession of the licit syringes they have 
purchased or exchanged at the NEP.2 In 2007, IDU continue to obtain sterile syringes, to purchase 
laboratory-grade filter units, and to return used syringes to approximately 180 registered, street-
front outlets for disposal.
One might query my choice of needle exchanges and IDU peers as being appropriate objects for 
the study of policies and organisations. Is not the NEP an aberration and, as with its drug injecting 
clients, of no account, indeed abominable, in the orderly and moral scheme of things? Yet even if 
the grand scheme of things was in fact the ultimate destination, studying the NEP’s emergence and 
development as a unique event seems useful as a way to explore New Zealand’s neo-liberal policy 
environment as a not so grand narrative exploration. The NEP offers a case study of some actual 
practices that have influenced the environment and field of health care. For twenty years the NEP 
has relied upon its close associations with criminal IDU activities and communities, yet has also 
depended upon state funding for its educational materials, labour costs, administration overheads, 
and charges for disposing of returned syringes. Furthermore, the NEP’s professional standards of 
health care for IDU developed without concerted opposition from the same health professions that 
1. Here drug users are referred to as ‘criminals’ because they intend to commit what they acknowledge as a technical 
crime of possessing illicit drugs and paraphernalia, particularly syringes, for the purpose of injection. Such IDU 
have not necessarily been caught and convicted of any crime. IDU may romanticise their activities as alien or exotic, 
but in general, approve of and normalise their illicit injecting activities. IDU are reasonably aware of the import and 
risk of such activities. In terms of agency they are ‘criminals by intent’, not “zombies” (Valentine, 2007: 504).
2. See Arrest Referral Scheme (2005: 3), Appendix 3, and discussed in more detail in chapter 12.
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claimed a jurisdiction over diagnosing and treating IDU motivations and behaviour. The silence of 
the professions is intriguing, since professions in general are in part characterised by their claims 
over occupational territory and their theoretical expertise. This silence draws attention to the way 
conventional professional aspirations have been echoed and developed into the strange many-
angled shapes of the NEP.
According to an authoritative 1996 account, between 1986 and the early 1990s the public urgency 
over HIV/AIDS was addressed by a “three-way partnership between the government and medical 
and the community health sectors” (Davis & Lichtenstein, 1996a: 5). The NEP was founded 
towards the end of this period. The three-way partnership has been presented as being characteristic
of New Zealand as well as the global best practices of health care, but also as having receded into a
“decline of the partnership model [and] ... complacency” (Davis & Lichtenstein, 1996b: 226).
In an earlier 1994 account, Plumridge & Chetwynd write of HIV/AIDS policy as being a 
constructed consensus, “dense with contradiction” (1994: 294). This account better matches the 
archival documents I retrieved than does the Davis & Lichtenstein account of the vague national 
emergence of a consensus partnership. But the Plumridge & Chetwynd account does not describe 
how consensus and contradiction came to coexist in policy and practice. 
I found that the archival record of institutional antagonisms, seemingly forgotten, offers a route to 
an empirically detailed account. My account describes in empirical detail a specific mechanism 
involving an alliance of contradictory interests through which the NEP was founded and shaped. 
Furthermore, since both the actuality and model of ‘partnership’ have been authoritatively 
presented as having collapsed, explanations based primarily on partnership and consensus models 
have correspondingly weakened.To be strengthened, such explanations requiring alternative or 
additional causal entities and wider contextual frameworks. In the account offered in this thesis, the
partial stability and overall sustainability of the NEP is explained by its mechanism of hybridity.
In this research I explore the on-going capabilities of the NEP in terms of its founding conditions 
and the subsequent ways by which it has modified its environment. I pay attention to the NEP’s 
boundaries of practice, to its conditions of possibility, and to how its constituent elements have 
been closely connected. These closures, together with wide connectivity at national and global 
scales, make this analysis an institutional and organisational study in social science, rather than 
simply a social history, or a cultural evaluation, or an examination of a policy intervention. 
My account is informed by actor-network3 approaches, described elsewhere in this and the two 
following chapters. Actor network approaches favour detailed case-studies that pay attention to 
objects. The approach encourages an even-handed analysis focused on asking ‘how’ things happen,
3. For a related topic and a related articulation of actor-network with historical and governance approaches to analysis, 
see Valentine (2007: 498-499, 510-512). See also Appendix 9, particularly 9.4.
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rather than ‘why’ they did, or should, or should not happen. My version of an actor-network 
approach involved a wide focus and deep inspection of ‘activities’, particularly movements and 
motivations that only made sense in terms of each other. I explored the movements and motivating 
forces involved in the interactions of syringes, legislation, specific organisations, advisory 
committees, and three professions, namely pharmacy, medicine, and drug/addiction treatment. By 
describing the interactions of such constituents, I explicate the NEP case, and supplement a 
partnership model with a hybrid model involving health work with criminal communities in the 
‘wild’ (Callon & Rabeharisoa, 2003). 
Various governments and polities have created a range of needle exchange systems in similar 
attempts to control the drug-using desires, risky hypodermic technology, and the blood-borne 
viruses which in combination have resisted conventional forms of control. Despite being partly 
influenced by global concepts such as ‘harm reduction’4 the New Zealand NEP differs from those 
found in other countries. For one thing, it has retained a significant degree of community control by
the representatives of its IDU clients. This is most unlike many other programmes of community 
empowerment that responded to AIDS. 
The NEP was founded with an intent to prevent the sexual transmission of HIV from IDU into ‘the 
community’. This ‘community’ had excluded IDU through forms of medicalising, criminalising, 
and stigmatising. Nonetheless, the NEP attempted to include and empower those defined as illegal. 
This seems an abnormal form of targeted health care. Yet the NEP also developed as a pragmatic 
application of the harm reduction and community empowerment principles that were also being 
expressed globally in the form of the Ottawa Charter (World Health Organisation, 1986). The 
foremost planners of the NEP specifically contrasted the principle of ‘harm reduction’ with the 
abstinence and prohibition goals associated with the principles of ‘harm prevention’5 (Lungley & 
Baker, 1990: 79) and ‘harm elimination’6.
4. Described elsewhere in this chapter, in Chapter 3, and Appendix 8.
5. A New Zealand Coroners Court has produced a useful definition of harm prevention, illustrative in its black and 
white, binary, determinist logics and language. Instead of pragmatic common sense, the following statement offers a 
revealing example of ideologically formalised common sense. The Court pronounced that: “It is elementary that all 
conditions apparent to the senses are the phenomenal effects of preceding causes. If one changes the causes one 
automatically changes the nature of the effects. Thistle seeds may no more produce a crop of grapes than grapeseed 
may produce thistles. Harm minimisation is directed to mitigation of causal effects. It is akin, in medical terms, to 
treating a patient symptomatically. The cause continues to produce effects. How does one bring about change at 
causal level? It is the Court’s view, on the evidence before it, that the primary principle in drug education 
programmes for children and young persons must be harm prevention. Harm reduction strategies must be 
supplementary to the primary purpose. The proper approach to be taken in a therapeutic interventional context is the 
prerogative of the treating clinician. Quite obviously, the factors that protect against the development of substance 
use and abuse are the polar opposites of those negative factors enumerated in para[14] hereof, predisposing to the 
development of dysfunctional individual and family units” (Coroners Court, 2005: 46). This Court advocated that 
more funding be found for preventative education, but ignored the problems of monitoring, the availability or not of 
evidence for effectiveness, and the risk of capture of such funding by a drugs treatment industry with an ever-
expanding clientele. The Court was able to ignore such pragmatic difficulties by appealing to a binary logic, and an 
essentialist ideology, presented in religious metaphors of good and bad vegetation, of prohibiting risk and trying to 
enforce safety, no matter the cost in terms of efficacy and social resources.
21
Chapter 1.      Strange - yet so strangely fitting
The labelling of policies intended to address harm and risk can be very confusing. Without close 
analysis of the methods and assumptions actually associated with the terms in the same document, 
it can be difficult to know what is meant or imputed in any particular usage, since harm minimising
and harm reduction are often differently understood, misleading in intention, and ambiguously 
deployed. Miller (2001) considers that although increasingly used, the principles of harm 
minimising and harm reduction have not been subjected to adequate sociological scrutiny and seem
an extension of ‘surveillance medicine’. The Royal New Zealand College of General Practitioners 
(RNZCGP) has described harm reduction practices as the acceptance of drug using as a fact while 
focusing on reducing harm for as long as drug use continues.7 Harm reduction entails a pragmatic 
acceptance that using substances for recreation and performance is a universal human practice. The
description acknowledges the dignity and human rights of drug users by framing their choice to 
inject drugs as a fact, rather than a value on cultural scales of legality, of good/evil, and of status/
stigma.8 The RNZCGP focus on ‘actual harm’ prioritises research methods that depend upon actual
empirical evidence.
New Zealand’s  'harm minimisation' policies9 have also been evidence-based. However, some 
differences between reducing and minimising practices are notable, for instance in a definition 
from Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) (2005). OSH is a New Zealand Government agency 
that has defined ‘harm minimisation’ as: "an approach that aims to minimise the adverse health, 
social and economic consequences of drug use, without necessarily ending such use for people who
cannot be expected to stop their drug using immediately" (Occupational Safety and Health, 2005).  
Whereas the RNZCGP definition of harm reduction referred to people 'unwilling to give up' their 
drug use, the OSH definition of harm minimisation referred to people who could not be 'expected 
to stop' their drug use. The assumed agency of IDU is presented differently. In the RNZCGP 
version of 'harm reduction', people are credited, in their “being unwilling”, with the ability and 
right to make their own decisions, despite potential hazards which would require reduction. The 
6. Harm prevention involves taking a criminological approach to social and individual health problems. Harm 
elimination involves a totalising approach to harm prevention, such as population-wide drug testing, attempted 
manipulation of cultural identity on a mass scale, and other assaults on civil liberties.
7. This definition is offered by Riley (1999, cited in The Royal New Zealand College of General Practitioners, 2005): 
"The essence of harm reduction is embodied in the following statement: “If a person is not willing to give up his or 
her drug use, we should assist them in reducing harm to himself or herself and other”" (Royal New Zealand College 
of General Practitioners, 2005).
8. Harm reduction approaches provide a range of individual goals, specific to a particular cultural environment, in 
order that the unique combination of factors in an individual's drug using life-world are not reduced into a single 
systemic category. Moore has pointed out, using an actor-network type of analysis, how the reconfiguration of 
particular activities of named substances, such as heroin, into a general category of 'drugs', have altered the legal and 
health consequences for heroin users and treatment specialists (2004). Moore examined how a dogmatic policy 
response of eliminating all illicit drugs excluded the capability to provide evidence-based treatment services for 
users of a particular drug in particular circumstances.
9. The National Drug Policy adopted by the New Zealand government in 1998 was described as a harm minimisation 
policy (Ministry of Health, 1998a). This policy and its successor introduced in 2007 are interesting since they seem 
to include harm reduction as one of the three primary constituents, alongside drug supply reduction and demand 
reduction through education and deterrence. However, in this harm minimisation policy, harm reduction seems 
renamed as a new policy called ‘problem limitation’. This ‘problem’ to be limited seems much less evidence-based 
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OSH version of 'harm minimising' positions people as lacking the control to make decisions which 
comply with social ideals and the expectations forced upon them. The delicate differences in these 
particular usages are not specified in their context of use. The OSH site, which represents official 
health perspectives, does not mention 'harm reduction', and the RNZCGP site, which represents a 
subset of professional health perspectives, does not mention 'harm minimising'. 
The ‘harm minimisation’ principles expressed in New Zealand’s National Drug Policy after 1997 
include and valorise drug prohibition legislation (New Zealand Government, 2004, 1998, 1975). 
The requirements to be directed by international legislation and social order10 take precedence over 
being directed by an empirical evidence base. The National Drug Policy has also replaced the harm
reduction approach of empowerment, of better immediate health, and of motivation change, with a 
disempowering treatment approach that favours abstinence and stigmatises unwilling patients. 
In 2005 the Associate Minister of Health, Mr Anderton, outlined how the:
National Drug Policy seeks to strike a balanced approach to minimising drug-related harm in 
three ways: law enforcement aimed at reducing the supply of drugs; education and community 
resources to reduce the demand for drugs; adequate provision of Government-funded treatment 
services to reduce the harm caused by drugs to individuals, families and communities. 
(Coroners Court, 2005: 65)
The most ground-breaking change in the twenty year history of the NEP came about in 2004 with 
the introduction of a government-funded, free, one-for-one syringe exchange system. Yet as a 
corollary of its increased government funding in the free-one-for-one scheme, the NEP has become
more vulnerable to assimilation into conventional or other treatment services. These services would
have experienced greater difficulties working with a primarily user-pays, client-driven commercial 
logistic of supplying syringes. Nonetheless, financial logics aside, the health care logics of 
‘treatment’ in more tightly controlled systems were already supplanting at least some of the logics 
of ‘open’, client-led, harm reduction systems.11 In addition, significant difficulties involving 
conflicting ‘logics of distrust’ have remained from the NEP’s founding era.
In 1987, the harm reduction and community empowerment approaches were required because IDU 
did not normally comply with directives from health professionals and officials, and worked to 
and more social, or cultural and perhaps moralistic, than the term ‘harm’. It is a vague area. The National Drug 
Policy is somewhat influenced by the Minister of Health. An amendment in 2000 to the Misuse of Drugs Act created 
the Expert Advisory Committee on Drugs (EACD) as a Ministerial advisory body. The EACD provides 
‘independent’ scientific and medical expertise and evidence on drug issues, generally already defined as social 
problems in political forums. The record of EACD decisions, for instance the restricting of NOS (nitrous oxide) in 
2006 and the banning of BZP, a moderate stimulant, in 2007, suggests that evidence-based policies of reducing or 
minimising harm increase the influence of health professionals over public perceptions of the use of various drugs, 
rather than the public providing a body of evidence that directs EACD members in their decisions. Furthermore, the 
EACD is specifically accountable for evaluating the harms of drug use, and is not specifically empowered to 
evaluate any benefits, but does so when this does not conflict with prior defining of social problems. 
10. Judges are well known for preaching ideological sermons on the seemingly universal 'evils of drug use' when 
convicting IDU. In the mid-1980s, several influential medical professionals who wrote to the Minister of Health 
about AIDS used language with similar religious connotations. 
11. As also illustrated by the ambiguous role of ‘harm reduction’ in the framing of the National Drug Policy.See 
Ministry of Health (2007, 2006b, 1998a), New Zealand Government (2004, 1998).
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evade legal requirements. Nonetheless, the NEP attempted to provide a professional quality of care,
by promoting preventative health through motivation change and safer environments, in ways 
acceptable within the cultural worlds of injecting, across the whole of New Zealand’s population 
and urban centres. Yet in achieving this goal, the resultant organisation became a more solid, fixed 
target for more government control and surveillance than could be applied directly to IDU.
In 1985, Bruce Burnett, a gay community organiser, was the first to publicly advocate for a harm 
reduction approach that promoted a safer-injecting programme for IDU. In the same year Burnett 
also co-founded the New Zealand AIDS Foundation (NZAF). The NZAF directly and publicly 
promoted safer injecting, and consolidated the harm reduction concepts that later were incorporated
into the NEP. A second organisational path to the NEP was provided by a small number of 
pharmacists, such as Mr Pollard in Christchurch, who supplied syringes illicitly, in defiance of their
professional body. Although never convicted, Bruce Burnett and these pharmacists were 'criminals 
by intent’. They directly helped gays and IDU to bypass legal prohibitions on gay sex and syringe 
supply respectively, while also advocating for legislative changes to make the law-breaking 
unnecessary and the practices safer. Yet, both Burnett and the dissident pharmacists were 
'professional', and both conveyed their initially unwelcome messages to policy forums in direct 
actions that could not be ignored. These actions ‘exchanged’ public health for public order.
The development of different types of ‘exchange activities’ have been important to everyday users 
of the NEP. In 1987 the NEP was planned as a user-pays system where a single ten-pack of 
syringes was sold for cash. This practice rapidly developed into selling single syringes for cash, 
counter to NEP regulations, then eventually developed into a state-funded, free, one-for-one 
exchange system in 2004. The terminology and understandings of ‘exchange’ that I found in 
accounts increasingly unfolded layers of complexity and connectivity in how they have worked and
developed. I began to see how IDU activities altered in their public and official representation by 
the way certain IDU participated as peer personnel in the NEP. I also saw how syringes became 
less of a health problem and more informational, developing into a measure of the NEP’s health 
services, while remaining deviant and difficult to regulate by officials responsible for overseeing 
the NEP. Such concepts provided new research perspectives. The multiple aspects and distributed 
entanglements of the NEP meant that while it has been a single programme, it has not formed as an
unambiguous, single case. To describe the characteristics and capabilities of the NEP as a whole, I 
focus on a specific hybrid feature of the NEP which I term ‘peer-professionalism’.
The term ‘peer-professional’ does not (necessarily) refer to the significant amount of problematic 
alcohol and other drug use by doctors (Robinson, 1998). By ‘peers’ I mean people who share and 
respect their mutual backgrounds, knowledges, and interests. In this case I refer specifically to 
knowledge about injecting drugs, and to people who acknowledged themselves as criminals by 
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their mutual intent to partake in illicit activities. The people were mostly IDU, but also included 
small numbers of treatment specialists and pharmacists who sympathised with IDU while 
overlooking or facilitating illicit activities. There are many different 'types' of IDU, of different age
cohorts, in different phases of their 'drug using careers', with different ethnicity and gender, and 
preferring different drugs. Despite such differences, IDU share a mutual problem of being legally 
defined as a single type of deviant (Moore, 2004). IDU peers are also joined by their experiences of
injection, and by the logics and stigma attached to the technology of syringes. For instance, a 
syringe must be ‘manipulated’ with skill, 'co-ordinated', and 'positioned' in 'appropriate' places. Its 
symbolic meanings must be ‘managed’ when referred to in ‘collaboration’ with other IDU. A 
syringe is constantly active, in its object-hood, in defining its owner and the owner’s relationships 
with others. A syringe motivates its user, as well as being used in motivated ways. Drugs, syringes,
and peers combine to constitute IDU practices. Yet this relational network borders on and connects,
despite barriers, to conventional professional practices.
I have used the term 'professional' in two12 conventional senses. One use refers to qualified people 
organising into formal occupational groups based on exclusive expertise and a collective loyalty 
that is recognised by special dispensations offered by governments and state agencies.13 
Professional autonomy is generally valued because of the essential nature of the services, their 
reliability, and an ethos of public interest. Such professionals regulate essential services in 
collegiate rather than bureaucratic, autocratic, market monopoly, or open market methods. Another 
use of ‘professional’ refers to claims of expertise and accountability by unqualified people and 
services that are presented as ‘of professional quality’. This usage may be applied to official duties 
and market activities where there is no long-term duty of maintaining a social institution, or a 
professional body, or public trust.14 
I use the term ‘peer-professional’ to refer to a specific pattern of connections, or configuration,15 
between several types of hybrid relationships. One relationship involves the joining of the broad 
goals of crime prevention and health promotion. A second relationship joins the specific goal of 
12. There might also be a third type of professionalising involving two sets of specialists that each accredit the other 
with being professional, yet outside of any public engagement and requirements for trust. Such professionalism 
could conceivably emerge within a larger hierarchal system or any private, non-market system.
13. For discussion of professions see Abbott (1992a, 1988: 161), Freidson (2001, 1999, 1994, 1990, 1984, 1975), 
Bucher (1988), Immergut (1992), Larson (1977), Johnson (1972), Bucher & Strauss (1961), Hall (1949), Durkheim 
(1957). For discussion on discretionary work practices outside of major state sheltered professions, in European 
contexts, see Le Bianic (2003), Evetts (2003), Tordoir (1995), Habenstein (1970), Elston (1991: 59), Döhler (1989), 
Reiter ([undated]). For a theoretically informed outline of changes in New Zealand health professionalism see Tully 
& Mortlock (1999).
14. See for instance Greene (2004) on pharmaceutical salespersons who do not interact or establish trust with the public,
but do employ a tactic of mimicing genuine health professionalism in order to more effectively influence their 
doctor clients.
15. By configuration I mean the whole shape of the connections of a system of multiple constituents. This is related but 
different in perspective from the way I use the term ‘articulation’ to mean a following of a linear strand in a 
configuration. Because writing and speech are linear, their grammatical expression of systemic meaning tends to be 
‘articulated’. But when drawing on topological expressions and metaphors, configuration seems a more appropriate 
term. Often these terms are equivalent, but not when when causation or temporal sequences are significant.
25
Chapter 1.      Strange - yet so strangely fitting
promoting safer material environments by providing syringes, to the goal of shifting IDU 
motivations towards greater control of personal and public health. The latter relationship links the 
commercial methods of supplying syringes with the trust needed to influence motivation change. 
My use of the term ‘peer-professional’ refers to the public face of drug use, combined with 
professional standards of work and professional aspirations for autonomy and public trust. 
My terminology of 'peer-professionalism' does not refer to professionals who become drug users, 
nor to ex-users who have trained as counselling professionals. This is because such people are not 
publicly presented as supportive of practising IDU nor of representing the collegiate knowledge of 
on-going developments in illicit injecting practices. Nor is any professional training and 
qualification implied by my term of ‘peer-professionalism’ so long as professional types of goals, 
logics, and practices are being pursued. 
The term ‘peer-professional’ emphasises a deliberate and necessary, yet also uneasy and 
ambiguous, linking of criminal drug worlds to professional health worlds. My analysis pays 
attention to the peer and professional aspects of how these two goals combined to align materials, 
expertise, reliability, and evaluative components in an interactive system of sites and linkages.
Although initially exceptional, needle exchanges were achieved through normal methods which 
seem patterned as well as aberrent. I will describe in following chapters how the initial shaping of 
the NEP was reinforced or adapted by means of stable16 practices, trials of strength and trust, and 
normal everyday luck, into patterns of greater sustainability.17 These regular practices and 
presumably random chances formed a relatively consistent environment. I draw attention to the 
way my most significant explanations derive from both the structural and eventful character of the 
mechanisms of activity and capabilities that configure this environment. I also emphasise the 
networking of linkages, gaps, barriers, and circulations that constituted this environment.
My research initially focused on the capabilities that emerged from the changing relationships and 
the exchanges of territory and influences between the drug injector networks, health officials, 
medical professionals, and peer educators who founded and developed the New Zealand NEP. My 
approach has ‘drawn’ a range of key stories, both historical and structural, into an interlinking 
account of a single case. This has been more an assembly than an integration since I did not assume
that the case started as singularly integrated. Instead I looked for linkages and good fit while 
working ‘outward’. As a result of this process I invite attention to how the boundaries of the NEP’s
institutional activity as ‘work’ can be understood, along with its capabilities. By building on, re-
specifying, and offering a ‘mechanism of action’ for previous accounts, I can explain the NEP’s 
record of sustainability by describing its characteristic founding ‘problematising’ of altering the 
16. By stable I mean patterns that are not expected to change rapidly, unlike trials and conflicts where abrupt change 
would not be surprising. 
17. By sustainability I mean neither stability nor change, but survival through times of rigidity or uncertainty.
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motivations experienced by a marginalised ‘community of crime’. Unlike homosexual practices 
and soliciting, which came to be decriminalised, injecting drug use was not decriminalised, nor 
regulated, nor ignored. Instead, some of the drugs often injected became more criminalised and 
none became less illegal. The antagonisms between crime systems and health systems, by 
becoming entangled yet remaining distinctive, contributed to a troublesome hybrid arrangement 
responsible for the more significant of the NEP’s capabilities. An account of peer-professionalism 
links the NEP with IDU, with a specific new occupation, with a form of peer representation, with 
professional health aspirations by non-qualified persons, and with professional standards of 
commerce in syringes and other drug-using paraphernalia. I will argue in chapters 10 and 11 that 
this peer-professional pattern explains crucial aspects of the NEP’s beginnings, shapings, stability, 
and sustainability.
2   Sketching a route: An index of landmarks
When planning an exploration of new territory it seems useful to lay out what is generally known, 
before problematising, extending, and triangulating from a range of different perspectives. In this 
section I present the bare necessities of quantitative and chronological case information. This 
outlines the scope, type, amount, and rate of change of IDU and NEP activity, stripped of the 
significance and unpredictability presented in following chapters. 
The use of chemical substances in New Zealand has been variable, at times seemingly non-existent 
and at times intense, yet generally absent from historical records. The written information available
about indigenous M!ori cultures18 does not tell of psychoactive substances being used in practices 
presented as recreational, dependent, or deviant. After the first exploratory contacts and 
negotiations led to settlements of Europeans, increasingly from the UK, the visitors and colonists 
used quantities of various drugs.19 Opiate use was considerable by post-1950s standards, yet carried
out in culturally accepted, legal or semi-legal practices of self-medication and recreation.20
18. Although M!ori may speak with a single voice on current issues that affect all their peoples, their oral histories 
remain distinct and cannot be reduced to a single account.
19. Marijuana was introduced and used legally as a medicine, to a significant but unknown degree (Yska, 1990). 
Alcohol has been regulated, but never totally prohibited, despite the efforts of a energetic temperance movement 
from the late-19th century. The sale and public use of tobacco was normal and legal until prohibited in public places 
in the 2000s. Functional food and beverages with drug effects, such as sugar, tea, and coffee, have been central to 
New Zealander’s domestic and work life. See Smith & Tasnádi (2006), Avena, Carillo, Needham et al. (2004), 
Avena & Hoebal (2003), Colantuoni, Rada, McCarthy et al. (2002), O’Connell (2004), Drewnowski et al. (1995), 
Drewnowski et al. (1992).
20. See Eldred-Grigg (1984: 110-115, 234-240, 242).  “... opium drinking was widespread. People in all walks of life, 
from ladies to prostitutes and shepherds to politicians, drank opium freely” (Eldred-Grigg, 1984: 112). Opiates 
feature in public advertisements for medication (Yska, 1990: 10). An Opium Prohibition Act was passed in 1901 to 
appease ethnic hostility against Chinese residents, and also associated with Christian influences and medical 
opposition to ‘quack nostrums’ and competition. However, this law only applied to solid opium suited for smoking, 
not the liquid preparations popular with non-Chinese. was not enforced with any rigour against non-Chinese  
(Eldred-Grigg, 1984: 236). No following legislation criminalising the possession of substances was enacted in New 
Zealand until the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1927. However, access to some drugs was formally regulated by the Sale 
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In the 1940s, large quantities of cocaine, heroin and other opiates were legally imported for 
prescriptions and OTC medicines, such as cough mixtures. Much was legally prescribed and 
dispensed, despite records showing that about half also vanished from the record keeping system 
(Lee, 1987), suggesting recreational, dependent, or otherwise deviant use. Intriguingly, few social 
or medical consequences have been recorded about a degree of drug supply that would later be 
treated as inherently harmful, dangerous, and a social evil. By the 1950s, international pressures led
to increased surveillance of pharmacists21 and GPs (Lee, 1987). Recreational drug use then became 
an unrecorded, illicit underground activity, with very small numbers reported (Kemp, 2004). In 
1965 there were only 113 arrests for illicit drug use in New Zealand out of a population of 
approximately 2.6 million (Statistics New Zealand, 2005). Nevertheless, the number of reports of 
drug use and enforcement efforts increased significantly during the 1960s (Newbold, 2004: 54-60), 
despite or because of an aura of cultural deviance and risk taking. There were at least 21,000 
charges laid in 1995 from a population that had expanded to 3,706,700 (Kemp, 1996).
Modern western societies legitimise many pleasure-seeking and performance-enhancing 
technological practices, some involving substances that increase health risks, for example Viagra 
and alcohol. HIV/AIDS is transmitted by both unsafe sexual activity and the unsafe sharing of 
syringes, particularly in situations conducive to risk-taking, such as inebriation. The initial 
prevalence of HIV in New Zealand was very similar to that recorded in Australia and the United 
Kingdom (Skegg, 1987: 4). This is not surprising in a modern global culture where the practices of 
enhancing physiological pleasure and capabilities are often valued, for instance as a right to pursue 
happiness. The campaigns to resist legal prohibitions on homosexual and drug-using practices have
drawn on such cultural values, as well as on pragmatic arguments that prohibition entails more 
costs than benefits. Such cultural values, along with financial and other pragmatic constraint, have 
provided influential frameworks for legislation and other codifications of permitted behaviour.
There is a clear ideological directive in some interpretations of Christianity to oppose any 
competing values and practices of happiness. For instance, in 2007 Cardinal Biffi reminded 
Catholics that: “[If] relative values such as solidarity, love for peace and respect for nature ... are 
given an absolute value or uprooted from or placed in opposition to the proclamation of the fact of 
salvation, then they become the basis for idolatry” (Wooden, 2007). Values such as enhanced 
performance and pleasure through gay sex, drugs, and music could be opposed on theological 
grounds of dogma (Rome, 2007: B4), even if not specifically forbidden in authorised versions of 
the Old or New Testaments. A significant proportion of Christian theological dogma carries a 
of Poisons Act, 1871. This control was informally ignored, with newspaper editorials proclaiming  that although 
opium smoking was pernicious and debased the individual, it was neither a scandal nor an affront to public decency 
(Eldred-Grigg, 1984: 110-111).
21. Pharmacists had formed a professional association during the 1870s. Early legislation regulating pharmacists or 
substances they traded in was passed in 1895, 1900, and 1902 (Eldred-Grigg, 1984: 113, 238).
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prohibitionist history. This influence is illustrated in the more local and specific instances of 
Christian political goals expressed in the platforms22 of the United Future and Destiny New 
Zealand parties, which indicate a continuing interest in influencing policy on sex practices and 
substance use. These examples illustrate why religious interests and influences cannot be excluded 
from analyses of policies that regulate pleasures, health, and prohibitions.
Until alcohol-focused temperance movements later emerged, colonial attitudes in New Zealand 
were not founded on drugs or their use being an innate social problem (Eldred-Grigg, 1984: 
110-111), but rather as a potential problem of overuse that might pose a risk to a specific 
individual’s soul (Eldred-Grigg, 1984: 109, 234). During the initial decades of the twentieth 
century, such perspectives were replaced by those of professional medicalisation23 that followed 
developments in the UK. ‘Publics’, or ‘populations’, of patients and potential patients altered in 
their delineation, as both social problems and social entities, during these developments. The UK 
influences on the criminalising of opiates added to a cultural movement promoting social health 
and moral hygiene (Eldred-Grigg, 1984: 234, 240, 243-244), and received greater impetus from a 
cultural distaste for Chinese residents (Newbold, 2000: 163-165, Kemp, 1996, Eldred-Grigg, 1984:
236). New Zealand developments were similar to those in the US as well as the UK (Kohn, 1992) 
during the same period. These New Zealand changes first accompanied, then have seemed 
subsumed within a global system of prohibiting particular substances.24 Health and religious25 
‘best-practice’ came to proscribe the private use of substances for recreational and performative 
goals, while approving of the use of mood and health-enhancing drugs26 if under medical direction 
for health goals.
The scale of drug markets and arrests offers some initial parameters, yet also some reasons to be 
wary of quantitative analyses when the sources and measuring methods have been unknown, or 
unable to be verified. The NEP’s initial official estimates of 2,500 IDU in 1986, based on the 
records of drug treatment centres and prisons, were later shown to have been derived from skewed 
22. For example: “Destiny New Zealand opposes: Any move to legislate recognition and normalisation of same-sex 
relationships and the promotion of such relationships to be equal to the traditional form of marriage. ... Oppose any 
attempt to legalise cannabis and any other Class C Controlled Drug” (Destiny New Zealand, 2007). United Future 
“Oppose the decriminalisation of cannabis and any liberalisation of other drug laws. ... Regularly review the 
classification of drugs ... and only allow them to move upwards into more serious classes of drugs. ... make drug 
dealers an accomplice to any crime committed by their 'customers' ... Require education programmes dealing with 
risk-taking behaviour in adolescence, such as drug use, to present abstinence as a genuine option, rather than the 
current focus on 'harm minimisation'” (United Future, 2007).
23. See Davenport-Hines (2004: 365-375), Marez (2004), Courtwright (2001,1997,1982 ), MacCoun & Reuter (2001), 
Marks (1990a, 1990b), Eldred-Grigg, 1984: 199, 201, 234, 236, 240).
24. This occurred as New Zealand Governments after 1912 signed and adhered to a series of international treaties. 
These treaties initially combined elements which conflicted in being both medicalising and criminalising, but 
became increasingly North American influenced towards medical professional support for criminalisation. The 1948 
Paris Convention seems especially significant in how it strengthened the International Narcotic Control Board 
(Kemp, 1996: 151-152). New Zealand and Australia were promptly accused by this Board of having the world's 
highest per capita consumption rates of heroin and cocaine, much being medically prescribed. The New Zealand 
Government complied and banned heroin importation in 1951 (Lee, 1987; Kemp, 1990, 1996: 154), making it 
impossible for previous practices to continue. These previous practices may have effectively constituted an informal 
‘professional best practice’ of palliative care through drug maintenance prescribing. Patients and doctors presumably 
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data. IDU numbers 'in the wild' were not represented by those held captive or seeking support for 
problems of addiction. New Zealand research, based on World Health Organisation methodology, 
indicated that in 1997, an estimated 13,500 - 26,000 out of a total population of 3,802,600 New 
Zealanders had acquired an opiate dependency.27 A later hepatitis C study accepted a known 
underestimate of approximately 20,000 to 25,000 people with injecting drug experience (Nesdale et
al., 2000: 16).28 Newbold argues for a figure of approximately 11,000 opiate users, both licit and 
illicit, of whom approximately 6,000 were addicted, at any time after 1990 (2004: 65-66). A 
comparison survey of drug use in New Zealand, carried out nationally in 1998 and 2001,29 has 
indicated that the number of people with IDU experience remained stable at approximately five 
percent of the population.30 However, the total population increased from a 'de facto' estimate at the
end of 1989 of 3,410,400, to a 'Resident Population' estimate of 3,851,200 at the end of 1999 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2005). If these estimates are equivalent, and if the approximation of five 
percent applied eight years earlier in 1989, then these statistics suggest an actual increase in 
recorded IDU numbers of 22,040 people over ten years, an average of 2,204 per year.31 The 
Nesdale et al. model (2000) estimates a regular increase of 14,000 IDU from 1990 to 2000, an 
average of 1,400 per year, the population having doubled within a ten year period. It is apparent 
that, given these trends, the public demand for syringes from the NEP is very likely to increase.
Health officials paid increasing attention to HIV/AIDS during the mid-1980s. Community 
programmes that focused on gay sex, commercial sex-work, and IDU were developed. The NEP 
was formally established in December 1987 by amendments to the Health Act that legalised the 
provision of syringes, but not their possession, while creating a legal defence against a charge of 
possession. Accompanying amendments to the Misuse of Drugs Act (New Zealand Government, 
1975) partly decriminalised the possession of syringes. The Health (Needles and Syringes) 
Regulations 1987 were gazetted before 1988. Between 1988 and 1998 the terms of these 
regulations were changed by decree several times. Except for one instance when syringes were 
substituted other substances and forms of access. It is not clear whether temperance movements in New Zealand 
were an exception to the previous pattern, or to international temperance patterns. It seems possible that the New 
Zealand temperance developments provided a means of shifting from a moral mechanism/model to a medical 
mechanism/model of understanding and working in an infrastructure of engaging with substance use. See also 
United Nations conventions on ‘narcotics’ (UN, 1961) that covered many other types of drugs.
25. Religious prescriptions for social purity and abstinence were often fervent in the non-Episcopal churchs (Eldred-
Grigg, 1984: 185-186) yet did not proscribe ritual and spiritual methods of intensely altering consciousness. 
Unfortunately, religious influences, often treated as private rather than social, have seldom featured in New Zealand 
histories and social science analyses. See Stenhouse (2004), Davidson (2000), Lineham (1991), Breward (1979).
26. Such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs).
27. See Ministry of Health (1997); Sellman et al. (1996). The total resident population at the end of 1997 was estimated 
from census results to be 3,802,600 (Statistics New Zealand, 2005). The estimated 0.3% - 0.6% of those with opiate 
using experience is in the order of the figures used in the Nesdale model of 0.7% of the total population having 
acquired hepatitis C.
28. The number of occasional users was acknowledged to be most likely an underestimate. However, the uncertainty in 
earlier IDU population data was reduced by combining Australian models of distribution patterns with particularities 
of the history of New Zealand drug markets. Gaps in historical data before the 1960s remain, and the ratio of 
occasional to regular users had been unreported in earlier records. An Australian model of pyramid drug market 
distribution (Marks, 1990b) in Melbourne was used to estimate the ratio of occasional to regular users during the 
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required to be labelled, all the changes were to relax previous constraints. In 1998 an amendment to
the Misuse of Drugs Act replaced the 1987 Regulations (New Zealand Government, 1987) with the 
Health (Needles and Syringes) Regulations 1998. A further amendment occurred in 2005, when the
onus of proof in charges of possession of syringes shifted from the defendant to the prosecution. 
Nonetheless, possession of syringes remained illegal if intended for any illicit purpose, such as 
injecting illicit drugs.
Since 1988 the NEP has supplied syringes through two types of outlet. The initial type consisted of 
pharmacies. In September, 1988, seven months after the NEP began, there were 149 registered 
pharmacy outlets (Kemp, 2004). Between that time and 2004, registered pharmacy numbers varied 
sufficiently to cause alarm, halving at times over the first seven years (Nimmo, 2004. pers. com.). 
In 1994 there were 152 pharmacy outlets (Walker, Brady, & Baker, 1994:1). In late 2004 there 
were 170 pharmacies registered with the NEP out of 900 pharmacies in total throughout New 
Zealand (Sheridan, Henderson, Greenhill, & Smith (2005). The numbers of pharmacies supplying 
syringes through the NEP over the last decade generally varied between 100 and 200. This number 
and distribution was sufficient to guarantee a surface type of national coverage, except for remote 
rural areas, and excepting a small percentage of pharmacy outlets that IDU seemed reluctant to 
visit (Walker, Brady, & Baker, 1994). 
Five months after the NEP pharmacies began operating in May 1988, an IDU peer group in 
Auckland was contracted by the Department of Health to provide NEP services. Four more groups 
formed by 1990. In late 1994, one peer group publicly32 collapsed, but was rapidly replaced. The 
five IDU peer groups formed a national federated body named Needle Exchange New Zealand 
(NENZ) in 1995. NENZ had been preceded by five successive co-ordinating agencies, all 
disestablished by government policy, the last succumbing by mid-1995. NENZ is a co-ordinating 
and service-provider body that meets twice yearly. NENZ services are of national scope, in contrast
to the regional focus of its constituent member groups. NENZ elects representatives to the NEP 
Stakeholder Group, which meets twice yearly to monitor governance and policy issues. This Group
includes representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Pharmaceutical Society of New Zealand 
exceptional period of large-scale heroin importation in New Zealand from 1976 to 1982. The larger numbers in the 
Australian model and the detailed ethnographic information from New Zealand were combined to give greater 
confidence in this estimate, especially since it falls within the previous estimated range. However, the authors accept 
that future projections are problematic given the uncertainties of volatile drug markets and drug using practices.
29. See Wilkins, Casswell, Bhatta, & Pledger (2002: 45-46). This is the only national comparative study undertaken.
30. Those having ever tried heroin, homebake, morphine, poppies and other opiates were 3.7% of the total sample in 
1998, and 4.3 % in 2001. I am assuming these drugs were injected. Those having ever tried other illegal drugs by 
injection were 1.2% in 1998 and 0.8% in 2001. Adding these I assume 4.9% in 1998 and 5.1% in 2001. Overlap 
between categories would reduce these figures, but I consider the measurements to be underestimates in any case. 
The point is that there was no great change. 
31. 156 deaths associated with opiate use were recorded between 1990 and 1996 (New Zealand Health Information 
Services, 2005). However, only 93 people are recorded as dying from opiate related causes between 1995 and 1998, 
an average of 31 persons per annum.
32. Other groups effectively collapsed and reformed, but not publicly.
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Inc., and the Pharmacy Guild of New Zealand Inc. (NENZ, 2005).
By 2004 there were twelve full-time peer outlets, two part-time outlets, and one de-centred service 
(Sheridan, Henderson, Greenhill, & Smith, 2005). The larger cities, such as Auckland and 
Christchurch, had begun to establish suburban satellite outlets. In addition, a new model of rural, 
non-outlet outreach and exchange was piloted on the West Coast. This ‘bush-net’ model involved 
flexible, ad-hoc arrangements where control was shared among local agents and a urban-centred 
support service. By 2004, NENZ was contributing to national quality control protocols in related 
fields and sharing leadership with public health professionals in combined research projects 
(Brunton, 2004. pers. com., Henderson, 2004. pers. com.).
In 1995, NEP outlets began being classified as either Level 1 or Level 2, depending on the 
commitment and comprehensiveness of service delivery. All the community-based IDU peer 
centres and several pharmacies were Level 2, 'dedicated' exchanges. The majority of pharmacies 
provided less comprehensive, more rapid Level 1 services, under the direction of protocols 
developed in the NEP by the pharmacies and community centres offering Level 2 services. In both 
Level 1 and 2 outlets, the supply side was fully commercial until 2004, with the syringes purchased
by the IDU client at the time of the transaction providing a professional service fee and 
reimbursement for labour.33 The number of syringes distributed by the NEP increased steadily to 
over one million per annum by 2000, with 64% supplied by community-based IDU peer group 
centres (NENZ, 2007). Surveys of NEP clients indicated that needle sharing incidents reduced from
50% of injecting occasions in 1994 to 6% in 2002 (Aitken, 2002: 5). Yet during this period, and 
increasingly after 2000, drug prohibition enforcement became more stringent34 while the potential 
distrust felt by IDU for state-funded programmes correspondingly increased.
According to every account the NEP has been a remarkable success. It was effective and efficient 
(Aitken, 2002: 7) in achieving its key outputs and outcomes, since between 1985 and 2003, those 
diagnosed with HIV numbered less than ten per annum, including infections acquired overseas 
(Saxton & Hughes, 2004: 8). The NEP is estimated as having saved $35 million in treatment costs 
(Aitken, 2002: 6). Yet given the ambiguities and on-going difficulties, how can such success be 
understood? It was not due to a rapid start that seized the key founding moments and people’s 
33. After this change, additional accounting systems have been required for calculating labour and managerial 
reimbursements (Henderson, 2004. pers. com.).
34. The New Zealand ‘drug wars’ intensified after 2000, partly due to one particular Minister holding a fervent anti-
drug agenda. “The first action of the Ministerial committee overseeing the National Drug Policy after Mr Anderton 
became chairperson, following the 2002 Election, was to put in place an Action Plan for alcohol and illicit drugs. 
The first such action was reclassification of methamphetamine to a Class A harm drug. In May 2003 the Ministerial 
committee incorporated under that Action Plan a 19-point methamphetamine action plan due to the seriousness of 
that drug’s effects. In December 2003 Cabinet agreed to amend the Misuse of Drugs Act to give Police and Customs 
greater powers, including search and seizure powers without warrants. The amount of drug material required to 
constitute presumption for supply has been reduced in relation to methamphetamine and methcathinone. There has 
been a reclassification of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine by way of Order in Council, with a view to penalising the 
unlicensed importation of such drugs” (Coroners Court, 2005: 65).
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imaginations, thereby blocking other possibilities (Laugeson, 2001: 131-132), since the NEP was 
even more notably delayed and hesitant than other HIV/AIDS responses in New Zealand. It was 
not due to the initial numbers of HIV-positive IDU being low, since the initial prevalence was 
equivalent, proportionate to population, to Australia. There are better explanations. I point out that 
despite the tardy official start, IDU themselves took precautions even earlier and were assisted by 
pharmacists who were also prepared to act illicitly. This initial advantage was then built on by the 
NEP being as flexible as needed, not only by design but also due to a combination of institutional 
interests and prejudice, as officials and professionals preferred ‘not to know’. Not to know what? 
Chapters 4 to 9 will describe what happened in terms of patterns of events and patterns of effects, 
together explaining a degree of social action in terms of a mechanism. But only a degree of social 
action, and a mechanism characterised by flexible ambiguity.
3   How has the NEP worked? Following logics,  hybrid mechanisms, actor-networks
When I asked two key NEP managers35 for their explanations of the way the NEP developed, they 
emphasised, among other factors including sheer good luck, that financial constraints and 
competition explained much about several important conflicts which had shaped developments. 
Yet such quantitative data, even about crucial social resources such as finance, can only explain so 
much. Such data do not explain how state-supported organisations run by active criminal associates
could form, nor how the consequences and conditions of such formations might interact in later 
developments. Numerical amounts of money, time and people refer to stories36 of extent and 
continuance, but not of what happened and how it continues to make a difference. The syringes did 
not ‘count’, in terms of quantity, as equivalent in number or type, since they were differently 
understood and of different legality in different environments. Such differences and consequences 
cannot be validly averaged or otherwise statistically merged into a smooth numerical index, though
Latour points out how such shifts and translations of information between messy reality and 
numerical registers can be efficiently achieved in practice.37 As I will show, a range of connective 
35. These were Catherine Healey, co-ordinator of WIDE and NZPC from 1988, and Simon Nimmo, NEP National 
Manager/co-ordinator from 1996 to 2002.
36. Numbers are important, as is measuring in general, since numerical system-building activity takes place in a local 
context where the process always includes the measure and the measurer in relation to that being subjected to 
measurement. The significance of numbers can be analysed using qualitative methods, such as the relational 
network required for any measurement to become active, to change things.
37. See Latour (1999c: 47-64). Pickering (1991) has much of related interest to say about joining divergent and 
distributed entities into actual cases in ways that are contextually contingent. ‘Translations’ are involved in the 
development of durable innovations as described by Latour, and techno-economic networks, as described by Callon, 
Larédo, & Mustar (1997), Callon (1991). Callon’s ‘translation’ focused on changes in the positioning, timing, and 
understandings of circulating intermediaries which maintain system boundaries as significant social features. Latour 
has drawn attention to the forms and forces involved in the sometimes cyclic activity of ‘immutable mobiles’. 
Translation involves the movement of meaningful objects across system boundaries, in ways that mean different 
things to different actors, depending on their positioning. My analysis has paid attention to how both innovation and 
sustainability have been facilitated by circulations of syringes, funding, and information. These circulations 
contributed to the stability of the NEP, and at least partially explain both the exceptional and sustainable aspects.
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effects emerging from the articulation of different motivations and meanings. 
My account of the NEP was informed by a general concept of ‘hybrid vigor’, where an unfixed, 
provisionally stable and productive arrangement of a small number38 of differences can be held 
together in some way.39 The concept of hybridity is conventionally associated with breeding, where
the crossing of normally distinct genetic sets produces an unusual organism. However, actor-
network approaches encourage a sceptical querying of explanations that rely upon the prior 'fixing' 
of an entity as either natural or social in any sort of essential identity and qualities. Rather than a 
biological metaphor, where organisms tend to be associated with a given nature as integrated and 
harmonious, my use of hybridity is better illustrated by a metaphor of artifice. For instance, when 
constructing classical Japanese swords, different alloys of steel and iron are folded tighter and 
tighter together in the forge until the respective grains and lamellae form an intimate alliance 
(Untracht, 1982: 364-365). The opposed characteristics of durability and edge hardness, which are 
so desirable in a blade, depend upon the connecting of dissimilar surfaces. This is why the joining 
process stops before the differences in metallurgical constituents ‘assimilate’ into a less effectual 
homogeneity. Such a mechanism is both quantitative and qualitative, since the types of different 
articulated surfaces, their size and overall configuration, are just as important as the chemically 
alloyed characteristics of each element, and on the overall shaping of the outside ‘sword-user’ 
boundary. Blade and environment engage at such boundaries as distinctive systems of social action 
where motivations mix with conditions of possibility. 
This metaphor informs an understanding of the NEP40 and peer-professionalism, in terms of human
and non-human living systems engaging with technologies and tools. For instance, the social 
activity of an illegal ‘syringe/user’ hybrid in 1986 was significantly different from that of a ‘legal 
syringe/illegal user’ hybrid after the NEP began operations in 1988. In 1988, to dispense a syringe 
for illicit purposes was considered illegal and immoral. After 1988 such dispensing constituted the 
respectable work of a licit public health organisation. In the case of the NEP, the hybrid 
mechanisms I will describe worked by connecting viral ecologies, legislative systems, cultural 
38. Hybridity frequently refers to mixtures of only two different things. This duality seems to derive from its original 
use in heterosexual breeding of plants and animals. My concept of hybridity shifts from dual to multiple.
39. This usage drew from a Buddhist analytical tactic of four-fold negation, which matched a pattern I observed in the 
NEP of ‘not this, not that, not both, not neither’. Yet my hybridity is not ‘transcendent’ in any sense of its meaning 
and activity being reliant on its ‘standing outside’ experienced reality in some domain of metaphysical ideals. My 
hybridity also does not refer to joining in the sense of merging, or of producing a well-defined, internally stable 
product` exhibiting a boundary only with externalities from some accumulation or re-arrangement of differences. If 
such a hybridity coalesces into a single thing, or stops activity, or separates into unattached entities, it is no longer 
hybridly productive. This is not an organising logic of aggregation, where basically similar elements become more 
active through greater impact of higher numbers. Nor is it a logic of partnership, where differences complement 
each other.
40. As a basically qualified welder (stick and oxy-acetylene) I have experience of controlling the heat input and speed of
cooling of molten metal puddles, where the eventual grain characteristics and homogeneity of the weldment is as 
crucial as when forging a sword. In fact, swords of exceptional quality in the Middle East were frequently cast in a 
process whereby the cooling of the metal alloy led to differentials in grain structure emerging as a heterogeneous 
outcome from a more homogenous molten state. Various aspects of the NEP can be usefully modelled as ‘forged’, 
‘cast’, and ‘welded’.
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expectations, human individuals, and syringes. Some of the network elements were human, some 
non-human but alive, some non-human and not alive, yet none can be ignored, despite some 
seeming more influential than others at least in the short term. The NEP’s antagonisms were forged
into close proximity and articulated41 through key jointings, acting partly as a mechanism and 
partly as a work environment.
The term ‘mechanism’ might imply predictability to some, but I disagree, since mechanisms can be
random or otherwise indeterminate. I do not suggest that the NEP’s mechanisms lead to predictable
outcomes. Actor-network descriptions are a type of positivism that require well-evidenced 
information and meanings, but are not determinist in the sense of all outcomes being inevitable and
caused only by a single, or a few prior events. Instead, the networked environment is 
‘conditioning’. Suddenly emergent things are acceptable if they can be demonstrated, and constant 
difficulties produce sites of conflict where chance and complexity contribute to outcomes that are 
unpredictable. The NEP was certainly positively determined and planned, at least initially, but I do 
not refer to this planning as the criterion for the ‘mechanism’ I draw attention to. Instead, I 
emphasise two other aspects. First, I point out that a provisional sustainability emerged in the NEP 
alongside an on-going selection process based on pragmatic workability. For instance, key IDU 
peer managers considered the NEP’s legislative framework to be irrational (NEXUS, 1992: 2; 
1990c, e, f), and did not follow directives blindly when obstruction, disobedience, and work-
arounds seemed preferable. The workability emerged from understanding the everyday institutional
actualities and IDU expectations that in becoming mutually involved were thereby able to work 
pragmatically.
The second aspect of mechanisms relates to my method of following network linkages through the 
movements of objects such as syringes, viruses, and documents. I emphasise how significance 
emerged from the NEP’s linkages of such objects with information. I found many connections in 
some places, and few in others. I considered both the presences and absences to be significant. 
However, the quantity of reported connections only told so much. Some links seemed more 
contextually significant than others within the local system of the NEP and NEP research because 
they outlined a local system, a mechanism of effects, in a history of events (Latour, 1999c: 
305-306), which made some possibilities more or less difficult than others. 
41. To avoid confusion I should probably specify my usage of the term ‘articulate’. In particular, I do not take up the 
somewhat structural determinist contexts of the analysis of class-cultural struggle that derives from Gramsci (1971), 
and has been developed in an even more nomadic direction by Stuart Hall (1996). I do, however, borrow from that 
stream the concept of articulation as a closeness and a conflict between being and becoming, and involving both 
linking and speaking. I also invite attention to the use of Hall’s ‘articulations’ in studies of ethnic group meanings 
and cultural aspects, since IDU may well be treated as an ethnic group with a characteristic ethos. However, I do not 
find Latour’s definition of articulation (1999c: 303) very useful. Latour emphasises how the term does not only refer 
to language, but has universal application. Although useful to a point, this also evades the point, or more 
importantly, the joint. The clarity referred to by ‘articulation’ derives from segmentation and jointedness (Latin 
articulare - to divide into joints), both of which tend towards a local and linear perspective, or following, of a wider 
configuration, or network, constituted from segments and joints as well as other entities.
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The actor-network approaches I utilise offer ways of directly linking objects, meanings, and 
motives. Actor-network approaches involve a set of principles and sensitivities rather than a pre-
ordered schema for research to be plugged into.42 The close physical detail of objects, the wider 
infrastructural patterns of pseudo-objects, and the personal motivations of actors, share a stage as 
interactants that ‘perform the actual’, and enact their performances in stages of timing and tactics. 
My actor-network approach involved engaging with both the contentious and regular activity of the
NEP by following its connections, while noting the rationales and patterns of ‘clumping’ and 
‘labelling’ into named, consolidated entities. My input into the substantive social history in 
chapters 4 to 9 was as a partial participant, not as a fully detached observer, since my research has 
been 'enthreaded' within the same multi-dimensioned, clumpy reality as that studied.43
It made an actor-network type of difference whether an argument for funding was found in an 
archived document with a private sending address and bent spoons44 in the kitchen, or an NEP 
office address visited by commercial carriers, where financial records were filed, and competencies
displayed to a public gaze. In both places new and used syringes were likely to be found, so I could
not merely note the presence of syringes. I also had to follow their movements and stories as these 
were modified by other objects and understandings in network practices. The meaning of an 
address on a letter could not be touched, unlike the physical object of the letter, yet its actuality at 
times connected to my memory of actual places, still present in a story that also involved bent 
spoons and filing cabinets in a range of potential articulations. These materialities and meanings 
made a difference, but within particular frameworks of understanding, which might, or might not, 
be specified at the time or in research.
The research is informed by a specifically ‘symmetrical’ actor-network stance that has involved 
‘neither condemning nor condoning’ the logics of illicit drug use and IDU perspectives. I adopted 
this stance to approach all aspects of the NEP case with the same methods and to deal even-
handedly with the whole case. This stance seems even more appropriate in being the formal 
42. This is why my approach will not necessarily be followed by other actor-network researchers.
43. Actor-network approaches are a theory-averse, innovative form of interactional positivism. However, they are 
highly theoretical in an immanent sense where theory is done by circulating close, but not too close, among cases 
(Latour, 1999c: 69-79) rather than made into a distinctive entity. In this respect the methods are located within the 
lineage of sociological studies of economies, technologies, and sciences. This field has pragmatist, historical, and 
interactionist footprints leading back to the 'positive social science' of Comte’s sociology and the establishing of 
history as a University discipline in 19th century Europe. Actor-network approaches overlap with anthropological 
and geographical interests in the locales of material culture. Actor-network following methods are similar to 
ethnographic tactics of using a researcher’s embodied interactions and situated vulnerabilities as a qualitative 
instrument.
44. IDU often bend down the shank of a spoon so the spoon bowl sits flat when put down to cool in the process of 
cooking a taste. The spoon contains a mix of crushed pills or poppy latex that is heated with liquid reagents, then 
cooled and drawn up through a filter into a syringe. This home preparation, requiring a heat source and flat surface 
areas, partly explains the lack of a street injecting scene in New Zealand. Between the ‘Mr Asia’ period and 1994 
(Walker, Brady, & Baker, 1994: 32), heroin was scarce in New Zealand and most of the affordable injectable opioid 
drugs have not been readily dissolvable in cold water. The spoon also provides a type of record. The most useful 
angle of the spoon is different from that required for conveying food into a mouth. Such spoons become 
recognisable and need to be controlled along with the nearby surfaces, raw drugs, reagents, filters, sterile water, and 
syringes that contribute to the safety of injecting.
36
Section 3:    How has the NEP worked? Following logics,  hybrid mechanisms, actor-networks
operating principle of the NEP peer groups. This symmetrical stance encouraged me to explore and
identify the basis for the trust expressed by IDU in the peers and pharmacists who run these outlets.
Yet the trust by government agencies in an organisation that was itself trusted by illicit IDU, and 
could be confused with a criminal gang, also required study. 
My approach involved attention to the way material environments, collective motivations, and 
social institutions intersected by means of physical objects including syringes, drugs, and quasi-
objects45 such as the NEP itself. Quasi-objects are like ‘black-boxes’ (Latour, 1999c: 304; 1987: 
2-5, 130-132) in being larger and more complex inside than seeming on the outside. However, the 
key criterion of quasi-objects as I employ the concept lies not in the packaging of complexity 
alone, though that frequently emerges from studies. Also crucial are the packaging of contests and 
trials over definitions, the enrolment of different interests, and control over practices and behaviour
as regards specific physical objects.46 For instance, why have IDU been seemingly unafraid to 
return used syringes containing potentially identifiable traces of illegal drugs and their DNA, in a 
context where no transparent public protocols protect the ‘donor’ from the use of this information 
without their consent? IDU would never voluntarily donate such samples to law enforcement 
agencies, yet do to health services such as the NEP, despite health authorities frequently co-
operating with police and despite health authorities permitting Corrections Department staff to 
place security and administration concerns above the health of inmates.47 
An unexpected experiment in surveillance, carried out by testing the syringes returned for 
exchange at NEP outlets, provoked my interest by not leading to any consequent expression of 
guarantees, nor any statement of ethical or ‘best practice’ protocols. The absence of this 
information, given the increasingly public concern with the ownership of personal, collective, and 
commercial information, such as DNA data, is explored in chapter 8. Exploring such a trial of 
collective interests requires first tracing the way in which IDU came to trust the same government 
system that proudly proclaimed its resolve to punish IDU or to stigmatise them as non-compliant 
‘potential’ patients.
45. I use the term quasi-object to refer to an entity that is uncertainly and unpredictably physical-natural, informational, 
and cultural-communicative, without being purely any single one of these constituent attributions. This usage 
follows actor-network understandings. Latour emphasises that such attributions are categorisations from after the 
crucial activity of making a quasi-object work in practice, whereupon it can also be made ‘true’ as a natural or social 
‘fact’. See Serres & Latour (1995), Latour (1993: 90; 1996: 213). Quasi-objects constitute areas and participant 
understandings of networks by circulating, and transforming meanings in shifts and translations as an inherent 
aspect of circulating, yet in ways that are always potentially contestable, and therefore of both ethical and political 
significance. Latour considers that quasi-objects are: “[r]eal as Nature, narrated as Discourse, collective as Society, 
existential as Being” (1993: 90). Elsewhere Latour specifies that quasi-objects are: “a continuous passage, a 
commerce, an interchange, between what humans inscribe in it and what it prescribes in humans. It transplants the 
one into the other. This thing is the non-human version of people, it is the human version of things” (1996: 213).
46. This is one reason why I do not follow a ‘complex systems’ approach. Complexity by itself explains little to 
nothing, if all situations are irreducibly complex. What then matters is how strategies of avoiding or making use of 
complex systems are organised.
47. As evidenced by the number of preventable deaths and injuries in prison, and by the Memorandum of Understanding
that prevents Health Ministry personnel from publicly commenting on health issues in prisons unless first 
negotiating permission from Corrections Department personnel.
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As I explored the journey of the NEP syringes and outlets from illicit beginnings to being normal 
and authorised, the amount and complexity of emerging information was drawn into increasing 
coherence by asking how the record of problems informed the stories of success. I noted that I was 
following syringes, along with IDU peers and peer organisations, down two somewhat parallel 
corridors of inquiry, one focused on the actual sequence of infrastructural developments, the other 
on the motivations and relationships between those participating in designing, using, and running 
the NEP. One process that has linked the two is path-determinacy. By this I mean that the 
constraints laid down in the form of durable structures provides the conditions that do not 
determine historical outcomes, but do provide unequal difficulties that make certain outcomes far 
less likely than others. Both types of explanatory frameworks are needed to understand the sorts of 
professional careers and jurisdiction that developed. Both types of question and sensitivity are 
needed to trace and identify the way institutions and organisations came to be assembled into a 
durable system. Where, and in what mix of structure and period, do the circulations of syringes 
interact with movements of money, documents, careers, trust/distrust, and surveillance that 
contribute to systems of governance? In pursuing these questions and instances I constructed an 
account that depicts the character of a unique case involving a specific, historical, local mechanism 
of hybrid interactivity.
4   Structure of the thesis
This thesis presents an argument that develops in steps from the NEP’s founding moments and 
conditions, through a detailed, analytical, and conceptually-informed social history. The argument 
progresses towards an account of the NEP as a specific case, linked to a description of peer-
professionalism as a principle that characterises the specific case, yet could be cautiously extended 
to similar cases. I have divided the stages of my argument into twelve chapters, grouped into four 
sections. In the first section, three chapters introduce the overall thesis contexts and arguments, 
then the methods of selecting information and the types of information analysed.48 The second 
section groups four chapters that describe the development of the NEP by exploring incidents, 
structural effects, and events in a chronological sequence. In the third section, two social history 
chapters offer a thematic analysis of NEP developments, describing wider connectivities and 
consequences. Here I focus on those synchronic meanings, motivations, and goals which do not 
neatly fit a linear, historical approach. The fourth section integrates my sequential and structural 
approaches. Here I present my ‘case for a case’49 in three chapters, by focusing first on the 
48. My research methodology does not depend upon a rigid ontological or epistemological framework. For this reason 
there is no theoretical framing chapter, although an informative, contextual discussion of methodology is presented 
in Appendix 9.
49. This legal metaphor of ‘making a case’ links to my scientific ‘grounded case study’ and my historical ‘meta-case 
account’. See Yin (2003: 39-45)
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grounded NEP case, then fully addressing my research question of capabilities by shifting to the 
meta-case of peer-professionalism that has permeated and informed the grounded case of the NEP. 
The thesis concludes with a final chapter that revisits my initial concerns and my questioning of 
‘capabilities’ in terms of the overall pattern of thesis material, my argument, and several on-going 
NEP issues. 
My chapters effectively address the key questions, foreshadowed in my Preamble where I 
presented the biographical context through which this research developed. The first chapter poses 
three questions. The first asks why one might bother to research needle exchanges. The second asks
what general sort of work needle exchanges do. The third asks where this research is positioned in 
relation to the preceding questions. In this introductory chapter I present a resource kit-index of 
sociological contexts, illustrations, methods, and reasons for my calculated stroll along a needle-
strewn path. I foreshadow my argument that the capabilities of the NEP result from its hybridising 
of antagonisms between IDU, officials, and health professionals. I introduce two previous 
explanatory stories (Yin, 2003: 29), indicating where my account diverges. I outline key contexts, 
such as harm reduction, mechanisms, and networks that initially informed my research and 
continue to offer useful ways of thinking about NEP issues. I present case contexts in the form of a 
succinct overview of NEP dates and parameters. Finally, I specify how my thesis argument 
develops in steps through chapters and sections.
As my research developed I confronted a series of cascading questions. For instance, how can a 
researcher trust what drug users, officials, and professionals have said when their motives and 
loyalties seem so self-centred? How can one make sense of diverging, often antagonistic stories? 
Can one rely on expert authority and clarity of memory? Do stories contain their own validating 
signatures? In my research I gathered many received truths, none of which are completely 
trustworthy, except as its actuality of being its own story. I also took into account my memories 
and current experiences of syringes and documents as physical objects that expressed their own 
‘facticity’ through their being related to other stories.50 To outline my approach to such 
methodological questions I describe in chapters 2 and 3 how this research enrolled material objects 
(imbued with everyday meanings), as well as movements (of focused information packages), 
together with previous accounts (by professional and academic authorities). The combination of 
these elements support my argument in three crucial ways. First, the specific indexing of these 
seemingly incompatible elements will provide reviewers with an adequate number of demonstrable
instances from close to the core of the NEP case. Second, my accounting of how the direction of 
analysis and selection of source material combined to mutually influence my argument will provide
reviewers with an adequate description of my matching of goals to methods. Third, the relationship
of a knot of relationships to a wider environment over a long duration will provide reviewers with 
50. See Latour (1999c: 116-117, 120-122, 131-133).
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an adequate description of the boundaries in both time and interactional space of the NEP case. 
Chapter 2 lays out how I accessed and selected my archival and interview sources and their 
particular features. In this chapter I explain how the methods, and particularly the logics of the 
thesis, were source-attracted or emergent, not hypothesis-driven. My analytical understandings and 
directions were informed primarily by engaging with a range of embedded information sources, 
although my analytic sensitivities have been informed by wider academic contexts. My actor-
network approach is described here because it is a following rather than a conjecturing method, and
it follows sources, like any good detective.
In chapter 3, I detail the key approaches, stories, and literature that informed my analysis and 
shaped my ongoing selection of sources. Here I specify my assumptions and analytical methods, in 
consideration of the great number of different qualitative research methods that might have been 
used (Plumridge, 2000: 454). I explain how these elements appeared to me, and how they 
connected to each other, as well as how significance emerged from such inter-linkings. I outline the
way I use key terms, such as mechanism and hybridity, to refer to processes and conditions of 
network selectivity. I explain how I embed historical and actor-network methods51 within a 
narrative, linear approach, similar to building up a portrait that expresses character. 
Where do the NEP stories begin? Is there only one starting point for a definitive history? Or are 
there a number of versions of the NEP developments, all of which might become authorised? If 
these are not linearly sequenced, one after the other, how can such stories be told together? Did the 
NEP’s hybrid, organising networks smoothly co-evolve or adapt in steps to its messy environment?
Could the continuing alignment of work, actors, and environment be guaranteed? In the chapters of
the following section I address these queries by describing key details and temporal linkages.
Chapter 4 presents the responses to HIV/AIDS by fractious alliances of gay community organisers, 
Department of Health officials, and medical professionals. Driven by community organisers, this 
alliance established a principle of policy participation and service delivery by affected 
communities. By operating close to the highest levels of ministerial advice, the representatives of 
these affected communities bypassed the dominance of clinicians and their established expertise 
within the health sector. 
In chapter 5 I describe how the fractious alliances of the previous cycle of development outlined in 
chapter 4 then consolidated. This consolidation provided a partial model for assembling and 
reconfiguring a regulated pharmacy-based NEP out of the illicit activities of a handful of 
exceptional pharmacists. I follow how the crucial legislation enabling the development of the NEP 
51. The seeming simplicity of actor-network accounts can be deceptive. Yet deception can be necessary when social 
research involves a process of cheating the social rules that keep crucial information secret. The methods of critical 
research evade, dissolve, undermine, or otherwise deviate in ways which are framed as licit and worthy of funding.
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was driven into and through parliament while in linked developments, pharmacists were enrolled as
a professional body into a prospective management plan, and a contractual relationship was 
negotiated for commercial syringe supply. 
I describe in chapter 6 how the entry of IDU peer groups into the delivery of NEP services , in 
terms of two health groupings and two goals, where concepts of peer counselling were 'negotiated' 
between several proposed models. The negotiations led to the contracting of the initial peer 
outreach group as an ad-hoc measure that proliferated. 
Chapter 7 presents a case study of the failure of peer-professional hybridity in a peer group which 
collapsed and was replaced by a more professionalised peer organisation. Close examination of this
case shows how a peer-professional environmental niche, which provided opportunities for careers,
occupations, and forming organisations, has in practice been constrained in scope and scale, while 
requiring continual maintenance of its network positioning. 
How was information about the NEP’s outcomes linked to the founding concerns over IDU 
motivation and safer injecting practices? How were the syringe movements organised in terms of 
economies and management of outputs? In chapter 8, the connections between syringes, 
biomedical testing, representation, and trust are laid out. I show how IDU and officials placed peer-
professionals in a stressful, yet strategic, intermediary position of trust, producing differentials in 
stability.
I describe in chapter 9 how long-standing tensions shaped the development of regional and national
infrastructures, while simultaneously, commercial and corporate expertise offered different forms 
of professionalism from that based on health education and outreach. I describe how these two sets 
of differences stabilised the peer component of the NEP while facilitating industrial conflicts with 
the Ministry of Health over policy relating to NEP cost increases. 
An inter-chapter then presents interview excerpts, in the form of a short dialogue between two 
Christchurch peer-professionals. These illustrate and contextualise the scope of their perspectives 
on professionalisation and IDU community needs.
What can this NEP case ‘do’, and how is it uniquely intriguing? What can be learnt, and how could
one identify where such lessons might be applied elsewhere? In the chapters of the following 
section I pull back from the detail and chronological focus of the previous section. My argument in 
Chapter 10 refocuses on the NEP case as a whole, by integrating the preceding themes and 
highlighting patterns. My argument is widened and solidified by directly cross-linking a range of 
issues and stories. I show how some past events, but not others, continued to directly influence later
events by remaining present as path-dependencies or active factors in the NEP’s on-going 
capabilities.
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Chapter 11 focuses on peer-professionalism and other selected themes identified in the NEP case 
across different times and locations. These themes are grounded in, but not necessarily limited to 
the NEP case. Here my thesis of peer-professionalism is developed and delineated through a 
discussion of the positive evidence, significant absences in NEP coverage, problematic gaps in 
source material, and my critique of some alternative explanations. Peer-professionalism is 
presented as a response from, but also perhaps ‘by means of’ the NEP. Peer-professionalising is 
related to the NEP’s environment of antagonisms, as well as an extension to previous explanations 
based on a concept of partnership that too easily slides over rather than digging into the NEP case. 
In this chapter I argue for a ‘strong emergence’, where ‘peer-professional’ directions and 
tendencies observably altered the environment they emerged from, despite not being specifically 
referred to in such terms by those involved. I point out that the social history I provide in this thesis
shows that actors understood peer-professional logics and necessities. I propose that this evidence 
constitutes support for the abductive and inductive logics I employ for selecting and analysing 
information. This chapter reinforces my claim to have used a rigourous process of analysing 
demonstrable evidence according to well-founded sociological principles of practice. 
Chapter 12 is a type of coda that returns to methodological accounts, not from where the thesis 
began, nor as suited for an introduction, but from the narrative analysis used during the exploratory
process. In this Coda I indicate where useful cross connections and extensions have led from the 
initial concepts that informed the context of my understanding, to more specified forms that have 
appeared in my better understood account of the NEP. The purpose of this final chapter is to invite 
reflection on the relationships between the grounded methods of this case study and its consequent 
account (Yin, 2003: 22-24), by distinguishing where the conceptual boundaries of the research, as a
case, have been positioned and where they might lead.
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2Configuring sources
I learn through my own inhabiting of the figure of the cyborg about the non-anthropomorphic agency and
the liveliness of artifacts. The kind of sociality that joins humans and machines is a sociality that
constitutes both, so if there is some kind of liveliness going on here it is both human and non-human.
Who humans are ontologically is constituted out of that relationality.
(Birth of the Kennel: Cyborgs, dogs and companion species. Donna Haraway, 2000c:np, with shifts in
emphasies)
How is it possible to study needle exchanges, and what sort of criteria require attention? Does my 
method of analysis locate the sort of information it needs, and are my sources of information 
credible? Could the method be duplicated, or is it a unique approach made incommensurable by my
sources or analysis? Might the bits be put together differently, or is the information sufficiently 
complex in its shape that only one combination satisfies all the criteria, despite the expected gaps 
of a empirical world account? These questions are addressed in this chapter as I relate the NEP’s 
sequence of development to the records it generated. These records referred to other documents, 
objects, and people. They travelled, first circulating, then selected according to their seeming 
significance or insignificance for discarding or deposition in archives. My approach entailed 
following these documents and thereby following the practices of people and the movements of 
things. I also followed changes in legislation, organisational boundaries, professional jurisdictions, 
and in logical rationales. My goal was to better understand a particular nodal cluster, or case, 
within this environment by overcoming or working around the difficulties of too much, too 
complex, and too little information. In this chapter I lay out the strategies I used, explain the 
criteria applied in selecting material, and invite positive critique.
I ‘followed’ the movements and linkages where different ‘informational objects’ intermeshed with 
logics, goals, legitimations, and other stories52 as I developed a portrait53 of the configurations of 
the NEP case. My method discriminated between the arguments, analysis, accounts, approaches, 
and the stories that I used. Since the stories about the NEP and its contexts were fewer than I 
desired, yet ramified into wider policy contexts and embodied environments, I wanted as much 
information as possible, but could only deal with the most relevant and directly involved meanings.
Accordingly, I applied a general criterion of tracing the stories that were indicated as relevant by 
their connections, for instance in the same documents, or archival filing category, or by the naming 
of actors and key objects. These story networks identified intensities and gaps in meaning that 
addressed my logical and tactical difficulties in configuring and signifying information.
52. I link theories about the social stories of governance structures and institutional logics (Campbell, 2004: 57-61), 
Büthe (2002), and Scott et al. (2000) with written sources, interview statements, and participant observation. 
53. Portraiture blends aesthetics and empiricism to reveal the activity, complexity, and details that shape processes of 
organising. The methods articulate literary logics with cultural sensibilities, and scientific rigor to produce ‘an 
intrinsic work’ (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Hoffmann Davis, 1997).
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In my first section I describe my actual methods and sources. The research was source-led, in that 
the degree of relevance was indicated by the network linkage among objects and stories. In the 
following section I describe actor-network approaches used to address the research problem of 
selecting sources for information. The ‘causal’ events and effects I will describe were pervasive 
and distributed, in fact better described as conditional. As such, their analysis did not rely on 
sources being specifically categorised within a prior theoretical framework that determined their 
selection. In the third section I describe how my actor-network approach involved following what 
the case situation offered, while assuming a stance of general, even-handed symmetry regarding 
my reasons for selecting and methods of evaluating the stories of actors. 
1   Documents, conversations, and sense-making
Three significant factors influenced my criteria for source material. The first was the significance54 
and coherence of published material as available to people when making decisions at the time.55 
Another factor was the re-conceptualisation of the case questions and the significance of details in 
response to emerging patterns of meaning and explanation from a researcher’s later perspective. A 
third factor involved my evaluation of the degree of selection bias caused by difficulties of access 
and the preservation of source materials. Since this was exploratory research I did not attempt to 
preselect or randomly sample documents and interview participants. Instead I used a process of 
following the articulations and mechanisms56 of the case, working practically with what materials 
could be made accessible, sensitised by the logics of systems of knowledge production.
I prioritised documents over interview sources for reasons that emerged during the research 
process. I had initially considered that interview-based analysis could be useful. Accordingly, I 
prepared an unstructured interview information sheet, formulated an interview protocol considered 
suitable57 for working with illicit members of marginalised groups, and applied successfully for 
Human Ethics Committee approval. As it eventuated, I did not rely heavily on interview methods 
and did not use questionnaires at all. The different types of participants, the very low number of 
key decision-makers, the unfamiliarity of most IDU clients with NEP history, and the then 
unknown areas of particular significance, all argued strongly against questionnaire methods. My 
few key interviews fleshed out and otherwise supported a reliance on documented accounts. This 
54. I searched the records for mentions of where chance events, such as personal biography and historical ‘accidents’ 
affected the ‘good fit’ between options and goals.
55. Every source has been considered to contain systemic evaluation frameworks, and implicit or explicit theorising, 
which have informed the research. 
56. Such concepts of articulation and mechanism are described by Deleuze & Guattari (2004), and appear in some actor-
network ways of looking, as if from inside, along the components of a mechanism being studied. I was not focused 
on this stream of writing when I began the research, but upon conceiving of a hybrid mechanism I looked for 
previous theorisations of mechanisms. However, I do not go so deeply into articulation and ‘folding’ as Deleuze & 
Guattari, since I reduce my theory to the minimum needed for the case of the NEP within my available resources.
57. By people not participating in illicit drug markets and not publicly supportive of the illicit aims of IDU.
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choice emphasised the logics and potential shifts in significance involved in analysing the writing 
and preservation of documents, as compared with engaging with ‘subjects’ and their remembrances
in face-to-face interviews. I recorded and personally transcribed the interviews. Most of those 
selected for interviewing spoke in their capacities as representatives of organisations. However, I 
also heard disclosures that could not be used in this thesis.58 
I found myself unwilling to try to overcome the distrust of surveillance by IDU. I myself strongly 
empathised with this distrust as being necessary for survival as an IDU. Nonetheless, since the 
period when I lived and socialised with IDU was a decade past, I would have needed to take an 
overly intrusive approach to access and motivate enough participants for a primarily interview-
based research method. This difficulty helped me identify the importance to the NEP of the 
physical presence of practicing IDU peers who could engage with IDU clients within the 
parameters and understood codes of mutual respect, yet in a neutral, mutually beneficial encounter. 
Asking illicit people to acknowledge an official research questionnaire and ethics document falls 
outside the parameters of everyday normality, and risks chilling relationships. It can increase the 
risk of introducing extra biases to a research situation. If using an ethnographic approach of 
maximising immersion and minimising experimental interventions, I consider that such research 
would need to be based at an operating needle exchange in order to compensate for any 
reinforcement of outsider labels and distrust. Yet interviews based at exchange outlets would, 
unless spread over the country for a short time at each exchange, unduly prioritise the perspectives 
of that peer outlet over others in different regions. I acknowledge such a bias in my personal 
background and wished to reduce rather than increase this potential distortion.
I did not wish to organise a national interview programme, irksome to all the administrators 
involved, without having first explored the archival records and found key themes so that the time 
investment of all those contributing would be most readily justified. Furthermore, I doubted that 
the clients attending and the peers working in exchanges would be, for the most part, any more 
informed about the founding of the NEP and developments in the policy frameworks than I had 
been when living and working in that world. 
I wanted to know how IDU perceived the NEP, whether any concept of changing motivations was 
involved, and how the possibility of changing motivations was framed, if at all. These perceptions 
related to some of the founding goals of the medical professionals who, rather reluctantly, agreed to
support the initial NEP concept. However, such questions and evaluation raised the problems of 
comparison and meanings, extremely difficult to engage with in a short time frame with no 
autobiographical texts by IDU to effectively extend the time and depth of reflexivity. Instead I 
58. Except for indicating areas to look into, and in reminding me of my personal experiences which have not required 
ethics committee approval.
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relied in part on my memory of discussing such issues when working at CIVDURG, and in part on 
reports, notes, and draft policy documents from the peer exchange archives.This range of material 
was sufficient to show how IDU generally perceived the NEP, and how peers viewed IDU and the 
NEP, but was not sufficient for a detailed, localised analysis of how such perceptions had changed 
and what the various actors felt about such changes. This range of material was only adequate in 
the single case of CIVDURG, which I present in chapter 7. Nonetheless, the outcomes of such local
developments could be observed at a nation-wide and a programme-wide scale of activity by 
means of documented reports and records of meetings.
People also forget the intricacy of details over time. This was brought home when I realised that 
my own memories at times skipped matters in documents that I myself had authored fourteen years
past when working at CIVDURG. I realised how I, as an actor, constructed my preferred history of 
remembrances in light of later situations. I could only assume that others, contributing to accounts 
and histories, could be similarly constructive. It seemed useful, therefore, to first conduct a 
document-based chronological analysis, and only then 'flesh it out' with remembrances through 
interviews, unless it became convenient or there appeared no other options than to interview a large
number of people who were involved in the formation of the NEP.
In 2003 I requested documents relevant to the development of the NEP from the Ministry of Health
under the Official Information Act. I was sent the Ministry’s complete file, covering a period from 
1986 to 2003, with only several missing pages and names blacked-out. Yet as I later confirmed, 
this was not the complete set of documentary material. At least one crucial report was held ‘off-
file’, due to having been commissioned by the Ministry from the ESR, a private Crown Enterprise, 
and accordingly treated as private rather than public information. When I discovered that this report
had been produced, and requested it by name, it was duly sent to me but only after the permission 
of the authors had been obtained, showing that it is not a public document of a type that can be 
searched for in a public database. This episode illustrates how many more such documents could 
exist without a researcher necessarily being aware from general catalogue searches. The strength of
a ‘following’ rather than a ‘scanning’ method of accessing records is clearly evident given such 
situations and the general interests of gatekeepers in maintaining their role by preventing easy 
public access.
I also received permission from the Ministry to access files relating to HIV/AIDS that had been 
deposited in the National Archives in 1993 by the previous Department of Health. I visited the 
National Archives and copied all documents referring to HIV/AIDS, needle exchanges, several 
AIDS TaskForces, and any other organisation shown in a rapid initial reading to have been 
connected with these subjects. I collected copies of several thousand documents, the exact number 
becoming meaningless after the first thousand. These document sources established what official 
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decision-makers would ‘know’ and find more credible as coming from their own authoritative files 
and official archives. 
The archives of the Dunedin Intravenous Organisation (DIVO) from 1988 to 1995 were made 
accessible by its management. I had full access to the defunct Christchurch Intravenous Drug 
User's Resource Group (CIVDURG) archive. All the functioning peer groups had offered their 
resources to assist the research at the NENZ AGM in 2003. I was unable to take up most of these 
offers, though I hope to continue exploring regional variations in the peer group histories. 
CIVDURG and DIVO have been somewhat comparable in both being located in the South Island, 
equivalently distant from the North Island where New Zealand’s political centre in Wellington and 
the commercial centre in Auckland are found. Apart from the strong differences between each peer 
exchange, drug injecting patterns in the North Island can differ from those in the South Island. For 
instance, at the time of research, premixed liquid opiates were commonly sold in the North Island, 
but never in the South Island. Yet there are significantly different expressions and perceptions of 
IDU community between Christchurch and Dunedin, despite high mobility and frequent visiting. 
Neither a single site, nor a national average, capture such differences in IDU ethos and market 
logics. 
CIVDURG and DIVO were better known to me and their archives more convenient to physically 
access. Other South Island peer exchanges, for instance in Nelson59 and Timaru, were established 
many years later, and therefore could not inform the founding NEP period except through their 
absence. After I gathered a research subset of archival documents I studied documentary material 
from this convenience sample of founding peer groups, I read accounts published by those who 
were indicated as having made key initial decisions.60 I then contacted other key decisionmakers. I 
continued to search for missing records by trying to locate the documents cited in those I had 
obtained. It seemed more effective and rapid to maximise my options by primarily focusing on 
resources that didn't need to be negotiated with, nor transcribed, nor had internal shifts in 
perspectives and interests once having been published.
Qualitative methods are notorious for producing unmanageable amounts of information. The actual
documents and copies were chronologically ordered in filing cabinets. The references to these 
documents, along with the information from documents and interviews, were chronologically 
organised61 in a computer database.62 The virtual files were then thematically keyworded according 
59. Unlike any other peer exchange, the Nelson exchange periodically goes into recess, then reforms, indicating a 
particular ambivalence in Nelson’s cultural environment.
60. Because policy was strongly top-down, most officials had no significant decisionmaking options. The NEP operated
during the early 1990s with very few official changes. I did not pursue later officials or politicians because of their 
greater interests in presenting a party line or defending personal records. I consider that decades need to pass before 
this problem of bias reduces to manageable levels, and by then memories seem less reliable. 
61. I periodically reread the hard copy files looking for assumptions and absences in the link to the virtual files, since I 
was not exposed to these in chronological sequence, which means that later information established the conditions 
of understanding of chronologically earlier information.
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to the internal referents and the connections that emerged from attempted explanations in memo 
writing. As gaps appeared in chronologies and thematic paradoxes emerged, they became 
expressed as research questions. For example, one key question involved the significance of a 
nation-wide strike that the peer groups of the NEP threatened in 2001. I did not know about this 
strike until I found it mentioned in the Ministry Archive. This incident led me to search the 
available records more closely for information about the degree and maintenance of regional 
cohesion, and the expectations held about input into policy among the peer groups.63 Other 
information emerged from the ease or difficulties of access to such unpublicised, discrete 
material.64
I attempted to capture as much cross-connectivity as possible by minimising any losses of 
information due to filtering and selection. The computer file was cross-referenced by means of 
substantial and thematic keywords. These keywords were my initial method for exploring and 
recording themes. As an analytical device, keywords work by trading-off between categorical 
accuracy and the convenience of minimising cross-references. Keywords captured all of the 
references, prioritised characteristics that appeared more frequently in the material, while drawing 
attention to what seemed unique or otherwise puzzling.
Each document reference in my database was also annotated with a brief memo with my immediate
notes on this source. The content of these memos were not overwritten. Instead they were added to 
in separate sections whenever the source documents were reread. I regularly searched in depth for 
material relating to particular periods that had emerged as problematic or suddenly meaningful in 
some way. At other times I looked for patterns in work-lists of references I created from database 
searches on particular names and keyword combinations. 
My keywords were initially taken from the title and abstracts or other self-descriptions found in 
documents. These keywords were elaborated as I read and reflected on the contents, environment, 
and ownership of the document at the time of its generation and when I sourced it in an archive. 
The keywords associated the documents by means of the names of people, agencies, countries, 
objects, programmes, principles, groups, and themes. The names acted as categories, or sets, 
including sets of only one element.65 I used this array of information to generate descriptive 
62. Microsoft operating systems and applications were not used, since confidential archival material was included in the
file. I used a Macintosh laptop computer system. The writing applications were first Nisus under OS9, then Mellel 
under the OSX operating system. The references and keyword database was initially Papyrus, then Bookends.
63. The legal independence of the peer groups as individual corporate entities alongside the contrasting illegality of IDU
emerged as a crucial factor that informed later tactics of proposing regional administrative blocs. This factor also 
promoted the mutual interdependence of the peer groups which led to a national federation instead of a reticulation 
of geographical territory within a hierarchical, top-down, funding-addicted system. 
64. For instance, some is only accessible to qualified researchers, not ‘lay’ IDU, whereas peer-professionals are 
generally too busy to gather and analyse historical documents. Neither State agencies, nor peer group Trust Boards, 
have employed peer-professionals as archivists or researchers in any capacity.
65. For a discussion of relationships between mathematical set theory and ontology, with reference to social sciences, 
arts and religion, see Badiou, 2007: 23-48, and in general.
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explanations through the logics and processes of writing. Such narratives attempted to produce 
precise accounts that combined descriptions of objects, incidents, events, and concepts in a 
provisional analysis of the NEP. These attempts increasingly required clearer specification of 
boundaries and causative mechanisms to emerge from the sequential event structure.66
The key themes, connections, and processes that emerged were extended by questioning the 
constituents, consequences and significance of each. I wanted to explore the potential implications 
of alternative decisionmaking, alongside potential differences in significance due to location, and 
changes in significance over time. I accumulated information and located it in a chronology, 
aggregated the information by theme, and selected particular recorded occurrences as being 
demonstrably characteristic or causative. I retold67 large amounts of sequential information as event
sequences that were wider, longer, deeper, more meaningful, more relevant, more graspable yet 
retained their solid actuality. Such questioning and positing of causes identified key constituents, 
including turning-points,68 social structures, individuals, lines of division, and lines of connection. 
This method required more engagement and reflective work than a pre-defined study, yet improved
the scope and relevance of the analysis, gave greater confidence that gaps in the source material 
had been identified, and enabled the redirection of analysis 'in mid-flight'. These techniques 
usefully addressed the unpredictabilities of case research, where explanations that describe 
boundary conditions (Ragin, 1992: 5) must frequently rely on identifying patterns within and 
between the contingent aspects of unique, unpredictable occurrences.69 Nonetheless, such 
occurrences are time-bound, and path-dependent, while also embedded as on-going opportunities 
and constraints in local networks (Tilly, 1997b: 45).
A known problem of interviews involves a desire by participants to protect the reputation of a 
programme they care about. When a programme is lauded, with reason, as spectacularly successful,
then conflicts, failings and ambiguities become smoothed over to enhance the achievements and 
defend ‘mistakes’ (Altman, 1994).70 Lichtenstein (1996: 444-448) offers a pertinent discussion of 
the difficulties of interview-based research on New Zealand policy communities due to the interests
of officials in not remembering certain things. I have used Lichtenstein’s material to complement 
my own documentary material. However, the documented role and goals of Dr. Meech, the Chair 
of the AIDS Advisory Committee, and later the Medical and Scientific Committee on AIDS, 
66. See Büthe (2002: 487-490), Griffin & Korstad (1998).
67. This retelling is not reduction, more the opposite. Retelling enables a complex and long actuality to be grasped 
parsimoniously without losing the scope, grounding, consequences and ethics. But only if done with craft and art.
68. Most crucial were the health sector restructuring that exacerbated the difficulties of central monitoring and strategic 
development, the shift from entrepreneurial to managerial leadership of peer groups (seen in the collapse and 
replacement of the Christchurch peer exchange in 1994-95), the withdrawal of many pharmacists in the early 1990s, 
the consolidation and commercial enterprise of Needle Exchange New Zealand from 1994, and a threatened strike 
by peer groups in 2001.
69. See Sewell (1996: 247, 272), Abbott (1992b: 68).
70. Dangers: “of over-romanticizing the achievements of grassroots organizations, of accepting the triumphalist rhetoric
which many organizations use about themselves ... to increase support and win political clout" (Altman, 1994: 167).
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problematises Lichtenstein’s account of the official aspects of the NEP developments 
(Lichtenstein, 1996: 421). This illustrates some difficulties of relying on interviews, especially with
small numbers of decision-makers who have a strong institutionalised rationale to valorise previous
policy shifts. Such valorisation tends to downplay the conflicts and uncertainties of the time, and 
diverts attention from the arguments of their opponents at the time. Consequently, I placed more 
confidence in accounts that included a degree of uncertainty and a range of perspectives.
The small size of New Zealand provides motives for policy and administrative elites to become 
more dependent, in terms of careers and socialising, on the good opinion of their peers than would 
seem the case in a larger society.71 This is why it was pointless for me to ask interview participants 
if they held a prior agenda for creating a needle exchange, let alone a peer-based form of an 
exchange system, or other interests. I assumed there may have been unmentioned interests, but not 
necessarily so in the case of any particular official. Nor did I assume that any collective interests of 
officials would be recorded in formal records, or that policy would not have been made by the 
administrative decisions of mid-level officials outside of recorded directives and frameworks.72 I 
was reluctant to rely only on insider accounts by policy-makers to explain how the NEP gained 
approval and status for an aspect of illicit activity. Instead I developed a more emergent, more 
widely explanatory account by prioritising written records with their greater scope, timeliness, and 
inclusivity. 
Despite assuming the existence of distortions, researchers must explore the official records, since 
that record is expected by most participants to be accurate, is used as such in many everyday 
activities as well as legal conflicts in court, and accordingly enjoys both expert status and 
pragmatic acknowledgement, whether precise or not. I considered archival research to be 
appropriate, effective, and efficient provided that sufficient records from an adequate range of 
actors became available. Archival research also minimised the significant methodological problems
of protecting researchers and participants when studying social ties that are illicit or otherwise 
secretive and stigmatised.73
71. For instance, Redmer Yska’s book on Wellington history (Yska, 2006) describes an official cabal, designated ‘The 
Order of the Rabbit’, sworn to self-interest at the expense of Councillors, loyal civil servants, and the public. After 
media publicity these rabbits ran for cover, unfortunately escaping extermination.
72. See, in general, various translations of Max Weber’s original work on rational types and bureaucracies, (i.e. Weber 
(1947)), and its later complexifying by Lipsky (1980) and Giller & Morris (1981). The latter authors demonstrate 
how, in the US and UK respectively, low and mid-level officials in bureaucracies make policy and alter bureaucratic 
rule-books through their daily interaction with clients and non-officials. See also Merton (1957), Marx (1957), 
Hasenfeld & Steinmetz (1981), Smith (1981), Brown (1981), Zimmerman (1971), Hughes (1958). A careful 
summary produced in the mid-1980s, at the time of the AIDS Support Network (ASN) and AIDS TaskForce 
activities, is found in Ham & Hill (1984). These authors inform a long-standing debate on whether policy change is 
better understood as incremental and adaptive, or rational and either predicatable or enforceable as a rigid model. 
These authors generally reject a simple typological framework, preferring to emphasise the ambiguous and 
changeable aspects, and so promote research through case studies, yet do not deny that institutions and rule-books 
act as powerful social forces.
73. See also, for instance, Fitzgerald & Hamilton (1997), Fitzgerald (1996), Broadhead & Heckathorn, (1994), Friedman
(1993), Griffiths, Gossop, Powis & Strang (1993), Power & Harkinson (1993), Sterk-Elifsen (1993), Grund, 
Blanken, Adriaans, Kaplan, Barendregt & Meeuwsen (1992).
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I assumed that peer-reviewed information and accounts, or those sourced from state agencies, were 
generally precise, due to the costs of being caught behaving unprofessionally, or of deceiving those
in relation to whom one has long-term dependencies, such as peers or voters. However, such 
accuracy could mislead if critical aspects of the criteria for measuring and reporting74 were left out 
of the documented material.75 I suggest that policy analysis is safest if treated as a game, certainly 
with rules, but also with rule-bending, and the likelihood of cheating.76 Yet much social research 
can be characterised as cheating, since it ‘wins’ knowledge by circumventing legitimate systems 
that, formally or informally, keep information hidden.
From a rationalist perspective, the utility of a document lies in the degree to which it minimises or 
highlights gaps in knowledge. A document is an adjunct to knowledge.77 From institutional 
perspectives, documents are so pervasive in organisations that they are apparently fundamental to 
its workings (Harper, 1997). Accordingly, documents as a 'technological system of living' might 
provide fundamental information about governance patterns, logics, and temporalities (Lash, 2001: 
107-116). When I was working in the NEP I observed and participated in the production of many 
documents. I see more clearly now that they caused effects and were valued due to their activity as 
technological, mass-produced physical objects that travelled. I also see that these documents were 
formed in part through path-dependent bricolage78 from that which was available as resource 
material, including understandings and goals, in their local environment. 
Documents can explain aspects of developments through their going from and to certain places and
people, but not others, in patterns of circulation (Campbell, 2004: 70-71). I read official documents 
in archives that peer-professionals actors working in the NEP at the time could not access, 
indicating how documents mediate trust and distrust (Campbell, 2004: 75-76). In Latour's 
terminology, these documents were ‘immutable mobiles’, since they 'locked-in' and consolidated 
meaning in a centralising way, yet also multiplied and allowed control at a distance in mobile ways
(Latour, 1990: 44-45). The NEP documents show how the authors and the actors participating in 
various types of stories were “able to make sense in the world” (Harper, 1997: 38), and thus 
embody social structures through a somatic sense of cultural boundaries (Bourdieu, 2004, 1991, 
74. For instance, New Zealand police have planted evidence, as in the Arthur Allen Thomas case, attempted to obstruct 
or defeat the course of justice in the Dewar case (Kitchin, 2007: A1), and invented fictitious assaults on themselves, 
as in in the 1996 Brent Garner ‘Executioner’ case (Christchurch Press, 2003: A8). New Zealand Immigration 
Department officials have been exposed for using e-mail to coordinate ‘lying in unison’. The records such officials 
produce cannot be assumed to be complete or precise, and may be intended to mislead. 
75. In at least one case in drug policy history in North America, deliberate deception has been reported (Courtwright, 
1982: 119-123). See also Lichtenstein (1996: 446) on the attitudes of New Zealand officials.
76. The likelihood of cheating is, after all, why rules are made. Within law and custom, what is proscribed is what is 
feared to be likely because it is desirable, not what is considered never to be a problem.
77. Documents provided self-description and contextual references to their physical circulation, including authorship, 
organisational affiliation, place of generation, destination, copies, and degree of privacy. Documents also provided 
narrative information about how the author expected to be understood, in relation to the problems that had caused a 
particular document to be generated, and kept.
78. Ad-hoc assemblage from a diverse range of constituents that were not deliberately planned and gathered, but instead
are available due merely to chance. See Mackenzie (2003), Law (1987), Levi-Strauss (1966: 17-36).
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1977).79 My analysis does not treat documents as merely referring to information. Documents also 
embodied information in their textual and other structure, and in their movements that delineated 
links of communication, or if not, boundaries that limited communication.
Since the circulation of documents and sense-making can only be partial, not covering all places 
and people, every document is understood by those using them as partial and multiple, to varying 
degrees. Yet at the same time, people effectively use these documents to reduce the number of 
available ways of making sense (Latour, 1990), which helps to reduce their fundamental 
uncertainty when sense-making in a complex world. This is, after all, why documents are 
accumulated and archived in mutually supportive files. Any single document is dense with doubt, 
but I have also found surprising gaps in official archives. Some gaps are inherently authorial, since 
many perspectives and interests may not be recorded, due to the purposes that the document was 
intended to address, but which the document may not necessarily clarify. Other gaps can derive 
from the processes, technologies, and protocols of record-making. Further gaps may arise from 
how organisations selectively archived documents through both policy and chance. For instance, 
the National Archive’s collection of the minutes of the National Council on AIDS does not include 
some papers recorded in minutes as tabled at meetings. Furthermore, its holdings end at 1991, yet 
the National Council on AIDS existed until 1993.80 
Reviews of the NEP over the period of the New Zealand health sector reconfiguration81 have also 
found gaps in the centralised record-keeping, where this existed.82 This systems failure has reduced 
the available documentary evidence; yet has also usefully illustrated the minimised, low-record, 
low-competency official environment in which peer-run exchanges developed their own 
'professional competencies'. Neither state agency official nor peer NEP administrator could fully 
trust the latest documents, because the generation of documents was designed to plug or cover 
known gaps, while the documented information would contain unknown gaps due to selection and 
misadventure. In the research here I am assuming that known gaps are not critical. Yet I have borne
in mind that certain records may be less informative because some contents or related documents or
contexts are absent. This might come about if the document was the only surviving remnants of a 
series of documents that formed a 'sequential text'. Despite such provisos, I consider that the 
documentation I found forms a reasonably self-referencing 'whole', adequate for my approach.
I have not used a sampling method for gathering those documents and other accounts which linked 
79. Bourdieu’s projects overlap with Latour’s, but in a competitive way. See Bourdieu (2004: 29).
80. National Archive staff could offer no explanation or other location for the missing minutes, as at June 2005.
81. During this period, community organisations were forced to devote their resources to generating funding 
applications in a competitive environment; managing the documentation of employees who had been volunteers 
before the passing of the Employment Contracts Act (1988); and producing reams of reports on the outputs 
designated in funding contracts. However, little centralised analysis of community programme outcomes were 
evidenced at all (MacGibbon, 2002: 20-22, Lichtenstein, 1996: 416-419), let alone made available to community 
groups to facilitate their effectiveness and efficiency.
82. See Aitken (2002: 38-39), Fitzgerald (1995: 1, 12), Walzl (1994: 41, 44-46, 50-51).
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to the NEP and HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C. Instead I have attempted to follow, gather, and engage 
with all the relevant source material, while acknowledging the limits on my resources and the 
contingencies83 in the preservation or availability of my material. Although I have attempted to 
work symmetrically ‘even-handedly in the middle of things’, my ‘following’ methodology has led 
to greater access to documents than to off-the-record discussions with key participants.This means 
that undocumented influences, internal or external to New Zealand, could be under-represented in 
this analysis. Nonetheless, I am not inclined to attribute causes to covert influences unless in a 
situation involving only a few key decisionmakers, and where the attribution is corroborated by an 
intersecting range of sources. Unless putative secret influences can be brought into the public 
domain, for instance by being widely believed in and thereby causing overt, observable changes, 
they do not belong in a ‘social’ history. These aspects are murky,84 yet I have attempted to cut 
through this fog by privileging the perspectives of participants on the ground and in the middle of 
things. Such research, and possible distortions, would have been unknown, or a standard 
background, to the IDU and NEP peer-professionals when they actually made their policy 
decisions. Having considered such uncertainties over the content and secrecy of information, I 
argue that the more forceful strands of the needle exchange developments have been echoed within 
this text through my presentation of a meaningful set of overlapping cycles, or folds, together with 
structural descriptions of the shapes of mechanisms. 
My approach has been to first understand the local elements and environments before attempting 
comparisons. However, I accept that comparative analysis, while unlikely to be so deep and 
engaged within the available resources, could provide different perspectives, emphases, and 
models. For ‘straight’ policy analysis, incorporating an underlying assumption of essential 
similarities between different societies, comparison may be preferred, despite a tendency towards 
accepting ‘top-down’ information sources and perspectives. Yet for an actualist evidence-based 
social history, and for an exploratory rather than implementational or hypothesis testing goal, my 
technique seems adequate within my timeframe and resources. The criterion for this accounting for 
the force of the forms of repetitive sequences and structures lies in whether continuing research 
finds different key themes, forms, or forces to be more explanatory, or more precise. My account of
this material on the substantive developments of the NEP is laid out in the following chapters.
83. I treat contingencies as discontinuous things that cannot be avoided, whereas structures are constructed and 
connected, whether intentionally or unintentionally. The eruptive urgency of HIV/AIDS and HCV is contingent.
84. The situation is further complicated by government interference in scientific research. For instance, the United 
States government is reported to have systematically distorted climate studies. Given the fundamentalist promotion 
of a war on drugs by the same government, I would not accept at face value any research originating from the 
United States, or from dependent nations or from compromised organisations such as the United Nations and the 
World Health Organisation. The difficulty in adapting this precautionary approach lies in the ambiguities over the 
relationships between New Zealand and United States governments. New Zealand is a military ally of the United 
States (Hager, 1996, 1995) yet New Zealand has also defied United States policy over nuclear ship visits.
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2   Actor-network Approaches
In 2002 a quantitative comparison with equivalent Australian programmes reported that the NEP 
was “effective and efficient” (Aitken, 2002: 7). But in the late 1990s a sudden upsurge in New 
Zealand’s amphetamine use towards Australian levels had created a potential for injection to 
supplement smoking as a normal route of administration, as in Australia (Long, 2003: 2-3; Aitken, 
2002: 21). If the numbers of IDU or frequency of injection increased, given that stimulants tend to 
be injected more frequently than opioids, the NEP would require extra resources to maintain its 
coverage and levels of service. Because the NEP’s initial user-pays funding structure was 
supplemented by a government funded, free one-for-one exchange system in 2004, increases in 
injecting drug use entail significant increases in politically sensitive public expenditure. The 
mechanisms and network effects of this situation illustrate a type of narrative logic that both 
contextualises and explains through description, for instance in showing how stories can inform 
policy consideration. Such stories can also explain relationships between events and effects in ways
that include rather than exclude human agency, alongside the activity of objects.
When reading the archival records closely I noted how the medical professionals who offered 
advice on the prospective NEP frequently explained the social non-compliance of IDU in terms of 
a 'natural' biomedical problem of physiological and psychological addiction. Yet later medical 
professionals also explained the physiological 'natural' harms of HCV transmission amongst those 
imprisoned for drug offences, in prison sites where drugs were injected. The medical professionals 
did not explain this transmission as being physically and physiologically caused and similarly 
preventable. Instead, their explanation was framed in terms of the social responses by enforcement 
authorities to the inmates’ non-compliance with drug laws. The prevention of disease transmission 
was implied to be social, inasmuch as inmates who obeyed the law would not spread or contract 
HCV. Categories of 'nature' and 'social' were at times used to explain each other, in a way that 
evaded analysis of the network activity from which their mechanism emerged in accounts (Latour, 
1999a, 1999b, 1993). This tactic highlighted the logics used in accounts to frame the status and 
meaningfulness of narratives.85 
The NEP participants experienced narratives as attaching to, permeating and enscribing objects in 
the process of arranging, making meaningful, and responding to the construction and movements of
such objects. Objects, accordingly, told stories, and those stories informed my search for further 
information and the meaning of incidents. In seeking stories about stigma it happened that 
85. Latour (1993) discusses the 'purification' of a messy reality into categories of 'nature' and 'social' which are deployed
in a generally circular mechanism to explain and control the other. Emily Martin has critiqued such explanations of 
human-non-human interactions for being universalising in a manner which creates a privileged authorial voice 
which carries a privileged model of ‘normal’ social interactions, but in a disguised method (Martin, 1995). See 
Swyngedouw (2006), who follows Zitouni (2004), for further unfavourable (but less persuasive) comparisons of 
Latour to Haraway.
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commercial discussions over the importing of syringes made more meaningful connections than 
surveys of the educational qualifications of IDU in treatment. Syringes, NEP workers, community 
magazines, drugs, and official documents were observed to engage with IDU in 'motivational 
counselling', and ‘information gathering interviews’. 
Appadurai argues convincingly that: “commodities, like people, have social lives” (1986: 3) and 
“circulate in different regimes of value in space and time [instead of being] inert and mute, set in 
motion and animated, where knowable, only by persons and their words” (1986: 4). According to 
Appadurai, this latter perspective: 
does not illuminate the concrete, historical circulation of things. For that we have to follow the 
things themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in their forms, their uses, their trajectories. 
It is only through the analysis of these trajectories that we can interpret the human transactions 
and calculations that enliven things. Thus, even though from a theoretical point of view human 
actors encode things with significance, from a methodological point of view it is the things-in-
motion that illuminate their human and social context.   (1986: 5)
My actor-network method involved ‘following’ people, texts, codified moralities, money, viruses, 
technologies, syringes, and drugs. As I followed these actants, I paid attention to their ‘shifts and 
translations’ between sites of activity, especially the activity of preventing change. I noted how 
narrative objects were build up and out from such movements and connections. Actor-networks can
include hybrid linkages of heterogeneous constituents, and are sensitive to stabilising effects 
created by circulating objects (Latour, 1999c: 71-74, 80, 98-112). From actor-network 
perspectives, objects, substances, and surfaces come from relational effects of the processes and 
trials of control, but are not essential entities ‘in their own right’. These relational effects are 
without blame but are intensely political in being all about control. Such activity is followed more 
than defined, or sampled, or statistically represented and measured. This is because the most 
significant influences may be ambiguous, or dis-similar, or work through forms of contact rather 
than amounts and numbers. Because objects, such as syringes and packets of information, moved 
between sites, as if following or drawing a line, difficulties could be modelled as boundaries that 
crossed such lines of desired action. The difficulties could be grouped, since they derived from 
institutions, or from the interests of sets of actors, or were otherwise patterned. Since these 
difficulties were expected, the work required to overcome them was also expected, and was 
conceptually framed as such in the circulation of objects and communicative processes of 
translation I observed in the NEP.
Actor-network accounts typically follow the circulations of physical objects, and often identify 
stages of translations of meaning, for instance in policy documentation. The actor-network 
approach uses a 'minimalising'86 methodology that is positive and interpretative, combining realist 
86. Actor-network minimises through parsimony in accounts and explanations, not by simplifying complex 
arrangements or emergent phenomena.
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and relativist aspects. The methods and explanations follow how objects move, or not, and object 
boundaries are stabilised, or not, in networked, rhizomal locales (Murdoch 1995: 747). These 
rhizomal environments of entangled links produce clearly observed activity and the solidity of 
object effects, yet the extended and complex enthreaded paths also produce uncertainty in the 
outcomes, categories and understandings.
Actor-network approaches differ from other types of analytical positivism by directly observing the
emergence of solid effects within complex, messy systems.87 In actor-network approaches, solidity 
and surfaces are not essential properties and not necessarily simple. Such approaches can achieve 
an openness to the unexpected, to the uncategorised, and to the counter-intuitive by restricting 
explanation as much as possible to close observation of what can actually be observed and 
interacted with. I used an actor-network88 approach to my selection of sources, and was informed 
by actor-network sensitivities, along with related ethnographic immersion in the area of study, 
when configuring the resulting items and patterns of information.
Bruno Latour’s actor-network approach promotes a general assumption of ‘symmetry’ prior to 
observation and analysis. Such symmetry is intended to destabilise the division of reality into 
categories of  'nature' and 'social' worlds, with different types of explanations whereby each, in its 
own field, assumes priority over the other. Latour’s actor-network analyses do not accept such 
prior division into ‘natural or social’ except as a process of construction and normalisation. He 
problematises a sociology where ‘the social’ is privileged over ‘the natural’, or vice-versa. For one 
thing, such biases encourage an overlooking of the significance of material objects in how people 
live in and make sense in terms of a material world of substance, surfaces, and shape. For another, 
people seem more easily abused when labelled as ‘natural’ recipients of exploitative strategies. I 
considered that the stand-point of ‘general symmetry’ was suited to research with marginalised 
practices and people, such as IDU, whose stigma is intimately related to their use of restricted 
technologies involving forbidden substances. Such symmetry helped in empathising with the 
difficulties IDU needed to deal with, alongside the problems of reproducing from an assumed 
perspective of a virus, and gave greater confidence that stigmatised sources of information were not
excluded by my research methodology becoming infected with a law enforcement agenda.
87. This contrasts with conventional positivisms that often rely on the reduction of complex systems into postulated 
causal essential elements and the prediction of determined events through postulated causal structures.
88. For actor-network style studies in networks of cyborg and object hybridity, often utilising case studies that follow or
'interview' objects, see Giere & Moffatt (2003), Haraway (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 1997, 1991a, 1991b), Law (2004: 
68-69, 151, 158), Lash (2001), Gomart & Hennion (1999), Bowker & Leigh Star (1999), Leigh Star & Griesemer 
(1989), Preda (1999), Harper (1997), Knorr Cetina (1997), Murdoch (1995), Rosen (1993), Law (2002, 1987), 
Callon (1999, 1991), Callon, Larédo, & Mustar (1997), Berg (2004), Latour (2004, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1996, 
1993, 1990, 1988, 1987), Gomart (2002a, 2002b), Pickering (1991). For a linking of my actor-network type 
approach to my historical approach, see Valentine (2007). For actor-network approaches related to health, see 
Valentine (2007), Lehenkari (2003), Mol; (2002, 1998), Dugdale (1999), Moser & Law (1999), Willems (1998), 
Latour (1988). For actor-network linkings to institutional and boundary analyses in general, see Todeva (2001), 
Dellbridge (2003), Leigh Star & Griesemer (1989). For actor-network applications in New Zealand contexts see 
Doolin (2001), Doolin & Lowe (2001), Lowe & Roper (1997), Thom (2004, 2002).
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In this thesis I am presenting a single approach, involving linked methods, for explaining both the 
well-delineated and the ambiguous aspects that contribute significant activity to the NEP case. My 
account draws on the surface ‘fit’ and connective relationships found in and between case 
narratives, actor-network symmetry, Deleuzian machinic assemblages,89 hybrid models, and 
mechanisms.90 This is because I value the way these approaches are positively described, are 
imaginatively open to the personal problems of individuals, and incorporate innovations alongside 
trials, or testing, of organisational arrangements.The research improves in internal consistency, 
parsimony, and coherency because the same approach has been used for the identification and 
analysis of source information. 
I make no strong claim of predictability, instead using an abductive logic91 to argue for a ‘strong 
emergence’ (McLennan, 2006: 148) of a hybrid ‘peer-professional’ pattern that influenced the 
participant understandings that underlay the process of its emergence. In the final chapters I extend 
this descriptive material more retroductively92 by arguing that the NEP’s hybrid peer-
professionalism best explains its overall capabilities. My argument builds on a theorised 'as things 
actually happened' historical account (Midgley, 2000: 177-178) involving an interplay of temporal 
and structural aspects (Conley, 1993: ix-xvii), found in stories embedded in complex, partial, and 
entangled sources.
In my account, forms of expertise and professionalism emerged through ad-hoc assemblages of 
heterogeneous constituents. Such expertise may be framed as forms of 'cultural hybridity' (Brown, 
1997: 186-187, 190-194; Patton, 1997: xi-xx) or the activity of 'cyborgs'.93 Social living seems 
unthinkable and unworkable without the folding of material environs, physical objects, and 
organisational logics into shapes of expertise. For example, without a clinic, medical equipment, 
referral systems, and qualification regimes a doctor becomes something rather different. Doctors 
use instruments for the diagnostic and treatment practices that connect physically and 
informationally to patients and also funding agencies, producing an institutional configuration and 
cultural expectations of ‘satisfaction’. The bits and pieces seem to fit reasonably well and ‘satisfy’ 
each other. However, these specialised instruments for dividing and distinguishing expert labour 
into specialties and status are held together and kept aligned within networks of professional and 
official interactions. The significance of such a network view of striated knowledges lies less in the
clear outline of any particular net, viewed as if frozen in its configuration at any point in time, and 
89. For discussion on the operating and production of social-historical-ethical action through the relational modes of 
form and force, see Deleuze & Guattari in general. In particular, see A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2004) and Difference and Repetition (Deleuze, 1994), also commentaries by McMahon (2005) and Surin (2005).
90. A model may be treated as a type, as in Weberian ideal types. I am cautious when dealing with ideal types because 
they are generally assumed to be more specific, with more assumed meanings, and with more associations with 
rational structures than cases, yet the grounded boundaries of cases seem more directly informative to explore. 
91. See Appendix 9.3.
92. See Appendix 9.3.
93. See Haraway (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 1997, 1991a, 1991b), Law (2004: 68-69, 151, 158).
57
Chapter 2.      Configuring sources
more in the complexity of the articulated overlays, foldings, and shifting alignments (Murdoch, 
1995: 754). Similarly, IDU as actors require mass-produced, dependable modern syringes and a 
reasonably predictable mass-produced supply of injectable substances. Without these materially 
embodied practices (Berg, 2004: 25-27) it is more difficult to assemble and articulate IDU social 
worlds alongside biomedical and industrial worlds. There are problems in the translation.
In actor-network terminology, 'translation' involves a process of reformulating and relabelling the 
goals and identities of actors through realigning their interests, boundaries, and connections. As 
will be outlined in chapters 4 to 10, actors in the NEP attempted to form coalitions to protect their 
longer-term interests. These coalitions mediated the presentation of public goals and identities. 
However, such long-term interests and tactics were also supported or destabilised by the associated,
everyday activities that sustained actors in the immediacy of their positioning in local instances and
connections.94 The translational activity of realignment or the blurring of alignment was achieved 
through altering the connections that positioned particular assemblages as a local foreground, in 
contrast to a wider and more backgrounded heterogeneous network (Latour, 1987: 113-119). 
During these shifts, new combinations of actants generated new organisational assemblages, while 
previous assemblages changed in shape and size. This is my way of explaining through describing 
how IDU became included as participants in public health, in terms of HIV prevention, but 
remained excluded from public participation in terms of HCV prevention. 
Translation methods have proven useful in analysing historical changes in the naming and policy 
consequences of regrouping networks of drugs, medicines, and infectious diseases (Moore, 2004: 
422). Translation encourages analyses of how 'lines' of connection and boundaries become 
institutionally stable and productive by means of their difficulties, alignments, realignments, and 
trials. In this way, the topological analyses that emphasise shapes, configurations, and form  
become analytically engaged with the discursive analyses that focus on language, meaning, 
motivations, articulations, and forces. This type of actor-network engagement in processes of 
translation is characterised by its attention to the understandings and production of the effects of 
‘solidity’ and ‘sequences’.
When boundaries cannot be crossed, except through a single connection, whatever or whoever 
controls that connection actively shapes the local network. My analysis followed objects, such as 
syringes, across a topography of connections and boundary lines. In this process the existence of 
shaping conditions, such as constraints on the number and capabilities of the connections that 
created the effect of an obligatory passage point,95 became more noticeable. The co-ordination of 
94. The NEP activities were required to be meaningful by officials and managers in the short-term, in order to achieve 
HIV/AIDS prevention in IDU networks, which had become required to sustain longer-term interests of protecting 
the public health of non-IDU.
95. ‘Obligatory passage point’ is a classic military, political, and hunting mechanism used to explain causal processes 
and descriptions of contingencies in actor-network methods. See Callon (1999, 1991), Callon et al. (1997), Latour 
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different types of multiple elements into regular circulations, and the problematisation of why other
circulations did not happen, offers an analytical framework wherein meaning-making follows 
syringe movements. Because people have been key agents, although not the only actants in such 
circulations, an actor-network perspective pays attention to how subjective perspectives have been 
framed in narrative accounts.
Actor-network methods resist prior categorisation and query the boundaries of entities by 
inherently destabilising authoritarian principles of an ‘essential’ status-quo. By contrast to a ‘black-
boxed’ normality, defined, categorised and deployed according to the needs and conveniences of 
elite groups, actor-network approaches are a type of critical non-theory, or praxis.96 These methods 
encourage analyses of the actancy of power, and of the ways in which various boundaries of 
authority become more or less sustainable. Since actor-network methods emphasise the need to 
follow the details of everyday reality, without overlooking the production of power and pain in the 
pursuit of dreams and dependencies, these methods are well-suited to exploring the conjunctions of
drug-using and democratic processes, where the citizenship and public voices of drug users are put 
on continual everyday trial. The ways in which substances and technological devices, such as drugs
and syringes, are intertwined in such voices and questions, are usefully integrated by using actor-
network methods of following movements, boundaries and translations.
3   Following sources and stories
My sources were found wherever I followed the temporal, structural, embodied, and narrative 
factors that the participants of the time reported to be relevant and significant. I also analysed the 
constitution of network effects in the case, using such effects as a guide for looking for sources of 
information that compared with the case, or which clarified wider contexts in which the case was 
situated. This approach maximised my responsiveness to the patterns and scope of the 
environments being studied by minimising the categorical baggage of prior theorising. The 
(1988: 43). Immergut (1992) uses a concept of ‘veto point’ when has analysing historical conflicts between 
European medical professions and state agencies. She argues that decisions were shaped through the institutional 
configurations of decision-making. Immergut demonstrates the significance of national differences in decision-
making processes, especially the number and type of veto point for blocking proposals from being enacted 
(Immergut, 1992: 226-228, 233-234, 241-244). Immergut’s policy veto points may be understood as obligatory 
passage points formed from an interplay between process boundaries and institutional boundaries that make a veto 
point obligatory. Her approach problematises explanations based on universals. I initially considered using ‘veto 
point’ explanations but found the scope overly restricted to policy domains that did not adequately engage with 
objects, stigma, and professional culture.
96. In Ancient Greek usage, praxis ("#!$%&) referred to activity that was engaged in by free men. For instance, Aristotle 
ccategorised praxis, along with theoria and poiesis, as the three basic activities of man. Three types of knowledge, or 
knowing, corresponded to the three types of activity: theoretical, where truth was the end goal; poietical, where 
production was the end goal; and practical, where action was the end goal. Aristotle categorised practical knowledge 
even further into ethics, economics, and politics. Modern usage of praxis may refer to activity as informed by 
theory, which is not an actor-network approach, but also to activity as informed by models and skill, which is 
somewhat actor-network. A specific actor-network praxis includes activity of meaning and communication informed 
by physical activity and by objects.
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approach initially assumed a methodological ‘symmetry’ by refusing to prioritise or exclude 
different types and sources of accounts. These methods and associated criteria explain how my 
selection of source material came to be rather wide. 
From 1989 to 1992, and from again from 1994-1995, I participated in the NEP operations while 
considering how the movements of syringes might be improved. Later, after having studied 
material cultures and actor-network analyses of ritual, science, and health care, I considered that an
object-focused approach was needed for exploring a programme that was centred on syringes and 
on the subjective motivations of syringe-users. Given that I wanted to understand how capabilities 
emerged and remained sustainable, I also considered that a method of describing temporal events 
was needed. These considerations combined in an argument for using narrative methods to analyse 
how stories associated and de-associated with other stories, along with objects and people.
Stories emphasised the way information was only to be found in patterns that were embedded in 
conceptual contexts and material objects. This implied that finding information required observing 
and following objects, while also following narrative linkages between the material, cultural, 
organisational, and personal elements that constituted the networks of the NEP case. In actor-
network terms, these elements have been interactionally actual and meaningful because they 
exhibit an observable material semiology (Law, 2007), where “what it is depends on what 
surrounds it” (Culler, 2007: 10). A general framework of case analysis seemed to overlap usefully 
with these network methods, since the case, narrativised as a diachronic social history, could be 
explored using the potential alternatives and actual closures of synchronic network effects. 
I could make this approach work because I had participated in these networks, experiencing them, 
with an immediate grounded focus at the time, from an insider’s perspective. Furthermore, during 
the course of the research I continued my habit of carrying safety containers at all times to dispose 
of the syringes I find on occasion in public places. This practice, which risked risk harassment and 
arrest, allowed me to directly measure my own motivations and distrust in terms of the benefits and
costs of association with used syringes. Both the remembrance and the ongoing direct experience 
supported my decision to adapt an actor-network approach.
Actor-network methods have worked well in other case-specific approaches where prior theorising 
and prioritising of sources has been deliberately minimised in the interests of escaping a priori 
formulations. This approach attempts to avoid a formulaic type of conceptual generalisation97 
which both prescribes and precedes the research information. I consider that formulaic approaches 
have no place within a grounded, actor-network case study. This is because the motives of illicit 
participants are more likely to become objectified as exceptional, whereas they need to be 
subjectified as normal. Furthermore, a formulaic approach risked encouraging conventional 
97. The issue of generalisation is deeply embedded in the philosophy and history of science (Kuhn, 2000, 1969).
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prescriptions and moral attitudes to drug use to become the complicit and singular goal of the 
research, instead of valuing and offering stories of alternative goals alongside descriptive stories of 
actual effects and events.
I do come to generalise my analysis, but mostly in a case-informed, reflexive way in my final 
chapters. There I explore how a general principle of the organisation of the NEP relates to the case-
specific aspects established through my actor-network approach. Nonetheless, I do not simply start 
in the middle of the case, since social science accounts require detailed descriptions and 
justifications of methods, even if these are theory-averse, in advance of the narrative methods of 
describing observations and conceptual framings. I point out that although requiring permissions 
from gatekeepers, all the sources of my key information are named and accessible to peer review 
and future research. From the perspectives of both arts and sciences, my criteria for selecting 
sources constitutes a major part of research credibility. Actor-network methods add to the 
significance of sources, in relation to criteria, because the sources are ‘the thing itself’, undistanced
yet always in the midst of critical translation.
When I began my analysis, the historical type of case study seemed capable of holding together, as 
a meaningful account, the then seventeen year duration of the NEP developments. I later came to 
consider the NEP’s sustainability as constituting a case of a particular type of exchange activity, as 
well as being a shaping of institutional expectations. Even later, I characterised the NEP case in 
terms of its inherent antagonisms that stabilised a uniquely semi-licit yet ‘solid’ occupation. As I 
describe in the following chapters on social history, the NEP case has featured cycles of repeating 
patterns of developments. This cyclic aspect raises questions about the relationship between 
descriptive and explanatory accounts of the similarities, and the boundaries, of these distinctive 
cyclic periods.
The question of boundaries is always critical to case analysis. This is because the content, 
character, processes, and exterior of a case are inherently matters of boundaries, whether selected 
by a researcher or identified from observation, or through some other analytical method. I argue 
that my analysis of a mechanism, formed by associating and disassociating boundaries of temporal 
duration, expectations, and occupations, is appropriately configured as a case analysis. Moreover, 
single unique cases need to explored by following the strands of internal cohering activity 
alongside the boundary processes that distinguish the internal aspects from external environments. 
My sources have been found along a branching network of research trails, or strands that intersect 
with the movement trails of actors, actants, information, laws, and logics98 of distrust.
98. A logic in this sense is not a proof or a truth claim in the sense of the deductive and inductive processes. Instead, 
such logics provide a description of an environment with reference to the rationales that seem to make sense due to 
the features of that environment. An environment of distrust features institutionalised distrust alongside participants 
feeling that it is sensible and generally necessary to distrust, though not obligatory. The participants are assumed to 
be unclear about distinguishing between what they may do, and what they must do. Whereas a conventional 
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I consider that the interplay in case research between convenience sampling and following topical 
strands is valid in itself, yet is also justified by the problems of establishing the representativeness 
of sampling, or other methods of reducing the quantity of information while constructing 
representation.99 Such problems seem greater than the problems of integrating an excess of 
information, given that source material has been restricted by the limitations of record-keeping and 
would be hazardous to reduce further. My methodology depends upon gaining access to sources of 
information, balancing my engagement as a partly-inside, partly-outside participant, while 
integrating the significance and consequences of theoretical frameworks. 
The linkages and meanings I present make more sense in part because they make sense to me. I 
have incorporated part of my story in the account offered in this thesis, because I was there, 
because this was important in my approach, and because, since I was active as the presenter and 
gatherer of stories, to suggest otherwise would be misleading. Yet I intend to portray the character 
and capabilities of the NEP rather than an autobiographical account:100 
Like every aspect of portraiture, voice is imprinted both on the product - the portrait as a 
finished narrative - and on the two mutually informative aspects of the portraiture process: the 
collection of data and the analytic shaping of the final portrait. ... the methodological question 
that portraitists must repeatedly ask of process is How (to what extent) does the disposition of 
my voice inform (give shape to but not distort) the product (the developing portrait)? And ... 
How (to what extent) does the articulation of voice inform (clarify but not mislead) the process 
(the developing understanding)? (Davis, 1997: 106)
As Davis emphasises, my understandings of linkages, frameworks, boundaries, and meaningfulness
are significant. These understandings require specific explication to distinguish between a self-
portrait observed only by myself as alone, and a more descriptive actor-network case account 
observable by many.101 I have tried to address this difficulty by laying out the configuration of my 
research logics in this and the following chapter. 
I ask myself periodically if my exploratory and representational methodology is particularly 
sociological, rather than an example of history, cultural studies, anthropology, critical management 
studies, or investigative journalism. All of these disciplines can produce effective social science, in 
the sense of producing analyses that are evidence-based, rigourous, and comparable with 
alternatives. 
Austrin & Farnsworth point out that there are: “diverse tensions out of which the hybrid formations
mathematical logic, as in deduction and induction, is a tactic to achieve greater closure and stability of categories, a 
social logic is unstable and resists closure. This makes such social logics of institutions and an ethos of distrust 
suited to the groundedness of an actor-network following approach.
99. A sample does not, merely of itself, represent a group, but rather is posited and calculated as doing so. Such 
selection and calculating cannot be done without first constructing the boundary relationship between the numbers 
of case incidents, and the overall single case which contains these numbers through a qualitative relationship. Only 
the single case is sampled, not any particular incidents, since these are unique before being reconstructed as a group.
100. Despite my own life course being somewhat peer-professional, as no doubt are many.
101. It is acceptable to only perceive things through the medium of a researcher’s work because all things are only 
understood through the work of various creators and maintainers of perceptual frameworks.
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called “sociology” were forged” (2007: 53). This is important for two reasons. First, labels aside, 
the differences between these disciplines are those of methodology and goals which are in a tensive
‘tug of control’ with those of the sociologies.102 Second, there are many sociological formations, 
which in being hybrid, may strongly overlap and mutually influence the hybrid assemblages of the 
other disciplines I mention. I cannot here explore this case of disciplinary boundary work because I
dedicate my argument to the NEP case, but I can offer a succinct response in several parts. 
An institutional answer is yes, due to the significant body of sociological literature I have drawn on
and added to, this is indeed sociological research. A more sociological answer is yes, this is 
sociological work, due to my sociological methods of engagement and abstraction, of relationality 
and reflexivity, of connecting personal troubles with social issues, as well as relating strategic 
agency to the structuring and sequencing of tactile and textual social environments. I formally 
relate the NEP to my argument through the levels, relevance, and scale of my theoretical framing 
of structural boundaries and the periodising methods of social history.
According to Mills (1959), a core criterion of social analysis consists of a ‘sociological 
imagination’. Mills argues that personally experienced problems become better understood and 
more capable of analysis through an enhanced awareness of historical and structural patterns. The 
emphasis I place on the ‘capabilities’ and the equivalent standing of actors’ accounts suits an 
abductive,103 constructive logic. Abductive methods of analysis acknowledge the significance of 
personally experiencing problems and opportunities such as those that have permeated the NEP. 
The NEP’s methods and principles can also be provisionally and cautiously generalised from the 
multiple elements of a single case study by using inductive processes of descriptive explanation 
and accumulating the instances or events which were similar. My research approach involved first 
an abductive approach, then a retroductive approach to following evidence trails left by participants
while generating this analytical narrative. Inductive, abductive and retroductive elements have been
gathered and aligned within not so much a narrative logic, but a logos. The resulting account has 
explored the NEP’s mix of singularity and generality in an interweaving of science, craft, and art104 
approaches. My particular approach to articulating objects with stories in the production of an 
analytic narrative text is described in more detail in the following chapter. 
102.  For example, sociology in New Zealand has been characterised as under pressure to function as a service 
department to other disciplines (Austrin & Farnsworth, 2007). Sociology internationally and historically has acted as 
“a parasite, ingesting and metabolising other disciplinary discourses” , according to Urry (1981, in Austrin & 
Farnsworth, 2007: 47) yet in consequence “destabilises its capacity to function as a unitary discipline itself” (2007: 
47) while featured an “inability to resist intellectual invasions” (Urry, 2000: 55).
103. I used Blaikie’s version of abduction as a: “different logic to the other three [inductive, deductive, retroductive]. ... 
The starting point is the social world of the social actors being investigated: their construction of reality, their way of 
conceptualising and giving meaning to their social world, their tacit knowledge. This can only be discovered from 
accounts which social actors provide. Their reality, the way they have constructed and interpreted their activities 
together, is embedded in their language. Hence, the researcher has to enter their world in order to discover the 
motives and reasons that accompany social activities. The task is then to re-describe these motives and actions, and 
the situations in which they occur, in the technical language of social scientific discourse.” (2000: 25).
104. By art I refer to a uniqueness of perspective and the deliberated construction of social sensibility.
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3Articulating stories, objects, analytical narratives
I rely on a kind of relentless insistence on the non-transcendent, on the always being in media res, that life
is a verb and that the actors aren’t all human. There are very important nodes of energy in non-human
agency, non-human actions. ... So I am trying to find descriptive languages that name emergent
ontologies. ... The world is in the details. ...
(Birth of the Kennel: Cyborgs, dogs and companion species. Donna Haraway, 2000c)
I have indicated in the previous chapter that I pay equivalent attention to objects and stories and 
that I analyse the activity of stories as empirical factors. It will be clear why objects are significant 
in research focused on syringes, but why are stories so important? For one thing, objects such as 
syringes have been widely distributed, at times fast-moving, making them difficult to follow 
directly. They were also used and understood differently in different situations, which a researcher 
may not gain direct access to but were partially experienced through stories that a researcher can 
potentially access. The character and meanings of syringes, particularly in the past, would be 
difficult to capture in static samples for concentrated analysis. Stories provide ways to ‘translate’105 
and condense wide distributions of quasi-objects and their information into tighter comparisons and
configurations (Latour, 1999c: 47-64). Moreover, stories can exert direct influence over collective 
organising because actors understand their desires and constraints in terms of the stories that they 
link to other stories in forms of logic, legitimations, and co-ordinating group activity.
In this chapter I prepare a conceptual space for the following social history and thematic chapters 
by laying out my key actants. These included the syringes, people, and documents that shifted 
around and within this case area. This information was generally enscripted in objects and 
embodied in people and viruses. However, this information was specifically configured as the 
stories that held together the historical accounts, reviews, departmental papers, academic analyses, 
remembrances, and media coverage. My analysis has engaged with the stories from which the NEP
was constituted, and by which it has grown, in successive folds. My account relates these stories, 
understood as time-shaping narratives, to the NEP case in a process of unfolding chronological 
layers then refolding as a mechanism with a ‘shape of activity’. 
These logics and stances lay the foundations for my evaluation. In my first section I support the 
relevance of my analysis by outlining the strengths and deficiencies in previous accounts of the 
NEP, noting the contributions to my own work. In section 2 the academic literature on connected 
HIV/AIDS developments in New Zealand is outlined. I show where stories about similar problems 
and opportunities, in contexts of direct linkages with the NEP, have contributed to my account.
105. Translation is used in an actor-network sense of altering a set of linked entities from one state, to another that is 
treated as equivalent but is not identical. The resultant state includes the agency and network linkages of the 
translation process and entities. The linked entities often include meanings, policies, understood problems, interests, 
protocols, and objects such as documents. See previous description of quasi-objects, and Latour (1999c: 311).
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1   Accounting for the NEP
Since I wanted to construct a social history of the NEP, I followed connections between its internal 
accounts and those of different HIV/AIDS related organisations and researchers. Only two overtly 
narrative histories of the NEP have been published, both by Kemp (2004, 1996). These were not 
highly theorised, nor thickly described, the latest being an article and the earlier a single chapter in 
a book on New Zealand policy responses to HIV/AIDS (Davis, 1996). They have, nevertheless, 
offered a singular, coherent narrative outline of a case (Maoz, 2002: 163, 170-171). No theorisation
of hepatitis C policy, or related organisational developments, have yet been published in New 
Zealand. I have also searched the wider literature for general accounts of needle exchanges in order
to understand the field better, and to follow any theorising back to their cases. 
There is New Zealand and worldwide literature on AIDS-related shifts in cultural attitudes and 
media framing. This is important for illuminating contexts, but in general, does not reveal the 
mechanisms of policy shifts and the emergences of new practices. I found a number of official 
reviews of the NEP, and prior theorising on HIV/AIDS policy responses has produced a range of 
useful accounts. These accounts indicate that New Zealand responses to HIV/AIDS were led by 
political, professional, official, media, and religious leaders, since I found no body of material from
popular mass movements or well-organised pressure groups outside of those most directly at risk. 
The absence of documents suggested the significance of charismatic leadership, uncontentious 
official influences, and marginalised sub-populations.106 These accounts included stories about how
the NEP developed and was understood, but for my purposes, did not adequately link the allocation
of agency, conceptual frameworks, objects, contexts of motivations, infrastructure, and outcomes 
of policy intervention.
By 1996, New Zealand researchers had generally agreed that at least three major phases were 
involved in the organisational responses to HIV/AIDS. In one account, these phases led from grass-
roots community organising to corporate institutionalisation, then to further professionalising 
(Lindberg & McMorland, 1996). Such analyses drew on international research,107 and were 
primarily informed by the New Zealand AIDS Foundation (NZAF) developments. Researchers 
such as Lindberg & McMorland (1996), have analysed the relationships between the NZAF and 
state agencies in terms of policy responses to the challenges of HIV/AIDS, but less so as an 
example of organisational and occupational innovation. These analyses and examples may be 
approached more as singular definitive accounts, or alternately, more as stories where multiple 
versions are not inherently troublesome. The range of different perspectives found in these stories 
106. This silent accounting for risk contrasts with moral panics, for instance over recreational substances in response to 
perceived cultural and economic threats. The exceptional case of a young white child refugee dying of AIDS 
(Lichtenstein, 1996) illustrates a general tendency to follow expert direction.
107. The three phases overlap with a wider international analysis of three or more policy response phases.
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draws research attention to a ‘negotiated case’ of reality being constructed as institutions, as 
historical accounts, and as an archival selection process. 
The multiple stories in the NZAF account (Lindberg & McMorland, 1996) were presented as a 
single case and as a single explanatory principle. This case and principle involved specialisation 
through centralisation, which included shifts and uncertainties in the activity and policy input of 
regional groupings. The NZAF account seemed to downplay antagonisms rather than attempt to 
use them in its analysis. These stories intersected with the official accounts of the NEP. The 
evidence for multiple actors and notably different perspectives within the NZAF account suggested
deficiencies in the circumscribed range of actor perspectives and principle of consensus that have 
been conventionally used to explain the NEP. On following closer to the sources, it turned out that 
the conventional NEP account was unduly circumscribed. Furthermore, the NZAF stories set up the
stage for the later NEP stories which overlapped before partly separating. The NEP itself 
specialised as it centralised, though in a quite different, bottom-up type of infrastructure. The NEP 
specialised into a pharmacy-based form of service provision, at the same time as it centralised into 
a single nation-wide programme and a single legislative framework. Yet unlike the NZAF, the NEP
did not consolidate into or otherwise easily and quickly give rise to a single nation-wide corporate 
entity that managed professional service delivery. My participant experience with the NEP offered 
a more intense story of distrust that configured connections and boundaries between key sets of 
actors. This story provoked a search for aspects of distrust, such as assumptions and activities, in 
archival documents from before the founding of the NZAF.
In some ways an ‘account’ seems unduly singular and fixed in its boundaries, whereas a ‘story’ is 
more easily conceived as partial, multiple, and less fixed. When approaching a case by assuming its
boundaries are unfixed, and only then checking to see how fixed and unfixed is the activity of 
different bounded areas, it seems more useful to work with stories than accounts. As I use these 
terms, accounts attempt to be definitive in their explanations, whereas stories attempt to be 
revealing by prioritising differences, often implicit, in goals and methods. Accounts, accordingly, 
tend towards fixing boundaries and singularity, whereas stories problematise boundaries as being 
partially fixed, partially unfixed, and intriguingly unpredictable. Of these two different goals and 
methods, I have looked into accounts to highlight rigidities and absences, and associated stories to 
provide the flexible connectivity that holds together this case and its study.
Many stories drew on a concept of consensus, generally not explicated, leading to continuing 
partnership, generally not infrastructurally detailed, as if 'consensus' was a causative force 
(Webster, 1990) rather than an effect of other processes. A more detailed and critical version 
presented consensus as a conventional tactic that preserved a 'policy making community' from the 
destabilising effect of public demands.108 An unusually analytical story was of a consensus that, in 
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being constructed as a strategy, was “dense with contradiction” (Plumridge & Chetwynd, 1994: 
294), and so was vulnerable to unravelling once AIDS was less feared due to the very success of 
such strategies. This story queried the way the NEP had grown rather than come apart. There was a
story of simultaneous conflicting demands which had to be continuously met by organisations that 
delivered needle exchange services (Matthews & Leland, 1990). This story queried forms of 
discretion, understood as a form of trained expertise, in accomplishing such balancing, and led to 
questioning the backgrounds and training of the personnel involved in the NEP. One story featured 
syringes which circulated between different worlds, thereby providing an instrument for inspecting 
IDU and evaluating interventions in drug markets109. I found a story of HIV/AIDS policy being 
exceptional, not only in being an emergency response, but also in the way it differed from HCV110 
Another story was of grassroots organising being a cause deserving of loyalty, yet capable of 
betrayal, depending on the options chosen in pursuing health goals (Altman, 1994: 162).
Despite e-mail contacts with overseas NEP and harm reduction activists, I have not found any 
international studies of needle exchange developments in situations directly comparable to New 
Zealand's isolated and unique environments of policy and practice.111 Furthermore, there are 
significant cultural differences between mainstream societies in the UK, North America, Europe, 
and New Zealand. Since IDU interact with mainstream cultural attitudes, especially via health 
services, it is unsafe to presume that research from these societies is directly applicable to New 
Zealand situations. I did not in any case consider that prior theoretical framings suited the emergent
patterns and ‘storied meanings’ of an actor-network case study. However, I wanted to obtain any 
information about the New Zealand NEP gathered by overseas researchers, since that might cover 
gaps that I assumed would later remain in the New Zealand archival records. 
An external review (Aitken, 2002) of the NEP provided useful information, but raised questions 
about why such a useful account had not been available earlier to inform the management and 
strategy. Yet this review’s stories, methods, and goals were not prioritised towards understanding 
why the NEP capabilities had begun and changed, but rather to evaluating the costs and benefits of 
the NEP as a health and financial intervention. This goal did not prioritise or explore the character 
of the NEP, nor its shifts in operations, nor its cultural and infrastructural consequences. The 
review outlined the shape of several absent stories, or stories of absence, that wove around the 
history and priorities of the policy environment through which the review emerged.
108. See James (1992, as cited in Gauld, 2001a). See also Day & Klein (1989), Fox, Day, & Klein (1989). 
109. See Kaplan (1994, 1991), Kaplan & Heimer (1994a, 1994b, 1992a, 1992b), Kaplan & O’Keefe (1993), Kaplan & 
Soloshatz (1993).
110. These soon exceeded projections of HIV/AIDS costs. See Crofts & Brown (no date, as cited in Kemp, 1996: 165). 
For costs of hepatitis C in New Zealand, see Sheerin (2003), Sheerin, Green, & Sellman (2003, 2001), Easton 
(2002), Chapman et al. (2000), Nesdale, Baker, Gane, et al. (2000), and Brown & Crofts (1998).
111. Many overseas studies are of situations involving ‘street scenes’ where purchase and injection happen in public or 
semi-public places as drug markets allow. This has not been the norm in New Zealand. Drug purchases and injection 
have generally taken place in private houses where some of the participants live, and locally grown poppies create a 
seasonal pattern of recreational, non-addictive injecting of chemically treated poppy latex. 
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Most studies of needle exchanges have tended to analyse and characterise needle exchange 
programmes quantitatively, in terms of short-term interventionist aspects of their operation.112 
These studies have largely been conducted in countries where the cost of NEP programmes have 
seemed less constraining than in New Zealand. Their arguments have been centred on effectiveness
and consequences. In the United States, where harm reduction concepts have not been formally 
acknowledged at the highest government level, many studies have focused on whether harms to 
IDU and the general public might actually increase due to supplying syringes. Such concerns have 
been irrelevant in New Zealand contexts since 1988, when the NEP began operating without such 
problems appearing. However, early overseas models from Europe, the UK, and Australia 
influenced New Zealand policy responses and programme design. 
I read studies with caution because their methodological assumptions were frequently buried 
beneath scientistic jargon, their goals were often unrelated to the perspectives of officials and IDU, 
and their institutional resourcing seemed likely to constrain their possible conclusions. There have 
been, for instance, pressures by the US government on researchers, other governments, and NGOs 
to make HIV/AIDS funding dependent on promoting abstinence, on de-prioritising barrier methods
of safe sex such as condoms, and on denigrating needle exchanges.113 
Actor-network methods, along with types of analyses that delineate the working of mechanisms, 
have emphasised the following of everyday reality in the detail of its material and relational 
processes. These methods do not overlook the production of power and pain in the pursuit of 
dreams and dependencies. Such methods are well-suited to exploring the conjunctions of drug-
using and democratic processes, where the citizenship claims and public voices of ‘normal’ illicit 
drug users may induce ‘abnormal’ social panic. The ways in which substances and technological 
devices, such as drugs and syringes, are intertwined in such voices and questions, is usefully 
integrated in actor-network methods of following movements, boundaries and translations. When 
such actants are observed to cohere in places, somewhat similar to how strands may cluster and 
fold into a knot, I describe the regular activity and the contours of such nodes as partial and 
provisional ‘mechanisms’ that nest within and help to constitute wider heterogeneous networks.
The mechanisms I describe are local and relational, positive, well-evidenced, yet unpredictable and
complex.114 They include unique and discontinuous constituent elements. They do not imply or 
112. For accounts of European syringe exchanges, see Buning et al. (1986). For early syringe exchange in UK 
environments, see Stimson et al., (1991), Hart et al. (1991), Hart et al. (1989), Stimson (1989) and Marks & Parry 
(1987). For syringe exchange in North American environments see Guydish et al. (1998), Guydish et al. (1993) and 
Weiker et al. (1999). Friedman et al. (1987) and Price (1992), briefly discuss the self-organisation of IDU in North 
American environments. For an excellent historical overview of the medical and policy environment in the US and 
the UK, as part of a general history of substance use from the 1600s to 2001, see Davenport-Hines (2004: 338-383).
113. See Ahmad (2005), Barnett & Parkhurst (2005), Das (2005a: 263-264, 2005b), Pancevski (2005), McKee & Coker 
(2003: 1580).
114.  For methodological considerations of positive science, interventions, boundary work, observation, and positivism 
see Midgley (2000: 2-7, 11-14, 29-30, 34-44, 89-91,113-133 162-168, 179-181), Crotty (1998: 18-74).
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require a reductionist, mechanical ontology. Such mechanisms fit with Tilly's category system of 
mechanisms, models, and story narratives. Tilly considers that descriptions of structural 
interactional processes are most specifically presented as mechanisms, most generally 
understandable when translated into narratives, with models somewhere between these extremes of 
precision and accessibility (Tilly, 2002: xii-xiii; 1997: 6-9). However, I differ from Tilly in placing 
greater significance on stories and narrative because it is through information that the elements of 
mechanisms become aligned and activated. The more competent explanations need to approach 
mechanisms and stories even-handedly. Nor can narrativised information be avoided in a 
mechanism-based explanation, since explanations, legitimations, and directives are essential 
elements in any mechanism of social interactivity.
I looked for models related to the NEP, and found two, one an absence and one actual. The latter is 
an international set of models115 used in ‘centres of calculation’ (Latour, 1987: 229) to estimate the 
outcomes of offering HCV treatment to prioritised sets of prospective patients. Latour uses the term
‘centres of calculation’ to draw attention to the way calculations do not happen everywhere, at all 
times, universally, which a story that promoted statistical validity might claim. Instead, calculations
with their frameworks, prioritisations and parameters happen at particular places and times. Since 
HIV prevalence among IDU rapidly decreased to effectively zero after the NEP began, it seemed 
understandable that higher priority might be given to other problems and that no specific models 
and calculations would appear in reports. Nonetheless, IDU exhibited a consistently high 
prevalence and incidence of HCV, which drew attention to how HCV has been treated differently 
from HIV, with particular reference to the centres and ethos of calculation. I searched for models of
HCV epidemiology that related to alternative treatment strategies. However, no such published and
specified models in general use and publicly accessible in New Zealand could be clearly identified 
by experts in this field (Sheerin, 2007. pers. com.; Jang 2007 pers. com.), or found referred to in 
any published New Zealand policy papers. 
One model of calculation that directly influenced the NEP developments in New Zealand was a US
model of syringe circulation. A research team studied unlinked syringes returned to a needle 
exchange and found that the circulation of syringes as objects enabled forms of non-voluntary 
monitoring.116 Phrases such as “behavior of needles ...[and] ... interviewing the needles” (Kaplan & 
Heimer, 1994a: 567-8) were emphasised. These themes presented the US research stance within a 
highly constrained and seemingly normalised research environment where IDU themselves could 
not be directly engaged with. I linked these research attitudes, methods, and findings to my general 
115. See Hutchinson, Bird, & Goldberg (2005), Griffiths & Nix (2002), Bekkering, Stalgis, McHutchinson, Brouwer, & 
Perelson (2001), Deufic, Buffat, Poynard, Valleron (1999). See also a related account by Tacke & Trautwein (2007) 
responding to Amin, Law, Bartlett, Kaldor, & Dore (2006), Bernstein, Kleinman, Barker, Revicki, & Green (2002).
116. See Kaplan & Heimer (1994a, 1994b, 1992a, 1992b), Myers et al. (1993), Guydish et al. (1992), Heimer, Kaplan, & 
Cadman (1992), Heimer, Myers, Cadman et al. (1992), Kaplan (1991). More conventional research was carried out 
in South Florida by Chitwood et al. (1990), and in Sydney by Wolk et al. (1988).
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actor-network approach, then extended my literature search to see how this method and 
information had influenced other researchers. Several UK researchers had commented critically on 
the way in which the US study had ‘interviewed needles’ in preference to engaging more fully with
the IDU participants.117 The 'voices' of syringes seemed to be constituted in part from the 
orchestrated silencing of the syringe users, not necessarily by the researchers directly but by the 
system within which the research took place, as I will show in detail later.118 This US study model 
was drawn upon in designing a study carried out by a Wellington peer group (Kemp, 2004). 
Several Australian researchers (Wodak, Dolan, & Imrie et al.,1987) had suggested analysing 
returned syringes, in an implicit story of the precedence of public safety over privacy. As I will 
later describe, this was followed in New Zealand by the actual testing of the syringes in different 
situations of informed consent. Testing without full consent emerged as a story of cultural 
exchanges and trust, or distrust, between the criminalised and medicalised jurisdictions generally 
associated with enforcement practices. These understandings of appropriate practices were also 
apparent in the degree of informed consent needed in situations of sentinel surveillance of stored 
samples from STD clinics (Paterson, 1996: 37-41). Such stories of conflicts have continued within 
a general health ethics framework (Auckland Womans Health Council (2004), as a problem of 
collective consequences of collective surveillance, and as an unasked question about the 
appropriateness of protocols over the testing of used syringes. Sociological concerns over 
researchers claiming: “ a right to deceive and manipulate people for research purposes” (Mann, 
1985: 106) are thereby focused on IDU collectives, as well as on individual IDU. The offering of 
consent through representatives, without public protocols, suggests that there have been difficulties
due to differences in the positioning of IDU and NEP personnel, as well as various types of health 
researcher. 
Nancy Stoller's brief account (1998) of an illicit North American exchange, which came to be 
supported, co-ordinated, and normalised by local government agencies, offers an informative story 
from well after the formative and mid-period of the New Zealand NEP. Stoller’s account has not 
been cited in any local reports or analyses of the NEP. In general, the different patterns of IDU 
practices, especially of 'street scenes' that have been unknown in New Zealand, have reduced the 
utility of North American ethnographies for this research. However, Stoller's analysis of 
organisational forms is sufficiently abstract, consolidated and generalised to translate across this 
gap. Stoller draws out themes of empowerment and improvisation through self-organisation by 
locating the exchange’s founding with a group of pagan anarchists who participated in a network of
marginalised peers. These founders deliberately resisted forming hierarchies and did not rely on 
117. See Green, Goldberg, Frischer, Cameron, Taylor, & Grueret (1995).
118. This critique would also apply, though to a lesser degree, to my own work. However, I have twisted this problem 
into a form of productivity by identifying, scrutinising, and analysing the way it works in practice.
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professional expertise. Stoller then describes a shift in this North American needle exchange 
towards bureaucratic institutionalisation, due in part to funding dependencies which co-evolved 
with the scale of the organisation's operations. The peer anarchist element in this story was similar 
to the founding of CIVDURG in Christchurch in 1988. Stoller highlights how differences between 
the management and volunteers became more significant due to shifts in the structures of funding 
and the types of opposition. This process told me about the importance of representation in 
situations where accounts and policies were being generated, or defended. 
However, for my purposes Stoller does not adequately account for how the peers became 
repositioned or excluded in such developments. She describes how certain peers opposed the 
changes from self-management towards a hierarchy and left, while others stayed, and some 
indicated agreement with the changes, yet the reasons are only summarised from an external 
surmise and the sequences are only hinted at. Some peers worked so long that they effectively had 
an occupation, but Stoller does not develop this aspect in any depth. Nor was that exchange 
positioned in relation to a state-wide network of peers, meetings, and channels of information. 
These questions sensitised my search for documents and details to maximise the scope and 
relevance of following the objects, sources and mechanisms through which the NEP developments 
are usefully described.
A story of harm reduction, first as pushing out conventional prohibitionist policies of harm 
prevention in a particular area of syringe exchange, then as becoming partly subsumed into a policy
of harm minimisation, runs through the NEP history. Harm reduction underlies the NEP in concept,
but in actuality the NEP has defined and described how harm reduction acted and appeared in New 
Zealand. Some illustrative definitions were found in publications. For instance, the Royal New 
Zealand College of General Practitioners (RNZCGP) described harm reduction practices as 
accepting drug use as a fact while focusing on reducing harm for as long as drug use continues.119 
Harm reduction in this story emphasises a range of individual goals, and reliance on evidenced 
research. The unique combination of factors in an individual's drug using environment are not 
reduced into a single universal systemic category, especially a category of ideological morality.120 
Harm reduction and harm minimising logics were used to alter how the NEP was labelled and 
perceived. This is a confusing area because the term 'harm minimisation' has frequently been found
in close proximity to the everyday usage of 'reducing harm'. For instance, the Occupational Safety 
119. This definition is offered by Riley (1999, as cited in The Royal New Zealand College of General Practitioners, 
2005): "The essence of harm reduction is embodied in the following statement: “If a person is not willing to give up 
his or her drug use, we should assist them in reducing harm to himself or herself and other”" (Royal New Zealand 
College of General Practitioners, 2005).
120. For instance, Moore’s (2004) actor-network analysis describes how the reconfiguration of particular activities of 
named substances, such as heroin, into a general category of 'drugs', altered the legal and health consequences for 
heroin users and treatment specialists. A dogmatic policy of eliminating all illicit drugs actually excluded the 
capability to provide evidence-based treatment services for users of a particular drug in particular circumstances. 
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and Health (OSH) definition of 'harm minimisation' included a reference to the primary goal being:
"a net reduction in drug-related harm rather than becoming drug-free overnight" (Occupational 
Safety and Health, 2005).
After 1997, the New Zealand National Drug Policy of 'harm minimisation' absorbed and positioned
the NEP’s ‘harm reduction’ alongside law enforcement programmes of ‘supply reduction’, and 
‘demand reduction’ programmes based on education, drug treatment, and punitive sentencing. The 
requirements for evidence-based research to back up and improve drug policy accordingly 
dwindled.121 However, some differences between reducing and minimising practices are notable, 
for instance in the OSH (2005)122 definition. Whereas the RNZCGP definition of harm reduction 
referred to people 'unwilling to give up' their drug use, the OSH definition of harm minimisation 
referred to people who could not be 'expected to stop' their drug use. These definitions illustrate a 
clear difference in their framing of authority and agency. In the RNZCGP version of 'harm 
reduction', people were credited with the ability and right to make their own decisions, despite 
hazards which would require reduction. The OSH version of 'harm minimising' positioned people 
as lacking the control to make decisions which comply with social ideals. The OSH site, which 
represents health officialdom, did not mention 'harm reduction', whereas the RNZCGP site, which 
represents health professionalism, did not mention 'harm minimising'.
A further difference lay in duration. Harm reduction has been presented as continuing indefinitely 
if it so chances, in contrast to a harm minimisation that would eventually cease when drug using 
ideally stopped. On a spectrum between dependence and abstinence, reduction and minimising in 
these senses appear as neighbouring rather than opposing concepts. This encouraged policy actors 
to shift the boundary between these concepts, leading to changing rationales for programmes and 
contexts for later actors. Nonetheless, harm minimisation has not relied totally on abstinence. 
Neither of these approaches to harm has promoted a total disregard for hazards, while both 
promoted reliance on an empirical evidence base.
The terms ‘harm reduction’ and ‘harm minimisation’ name two differing policies. Yet the terms 
'reduction' and 'minimising’ frequently interchange in popular usage and policy descriptions, while 
sometimes establishing specific distinctions. Apart from the shifts in New Zealand policy and 
method, harm reduction appears in overseas accounts, but close attention to context is needed when
evaluating such material.
Stimson et al. (1991: 230) identify three specific factors that facilitated needle exchange 
121. I would argue because existing institutions and organisations, with a legacy of moral legitimations and 
configurations as private fiefdoms, exhibited ‘bureaucratic capture’ and could resist accountability.
122. Harm minimisation is: "an approach that aims to minimise the adverse health, social and economic consequences of 
drug use, without necessarily ending such use for people who cannot be expected to stop their drug using 
immediately" (Occupational Safety and Health, 2005). 
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developments in England. There had been a pre-existing debate on harm minimisation, a wide 
range of potential institutional sites, and a social policy framework of central policy initiatives that 
emphasised local autonomy in implementation (Stimson et al.,1991: 230). The latter factor seems 
particularly significant in the New Zealand context. Rhodes & Hartnoll present a concept of 
outreach as providing “an interface between community and professional-based services” (1991: 
243) which is both necessary and precarious because of conflicts at ideological and pragmatic 
levels. Rhodes & Hartnoll draw attention to the difficulties and need for systematic monitoring and 
evaluation of outreach services (1991: 243-245).
Davenport-Hines (2004) has identified the influence on UK policy of a small group of abstinence-
fixated, mental health specialists. This segment of psychologists and psychiatrists 'captured' drug 
policy and resisted harm reduction programmes, following similar professional developments in 
North America, which were linked to political agendas that collaborated to support the ' war on 
drug-users' (2004: 369-374). Davenport-Hines points out that " ... the prevalence of HIV among 
drug users was crucial to the British strategy of presenting the virus as a threat to the general 
population rather than as a by-product of homosexuality" (2004: 377). The crucial UK Committee 
that first presented medical evidence and judgement in support of harm reduction measures, such as
needle exchanges, were predominantly "haematologists and virologists rather than consultant 
psychologists from the drug dependence clinics" (Davenport-Hines, 2004: 380). North American 
influences towards abstinence approaches also impacted on drug treatment concepts in New 
Zealand, yet not to the extent that Davenport-Hines describes in the UK. As discussed in Chapter 4,
gay community organisers allied with health sector officials to more effectively reduce the 
decision-making power of health specialist groups in New Zealand (Smith, 1990: 2). Furthermore, 
GPs and pharmacists, who constituted a major segment of the primary health sector interface with 
the public, have been receptive to harm reduction concepts and have generally promoted the 
agency of health consumers, provided their own agency was not diminished in consequence.123
Hulse (1997), has analysed community-oriented, Australian HIV/AIDS policy in relation to HCV 
policy. In his story, the crucial input of community organisations to national policy was strongly 
opposed by medical professionals and was later “unacknowledged by senior health bureaucrats and
politicians” (1997: 171). Because the credit for a successful HIV outcome was attributed to a 
political and policy elite, IDU harm reduction and outreach organisations in following years had 
123. The record of venereologists has been far more variable. See Kampf (2007: 9-12, 118-123, 130-133, 138, 142, 
152-153, 156-163, 168, 176, 208.) -  Kampf focuses on heterosexual practices, perhaps following the medical 
discourse of the period studied. However fleeting references to homosexual aspects began to appear in archival 
records from the late 1960s. See Kampf (2007: 175, 179-180). The first Venereology Conference in New Zealand 
was held in 1964. The New Zealand Society of Venereology was only established in 1978, barely preceding the 
advent of AIDS. Given the policing of womens’ sexual practices by venereology practitioners and Department 
officials, together with strong moral conservative assumptions that impacted adversely on womens’ sexual health, 
one can imagine that male homosexuals would have exerted great efforts to evade surveillance and control by the 
profession of venereology.
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less credibility. It became more difficult to use their knowledge of grassroots practices to shape a 
national HCV strategy. Instead, policy became captured by established ‘mainstream’124 sources 
(174-175). 
Dr. Neal Blewett (1997), a gay medical professional who had been the Federal Minister of Health 
during the mid-1980s, responded to Hulse by claiming that there had never been an ‘effective’ IDU
community that could provide policy advice ‘acceptable’ at a national level. Blewett presents a 
story of a desire by government to empower gay communities, but also utilising a counter-theme of
IDU being inherently limited by their criminalisation to a street level type and degree of service 
delivery (177-178). 
Bill Bowtell, who had been a senior advisor to Dr. Blewett after 1983 (Bowtell, 1997: 180), 
commented that community participation broke the monopoly of funding and advice decisions by 
medical and official elites, but these later made successful efforts to reassert their primacy. 
However, in New Zealand, similar story ingredients combined differently with different timings 
and emphases in expression. The initial policy input from IDU was high and preceded equivalent 
Australian developments. IDU peer input into NEP policy was then effectively excluded from 1990
to 1995, before regaining access and credibility through the infrastructural centralising of peer-
professional service delivery organisations. 
An early Dunedin study (Matthews & Leland, 1990) on public and IDU attitudes towards the 
innovation of the NEP, cited comments by Des Jarlais, a noted international researcher into harm 
reduction programmes. Des Jarlais had studied the earliest needle exchange programme in 1984 in 
Amsterdam. He characterised such programmes as subject to short-term 'selection pressures' which 
required the programmes to adapt to the needs of the IV drug users participating in the scheme as 
well as to the demands of those who funded the programme. He gave examples of UK schemes that
were closed due to their inability to adapt to these sometimes conflicting requirements. He 
emphasised that the programmes were not static entities, but instead evolved to meet the conflicting
needs of IDU, the needs of funding agencies, and the attitudes of local communities, according to 
Matthews & Leland (1990: 2-3). The Dunedin Intravenous Organisation (DIVO) began operating 
during the course of the survey, and this study was found in DIVO's archive, suggesting that Des 
Jarlais' generally theorised sense of 'interactions of conflict' was known in New Zealand. My 
concept of NEP hybridity fits well with the general concept of Des Jarlais (Des Jarlais & Friedman,
1991), and with concepts promoted by Nimmo in an internal, managerial analysis of the peer group
operational role in his paper ‘between a rock and a hard place’ (Nimmo, 1995a).
Several partial accounts of the background and problems of the NEP have appeared during its 
124. By ‘mainstream’ I refer to a cultural identity, rather than any group that can be empirically defined from the outside.
Mainstream people are those who consider themselves to be the normal and rightful majority, whose opinions and 
directives should be obeyed in a democratic society. 
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development. Nonetheless, though wide-ranging and relevant, none fully address the questions that 
shape this thesis.125 The first account laid out a prospective Management Plan for the NEP (Baker, 
1987a, 1987b, 1987c). This was followed by quantitative reviews that included useful background 
and issues sections (Walker, Brady, & Baker, 1994; Lungely and Baker, 1990; Lungely, 1988). The
other accounts were descriptive, or legitimations of proposals, the fullest being a report on 
management issues (Fitzgerald, 1995). Some accounts were insider positioned,126 more-or-less 
oriented to Ministry of Health, or IDU peer, or NEP goals. For instance Auerbach's (1994d) review
was not intended to be analytical, but rather to list stakeholder concerns. External reviews (Aitken, 
2002; Walzl, 1994; Robinson, 1990) have included more qualitative analysis. However, external 
reviews are assumed to have followed and complied with the goals and environmental 
understandings of the NEP's funding and regulatory bodies. Only the accounts of Kemp (2004, 
1996), Aitken (2002) and Lungely (1988) have been published.
These accounts have illustrated not only the development of the NEP as such, but also the changing
policy environments of the writers. They describe problems of stability, funding, evaluation, co-
ordination and performance. They tell stories about NEP peer-professionalism, yet in so doing, tell 
a counter-story of collaboration betweent the official, managerial and political aspects of the 
environment of the NEP. These accounts illustrate how people live socially through using stories as
shaping, stabilising and sustaining technologies of interactional networking (Somers, 1994: 614). 
Social story-scapes seem as pervasive as land-scapes, object-scapes, techno-scapes and body-
scapes (Turner 2001: 475-478, 499-502). This conception allows actual storied life to partially 
occupy accounts, such as the reviews explored here. This conception offers a way of understanding
how stories can be active in the present moments of reading, re-visioning, and translating (Rich, 
1990: 483-4).
2   Stories of communities and professionalising
The NEP, along with needle exchanges in general, developed partly alongside and partly within 
global HIV/AIDS policy frameworks. Many international comparisons of policy responses to HIV 
have resulted.127 Berridge, for instance, describes phases of policy-making that have been linked to 
125. I have been particularly interested in these reviews because they were constructed as ‘wholes’ with a narrative and 
analytical intent. However, an analytical comparison has been precluded by space considerations.
126. See Kemp (1990, 1993, 1996, 2003, 2004), McNicholas, Garret & Baker (1996), Auerbach (1994d), and Nimmo 
(1994a, 1995a, 1995b).
127. I have considered accounts of developmental phases by Berridge (1996, 1995, 1993), Patton (1990), Altman (1994), 
Stoller (1998: 139-147) and Hulse (1997). Other influential accounts include Aggleton, Weeks & Taylor-Laybourne 
(1993), Fox et al. (1989), Kramer (1989), Whitehead (1989) and Carr (1989). However, an alternative concept of 
sequences of public and policy 'states', ranging from urgency to normalisation, or complacency, is also found in 
Berridge (1996) and Street (1993). For phases of normalisation see Steffen (2000), Rosenbrock et al. (1995), van 
den Boom (1998), Day & Klein (1989), Porter & Porter (1988) and Downs (1972). Writing in a New Zealand 
context includes Parkinson & Hughes (1987), Lindberg & McMorland (1996), Davis & Lichtenstein (1996a,b) and 
Plumridge & Chetwynd (1994). For sequential stages of consensus construction see Crofts et al. (1994). These 
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phases of control of service delivery. These phases included the evasion by health professionals of 
accountability for HIV/AIDS, along with innovative community organisation and service 
provision, followed by re-occupation of such service provision environments by health 
professionals and health bureaucrats. Most analyses of general responses to HIV/AIDS identify 
three or four phases of policy change, where community control is accepted and empowered during
an initial state of crisis, before being limited, reduced, and assimilated in successive later phases. 
At the same time, the engagement of community organisations in policy and service delivery often 
increases, yet in either more politicised or more institutionalised ways (Altman, 1994). New 
Zealand's institutionalised policy responses have been critiqued, along with those of other 
countries, as 'selling out' by Altman.128 
Patton (1990) has described a pattern of autonomous, distributed, grass-roots community 
organisation, initially conflicting with centralised government and health professionals, yet 
becoming more centralised during a later phase. A single institution, possibly constituted from 
competing elements united by common goals of funding and status, exhibits shape and coherency 
through the structuring logics, and professionalisation of NEP services. In Patton’s account, these 
professional accountabilities are multiple, with related sets applying to publics, special groups, and 
to the maintenance of territorial boundaries.
Stories that link legal rights to moral codes and to personal health feature strongly in sociology. For
instance: “the ‘good’ citizen in the modern world is the ‘healthy’ citizen” according to Petersen & 
Lupton (1996, in Bashford & Nugent, 2001: 112).129 Moral narratives (Rousseau, 1981), which 
were challenged after the Nuremberg Trials by ethical constraints on scientific knowledge 
acquisition, have troubled the methods of health professionals and social scientists. Yet IDU are 
equally troubled when persuaded or induced to be ‘good’ by being ‘healthy’ while injecting illicit 
drugs. I was sensitised to such stories where they appeared in accounts of NEP policy arguments 
and of monitoring NEP clients, due to my direct experience of being a moral ‘associate member’ of
an excluded social group that nonetheless considered illicit drug use to be completely normal. My 
awareness of personal vulnerability extended to a wider network of collective vulnerability. Here I 
was informed by the AIDS stories about communities (Altman), intersecting collective 
vulnerabilities (Stoller), on the policies of AIDS testing, and of political exclusions from ‘the 
public’ for health reasons as well as legal sanctions and moral stigma (Baldwin, 2005; Brown, 
different concepts of phases and sequences may be treated as complementary perspectives.
128. “Community organizations need to walk a fine line between seeking to influence the agenda and performance of 
governments and becoming subsumed into the interests of the state. In some countries - I have heard this criticism 
about both New Zealand and Denmark ... the constituencies of successful AIDS organizations see them as having 
‘sold out’ to the demands of the bureaucratic state” (Altman, 1994: 162).
129. Petersen & Lupton (1996, in Bashford & Nugent, 2001: 112)) discuss the Aborigine patient’s ‘careless and 
irresponsible habits’ that ‘render it impossible to keep him under observation, or to submit himself to a course of 
treatment unless he is under restraint’”(112). Bashford & Nugent relate the ‘compulsory isolation’ of Aboriginal 
people to their perceived ‘incapacity for modern citizenship” (2001: 108). 
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1999, 1997). I followed the attention these authors130 paid to how individuals and groups have been
excluded from participating in ‘the public’ domain of citizenship. These authors drew attention to 
the significance of gains, however small or contested, of a public voice through methods particular 
to geographic and historical localities. In my account I emphasise moral narratives about drug use 
and drug prohibition in particular. 
However, the unique historical and geographical features of New Zealand reduce the relevance of 
direct comparisons between the NEP and international needle exchanges. In consequence, I have 
assumed that a longitudinal comparison of NEP developments within New Zealand can be 
effective131 and can usefully precede international comparisons. Furthermore, shallow international 
comparisons hold dangers. For instance, comparisons with rapidly gathered Australian statistics 
can generate numerical differences, but of uncertain relevance and significance, whereas trans-
Tasman evaluations that attribute too much value too quickly entail an assumption that differences 
between Australian and New Zealand environments ‘should’ reduce.132 The consequences and 
meaning of international comparisons require greater specification of what case parameters are 
being selected, or generated, or compared, and why. Given my even-handed scepticism towards 
expert testimony and documentary accounts, and my commitment to accessing all the available 
records, a trans-Tasman study in such detail would have been unachievable within my research 
constraints. Instead I have explored the near context of the NEP, following closely connected 
policies and programmes in New Zealand.
Lindberg & McMorland (1996: 103-115), and Davis & Lichtenstein (1996a: 3-7, 1996b: 226-227) 
have applied the useful, conventional concept of phases to the New Zealand AIDS Foundation 
(NZAF) history. These phases do not specifically analyse any pattern of accountabilities between 
the NZAF and state agencies, yet it seems implied that professional organisations would not 
directly challenge their government (Lindberg & McMorland, 1996: 104). Nonetheless, Lindberg 
does not emphasise how the AIDS Service Network, which was the precursor to the New Zealand 
AIDS Foundation, competed for jurisdiction with conventional medical professions over issues 
such as control of biomedical testing policy, and provision of prevention services.133
130. Baldwin (2005) and also Brown (1999, 1997) analyse wider relationships between diseases and democracy in terms 
of connections and differences between private and public practices. Baldwin utilises a model of complex and 
unpredictable tradeoffs between the regulation of public health benefits and civil liberties. Both analysts approach 
such relationships through case studies in AIDS policy. Brown restricts himself to a geographical study of North 
American and New Zealand localities. Baldwin provides a wider comparison of AIDS policy differences across 
industrialised societies. This builds on his earlier work on relationships between epidemics and state policy in 
Europe (Baldwin, 1999).
131. Such comparisons might become increasingly valid if New Zealand drug use patterns, methods of harm reduction, 
and standards of record keeping, approached Australian norms, or vice-versa. This would make regular comparison 
easier but would also lead to pressure to copy Australian monitoring and evaluation methodologies. Since local 
methodologies, despite faults, are developed for local conditions, their replacement poses risks.
132. Such a political project with ideological underpinnings is not promoted, either overtly or covertly, in my analysis.
133. Warren Lindberg was the Director of the NZAF over most of the period I deal with. Lindberg’s presentation 
illustrates how the NZAF had come to control a health jurisdiction, rather than opposing or resisting medical 
domination. This control involved acting similarly to other health managers, who find it expedient to follow a 
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Other New Zealand focused accounts134 of marginalised communities135 have been written by Phil 
Parkinson (Parkinson & Hughes, 1987). Parkinson has been admirably direct in his descriptions of 
historical and continuing conflicts of interest between treatment professionals and the gay 
community (National Council on AIDS, 1988b: 1-2). Parkinson & Hughes (1987) and Lindberg & 
McMorland (1996) have summarised how HIV support and education funding was primarily 
community driven, with minimal government contribution, until quite late in the development of 
co-ordinated responses. Michael Brown (1999) has analysed HIV/AIDS programmes and 
organisations in Christchurch in terms of 'regime theory'. Brown notes how arrangements between 
public and private spheres have led to HIV/AIDS governance practices being characterised by 
flexibility, yet also by difficulties in maintaining governance coalitions.
I initially studied Altman's (1994: 6, 7, 162, 167) analysis of the relationship between community 
organising and state programme development. Altman argued that: “Wherever it is possible, there 
will be grassroots responses to the demands of the epidemic, and no government or international 
agency program can be effective if it does not cooperate with, and support, such responses” (1994: 
166). He generalised this analysis across different societies, and it clearly applies to the New 
Zealand NEP. 
Altman focused on the significance of linkages between community organisations and state 
agencies. He raised awareness of problems inherent to expanding governance capabilities through 
methods which could lead to ‘detachment’ from community foundations and accesses. He also 
problematised his own use of the term 'community', showing how it could be highly politically 
laden and differently understood (1994: 7-8). But Altman seemed to have no alternative given that 
his analysis was not grounded in any particular society and therefore needed a general unspecified 
term that readily crossed different societies.
Altman has not offered any close, in-depth case study that explains capabilities in terms of 
sustaining, shaping, and stabilising effects (Campbell, 2004: 62-65; Tilly, 1997b: 6-9, 44-45) by 
exploring local developmental conditions. Yet Altman’s analysis continues to portray the necessity 
medical collegiate code of never denigrating fellow health professionals in public conflicts over professional 
territory (without extreme provocation). Constant conflict over turf is disguised by professional needs to maintain 
collegiality, to work in collaboration with different health professions and managers, and to maintain public trust in 
the medical profession being selfless and expert.
134. Various analysts have discussed the control of accounts, stories and cultural constructions of HIV/AIDS. Such work 
informs the generation, understandings, and evaluations of accounts in a variety of ways, for a variety of individual 
and institutional causes. See Treichler (1999), Epstein (1996) and Waldby (1996). Gilman (1988), emphasised how 
HIV/AIDS co-existed with and was shaped by responses to older STDs. Lichtenstein (1996), followed Gilman in a 
New Zealand context, while also offering impressive local contextual detail of AIDS service organisations and their 
connections to state agencies.
135. For New Zealand Prostitutes Collective and New Zealand sexwork accounts see Perez-y-Perez (2004), Plumridge & 
Abel (2001), Plumridge, Chetwynd, Reed, & Gifford. (1997), Plumridge, Reed, & Gifford (1997), Eden (1997), 
Chetwynd (1996) and Lichtenstein (1996: 300-314). The New Zealand Prostitutes Collective provided a discreet 
needle exchange service within the NEP by the mid-1990s. Jang (2003) has written a short unpublished paper on the 
social environment of the Hepatitis C Resource Centre, which developed out of the Christchurch peer exchange. 
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and consequent institutionalising of grass-roots community organising:
The development of AIDS organizations often plays a significant role in building a sense of 
community in stigmatized groups ... [however] any idea of ‘community based’ must involve 
some sense that the organization represents the community in question, and how this is done is 
one of the major theoretical problems facing almost all AIDS CBOs.    (Altman 1994: 7)
Altman emphasises that centralisation and other forms of distancing from grass-roots community 
networks, does not characteristically emerge as pressure from below, but is instead pulled from 
above:
In only a few countries are there effective national networks embracing all - or even the bulk - 
of community-based AIDS organizations. Where these have been created, this is often ... at the 
instigation of central governments eager to establish one peak body with whom they can deal.  
(Altman, 1994: 101) 
Lindberg & McMorland (1996) offer an account of a NZAF that became increasingly capable as it 
moved from grass-roots to corporate to professional identity. Despite greater social distances being 
involved in a shift from a ‘flat’ politics of gay community to a hierarchal connection between 
grass-roots and policy elites, this distancing was not followed by the development of continuing 
divisions, although some divisions did emerge. Kemp (2004) notes that the AIDS Task Force, then 
a division of the Department of Health, attempted to reduce the centralised, professional influence 
of the NZAF, and any similar organisation, by promoting independent local initiatives. Kemp 
infers that this was a significant aspect of the crucial decision to offer contracts to the initial IDU 
peer outreach groups on a regionally independent basis. Nimmo (1995a) warns of some criticisms 
from the 'gay community' of the NZAF becoming detached from its roots, yet proposes that needle 
exchange development should be modelled on the NZAF example of 'professionalising'.
Stoller (1998) continued and supported Altman's themes, with special emphasis on conflicts within 
community organisations. Stoller focused more closely on the situations of minorities and the 
marginalised in North America, looking more at how being poor, a woman, and black intersected 
with being gay. Altman and Stoller combined local case studies more symmetrically with wider, 
more generalisable theorising. Both authors generalise 'outward' to provide conceptual frameworks 
that continue to be relevant to modern industrialised western societies. They tend to focus on 
communities and health. Along with Treichler (1999), Altman and Stoller are often sensitive to the 
consequences and significance of professionalising expert knowledges. Yet they generally ignore 
the social construction of crime (Becker, 1973, 1964), for instance in how drug criminalisation in 
the U.S. through the 20th century was mutually entangled with the increasing influence of medical 
professionalism and with the medicalisation of substances and substance using motivations 
(Courtwright, 2001, 1997, 1982).
Analyses from the U.S., however, cannot explain phases in the development of the New Zealand 
NEP. These phases are best understood as parts of whole events, for instance within longer 
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duration dependencies and conflicts between state agencies and medical professionals, yet also 
embedded in local environments. Alternatively, the phases in the NEP development might be 
further broken down into analyses of the logics and expectations that participants experienced as 
en-scripted into social institutions and objects. Such logics and expectations would appear to 
inform the workability of the policy, regulations and implementation of the NEP as understood by 
participating actors at any moment. It seems necessary, accordingly, to select sites where such 
understandings of the NEP were being applied. I have paid attention to the grounded sites of 
everyday IDU life, and everyday peer-professional work, because policy makers can only propose, 
not dispose. Policy would not have happened as practice unless other people agreed to participate 
in approved actions and communications. Yet such information is very difficult to acquire directly 
from the everyday worlds of illicit and stigmatised people.
The NEP has been explained as a story of a characteristic consensus or enlightened response 
(Paterson, 1996), or as an account of an initial experiment that turned rapidly and successfully into 
an institution of 'partnership' between communities, professionals and state agencies.136 The 
conventional NEP explanation of origins is an adaptation of this model, which seems based 
primarily on the NZAF’s formative history.137 Yet Plumridge and Chetwynd’s (1994) analysis of 
New Zealand policy responses to HIV/AIDS concludes that popular accounts invoking a 'natural' 
or prior consensus that explains local developments in prevention and support, are inadequate. 
Plumridge and Chetwynd offer a more institutional account of 'manufactured consensus' (1994) 
which supports Kemp's description (2004) of Department of Health tactics of 'contrived 
spontaneity' and the UK accounts of ‘manipulated emergence’ (Harrison & Wood, 1999). A story 
emerges of a governance method of managing potential disorder and reassuring the public by 
enrolling representatives of marginalised communities in programmes that offer health services to 
their peers.138
There is considerable evidence to support such stories, but such accounts do not adequately explain
the particular situations observed in the development of the New Zealand NEP. Models of 
136. See Davis & Lichtenstein (1996b), Plumridge & Chetwynd (1994), Crofts et al. (1994: 50). However Plumridge and
Chetwynd support Berridge’s analysis, in New Zealand contexts, by demonstrating negotiated conflicts through 
which consensus emerged. For Australian perspectives see Hulse (1997) and Blewett (1997). Crofts et al. (1994) 
discuss community involvement in policy responses and ‘ad-hoc’ partnership models. Hulse critiqued Australia’s 
changing degree of inclusion of ‘affected’ communities in public health responses to HIV and HCV. Ex-Minister of 
Health, Neal Blewett (1997) quickly responded in defence of government policies. For discussion of parnership 
between marginalised community groups and state agencies in the context of womens’ refuges in New Zealand see 
MacGibbon (2002: 20-22). Surtees (2003: 36-48) and Tully, Daellenbach & Guilliland (1998: 245-255), discuss 
partnership aspects of the professionalising of midwives in New Zealand. Women’s refuges and midwifery are 
notable for being based on a peer principle, yet also requiring state agency funding, regulation, and shelter according 
to bureaucratic principles. Such hybrid ‘partnership’ situations seem similar to those of needle exchanges.
137. See Lindberg & McMorland (1996: 105), Parkinson & Hughes (1987).
138. The profession of venereology had popularised the concept of ‘at risk’ groups during the late 1960s, together with 
the concept of being ‘peers’ rather than enforcers of moral agendas. However, the actual practices maintained a 
professional divide between practitioners and community, with no Departmental support for community based 
sexual health education by actual peers. See Kampf (2007: 188, 190, 212). Venereologists were not prepared to 
directly challenge the stigma that linked venereal disease with illicit or deviant sexual practices.
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consensus and partnerships in IDU worlds do offer approaches for researchers, despite structural 
ambiguities and some counter-evidence. Consensus and partnership goals have seemed prevalent 
within the New Zealand health sector policy community.139 This partly explains a variation 
emerging in the form of the AIDS Service Network and the NZAF. Yet consensus and partnership 
in the NEP context have seemed more driven by contingencies, chance, and personal charisma in 
unique events that demonstrated path-dependent consequences (Lichtenstein, 1996: 405-411). Nor 
had my personal NEP experiences of governance through such enrolments appeared as smooth or 
reliable from the inside. More general stories of problems inherent to commercial and managerial 
models of health, seemed as well-evidenced and as likely to discretely appear in officially 
commissioned reviews of the NEP, as those of consensus and partnership.
Comparatively little ethnographic work has been done among New Zealand IDU (Kemp, 1996: 
154). Of the available work,140 most has been done through clients of needle exchanges, which 
might distort representativeness. However, information derived from law enforcement 'clients' and 
those in voluntary treatment seems likely to be far more distorted, as apparent in decades of denials
by Corrections Department officials that injecting drug use took place in New Zealand prisons. 
Such deliberate misinformation by corrupt officials was only possible because IDU inmates could 
not afford to tell their stories against those who controlled their environments. In being convicted 
criminals, their public voice had been curtailed in access and status. IDU in treatment are also very 
different from those in everyday drug-using contexts. Information originating from undistorted 
IDU experiences is particularly useful because the use of actor network analysis requires treating 
criminal or otherwise marginalised perspectives in the same way as law enforcement perspectives. 
Actor-network methods alert the research to effects being co-produced from heterogeneous 
alliances. From this perspective, studies of syringe movements also study the movements and 
motivations of IDU .
Despite several overt gaps in policy and implementation documentation, the most direct absence of 
sources that has impinged on this research has been the erratic character of the documentary record 
of the NEP. The depth and range of understandings found in the documentation of the early history 
of the NEP seems generally poor. I explain this by pointing to the stigma of the IDU situation, 
combined with the secrecy characteristic of IDU, officials, and the keeping of histories. People who
knew about the NEP were either working within it or employed by state agencies in related areas, 
139. See Barnett, Malcolm, Wright, & Hendry (2004), Barnett & Barnett (2004), Gauld (2001a: 429-430) and Barnett & 
Barnett (1999).
140. Matthews & Leland (1990) surveyed public and consumer attitudes in Dunedin just as the local peer group began 
operating. Plumridge and Chetwynd (1999, 1998) sampled the ‘moral worlds’ found in the everyday life of IDU 
who share needles and syringes. Anonymous telephone surveys from the mid-1990s have produced data on illicit 
drug use. However, the accuracy in terms of injecting drug use is questionable, being counter-indicated by HCV 
incidence rates. As illicit drugs become normalised, telephone research technologies have become more feasible. 
Accordingly, they provide a measure of illicit drug normalisation when compared with more precise measures based 
on incidence rates of marker diseases such as HCV.
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providing reasons to not enquire too deeply. Such contexts explain why peer-professional patterns I
describe have not been specifically written about by the participants who experienced them. 
Moreover, such absences seem in no way exceptional in the health sector.141
Over the same research period that I obtained archival material on the conflicts over the expert 
advice to the Minister, I drew on actor-network accounts of the scientific expertise featuring in 
medical professionalism. Professionalism was a story that some NEP actors cited and understood 
well (Nimmo, 1995a, b, c). Professionalisation has been associated with establishing collegiate 
linkages and public status for private practices through trust, whereas bureaucratisation has been 
linked to directing activities through regulation.142 Professions143 may usefully be treated as 
institutions in themselves, and as constituents of governmentality systems.144 This trail circled back 
into a structural model of conflicts between medical professional interests and IDU interests.
Andrew Abbott treated disciplines and professions similarly to careers, in being constituents in 
wider structural systems that develop historically, and in more extensive and chancy environments 
than an 'ideal type' instrument can explain. Abbott (2001, 1990) combines interactional analyses of 
professionalising processes with philosophical and methodological explorations of time and 
history.
Abbott tells a story (1999, 1992a, 1988, 1982) about historical changes in professional jurisdictions
produced by boundary shifts in a system of inherent exclusions and conflicts. This story presents 
professional characteristics as traits associated with a configuration of conflict and control 
processes.145 To Abbott’s more precise story of ‘profession’ and ‘professionalising’, I add an 
everyday, generalised complement that refers to an excellent degree of quality and reliability in 
commercial transactions. 
Abbott shows how some forms of professional domination work by comparing and contrasting 
potentially changeable professional boundaries with their provisional solidification through social 
141. I have been intrigued by the number of medical and nursing textbooks that do not have a publishing date. It is as if 
the books are claiming to be timeless authorities, despite generally being one of many editions. In certain ways, 
health as practiced seems highly resistant to the idea of health as within history, and health best practices as never 
adequate by later standards.
142. Both methods offer guarantees of dependability and accountability, but different expectations, methods, and 
consequences. I consider managerialism to relate to corporate environments that can ‘speak with a single voice’, if 
needed, and are suited to working towards a single or narrowly constrained set of goals. Nonetheless, during the 
period studied various collegiate and official health systems were reconfigured in a corporatist form and mode 
during neo-liberal experiments in New Zealand’s state sector governance. This has meant that the relationship 
between administrators, officials, and managers became less specified and more overlapping, at least in potential.
143. Patients, officials, politicians, and other professions all require health professional work to take place. For discussion
on professions, semi-professions, deprofessionalisation, and clinical governance in conventional and new forms see 
Döhler (1989), Bucher (1988), Tordoir (1995), Reiter [undated], Abbott (1992a, 1988: 161), Freidson (2001, 1999, 
1994, 1990, 1975, 1970), Evetts (2003), Le Bianic (2003), Elston (1991: 59), Larson (1977), Johnson (1995, 1972), 
Bucher & Strauss (1961), Hall (1949). The NEP developments did not seem semi-professional (Etzioni, 1969; 
Toren, 1972), post-professional (Burns, 2007) functional trait-oriented (Flexner, 1915; Greenwood, 1957; Wilensky, 
1964; Pavalko, 1988) or power-holding (Johnson, 1995; Larson, 1977; Freidson, 1970), because the criminal aspect 
of injecting illicit drug ensured that qualified professionals were driven away, despite the health provision goals of 
the NEP. For theorisation of complex service organisations see Hasenfeld (1992), Gronbjerg (1992). For analysis of 
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expectations, laws, and conflicts.146 Abbott’s boundaries seem inherent aspects of communication 
and shared expectations, which become legally categorised and infrastructurally consolidated into 
‘professional territory’. Such territory may be conceived of as the shaped and reshaped zones of 
jurisdiction, where the actual connections and disconnections of professionalising practices in 
everyday work are delineated. Abbott conceives of multiple boundary conditions becoming joined 
into a new boundary in a process of assembling, consolidating, stabilising, and expanding of 
organisations and institutions. As I interpret this argument, the initial line of division with respect 
to professional boundaries does not necessarily remain, because Abbott acknowledges that social 
structures are in constant change (Abbott, 2001: 254, 257, 263, 266, 296). 
According to Abbott, institutional boundaries, including the territorial rearrangements of 
professions over time, may precede the naming of the consequent entity. Abbott (2001: 261-279) 
suggests that instead of analysts finding prior entities in order to find the revealing boundary sites, 
analysts should look for the boundary conditions. Such conditions may even possibly come before 
the material infrastructural changes, such as the address, the office, the university, and the 
employee wage system that become assembled to form the supportive organising of named entities.
However, this suggestion draws attention to the various types of activity of material objects that 
could constitute such conditions of assemblage.
I have used Abbott to inform my approach to the intersections where illicit activities meet 
professional boundaries. Abbott offers a story of solid boundaries of institutional expectations 
which are difficult to clearly describe in purely organisational terms, but become clearer as a 
history. Abbott’s story indicates how consensus and partnerships in the NEP might be constructed 
as history. Moreover, Boston et al. (1996) focused on the need for trust147 since the erosion of 
professionalism could compromise the management and design of state sector policy. I considered 
that IDU deviance, alongside forms of general health sector consensus and professional territorial 
conflicts over jurisdictions,148 seemed more durable and explanatory as co-factors than many of the 
discretionary work practices outside of major state sheltered professions, in European contexts, see Le Bianic 
(2003), Evetts (2003), Tordoir (1995), Elston (1991: 59), Döhler (1989), Habenstein (1970), Reiter ([undated]). 
Tordoir (1995) describes European concepts of professionalism as less formal, less centred on state protection of 
territory and institutional reproduction, involving more employment by state agencies, and being more defined by 
the degree of discretionary judgement in everyday work. I consider the NEP has more in common with European 
than UK or US models of professionalism.
144. I considered shifting my case away from the actual NEP, towards the theoretical frameworks of the sociology of 
professions, but feared my approach would be more obscuratory than exploratory. I have not pursued such wider 
frameworks beyond the context needed to explain the conflicts with IDU and health officials/managers that became 
incorporated into the NEP. Governmentality perspectives might have been used to explore the needle exchange area, 
especially aspects of surveillance, and the ‘arrangements of life itself’, as in the institutionalisation of IDU and peer 
role types. However, I decided against this approach. I consider it would entail more theoretical baggage, and is less 
attuned to objects and interactional networks, than historical, interactionist and ANT approaches. However, some 
governmentality approaches overlap with actor-network approaches (Valentine, 2007: 500). See, for instance Rose 
& Novas (2003), Haggerty (2001), Rose (2001). I think it useful for actor-network and historical/philosophical 
methods to be applied to the crucial surveillance aspects and questions of governmentality. 
145. See Abbott’s study of the development of the psychiatric profession in the United States (1982). Abbott puts aside 
Weberian, ideal type of comparative understandings of professions and instead develops an understanding based on 
a single case study of the organisation of an occupation (Abbott, 1982: 4). Abbott’s (1988) trait definition of 
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policy and organisational phases found in conventional accounts of the NEP and general HIV/
AIDS policy.
My account of the NEP has featured a ‘peer-professional’ concept and practice that links analyses 
of communities and institutions to illicit objects and occupations. Peer-professionalising does not 
refer to professionals who become secret IDU, nor to ex-users who qualify as counselling 
professionals. Instead I refer to the public face of illicit drug use, combined with professional 
standards of work and professional aspirations for autonomy and public trust. Nor is professional 
training or qualification required, provided that professional types of goals, logics, and practices 
are pursued. The term attempts to encapsulate the adaptive character of the peer capabilities for 
making decisions within a deliberate and necessary, yet also uneasy, entangled and ambiguous, 
hybrid linking of criminal drug worlds to professional health worlds. I have not found any directly 
comparable concept in the academic literature.
Peer-professionalism can be observed in the NEP’s ‘blood awareness’ educational campaign.149 
This attempts to motivate IDU to be aware of a zone of potentially contagious surfaces around any 
act of injection. The goal is not only to reduce harm by improving environmental safety and 
encouraging IDU to adopt a calculated, precautionary stance. It is also to improve the quality of 
health promotion information, particularly its accuracy and receptivity to on-going research 
findings. The ‘best practice’ of NEP peers in this instance is to promote ideal harm reduction 
standards and find pragmatic ways of approaching these, rather than using the difficulties to 
legitimise the acceptance of average or lower standards.150 More generally, I have asked how 
professionals and peers evaluated each other, and were evaluated by others due to their 
collaboration in the NEP.151 I also considered how peers and professionals enhanced their 
capabilities by supporting or restraining each other in public. 
The concept of hybrid 152 peer-professionalism emerged slowly.153 The concept consolidated from 
professionalisation in North America involved three core, and four significant processes of professionalism. The 
core processes were: “the change from individual to group practice, the cultivation of rationalized or scientific 
knowledge, and the creation and maintenance of particular clienteles” (1982: 1). The significant processes were: 
“the play of individual incentives, the goal of professional autonomy, the implications of professional knowledge, 
and the requirements of social control” (1982: 1). Abbott cited eight general characteristics of professionalism, three 
being fundamental, consisting of expertise (knowledgeable skills), qualification (special training in those skills), and 
certification (control over services, licensing, monopoly, and ethics). Abbott appended less critical but still 
significant aspects, such as fixed remuneration, altruism, strong associations in a professional body, vocational 
subculture, and a foundation of client trust. Abbott cites Millerson (1964), and Hughes (1958) for the range of 
conventional understandings of professionalism.
146. Burns (2007: 82) disagrees.
147. Boston et al. (1996) write from the outside, and top-down, delicately outlining problems and robustly celebrating the
state sector changes after 1984. Their critique is, accordingly, more compelling than a critical perspective.
148. There have been long-term conflicts between health professions and state officials over control of health budgets 
(Immergut's, 1992). Reviews of the prevalence and incidence of HIV that originated from clinics, both overseas and 
from New Zealand, seemed important in providing a 'sheltering umbrella' for the IDU peers who were employed and 
normalised in the NEP. Such reviews provided evidence that syringe supply did not cause increases in other health 
problems related to injecting practices. However, the health sector had been reduced in status by social movements 
for de-medicalisation and by public conflicts over professional dominance. For instance, a Government report 
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an interplay between evidence, critical analysis, and participant responses to initial memos and 
presentations. In the process I borrowed structural elements and rationales from the previous 
stories, from my personal experiences in the NEP, from the shunning of peer outreach by the 
addiction treatment industry, from the threat of a peer strike in 2001, and by considering how a 
small number of individual NEP 'policy entrepreneurs' both differed from their peers, yet were also 
more understandable when peer norms and expectations were considered. The peer concept helped 
connect this train of logic to the issue of peer-to-peer counselling, and to a way of explaining 
continuous change within stable boundaries. I evaluated the degree to which all the NEP peers 
were actively using identifiably peer-professional types of concepts. Peer administrators including 
Burnett, Wright, Kemp, Nimmo, and Henderson expressed partial aspects of such ideas. As I 
interpret their words, they were hunting for a vocabulary and grammer to carry their meaning more 
succinctly and reliably. This suggested that their NEP environment and organisation was better 
described by using a formalisation of such terms and articulations. An actor-network sensitivity 
ensured that I did not simply formalise a typology out of these realisations, but instead encouraged 
the emergence of a concept of dynamic instability of an assemblage of heterogeneous elements. 
These held themselves in provisional alignment by means of circulating object, expected 
accountabilities, expertise of experience, professional landscapes, commercial logics, harm 
reduction ethos, and personal work.
I followed hybrid connections between peer-professional individuals and organisations, in 
historically contingent peer-professional environments, through their occurrences, sequences, 
structures, and significance as ongoing events. This approach has overlapped with new institutional
approaches. These ask how organisations become institutionally 'locked in' to the shapes of 
founding environments and embedments; how accidents of organisational birth become presented 
as essential elements of stability in accounts; how control of institutional reproduction leads to 
professional types of attempts to assimilate the territorial jurisdictions of other occupations; and 
(Cartwright, 1988) into the 'unfortunate experiment' conducted by Dr. Green at National Woman's Hospital 
remained influential in 2007. The report told a story of a need for patients and others to distrust the potential abuse 
of medical expertise, authority, and collegiality. Specialised, collegial expertise was presented as a significant reason 
for medical professionals being at times effectively unaccountable to patients, public, politicians, and officials 
charged with rationing health services within set budgets. 
149. See Appendices 4 & 5 on Blood Awareness and other safety campaigns.
150. See Appendices 4 & 5 on Blood Awareness and other safety campaigns.
151. See Fear & Barnett (2003) for a discussion of recent New Zealand developments in collaborative health work. 
152. Yet the general concept of hybrid organisations and institutions have not been common as tools of analysis, 
especially policy analysis. I suspect this is because hybrid assemblages seem to undercut, or more accurately, 
overflow beyond, the simplifying aspects of typologic approaches. Instead of locating a case in relation to ideal 
types in a static approach, hybrid activity appeals to uncertainty due to emphasising the instability and constructed 
non-reality of types and type-based comparisons. Nevertheless, hybrid examples have not seemed contentious when 
limited to particular phenomena and cases, rather than presented, as in some actor-network approaches such as 
Latour’s, as a pervasive aspect of reality. D’Aunno (1992: 352-354) uses a hybrid model to characterise and 
evaluate how the Alcoholics Anonymous ‘addiction as a single disease’ self-help models have mixed in North 
America with mental health ‘psychosocial adjustment to environment’ professional models. Kirk & Kutchins (1992) 
do not refer to hybridity yet offer a description of rather hybrid paradox and uncertainty in mental health 
organisations. Tuunainen’s (2005) Contesting a Hybrid Firm at a Traditional University offers a descriptive 
85
Chapter 3.      Articulating stories, objects, analytical narratives
how, in general, an ecological approach might be taken to the way the claims of some occupational 
groups are more readily accepted, while those of others are rejected or questioned (Powell, 1991, 
1987). Some institutionalists, such as Büthe (2002: 487), accept a mix of historical narrative 
analysis and model analysis, yet reject attempts to form structural analyses of event sequences from
the development of network boundary analyses. I differ in finding such approaches useful154
I have found no direct treatment of a concept of hybrid peer-professionalism between crime and 
health in social science literature.155 There are stories about the legal hazards faced by outreach 
workers and researchers in criminal situations, such as where injecting drug networks interact with 
HIV/AIDS programmes. The discussion on legal hazards approaches my focus on productive 
conflicts between professional types of goals and accountabilities and those of IDU peers.156 There 
are stories of communities unifying or allying in consensus, of communities and officials creating a
partnership model157 of working together on mutually benefiting policy or organisational phases, of
pragmatic necessities of the moment, of conflict, of betrayal, of loyalty, and of contingencies. 
Syringes, in their patterns of kinaesthetic movements, told stories, similar to how a river tells 
stories of its slower-flowing environment. I particularly value the stories which offer precise details
of how developments proceeded (Berridge & Strong, 1991). These various types of accounts have 
influenced my research perspectives. Single case studies inherently configure the intersection of 
multiple disciplinary fields. In the NEP case, fields such as geography, history, phenomenology, 
systems philosophy, holistic health care, biomedicine, anthropology, and epidemiology have been 
drawn on. This review is intended as a brief guide to the research relevance of such storied 
accountings. It is offered not as an exhaustive survey of such fields and worlds, nor as a detailed 
diary of changing itineraries along a research trail, but instead of the relationship of each to the 
other. 
analysis of conflict between academic and commercial hybridity where conventional concepts of hybridity are either 
locationally separated forms of “close collaboration networks between different actors” (2005: 175) or where staff 
have simultaneous academic and entrepreneurial accountabilities such that “the dividing lines between academic 
research and industrial development seems to vanish altogether’ (2005: 175-176). Hybridity is initially presented as 
coalescing clearly distinct areas yet Tuunainen proceeds to problematise these understandings in a boundary analysis 
similar to my treatment of the hybridity of the Needle Exchange Programme. See also Guston (2001) on boundary 
organisations. Criminologists have utilised a general model of an uneasy hybridity between public and private forms 
of security provision, although such usage has been critiqued as rigidly structural and non-historical (Johnston, 
1992), (Sheptycki,1999: 223), Stenning & Shearing (1980), and Walker (1978).
153. It did not appear in a presentation eight months after beginning the research, but did in a presentation 12 months 
later.
154. See Abell (1993), de Swaan (1988), Appendix 9, particularly 9.6.
155. General concepts of niche formation have been articulated in ecological evolutionary literature by Odling-Smee, 
Laland & Feldman (2003). These are concepts that link individuals with groups as constituents of whole systems 
that develop over time in partially controlled material and activity environments. Such environments are inhabited 
by individuals that may be agents in how, through environmental modification, they can alter their constraints and 
opportunities in path-dependent ways. This work seems usefully applied to human activities, such as the production, 
transport and use of objects, and as a heuristic for explaining possibilities of semi-stable developments in the 
intersection of health and crime activities (Manning & Godfray, 2004; Laland & Odling-Smee, 2003).
86
Section 2:    Stories of communities and professionalising
Section  2
Assembling a Social History
156. (See, for instance, Fitzgerald & Hamilton (1997), Fitzgerald (1996), Broadhead & Heckathorn, (1994), Friedman 
(1993), Griffiths, Gossop, Powis & Strang (1993), Power & Harkinson (1993), Sterk-Elifsen (1993), Grund, 
Blanken, Adriaans, Kaplan, Barendregt & Meeuwsen (1992)).
157. See Fitzgerald (1995: 14), National Council on AIDS (1990a: 80), NEP (2001: 3).
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4Professional shapings: Specialists, pharmacists, and officials
The actual rearranging of life and death is producing cross-talks that are forcing us to redescribe our
philosophical inquiries, particularly to let go of extremely durable recurrent binaries. ...there is no way of
doing ethical action outside of actual engagement, ... so that domains of practice make claims on each
other, which at times results in partial translation and stuttering communication. ...That is not a barrier, it
is the condition of signification.
(The Birth of the Kennel: Cyborgs, Dogs and Companion Species. Donna Haraway, 2000c: np, with
stutters)
1   Connecting sex and drugs: does it matter which came first?
In this chapter I begin the substantive steps in my argument that the NEP capabilities have been 
partly unique, partly path-dependent, and characterised by a peer-professional principle. I have 
described how my approach of linking object and institutional mechanisms to event cycles and to 
the shapes of actor understandings, suits the exploration of single cases such as the NEP. An 
international review of the efficacy of needle exchanges noted that: “... both intentional and 
unintentional barriers ... are often specific to local settings, [yet] there are often common structural,
legal, and ideological barriers that can be identified ...” (Strathdee & Vlahov, 2001). I treat local 
settings as actively connected to such structural, legal, and ideological barriers. I suggest that 
widespread professional practices connected to first gay, then IDU ‘inside knowledge', despite 
distinctly different community logics of motivation. In this chapter I begin to apply these methods 
to the documents and stories that record the NEP case. 
How do I know this is the beginning? Specifying beginnings and endings is a long-standing and 
contentious issue in historical case analysis. I initially thought the NEP began shortly before its 
legislative framework was enacted in December 1987. I imagined that my analysis would follow 
the implementing and adjustment of these laws and regulations. Yet the more I told that story, the 
more it was queried and resisted by the details in earlier documents. I responded by following these
questions and references. 
I found that the NEP story did not start with the labelling of Gay-Related Immunodeficiency 
Disease (GRID), nor with the biotechnology involved in identifying Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus (HIV). Nor did the NEP begin when health professionals drew attention to the connections 
between IDU, partners, sex workers, and clients. These happened several years before any need to 
legalise syringes was acknowledged.158 In other societies the frameworks of understanding and 
158. The work of framing barely started when authoritative bio-medical epidemiology 'pulled' Gay Related Immune 
Disorder (GRID) out from the messiness of life and up to a policy-making political elite as a newly labelled social 
problem. The framing gained traction when a contagious virus was eventually concluded to be the primary cause, 
and unsafe social practices to be the contributing causes. The framing gained further traction when it was realised 
that the heterosexual public was at risk, due to sexual transmission from heterosexual injecting drug users (IDU).
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capabilities did not lead to the pattern of hybridity and peer involvement that has characterised the 
NEP. Instead, the NEP began when gay community organisers assumed control over public health 
campaigns against HIV/AIDS, becoming simultaneously vulnerable, expert, trusted, and 
empowered, problematising the meanings of private, public, health, and citizenship.
The first section of this chapter explores the local setting in which the NEP developed. This setting 
was constituted from the environments of state agency, professional, and harm reduction practices, 
while simultaneously being constituted from the institutions of medicine and crime. The second 
section describes how gay activist culture and community organisers responded to inaction by 
health professions and state agencies over HIV/AIDS prevention and homosexual law reform. The 
third section describes different frameworks of policy responses. 
2   Gay peers link officials, medical professionals, and viruses
Licit syringe supply was inconceivable in New Zealand until the mid-1980s, when action in 
response to the threat of HIV/AIDS to the mainstream communities became an overwhelming 
priority for professional and political representatives. Previously, police, health groups, religious 
groups, traditional values groups, residents, educationalists, and many other mainstream lobbies 
opposed anything that might conceivably reduce the stigma and legal disincentives of illicit drug 
use. Syringe supply entailed unjustifiable career risks in what was then a stable employment, 
highly state-centralised159 and professionalised health system. The concept of syringe supply was 
only accepted from overseas after new biomedical tests for HIV were available to provide reliable 
data for promoting evidence-based policy and models.160 Such evidence allowed the opposition to 
syringe supply to be ‘put on trial’.
Modern societies have been characterised as alliances of state and profession, or of state agencies161
159. By centralised I mean that implementation was directly centred on state agencies and oversight. Later systems were 
contracted to and had funding supplied from central state agencies, but were not implemented by state officials or 
employees. Nor were the later systems reliant on professional medical personnel, since a model of administration 
had been replaced by a management model, and the managers were no longer required by legislation to hold 
professional medical qualifications. For example, hospitals in New Zealand became centralised in 1938, with the 
passing of the Social Security Act. Previous hospital developments had only been partially centrally funded, and 
was: “relatively haphazard, with the government being only one of a variety of providers, and with the establishment 
of hospitals being determined as much by local politics, political posturing and the influence of the medical 
professions, as by established need” (Gauld, 2001b: 220). The NEP, accordingly revisited or echoed a previous 
pattern of non-centralisation, yet not as ‘normal’ but as the ‘re-emergence’ of a forgotten past in the form of a 
forward-directed innovation responding to direct, immediate needs as much as to institutional frameworks of 
centralised official and professional systems.
160. Needle exchanges were 'invented' in Amsterdam in 1984, to reduce hepatitis B among IDU. In New Zealand, 
methadone supply programmes were considered to be, or at least presented as, curative treatments for drug use. 
Methadone was neither understood nor presented as a palliative treatment, involving harm reduction through 
maintenance. This may be because palliative treatment has only been considered ethical, from medical perspectives, 
when no curative treatment has been available. See Jenner (2001) for an ANT informed account of methadone in 
New Zealand. Van Kuppevelt (2000), has analysed Christchurch drug treatment centres.
161. I treat ‘a state' as an ideal or evidenced entity of national governance. This is different from the production of 'state 
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and professional bodies.162 State legislation protects professional jurisdictions from predation by 
competing occupations and other professions (Abbott, 1988, 1982), and from lay challenges over 
expertise and self-help. Professions 'package' their ethical, organising, expertise, wealth, status, and
surveillance systems, all of which also support the capabilities and authority of state agencies. In 
the health area, these mutual dependencies are codified in legislation, beginning a ‘modern health 
era’ with the Medical Act (1858), and supplementary legislation (Saks, 2002: 149-150). 
Nonetheless, health professions also compete with state agencies over their degree of autonomy 
and the priority of ethical accountability (Stone, 2002), especially of control over regulations and 
financial remuneration.163 State-professional relationships seem inherently complementary, since 
they cannot be separated, yet their productivity seems to derive from utilising their specialised 
differences in expertise, by means of actors who co-ordinate such differentials in unexceptional, 
everyday life.
New Zealand health professionals had followed international medical trends by medicalising 
unauthorised drug use, and by promoting the criminalisation of unauthorised drug use.164 In New 
Zealand, as a variation on UK and US models, health professionals165 claimed jurisdiction over 
treating drug users, similarly to the treatment of gays, for a succession of physiological, 
behavioural, and mental disorders.166 These general disorders of drug use were also supposed to 
constitute or represent the illicit activities and desires of IDU.167 Yet during the 1970s a multi-
stranded, anti-authoritarian social movement which opposed medicalisation, while promoting the 
control of caring practices by consumers and patients, had emerged.168 Gay rights and gay 
liberation movements also emerged during this period. Furthermore, after a period of stigma, the 
specialty of venereological began to be more professionally organised in New Zealand (Kampf, 
2007). Certain disorders became more negotiable. Yet previous challenges to proper order and their
settlement through corrective treatments and regimes became more complicated and problematic.
Self-help addiction groups had, decades earlier, challenged professional medicalisation from a lay 
effects', through network connections of agencies that collectively align ‘statable, statistical, and statemental’ types 
of activity.
162. See Moran (2002), Ericson & Haggerty (1997: 69-70; 101, 111-114, 119), Johnson (1995), Beck (1992), Miller & 
Rose (1990), Menzies (1989), Abbott (1988: 30, 232, 320), Larson (1977).
163. See Allsop (2002: 79-93), Rosenbrock, Schaeffer, Dubois-Arber, Moers, Pinell, & Rosenthal (1995), Stacey (1992), 
Immergut (1992).
164. Refer ch. 1, sect. 2 & 3. See Davenport-Hines (2004: 365-375), Courtwright (2001, 1997, 1982), Marez (2004), 
Marks (1990a, 1990b), MacCoun & Reuter (2001).
165. Division of treatment expertise and organisation between clinician and addiction specialists, and between 
physiologists, counsellors, and mental health specialists, are too extensive and complex to describe here. Instead I 
use a general concept of interventionary treatment, either curative or palliative, for individual patients in a private 
relationship, in contrast with preventive expertise in public health relationships and public environments.
166. Such medicalisation of everyday life evokes comparisons with an earlier generation of medical professionals who 
medicalised masturbation, perhaps for similar sex-negative reasons associated with a cultural and legal heritage of 
western christian puritanism.
167. See Thom (2004: 17-24), Douglas (2002: 36-50, 149-152, 160-172), Douglas (1986), Courtwright (2001, 1997, 
1982), Auerbach et al. (1994: 6-9), Zimring & Hawkins (1992), Zinberg (1984), Becker (1973). Many illustrations 
are found in recommended reading literature for professional drug treatment tertiary qualifications in general. 
Ghodse (2002: 1-10) offers a less biased guide than many. See also Davenport-Hines (2004: 294-383).
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collective position through being financially self-supported if needed, by being residentially based, 
by defining addiction as an 'incurable disease', and by relying on faith in a 'higher power' (Ghodse, 
1989: 142-147). Treatment specialists, in general, had not wished to claim such patient-centred 
terrain, yet could not offer better evidence of cures. Since both the lay and professional methods 
attracted dedicated practitioners, workable hybrid arrangements were negotiated in practice 
(Ghodse, 1989: 143). Despite the lay challenge to the boundaries of the area of professionalised 
treatment, both groups shared a common goal of 'religiously' espousing abstinence as constituting a
defining criteria of wellness, while from a somewhat opposed framework, also providing the only 
cure for the 'disorder' of wanting to use drugs. The cultural circularity of this ideological concept 
created unlimited work for treatment professionals, but problematised evidence-based diagnosis 
and evaluation (Waller & Rumball, 2004: 23, 34). 
Before HIV/AIDS became recognised, medical professionals, alongside practitioners who 
legitimised their work by means of biopsychological theories, had dominated the treatment of IDU 
in New Zealand.169 These types of health expert claimed to represent the best interests of IDU when
advocating abstinence-based treatments. However, mounting overseas evidence of the sexual 
transmission of HIV between IDU and non-IDU led to significant numbers of health specialists 
supporting the supply of syringes, even if these specialists did not support the treatment of drug 
problems through harm reduction methods and logics (Kemp, 1996). HIV/AIDS also fell partly 
within the territory of the existing speciality of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). The history of
STD treatment had oscillated between medicalisation and socialising. Medicalising was understood
as tending towards private, individualising treatment even if subsidised by funding from state 
agencies. Socialising was understood as involving a public problem which required public health 
interventions and invoked a collective, moral framework of conduct.170 This history involved 
stigma and patient blaming that engendered opposition, for instance when a Christchurch gay 
community centre was driven to operate its own STD clinic, separate from the moral agenda of the 
mainstream sexual health clinic. In 1982 the services of this gay STD clinic were extended to 
provide information about HIV/AIDS prevention (Parkinson & Hughes, 1987: 77-78).
Health specialists could efficiently access medical research from their overseas peers. An Auckland
Hospital-based TaskForce began its collaboration on HIV between different medical specialities 
around 1983 (Lichtenstein, 1996: 412).171 The gay community responded more rapidly,172 with an 
168. Neo-liberal, socialist, anarchist, radical, and conservative versions of feminisms have offered different critiques of 
the accountability of both professional and bureaucratic control. See Bunkle (1998), Libertarian Press (1991).
169. See Hannifin (1997), Van Kuppevelt (2000), and Jenner (2001: 19-21). Significant support for ‘recovery’ was 
offered by 12-steps groups. However, the disease model used by 12-steps groups was not accepted by many medical 
specialists, despite the support being acknowledged as contributing to better outcomes.
170. See Kampf (2007), Kehoe, (1987). The tactic of ‘contact tracing’ backed by powers of arrest and incarceration, as 
well as the forcible taking of samples without consent in prison situations, illustrates how the intersection of 
individualising and moral practices could be both an intensification yet also a deterrent to sentinel surveillance.
171. However, its earliest records in the National Archives date from October 1984 (AIDS TaskForce, 1984). In 1984, 
the newly elected government appointed a new Minister of Health, and radical state sector changes. Discrete liaisons 
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equivalent degree of access to research. This information was publicly disseminated in gay 
magazines such as OUT! and Pink Triangle (Parkinson & Hughes, 1987: 77-78), unlike the 
medical collegiate approaches. 
Parkinson & Hughes (1987: 77-78) describe how in 1983 the National Gay Rights Coalition was 
resurrected with an HIV/AIDS focus, after going into recess in 1981. In Easter, 1984, a new 
grouping called the AIDS Support Network (ASN) emerged from the proceedings of a national 
seminar. The ASN gathered together many of the existing regional groups, such as the Auckland 
Gay Welfare Group and the Christchurch Gay Health Group. The ASN later restructured itself into 
the ASN Trust, which then changed its name to the New Zealand AIDS Foundation (NZAF). Since
the NZAF was funded to represent and provide services for all people vulnerable to HIV/AIDS, it 
no longer represented gay-specific interests. Instead, the Gay TaskForce was created as a gay-
specific representative group in 1985, working in close alliance with the NZAF on most issues 
(Parkinson & Hughes, 1987: 77-78).173
Under the third National Government, led by Prime Minister Robert Muldoon from 1975 to 1984, 
gay community organisers produced leaflets and sent a delegate to an international conference, but 
received no funding, nor material support, nor formal recognition from the health officialdom, 
which lacked policy direction.174 Nonetheless, the self-funded capabilities of gay organisations 
permitted health officials, some health professionals, and gay communities to take up policy 
positions that differed from mainstream public expectations. Yet health officials depended upon 
public understandings and political support to gain the resources and authority needed to directly 
implement policies, or direct professional agents. The 'spaces' of this policy differential opened up 
a resource for those people, activities, and environments most affected by the social interactivity of 
HIV/AIDS. Since hazardous practices needed to be decriminalised, according to some logics, yet 
were pressured to remained stigmatised or criminalised according to other logics, the institutional 
boundaries of crime, stigma, and status became more negotiable. These shifts were not necessarily 
extensive, nor foundational, but some created new opportunities for work. These opportunities 
responded to the needs of an environment that featured shifting boundaries of interactional 
practices.
By 1985, two separate groups had developed policy responses to HIV/AIDS. The process involved 
shaping themselves into collective infrastructures and accountabilities for delivering programmes 
concealed under the previous government could then have suddenly emerged fully functioning. Certain health 
professionals also acknowledged an ethical requirement, unlike officialdom, to provide expert and timely health 
services, provided these services accorded with the precautionary principle of 'first do no harm'.
172. The initial New Zealand responses predated the identification in 1983 of HIV being the primary cause of AIDS.
173. Regional groups later emerged to provide alternatives to the state agency focus of the NZAF. These included the 
Auckland Community AIDS Services. Body Positive, which emerged later, focused on support and other grass-roots 
activities more than on national funding, policy input, and the co-ordination of education and prevention 
programmes (Lichtenstein, 1996: 384-385; Lindberg & McMorland, 1996).
174. See Parkinson & Hughes (1987: 77-78), Lichtenstein (1996: 383-386).
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of care and advocacy. The first group consisted of those who organised within their local gay 
communities. Their organising patterns drew on gay rights models, then on the Shanti Project 
model from San Francisco (Parkinson & Hughes, 1987: 77-78). The Shanti Project was centred on 
peers ‘giving care’ to people with AIDS, as distinct from professionals ‘providing expertise’. This 
type of community group was funded from within gay communities. As such groups became more 
experienced and effective they held national conferences and developed national facilitating 
structures. They rapidly extended their field of activity from ground-level responses within 
community networks, to include the mid-levels where health provision was strategised within 
specialised agencies. With no effective competition as service providers, they immediately formed 
close links with policy-making levels and national funding levels of health governance. The 
organisers had little previous experience of health sector politics, which differed in method from 
the gay liberation politics that had become familiar over the 1960s and 1970s.
The second group consisted of an informal network of treatment professionals. They had probably 
been communicating in a private, professional capacity. However their cross-specialty 
collaboration became shaped and stabilised when some, but not others, were invited by officials 
from the Division of Health Promotion to attend a meeting in Auckland to offer advice to the 
Department of Health as an informal TaskForce. Those selected constituted the AIDS TaskForce, 
which was based in Auckland Hospital.175 This TaskForce was not formally linked to the 
Department, which was useful, since civil servants could not easily advocate for the reform of 
legislation. The TaskForce had greater freedoms of communication and was more insulated from 
Departmental politics, but was more directly accountable to the health professions which its 
members represented.
Officials, although qualified health professionals, were directly accountable to the government. In 
being a state agency, loyal to the government of the day, the Department was not necessarily 
trusted by the community organisers, health practitioners, medical professionals, and the general 
public. The officials, who represented state agency employers, could not condone illegal acts. Such
officials were averse to negotiating with people such as gays and IDU who, quite publicly and 
blatantly, intended to commit crimes and who advocated for removing public order legislation that 
prohibited private consensual sex activities. For example, the first gay publication on HIV/AIDS 
was disclaimed by Department officials, who inspected the details of the publication for accuracy, 
but refused to be associated with an overtly gay enterprise.176
175. According to national archive documents, their first recorded meeting was on the 15 October, 1984, after Labour 
had won the election from National (AIDS TaskForce, 1984). Other accounts suggest they first met around 1983. 
See (Department of Health (1985a), Holden (1985b), Bassett (1987a). There had been other taskforces set up in ad-
hoc fashion, but no others were recognised as supported by the Department while not at all formally connected to 
the Department.
176. See Lindberg & McMorland (1996: 105-106), Parkinson & Hughes (1987: 78-79).
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Although the Shanti Model initially focused on providing support care, its adherents also promoted
effective public AIDS prevention programmes, as did the TaskForce. This goal required an initial 
evaluation of the conventional models of disease control. New Zealand legislation had prescribed 
forms of border control, isolation, quarantine, ‘cordon sanitaires’, and compulsory vaccination 
(Gray, 2006; Sewell, 1987: 43-44). Vaccination was clearly a non-issue, and it was generally 
agreed that border controls could need tightening. However, cordon sanitaires could not be 
practically defined, let alone enforced, when HIV was intermittently distributed and did not travel 
as a wave-front. The isolation of people diagnosed as HIV-positive, and the quarantine of people 
suspected of being potentially HIV-positive, from having already contracted the virus or through 
being liable to contract the virus due to their practices or reputation, would have seemed potentially
useful, especially for reassuring the public. Yet enforced isolation and quarantine methods were not
supported by medical specialists, nor public health officials. A number of factors were involved.
The transmission of HIV was through specific activities, such as sex and sharing injecting 
equipment, not through casual contacts, or merely being in someone’s general vicinity. This meant 
that quarantine could not be justified without labelling those quarantined as lacking in the 
capabilities or responsibilities for adult self-control and social morality. There were no medical 
treatments to cure or to eliminate infectiousness, which meant that incarceration in quarantine 
would apply for a person’s remaining lifetime, in some form of tax-funded custody, similar to the 
sanatoriums and leper colonies of previous eras.177 The pragmatic difficulties in maintaining the 
infrastructures of systems of widespread, long-term segregation would be immense, as well as 
culturally unpalatable. Furthermore, most past episodes of national quarantine programmes were 
not considered highly effective.178 
The quarantining of a group of people for being social dangers, for example gays and sex workers, 
could not be effectively and efficiently enforced in a democratic liberal society. If IDU had not 
already been put in prison, they could hardly be quarantined. Yet the quarantine of HIV-positive 
people only could not be effective unless targeted on the basis of group identity, or by relying on 
large numbers of people to co-operate with the sentinel surveillance needed to identify those who 
were potentially contagious. Yet if imprisonment in a quarantine programme seemed a prospective 
outcome of surveillance testing, then the co-operation of those most needed to be compliant could 
not be ensured, making the expense of such programmes unjustifiable. 
Quarantine and isolation programmes were thought likely to be demanded by many of the public 
for the satisfying of aesthetic and emotional prejudice.179 But such programmes and prejudices 
177. See Krieger & Appleman (1994), Nowak et al. (1991), Anderson & May (1988).
178. See Gray (2006), Sewell (1987: 43-44), Skegg (1987: 6). 
179. See Lindberg & Johnstone (1987: 30), Sewell (1987: 44), Musto (1986). However, a public referendum to introduce 
quarantine legislation in California in 1986 had been lost by two to one. See Kirby (1988), Jayasuriya (1988), Lee S. 
(1987), Le Poire et al. (1990), Earickson (1990), Ranney (1987). Similar attitudes might well have been found in 
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were unjustifiable according to the rational, evidence-based planning methods which the officials 
and health specialists were required to employ. The only barriers which could be defended as 
effective in preventing HIV transmission were condoms, which required individual choice and 
motivation during a private social interaction. Quarantine risked excluding the person and driving 
the virus underground in many potential hosts. By contrast, a condom wordlessly asks those having
sex to participate in isolating any viral risk, quarantining the virus and not the person. The 
combined condom and education approach promoted peer motivations towards individual 
accountability and choice, instead of reinforcing social barriers constructed from fear, secrecy, and 
stigma. Such logics and models of community-based motivation change, together with providing 
safer material environments, provided the goals towards which different medical, research, and 
community efforts became aligned, initially in San Francisco, then in New Zealand (Lindberg & 
Johnstone, 1987: 28-31).
3   Shaping the frameworks of policy responses
In 1983 Bruce Burnett returned to New Zealand with an AIDS Related Condition (ARC). Burnett 
had worked with the Shanti Project in San Francisco. Astonished by the lack of effort being applied
to national organising in New Zealand180 Burnett took on a commitment to remedy this situation. 
By 1984 he had promoted, assembled, and represented the network of regional AIDS support 
groups which named itself the AIDS Support Network (ASN). This community network requested 
and received stakeholder status with Department officials, who arranged for Burnett to attend the 
TaskForce meetings of biomedically qualified health professionals. Burnett represented gay 
communities, people with HIV/AIDS, and particular organisations, yet he has also represented lay 
people and communities in general. Moreover, he acted for a form of health care outside of state 
direction. This type of community care was a volatile, hopeful response to the deficiencies in the 
existing practices of professional care and epidemiological research. 
The emphases on collectives and embedment contributed to a concept of 'environments of risk', as 
contrasted with individuals, groups, and practices of risks (Barnett & Whiteside, 2002: 81). The 
emphases in education and prevention shifted away from providing specific, time-limited 
interventions by outside experts, and towards providing social and material influences that were 
continuously reinforced by community peers. This type of service was not provided in the state 
sector and was perceived as conflicting with conventional priorities. For instance, after the 
Department paid Burnett to be an AIDS Support Network (ASN) educator and representative, 
certain medical specialists protested that health funds were misused by the employment of a lay 
New Zealand. 
180. Before 1984, New Zealanders were proud of their liberal socialist tradition of central government care for the needy.
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community organiser “to educate people how to have safe sex and how to inject drugs safely” 
(Department of Health, 1985c). Department officials deflected this accusation by describing 
Burnett as contracted, rather than as representing the Department as a full employee.181 In an 
increasingly antagonistic environment, the distancing and impermanence of contractual 
relationships provided a mechanism of stability. 
During his inaugural attendance at an AIDS TaskForce meeting, Burnett lectured the members on 
how: “gay men found difficulty in taking advice from the medical profession. Gays ... could not be 
motivated by fear. Such counselling required trained people” (AIDS TaskForce, 1984). This stance 
challenged established professional territories, especially that of venereology.182 Burnett was 
referring to how understandings of illness and death due to HIV/AIDS had been presented as 
biomedical facts which required behaviour change, yet were also associated with a history of 
medicalisation reinforced by puritanical attitudes to sexual desires.183 Psychological diagnostic 
manuals had labelled gay desires and practices as harmful (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992: 179; Bayer, 
1981), which had supported the criminalisation of gay men in codes of law (Logan, 1985) by those 
with religious and moral agendas. Venereologists were particularly distrusted by the gay 
community (Lichtenstein, 1996: 423).
Burnett and the AIDS Support Network (ASN) challenged the domination of HIV/AIDS policies 
and programmes by the medical professionals and biomedical expertise that constituted the AIDS 
TaskForce. According to then current institutional understandings, an STD was diagnosed through 
micro-organisms, but its spread was caused by the disordered behaviour and morals184 of 
individuals, who consequently should be blamed and shamed as a public health component of their 
medical treatment. 
However, the ASN re-presented HIV/AIDS as a social challenge, not merely another sexually 
transmitted disease. This stance reshaped general definitions and institutionalised understandings of
diseases away from being essentially biomedical. That is, away from being limited to individuals or
even ‘cases’ that excluded the whole patient from serious consideration except for the imposition 
of moral and behavioural demands for compliance. Instead of basing their approach on an 
ideological foundation of individualism and reductionism, the ASN applied a holistic method. This 
method emphasised the individual accountability needed for preventing HIV transmission, and 
expressed the goal of promoting quality in scientific research. Nevertheless, the ASN method 
allocated greater priority to ensuring the effectiveness of public health, education, and social 
interactions as a whole (Lindberg & Johnson, 1987: 28). 
181. See AIDS TaskForce (1984), Department of Health (1985d).
182. See Lichtenstein (1996: 423-424), Logan (1985).
183. See Kampf,(2007), Kehoe (1987: 7), Lindberg & Johnstone (1987: 28-29).
184. A miscegenation of religious and secular puritanism seems involved. This framing of social problems as individual 
faults abetted religious stigma and presented homosexual law reform as a private rather than a public benefit.
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Burnett and colleagues presented this biopsychosocial approach as a better foundation for HIV/
AIDS prevention practice.185 The experts in this method were not the bio-medical specialists in the 
scientific reductionism of clinical medicine, nor similarly reductionist bio-psychologists with their 
medicalised methods of defining normality and deviance. It was not made clear who did hold 
biopsychosocial expertise, but it was implied that skilled practitioners could be found or trained in 
New Zealand if a suitable policy and programme environment was created. This did not constitute 
a governance problem at state level because the general concept of community care and de-
institutionalisation (Baker, 2002: 18) was acceptable to the fourth Labour Government. The way 
this biopsychosocial approach was presented blurred the boundaries between an actively caring 
community and a caste of qualified, career professionals. 
The AIDS Support Network (ASN) pointed out how institutional attitudes contributed to the 
continuance and potential increase in the number of HIV/AIDS transmission. Since gay identity 
and sexual activity were often equated, frequent sex with multiple partners was seen as effectively 
a norm within gay culture (Parkinson, 1987a; Lindberg & Johnston, 1987: 28-30), regardless of 
legal prohibitions. Yet official or professional health advice on reducing transmission hazards 
during sex was suspect, because gays had well-established reasons to distrust the ignorance and 
fear the prejudices of health professionals (Parkinson, 1987a; Lindberg & Johnston, 1987: 28-30). 
As late as 1987, when the NEP infrastructure was being planned, gay community challenges to 
biomedical biases appeared in the New Zealand Medical Journal (Parkinson & Hughes, 1987), and 
Phil Parkinson informed a public symposium at the Auckland School of Medicine, that:
Even within the gay community in Wellington, I found that in a survey group of 78 mostly 
openly gay men, almost 20% had NOT [original emphasis] told their personal doctor of their 
orientation. A larger proportion had concealed this information from their doctor at a time 
when it might have been relevant to their health, usually in connection with stress and anxiety. 
Again, the reason is fear of what the doctor will think, and the possibility that they will receive 
inferior treatment because of the doctor’s prejudice. And I’m sorry to say that some doctors are 
very prejudiced and very ignorant. ... only twenty years ago the American Medical Association 
still considered both homosexuals and masturbators to be mentally ill. No wonder the patients 
don’t trust the doctors. ... I would urge all doctors who are involved in STD work to 
scrupulously avoid bringing their religious or moralistic prejudices, racism and or homophobia 
into the consultation with them. ... Do not stigmatise your patients, for by doing so you place 
them at increased risk. When we are labelled, we are no longer people, whether we wear a 
medical tag, a pink triangle, or a yellow star.  (Parkinson, 1987b: 24-25)
Medical professionals on the AIDS TaskForce added to such distrust by refusing to support 
homosexual law reform, despite the physical harms caused by the criminalising of homosexual 
practices (Parkinson & Hughes, 1987: 79). Such general distrust was reinforced when a nurse 
refused care to the first person known to have AIDS in New Zealand (Parkinson & Hughes, 1987: 
78). The professionalism which guaranteed the ethics and overall benefits of testing, whether in 
response to individual concerns or sentinel testing, was shown to be liable to prejudice and denial 
185. See AIDS TaskForce (1985b), Burnett (1985), Clements (1985).
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of care. The historical legacies of distrust were reinforced by current instances and fears that 
sentinel testing regimes would objectify and isolate individuals, and define gay communities from 
the outside, inviting stigma and other social dangers (Bayer & Kirp, 1992: 23-24). By contrast: 
“The risk reduction measures that appear to be responsible for the recent decline in the incidence of
AIDS continue to be the most effective means to fight the epidemic” according to Burnett (1984, as
cited in Parkinson & Hughes, 1987: 78). 
Placing sole faith in bio-medical testing clearly required quarantine programmes to be effective, yet
detracted from the community engagement and harm reduction prevention programmes. Burnett 
emphasised at a Venereology Conference in 1985 how: “the sociological and political aspects of 
the AIDS epidemic must be included in the medical response” (AIDS TaskForce, 1985b). A gay 
liberation slogan of the time consisted of ‘we are everywhere’. This pervasive yet invisible 
normality implied that programme administrators and official policy makers could not simply 
target well-identified gay groups for health education and screening. Such logics of control could 
not be expected to apply to a general population where those most likely to contract and spread 
HIV/AIDS were those most desirous of protecting their privacy from medical and related forms of 
official surveillance. 
As Burnett pointed out to the TaskForce doctors: “80% of gays did not want to be identified and it 
was necessary to get in touch with them at a community level. ... the AIDS support network was 
strongly opposed to HTLV testing” (AIDS TaskForce, 1984). At this TaskForce meeting Burnett 
tabled an article extracted from the New York Native Magazine of 8 October 1984 which suggested 
that testing would only do harm to the position of gays in the community, while being useless in 
clinical and epidemiological terms. At the same TaskForce meeting, a proposed survey of 1000 gay
men was abandoned because of practical and ethical difficulties, as well as the questionable value 
of the results from a non-random sample of only 20% of gays (AIDS Taskforce, 1984).
The AIDS Support Network (ASN) informed the TaskForce they were advising the gay public to 
preserve their personal and collective safety by boycotting general screening programmes at 
standard clinics.186 Instead, the ASN would extend their own community-based education, 
counselling, and outreach services through their own clinics, staffed with professional employees 
and volunteers directly accountable to the ASN. Gay representatives such as Burnett attempted to 
minimise or control the potential harms of testing. They promoted a gay responsibility187 to 
enhance community partnership by not donating blood, but they also challenged the accuracy, 
relevance, and social consequences of becoming subject to regimes of biomedical testing. 
186. See AIDS TaskForce (1985c), Parkinson & Hughes (1987: 78).
187. Some North American gay groups argued for continuing to donate blood, since being excluded from the ‘public gift 
of life’ (Titmuss, 1997) reduced their civic status and human rights. This created a climate where non-gays 
increasingly demanded sentinel testing, not only of blood supplies, but of populations, as a public safety measure. 
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By publicising problems of trust and testing, by showing connections between moral prejudices 
and scientific medicine, and thus turning irrationalities of medical practice into a political and 
policy problem, Parkinson, Burnett, and colleagues directly undercut professional medical 
authority. This benefited health officials, who generally were required to reduce the control that 
health professionals could exert over health expenditure. IDU, who suffered as a group from 
refusing to comply with medical control of drugs, also benefited, since those particular cases of 
compliance with medical authority in treatment regimes thereby became excluded from IDU 
society. Officials could not ignore these activist, grass-roots criticisms because they were 
associated with groups that had already achieved measurable health promotion goals, with a greater
expenditure of their own funds than the government had expended over the same period (Parkinson
& Hughes, 1987). 
The prevalence of HIV among IDU helped the AIDS Support Network (ASN) since venereologists,
who could otherwise have claimed HIV/AIDS as falling within their professional territory, could 
not claim expert knowledge of drug injecting modes of transmission. Nor could Departmental 
officials claim any bureaucratic access to expert capabilities in the field of injecting drug use. 
Department officials, supported by Australian advice (Kirby, 1986), were aware that Police, 
Customs, Courts, and Corrections operations were incapable of stopping intravenous or other forms
of drug use, or stopping drug users from having sex with non-drug users. The greater criminalising 
of IDU and greater vulnerability of sexworkers, compared with gays, were recognised in the New 
Zealand National Strategy.188 Moreover, people attended venereological clinics to be cured. With 
no cure, there was no motivation to attend only to receive a medicalised sermon demanding they 
effectively stop being gay, or IDU.
The AIDS TaskForce responded to this challenge to medical and official governance in three ways.
The first was to continue with standard biomedical models and public health organisations, using a 
minimal change model that I describe below. The second way involved promoting a 
biopsychosocial model, which used a new infrastructure to connect ‘deviant’ communities with 
health professionals and policy governance agencies. The third way consisted of denying or 
diluting the priority of the AIDS Support Network’s critique by presenting religious, pastoral care 
as a socially legitimate alternative provider of health services. These responses illustrate how 
features of the institutional terrain in New Zealand were drawn into overt conflict by the need to 
reshape the boundaries around particular sites of care and deviance. The intensity of the public 
crisis, together with the obduracy of HIV and sex practices, led to the weakening of established 
boundaries between categories of care and deviance. 
188. According to Lindberg, (1988 as cited in Lichtenstein, 1996: 390; Lindberg & Johnstone, 1987: 31).These 
comparisons emphasised the futility of driving gays back into the closet, where they would become as difficult to 
contact, motivate, regulate, and monitor as sexworkers and IDU.
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One response of AIDS TaskForce members was to deny that gay communities and their 
representatives had a valid priority based on their greater vulnerability to the harms of HIV/AIDS. 
Several medical specialists on the TaskForce tried to establish what they claimed was a more valid,
pluralistic form of community engagement. They presented 'non-judgemental Christianity', as a 
complementary priority. These specialists accused 'gay empowerment' concepts of dominating 
other perspectives, and argued for Christian counselling to also be supported (AIDS TaskForce, 
1985d). 
In February 1985 these specialists invited a pastor to attend a TaskForce meeting to apply for 
support “as a representative of Counsellors [sic] for non gay persons with AIDS or AIDS related 
queries” (AIDS TaskForce, 1985a). No reasons were recorded for non-Christian IDU, or non-gays, 
or different Christian denominations, to trust, or be motivated by, or accept being represented by a 
single Christian authority. This tactic, emerging from within the TaskForce, suggests reasons for 
the Minister and Department to increasingly appoint the membership of this high-profile, expert 
advisory group, rather than allowing or encouraging self-selection by professionals or their 
professional bodies on grounds limited to qualification and experience. 
Nonetheless, the Minister’s selection of the expert, professional membership for religious and 
political reasons conflicted with the Ministerial stance that both social and scientific expertise was 
needed, but would be most effective and efficient in separate implementation and policy advice 
streams. This tactic also draws attention to the overlapping of Christian and medical professional 
networks. Although religion has been frequently presented as essentially private, and so irrelevant 
to medical expertise and social policy making,189 that was not the case in the manoeuvrings of the 
TaskForce members. This overlapping becomes more significant later, because Christian 
organisations have generally opposed the decriminalisation of illicit drugs190 even more than they 
have opposed the decriminalisation of homosexual practices.
A differing response to the gay community challenge involved AIDS TaskForce members 
attempting to retain control of health services provision by continuing with existing public health 
models, professional clinics, and official monopoly of decision-making. Dr. Ramirez, a member of 
the AIDS TaskForce, proposed that regional task-forces of medical practitioners would be 
employed by the Department. I interpret her model as requiring minimal changes to conventional 
arrangements, as in the following schematic. 
189. For a strong counter argument with compelling evidence see Hager (2006). Hager analyses the covert influence of 
the Exclusive Brethren sect on political processes from which policy becomes legitimised as legislation.
190. There seems no fundamental reason for this in Christian scripture. There is a link between sex and drugs as forms of 
pleasure. There is also a strand of Christian belief and practice involving a ‘puritanical’ rejection of pleasure. 
Nonetheless, medical professionals are influenced by many factors, including a concern for evidence in 
decisionmaking. For instance, a survey in 1985 concluded that three-quarters of young clinical staff had used 
marijuana, and a group of younger doctors lobbied for decriminalisation, to the dismay of their professional body 
(Yska, 1990: 162-164) .
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The 'Minimal Change' Model Diagram  1: 
The proposed Regional TaskForces were to be hospital-based and primarily advisory, similar to the
existing Auckland Hospital TaskForce. They would provide the epidemiological surveillance and 
co-ordination for evaluating needs and allocating existing types of resources efficiently (Ramirez, 
1984). This approach combined public health models of prevention with medical models of 
treatment, in a single system that remained dominated by health professionals and health officials. 
This model seems a cost-effective extension of conventional health services provision. However, 
Hospital Board administrators highlighted underlying logical contradictions.
Such AIDS teams should become the responsibility of the local District Offices rather than the 
Medical Superintendent-in-Chief of a Hospital Board as the difficulties will occur in the 
private rather than the hospital sector.  (Fairgray, 1985)
Moreover, the higher level medical specialists, who were more concerned about managing public 
panics and facilitating healthy relationships between the public, health professions, and health 
infrastructure, considered that many essential functions were not addressed, and could not be 
addressed, by any extension of standard practices of GP primary contact, specialised secondary 
treatment, and recovery support. Ramirez herself accepted that the support needs of AIDS patients 
“are expensive and involve numerous agencies and people and are therefore complex to organise 
efficiently” (Ramirez, 1984).
A month later, Dr Kent proposed that Regional AIDS Consultant Groups would each oversee an 
AIDS Clinic, initially a small pilot project. These Consultant Groups would include a 
representative from the Department, the local Area Health Board, blood donor services, 
Haemophilia Society, Gay Rights, Drug Abuse Centres, Social Workers, and an AIDS Referral 
group. The Clinic would liaise directly with these organisations (Kent, 1985). Kent’s system added 
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detail to the regional centres. It shifted from a medicalised focus towards wider community 
accountability and input, but only at regional levels. The Department’s governance role was 
unspecified, as was how the Consultant Groups would advise, report on, audit, or manage ‘their’ 
AIDS clinic. Both Department and community were represented, but how policy and programmes 
would connect locally, regionally, and nationally was unspecified. Standard arrangements 
seemingly remained foundational.
Nonetheless, Kent’s system included possibilities for separating the expertise located in the Clinic 
from the managerial issues of strategic governance of specific health organisations, from engaging 
with communities, and from co-ordinating a range of health specialities. Conventional forms of 
medical dominance would certainly be diluted and made accountable to a wider range of 
stakeholders than normal. Yet any representation from gay community organisers and drug 
treatment services would be readily outvoted by the health professionals. Since IDU engaged with 
personnel from drug treatment centres as enforcers of gate-keeping and treatment regimes, not as 
peers, the proposal was further stacked against community representation. At the time this would 
have seemed a reassuring aspect likely to attract support from health specialists, officials, and 
politicians.
The AIDS Support Network (ASN) counter-proposed a model featuring two parallel vertical 
‘channels’ that connected the Department to the community. 
The ASN Basic Model Diagram  2: 
Each channel connected a public 'pool' of health needs to the Department’s funding and co-
ordinating authority. In the left hand channel, the ASN liaised directly with the Department. In the 
accompanying text the ASN functions were described as controlling primary and public health 
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aspects of prevention, and directing policy over GPs and research. In the right hand channel, 
clinicians treated those patients who required interventions and intense support. In this diagram the 
ASN was drawn at an equivalent level to a Clinical Services Coordinating Unit directly under the 
Auckland Hospital in the right hand system (Burnett, 1985), but was less restrained in its vertical 
and horizontal scope, being New Zealand-wide.
Burnett noted that the ASN model of community service provision included the AIDS Referral 
Centres of Ramirez’s practitioner-based model. However, directing policy over research and GPs 
would encourage the ASN to run its own clinics. The ASN would also direct existing aspects of 
primary health, such as GP and biomedical research. Burnett and the ASN did not aim for a 
separatist model. They wanted a pragmatic but radical shift.
There seems to be an attempt to segregate clinical aspects from the psycho-social; generally I 
think this is futile and dangerous. Apart from very specialised clinical aspects ... all discussion 
should include everyone. ... There was a general feeling among the community/lay 
representatives last time of an “orchestrated effort” to silence them and their concerns.  
(Burnett, 1985)
The ASN model presented a clear programme for territorial expansion by community interests, and
retraction of territorial claims by the conventional health professionals.
The AIDS Support Network (ASN) functions that were ‘black-boxed’ in the left hand channel, 
could be assumed to be complexly interactive, because aspects of medical policy combined with 
social policy and forms of implementation without precedent. This would require new work skills, 
start-up funding, pilot projects, and monitoring. The right hand channel functions seemed less 
complex, with well-tried types of organisation and expertise being extended somewhat. The 
diagram invited officials to attain the capabilities of the left hand path, but also to reduce the costs 
and encapsulate the accountabilities at a distance by contracting the arrangements to a non-
government organisation, such as the ASN. The Kent model reduced professional dominance, but 
had not established a single, gay, community-oriented group as the crucial link between the 
Department of Health and all the non-treatment aspects of HIV/AIDS prevention. The ASN model 
did so in a way that clearly prevented professional practitioners from taking control of the 
community clinics and counselling sites where primary contacts and referrals would take place. 
Ramirez responded by insisting that only a fully informed and qualified Medical Officer was 
capable of organising and providing the services of the 'AIDS referral centre' (Ramirez, 1985). This
stance promoted medical expertise and official accountability, while undercutting the claim of the 
AIDS Support Network to holding greater  expertise in community engagement. Nevertheless, the 
tactic and logics employed by Ramirez seem fatally flawed, since it required officials and 
politicians to assume political accountability for the private activities of gays. Gays were 
stigmatised. Homosexual practices were illegal. Yet prevention programmes needed to be trusted 
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by gays, because there was no prospect of a cure to pull them into treatment after becoming 
infected. The diagrams tell a story in which the price of retaining a wider separation between 
professional and lay claims to authority, while simultaneously protecting public health, was to cede
professional territory. 
These three proposals were presented to the TaskForce by its Chairperson, Dr Clements, in a way 
that recognised that one of two essentially different models needed to be prioritised. Dr. Clements 
stated:
While hospitals are undoubtedly going to have to respond to the need for admission of AIDS 
cases, there will equally surely be a need to sort out, diagnose, treat, counsel and reassure very 
many more people than simply those with AIDS. It is envisaged that the following will also 
seek help:
     1 At risk groups
     2 Contacts of known or suspected cases
     3  Those with suspicious sysmptoms [sic]
     4  Worried individuals from none of the above groups.
They will all need a range of services which may include:
     1 Screening, surveillance or diagnosis
     2 Outpatient treatment
     3 Counselling
     4 Contact tracing advice or service
     5 Support
     6 Education
In addition there needs to be a resource in main centres where individuals can be available for 
health education of community groups. Most of these activities could be usefully brought 
together in AIDS referral centres. These might be within the framework of the hospital’s board 
or in the community and voluntary sector.    (AIDS TaskForce, 1985b)
Dr Clements shifted the emphasis from clinics, with their medicalised expertise and hierarchal 
forms of administration, to a concept of ‘referral centres’, with information and people crossing 
lay-professional boundaries. He left open the question of the ownership of these centres, but knew 
very well that hospital administrators wanted no extra work, especially that involving private 
activities, perhaps illicit, with unclear funding arrangements and accountabilities. One 
administrator stated that involvement could: “overtax all in the hospital and local area. I fully 
realise the emotive appeal of AIDS and the need to prevent great emotional outbursts, but the 
number of cases is likely to be, hopefully, very small ... (Fairgray, 1985).
Dr Clements also knew that the shaping and stability of any health system depended upon funding 
systems, where funding streams and priorities might be altered by actors at key configurational 
points. He presented three funding alternatives, although the first seems a red herring. He stated to 
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the TaskForce:
Payment for services might be ... run predominantly by hospital boards with medical officer of 
health and voluntary agency assistance. Or it could be a departmental activity, the department 
paying contractual fees for services rendered - this would not easily fit any existing model. 
Another option would be to fund a voluntary body centrally who would contract out services as 
required.   (AIDS TaskForce, 1985b)
Both of the two feasible funding options involved offering effective control of funding bottlenecks 
to agencies that might lie outside conventional medical professions or the official Department 
hierarchy. Dr Clements pointed out the potential problems of the Department becoming directly 
accountable for numerous regional contracts for experimental forms of services provision. This 
only left the ‘voluntary body’ option, as Dr Clement told the story.
The third response by AIDS TaskForce members to the gay community challenge was to accept the
lack of capability of medical expertise and attempt to redress the situation in two ways. The first 
was to argue that law reform was an essential component of changing people's lifestyles towards 
safer practices. However, the influence of these particular members was insufficient to carry a 
proposal, on both compassionate and scientific grounds, that the TaskForce publicly recommend 
homosexual law reform (AIDS Taskforce, 1985c). The second tactic was aimed at expertise. Since 
HIV/AIDS was incurable, the palliative treatments of people with HIV/AIDS involved the 
organising of collective networks of care-givers over a patient’s remaining lifetime. Burnett and 
several supportive members on the TaskForce therefore promoted a 'biopsychosocial model' over 
the biopsychological and the biomedical models.191
The initial biopsychological approaches to HIV prevention were conceptualised and implemented 
in terms of stages of rational control and understandings of individual patients (Auerbach et al., 
1994: 5-9). Such methods drew on biomedical models of interventions by professional practitioners
in clinical settings. Later methods utilised 'biopsychosocial models' of reciprocal relationships in 
wider environments which included life-worlds and life-phases.192 A biopsychosocial approach 
seemed better suited for support and prevention programmes, in being less interventionist, less 
reductionist, and more sensitive to differences in social environments. The approach included 
interactional models, concern with environments, and diffusion theory.
Some of the biopsychosocial interactional methods focused on micro-situations of understandings 
between emotionally linked people.193 These therapy-oriented methods were nonetheless associated
with community change (Aggleton, 1989). Environmental theories focused on social and material 
factors, such as the poverty, racism, employment, and the imprisonment that increased 
191. See AIDS TaskForce (1985b), Clements (1985).
192. These environments included psychological and social interactions that influenced 'motivational challenges', while 
also being influenced by continuing interactions in life-worlds that might become internalised as 'normal'. See 
Waller & Rumball (2004: 23-25, 33, 39, 44), Engel (1982, 1980, 1977)
193. See Phillips (1988), Emmons et al. (1988), Shilts (1987).
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marginalisation.194 Diffusion Theory (Rogers, 1983) focused on how individual communication and
action was embedded in the networks and foundational aspects of communities.195 
Burnett had pointed out that the TaskForce’s biomedical expertise was inadequate when found 
unacceptable by those being 'treated'. He also showed that alternative logics and practices of 
interaction were available. However, the leading medical professionals on the TaskForce had 
shown they would strongly resist working in collaborative projects where their authority, expertise,
methods, and recommendations would be evaluated from outside their circles of professional peers.
Their separatist priorities were seen in the way the TaskForce members only reluctantly allowed 
Burnett to attend their meetings. Any proposals for participation by the representatives of 
marginalised communities and haemophiliacs was resisted. Even health professionals, such as 
nurses and public health officials, were excluded if considered too ‘different’. Only in April 1988 
was a Medical Officer of Health finally invited to join the AIDS Advisory Committee (Meech, 
1988b, 1987c) which had carried on the TaskForce’s functions. In 1988, according to Lindberg: 
“the only member not a doctor was Kate Leslie, a medical social worker” (1988, as cited in 
Lichtenstein, 1996: 386-387). The twenty-two doctors on the TaskForce unanimously: “ agreed 
that the interests of haemophiliacs were well enough represented by Dr. [#] without the need for 
their representation on the Task Force which is primarily a technical committee” (AIDS TaskForce,
1985b). Arrangements involving any collaboration with political goals of homosexual law reform 
and social goals of community governance of health, would seem to threaten, by association, the 
expert status held by medical professionals. 
Nevertheless, the AIDS Support Network representatives vehemently denied that a 'technical 
committee' could adequately represent the interests of an affected community. Lindberg and 
Johnstone emphasised that:
Heterosexuals have been telling homosexuals what to do for a long time, with disastorous [sic] 
consequences. Sex is that part of our lives that is most private, most personal, most surrounded 
with mystery and fear. Target groups must have a role in planning and carrying out their own 
campaigns within their own social group ... The role of the health professionals is to support 
community action. (Lindberg & Johnstone, 1987: 30)
Although focusing on sex, it is clear that other private, fearful, and mysterious aspects of identity 
and social practices would also contribute to marginalisation. Chronic diseases, such as 
haemophilia, sex work, and injecting drug practices, would all qualify. 
The biopsychosocial model was promoted primarily as a workable adaptation to a society-wide 
problem, in the specific locality of health care, with a specific antagonist of biomedical dominance 
of the territory over community health. These principles were not founded on nor related to 
194. See Ankrah (1989), Fineberg (1988), Gallo & Montagnier (1988), Freedman (1987), Pearson (1987).
195. For more recent diffusion theory relating to HIV/AIDS, see Rogers & Shefner-Rogers (1999). Roger (1983) offers a 
perspective closer to the time of the NEP founding.
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requirements for human rights or other universal ideals. The imperative that drove the lobbying and
underpinned the need for change was primarily pragmatic.Nonetheless, there seems an implicitly 
political human rights and citizenship goal to be found in the pragmatic requirement for the 
empowerment of marginalised people and communities. The AIDS Support Network 
representatives made claims to public participation, based on pragmatic necessities of health 
governance, and were consequently offered a voice in an influential policy forum close to the 
political centre of state agency governance.
In March 1985, the Minister of Health agreed in a private meeting with Burnett, Logan, and two 
Department officials to make a financial grant to the AIDS Support Network, provided a Trust was 
established to administer the funds (Holden, 1985a). The AIDS Support Network had not received 
any previous government funding.196 The AIDS Support Network Trust197 was rapidly formed and 
received funding in May, not only for direct health provision, but also to meet the travel and 
research needs of liaising and directing HIV/AIDS policy (Holden, 1985a). In August 1985 the 
AIDS Support Network Trust renamed itself the New Zealand AIDS Foundation (NZAF). This 
pattern of organising that began as a network of community nodes had become in name, and 
actuality, a national scope and territory.
On the day the AIDS Support Network Trust deed was signed, the Minister's Advisory Committee 
on AIDS replaced the AIDS TaskForce. The AIDS Advisory Committee which succeeded the 
AIDS TaskForce held its initial meeting in July, chaired by Dr Meech198 (AIDS Advisory 
Committee, 1985).199 The Department of Health imposed the terms of the AIDS Advisory 
Committee after the AIDS TaskForce members refused to agree to support any that were proposed 
(Holden, 1985b). The new body was initially called an AIDS Taskforce, but soon was termed an 
'advisory committee'. Presumably the term 'TaskForce' had become inappropriate. This AIDS 
Advisory Committee reported only through the Communicable Disease Control Advisory 
Committee of the Department of Health. It also offered Ministerial advice, but only on request. 
This prevented it from making media releases or presenting the Minister with unwelcome advice. 
The Minister wanted different types of expert advice, but competing claims to knowledge, 
expressed within his solitary advisory committee, threatened constantly to erupt into politicised 
conflicts in a sensitive location. The expert committee was partly controlled as a private space for 
196. Burnett had been individually employed in a consultant/liaison role while also representing the AIDS Support 
Network (Department of Health, 1985d). This expenditure had not been directly authorised by central agencies, and 
totalled less than $7,000. 
197. The 'AIDS Support Network Trust' was a separate legal entity from the AIDS Support Network.
198. Dr Meech was recorded as attending the first TaskForce meeting in October 1984 (AIDS TaskForce, 1984), but 
none of the following meetings.
199. Ten TaskForce members left, including two members who had criticised gay influence over the TaskForce. The 
secretary also changed. A Departmental secretary may have come to be considered appropriate. The chairman 
remained as a member, as did Dr Ellis-Peglar. Five others joined, all doctors, and the membership dropped from 
eleven to nine.
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representatives of individual specialities to work in discrete collaboration, yet it was also a public 
platform from which politicised statements could be launched, and which constituted a tactical 
resource for aspiring projects of empowerment. The Minister needed to integrate the various types 
of knowledge into a pragmatic framework of workability and accountability. However, each type 
of specialist shared a professional interest in promoting their own biomedical frameworks and in 
excluding other perspectives.
The members of the initial TaskForce had begun to be appointed by the Minister himself. The 
Minister supposedly acted on the expert health advice of his Department (Department of Health, 
1985a), despite the Department being bound to follow Ministerial direction. Such ambiguities 
illustrated conflicts of interests between officials and professionals. Some TaskForce members 
criticised the changes (Holden, 1985b), for instance, when the Division of Hospitals insisted that 
the Chair of the new (second) TaskForce not be a Department employee (Department of Health, 
1985b). Equally significant conflicts positioned Christian against gay interests, as noted previously;
and medical professionals against organised lay communities. The signing of the AIDS Support 
Network Trust deed, and the replacement of the AIDS TaskForce by the Minister's Advisory 
Committee on AIDS on the same day, formed a ‘coupled’ response to such conflicts over structure,
methods, and representation. For instance, a senior Department official responded to protests by 
some medical professionals against Burnett's membership of the TaskForce with reassurances that 
the membership system was being changed.200 It was implied that the shift represented by the 
TaskForce turning into the expert advisory agency would prevent the sort of activities and publicity
that Burnett had undertaken.
The new expert advisory agency was to specialise in controlled engagement with community and 
medical expertise. The distinction between the AIDS Support Network being non-funded, and the 
AIDS Support Network Trust receiving a $100,000 grant (Department of Health, 1985d) can be 
understood as a selection and control mechanism. This mechanism separated medical professionals,
peer community professionals, and officials201 with formal boundaries. However, the mechanism 
also strengthened links of similarity between the gay community and conventional health service 
providers. In effect, the community, or its representative body, was moved towards more direct 
contact with funding agencies and legitimacy as a health service provider. Three weeks after the 
ASN Trust received $100,000 as reimbursement and start-up funding from the government, the 
Minister signed-off $345,440 as the initial funding for the ASN Trust to run an AIDS prevention 
campaign. This funding also illustrated the direct, top-down state authorising and organising of 
professional work opportunities, characteristic of European types of professionalism202 where an 
200. See Department of Health (1985c, 1985d). It was well-known that Burnett would not live long.
201. Later community representation on the AIDS Advisory Committee was by a single, professional, NZAF member.
202. See Le Bianic (2003), Freidson (2001), Abbott (1988: 161).
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‘effect of state’ activity can emerge from a distributed network type of agency.203 
The AIDS Advisory Committee was designed to be autonomous in its internal functioning, yet 
highly controlled by the Department and the Minister in its communications. The Committee was 
specifically defined as not being representative of communities, despite including a General 
Practitioner and an ASN Trust member as “representatives” (Department of Health, 1985b).204 The 
NZAF, by contrast, became a service delivery body that expertly represented consumers of health 
services along with communities affected by HIV/AIDS. Grass-roots community influences led to 
a multi-focused infrastructure that was centralised, yet promoted regional representation (Lindberg 
& McMorland (1996: 107-109). 
I consider that the officials of the Department did not want any independent medical professionals 
contesting their advice to the Minister, offering different perspectives to the public, and 
complicating their arrangements to provide services through contracted agencies.205 Independent, 
professional quality, representation leading directly to the Minister from disorderly communities 
was equally undesired by these officials as well as by health professionals, despite their desire to 
research, monitor, and deliver services within such communities. The Minister needed to prevent 
contentious politics from emerging in his professional Advisory Committees, because divergent 
voices compromised the political authority and public stability provided by his enrolment of 
professional expertise alongside, yet conflicting with the tacit knowledge and direct engagement 
practices of community expertise. 
Gays caused a problem for health officials by not following directives and by making political 
demands for support on gay rights issues. Gays caused problems for health professions by publicly 
rejecting specialist demands for trust, rejecting their expert methods, and rejecting the monopoly of
a psycho-biomedical theoretical framework for policy-making. Although these rejections were 
applied to the single area of HIV/AIDS, this was a large and intense area in terms of public 
perception. The ASN Trust's inherent conflicts between representing different regions, and 
reducing differences in its community perspectives, became its private business rather than a 
203. See Le Bianic (2003: 1-2), Immergut (1992). Le Bianic cites Abbott and Freidson as examples of an Anglo-
American sociological perspective associated with a basic division between European and 'English-speaking' 
versions of state-society which includes characteristic types of professionalisation. Le Bianic critiques Anglo-
American perspectives of treating 'the state' as a unitary actor from the perpective of professions, or systems of 
professions. In a case study of psychology in France, “The state apparatus comprises various segments, each acting 
in a different way towards the professions, and trying to promote a particular segment within the profession. ... 
states' policies towards professions are much more ‘anarchical’”. Accordingly, the significance of locality informs 
the theorising of professionalising processes.
204. This created the appearance that the Minister and medical professionals told several different stories about the 
supposed definition and terms of the Committee. On the other hand, the two representative positions might have 
been an attempt to incorporate two specific and forceful lobbying organisations, rather than communities. It seems 
that an indirect form of community/professional representation was wanted, but the appearance of direct and 
effective representation was shunned. There are clear managerial and electoral reasons for accessing expert 
information while rejecting any associated dependency.
205. No communicable diseases Taskforce seems to have existed until HIV/AIDS disrupted existing arrangements.
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Ministerial, Departmental, or professional responsibility.206 Disorderly community voices from the 
ASN became re-ordered in a functional niche of contractual service delivery. 
At the same time as a concept of 'gay community' was being redefined as a 'health care receiving' 
community, it also became redefined as a 'health care providing' community. Certain principles, 
such as the participation and empowerment of 'at risk' marginalised communities, became 
institutionalised during these conflicts. The conflicts cannot be considered separately from the 
alliances. Both need to be included in any characterisation of the shaping and sequencing of events 
as primarily driven by or producing a consensus. Because gays were distinct, due to being 
criminalised, medicalised, and stigmatised, they presented a problem for non-gays. Yet because 
‘they were everywhere’, coexistent with those who considered themselves the mainstream 
community, their very normality constituted even more of a problem. The issue, and problems, 
seem characteristic of the hybridity of the situation.
Organising activities needed to act through representatives, because the sites of policy activity were
'owned', or limited in size, as, for instance, were the collections of officials who controlled access 
to Ministers and funding. This aspect of reduced scale and locale turned collective activity in other 
areas of wider scale into individualised activity, where chance, for instance the early death of Bruce
Burnett, made a difference to the sequence and shaping of events. Long-term established players, 
such as Department officials, had interests in excluding individuals who refused to obey the rules, 
and who resisted exclusion by means of forming durable organisations that offered unique, 
essential services. These organisations attracted funding when official interests perceived these 
organisations as effective and efficient when controlled through their positioning as contractees, 
and when professionally corporatised as Trust Boards. These aspects suggest ways of thinking 
about links between scale, representation, and boundaries. The ASN Trust appears as a shaped and 
stabilised set of boundaries which emerged into wider recognition and negotiations, partly as an 
'organisation', and partly as the exercise of a 'right' to participate. As Abbott (2001: 261-271) might
suggest, in some ways the boundary shifting came first, part as possibility and part as seeding/
ceding incidents amongst many other incidents that later appeared less significant than at the time. 
The initial boundary shifting then became more solid, before emerging as actual occurrences and 
experiences, as well as in the later retelling as events. As a result of organisational compromises 
pursued by the Department of Health in a series of pragmatic steps, the occupational form and 
boundaries of harm reduction work became significantly detached from the direct control of 
previously established players and from conventional institutions.
The implementation of New Zealand’s HIV/AIDS strategy emerged from demands by the ASN for 
206. This accomodation even lasted several years until 1988, when struggles between marginalised community 
representatives and professional health experts forced new adjustments with the splitting of the AIDS Advisory 
Committee into the National Council on AIDS and an appended Medical & Scientific Subcommittee.
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community control of a parallel and autonomous system of professional health care. But was this 
implementation a type of management, or tactic, or a re-working of global to local models? I 
suggest the latter. By controlling the circulation of information at the mid-level of community 
networks, despite set-backs and opposition at advisory levels, gays who worked as HIV/AIDS 
programme organisers effectively controlled the policy configuration in the areas of greatest 
concern. In this way gays came via a health professionalising route to represent the public 
mainstream, in terms of its health, and for its own good. Gays effectively controlled public 
confidence in the authority of state agencies and health professional coalitions, as would any 
equivalently organised and motivated social movement. 
These developments influenced the later NEP emergence and its peer-professional aspects through 
three well-evidenced types of activity. The records of how actors understood their options highlight
the activity of temporal sequences, as in path-dependent constraints on possible actions. The 
records also show how actors established hopes and formal goals from desires and fears, and from 
trust and distrust. This activity involved general patterns of interactions, particularly the hybrid 
shapes between crime and health worlds. A third type of actant involved chance events, as in 
personal characteristics and biographical motivations for involvement. Path-dependencies, such as 
HIV/AIDS, become part of the landscape, continually and actively shaping developments while 
being used to ‘explain’ necessities and choices in terms of being natural or social. Chance events 
such as individual skills and charisma, might suddenly disappear and be no longer directly active, 
only influencing developments in terms of institutional path-dependency. In this manner the linking
of a logos and a logic shifted into greater solidity in the form of a somewhat self-maintaining 
institution, or quasi-object.
In this chapter I have outlined the key actors who established the policy environment and 
organisations that influenced the later emergence of the NEP and its peer-professionals. I have 
shown the increasing status and utility of concepts of peer empowerment and harm reduction, as 
well as the blocking of religious and professional claims in areas characterised by private desires 
and decisions to reject puritan approaches to pleasure and risk. The alliances of community and 
official representatives have been accounted for, despite the inherent antagonisms between illicit 
gay practices and the requirement for officials to uphold the regime of law. In the following chapter
I follow the broader environment of HIV/AIDS policy and organisational models, and specific 
advocacy by gay community organisers for a syringe supply system, to the situations where the 
NEP itself began to take a solid form during 1986.
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5From pharmacy to parliament
... it’s about finding the creativities, the interesting cross-talks, ... a going-on-together that is less
committed to death-defying heroics, more committed to mundane dailiness, more about the ordinary
ethical accountabilities about life in these worlds which aren’t all the time everywhere.
(How Like A Leaf. Donna Haraway, 2000b)
I have outlined where the logics of needle exchanges originated, and when their precedents were 
established, but why in particular places, and how were potential oppositions dealt with? I will 
describe in this chapter how a 'space'207 was constructed from, or between, pharmacies, overseas 
models, local gay organisations, gay IDU, key medical professionals, and health officials. This 
space consisted of patterns, permissions, and regulations over a harm reduction programme for 
IDU, forming a health jurisdiction. Unlike most spaces of regular health work and reliable funding,
this was characterised by the absence of professional claims. Perhaps this is to be expected in a 
new health area. Yet the stages of spatial and motivational translation that explain the emergence of
what was impossible in a single step involved strong professional influences. A discrete 
professional story appeared as part of a sequenced narrative event that became part of, and folded 
back into the actual and messier sequence of incidents and coincidence.
1   A new cycle  - sex networks make syringes an official community problem
The initial HIV/AIDS organising had centred around the reformulation of professional, 
bureaucratic, and community claims over gay sexual activity. Proposals for tighter controls had 
been subverted by offers of community accountability, with a price-tag of community 
empowerment. However, by 1985 the overseas epidemiological literature indicated a potential for 
'explosive' increases of HIV among IDU.208 This literature presented feasible links between IDU 
and wider populations, for instance through sex activities. New Zealand health professionals and 
officials also seemed influenced by a discrete, unspoken mutual need to minimise public panic. 
This need focused attention on how the needs and desires of IDU were to become formally linked 
to the official health policy in the context of HIV/AIDS.
The problems of offering health benefits to IDU had previously been explored in North America 
through debates over the provision of methadone maintenance programmes for treating or 
managing drug problems (Brettle, 1991: 125-126). The issue firmed up as involving a conflict 
between health ethics and legislation. The requirements of medical ethics to provide evidence-
207. Such 'spaces' include physical, conceptual and representational locations of activity. They are not just ‘places’.
208. See Kemp (1996: 153), Lungley & Baker (1989), World Health Organisation (1987: 3).
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based treatment or other care to all, including IDU, conflicted with the requirements of medical 
professionalism to uphold laws prohibiting harmful or evil activities and so retain the confidence of
public and politicians. In 1957 the Council on Mental Health of the American Medical Association 
admitted that such conflicts: "cannot be settled on the basis of objective facts", according to Dole &
Nyswander (1985, as cited in Brettle, 1991: 126).The health of society, understood according to 
non-objective frameworks of evaluation, was accepted as a professional rationale for ‘rightfully’ 
excluding IDU from the best practices of medical care. 
An extreme example is found in the MK-ULTRA programme that involving experiments on 
humans, including patients and IDU, without informed consent.209 Such discrete, uneasy conflicts 
between health ethics and the perception of public interests were also found in New Zealand. For 
instance, until the 1980s venereologists ‘examined’ women inmates without medical need or 
informed consent (Kampf, 2007: 175-176). Yet in general, in New Zealand, IDU wanted 
supervised withdrawal and methadone maintenance treatment, but could not access these due to the
low numbers of specialised clinics and the barriers put up by particular addiction treatment 
professionals.
When HIV/AIDS emerged as a social and physiological problem, the interventions proposed by the
health professionals who claimed expertise in illicit drug use was initially limited to “advising drug
abusers”, along with “supporting suitable community groups” and “establishing confidential 
information and surveillance systems” (Department of Health, 1985e). The initial concepts in early 
1985 were quite ambiguous, yet the proposed interventions into individual motivation changes 
were clearly prioritised over the interventions into community linkages:
Health education is defined as that which brings about behaviour change that improves 
individual and community health. ... Primary aims at preventing the individual from coming 
into contact with the AIDS virus. Secondary aims at limiting or preventing the spread from 
infected people to others. (AIDS TaskForce, 1985b)
209. Such relationships between IDU and health professionals are further complexified by the participation of both in the 
MK-ULTRA programme in the 1950s. For example, one early MK-ULTRA funded study took place at the National 
Institute for Mental Health-Lexington Rehabilitation Center in Kentucky (Church Committee Report, 1976: 
391-399). Addicts were supplied with their drug of addiction as a reward for being injected with hallucinogenic 
drugs, including LSD. Dr. Harris Isbell was one such doctor. He was employed by the CIA as well as being a 
member of the FDA's Advisory Committee on the Abuse of Depressant and Stimulant Drugs. Dr Isbell subjected 
inmates at the Addiction Research Center of the US Public Health Service Hospital in Lexington to intense 
biopsychosocial experimentation without the consent of the participants. The CIA funded these studies and archived 
the records. The CIA documents report that the subjects, who were nearly all black, received LSD for more than 
seventy-five consecutive days. See also commentaries by Marchetti & Marks (1974), Marks (1979), Lee & Shlain 
(2001), Blumsohn (2007). Some of the earlier records and commentary was known to my circle of anarchist IDU in 
Auckland and Christchurch in the 1980s. Such accounts continue to be corroborated by ongoing research. According 
to Blumsohn: “MK-ULTRA research was carried out with the quiet acquiescence of official medical bodies and 
with the active collaboration of many individual academics. Many individuals were awarded high honours, and no 
physicians were ever punished. Despite attempts to destroy MK-ULTRA records [Memorandum regarding 
destruction of MK-ULTRA documents in 1973 (1975), Summary Of Agency Records Retrieval (1994), Helms 
(1978)] much documentary evidence is available and the names of many of the involved academics, universities and 
hospitals are now known. On my way through MK-ULTRA documents I noted many names. A majority were 
doctors.” (2007). 
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Education programmes were framed as primarily treatments, or as isolation from harm. Interactive 
public health then followed as a secondary approach. The more general concept prioritised 
'reception prevention' over 'transmission and reception prevention'. A prescription for IDU 
followed:
Primary consists of stopping shooting. Secondary consists of stopping sharing syringes, 
stopping depositing semen in others, and encouraging condom use. (AIDS TaskForce, 1985b)
'Shooting' was presented as an individual activity, whereas sharing syringes and sex was presented 
as social interactivity. The more IDU-specific formulation for motivation change prioritised 
individual abstaining over safer using practices. The AIDS TaskForce could not prescribe 
abstinence as a 'prevention treatment' for gays (see previous chapter), yet tried to normalise 
abstinence as a prescription for IDU, as outlined in Table 1.
Table 1: Motivation Change Logics
Priority General Goals Implementation Logics Connotations
1° Preventing 
individual risk 
of receiving 
HIV
Abstain from:  injecting drug use?
But not from:   gay sex practices?
Opposed logics
Different models
- Motivation change only
- Treatment expertise needed
- Prolonged intervention?
- Intensive intervention?
- Expensive?
2° Preventing 
HIV social 
links through 
objects
Safer:             injecting practices?
As well as:       gay sex practices?
Aligned logics
Similar models
- Motivation change also
- Environment change
- Public health expertise
- Education required?
- Trust required?
- Focus on objects
The framing of the AIDS TaskForce proposal referred to the objects in IDU-HIV networks, such as
syringes, semen, and condoms, in terms of social interactions rather than availability. Bleach 
became the initial type of injection 'equipment' to challenge prohibition laws. As with public sex 
education on illicit homosexual acts (AIDS TaskForce, 1985c), advocating the use and supply of 
bleach led to unease but was not interpreted as illegal. Nor were police and treatment specialists 
recorded as opposing proposals for the Department to publish information on sterilising syringes 
with bleach. But an uneasy tone was apparent in those discussions, and proposed policies that 
involved the direct provision of bleach were rejected.210 
Despite the unease over directly supplying bleach, the AIDS TaskForce placed the concept of 
supplying sterile injecting equipment on its list of policy options that had been tested overseas. My 
interpretation is that directly supplying bleach involved immediate costs to the proponents of an 
210. See Lungley & Baker (1989: 39). I heard anecdotal accounts during that period that bleach was sometimes found in 
prisons, but this depended on informal work-arounds and the attitudes of particular staff. 
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under-resourced policy initiative. By contrast, a deferred, clearly slower moving proposal to 
institute a formal programme of syringe supply provided the time to gather momentum and status 
in a state-by-stage development. Bleach was simpler to provide than syringes, in fact too simple 
given the institutional difficulties needing to be overcome or reconfigured. The interplay of 
resources and risks have seemed important, but the timing even more so. Earlier debates, strategies,
and organising models preceded and shaped the environment for successive developments and 
reshaping of new conflicts. 
As with the earlier cycle of sex-oriented prevention programmes, staged policy developments were 
notable (Plumridge and Chetwynd, 1994: 289), where planning and community responses both 
influenced the timing and shaping of official policy responses. In mid-1985, Burnett had publicly 
called for safe injecting education (Department of Health, 1985c). In March 1985, Redmer Yska, a 
journalist who later became the Minister’s Press secretary (Yska, 2007) made an appointment to 
see the Minister of Health to discuss issues of injecting drug hazards raised in TOM, a Wellington 
urban culture magazine:
Unlike Australia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.A., no chemist in New Zealand will sell a 
syringe to someone he suspects is a junkie. AIDS would scythe through Auckland's junkie 
population in a couple of weeks. Who knows - maybe it already has. ... pharmaceutical 
narcotics and clean equipment must be supplied to addicts on a controlled basis at approved 
clinics.  (Anon., 1985)211 
The Minister gave sufficient credence to this article, and to the journalistic sources not accessible 
by the Department officials, to agree to the personal meeting (Yska, 2003 pers. com.). It became 
clear from such sources that an illicit form of syringe supply clinic already operated. Between 1985
and 1986, several pharmacists sold syringes, against the dictates of their professional bodies and 
legislation.212 These sales showed that many IDU accepted a user-pays system and their custom did
not disrupt business.213 Yet the handful of pharmacists involved illicitly was unlikely to increase in 
number without syringes being decriminalised or legalised syringes. Some medical specialists 
interpreted syringe supply as opposing their professional ethics and interests by causing harm, even
if indirectly.214 
211. "A decade ago opiates were pretty freely available ... thousands tried heroin at least once. By 1980, hard drugs were 
all but finished ... The early 1980's saw the junkie population enjoying locally grown poppies and another 
"completely non-addictive painkiller" called Temgesic or Buprenorphine which was abused so much by young 
needlers it had to be reclassified. ... And so to homebake which really peaked in 1984 with hundreds involved in the 
main centres. ... Meantime the "sleeping" junkies of the 1970's are crowding back into the drug clinics for treament. 
Re-hooked on all that spare 'bake ... More disturbingly homebake has brought back the needle. And most 
hypodermics are blood-caked and dirty as hell. ..." (Anon., 1985: 1).
212. The police turned a blind eye, but some Christian pharmacists from Dunedin arranged for a Christchurch pharmacist
to obtain proof of sales and lay a formal complaint before their professional disciplinary board. See Lee (1987: 
114-115), Mainline (2003a, b). See also Baker (1987a: 73), Moffett (1987a, 1988), Pollard (1988). Pollard was 
found in breach of professional codes of conduct, censured, and fined. However the Christchurch City Council 
formally honoured Pollard for his contributions to public safety. Pharmacist opposition to any involvement with the 
NEP had been strongest in the southern half of the South Island. See Donoghue (1987a, b).
213. This was feared, due to cultural stigma reinforced by interested groups who attribute social isolation, incompetence, 
nihilism, and ritualism to IDU. The situation seems related to the stigma and opportunism, if not exploitation, of the 
mentally ill and those born less capable, whose social desires are also frequently treated as outside of human needs.
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A syringe supply policy was initially introduced, reluctantly, by the Drugs Advisory Committee215 
in a paper for the AIDS Advisory Committee (1985). This paper described IDU generally as 
irrational, and as ritually sharing syringes, but did not cite any studies of New Zealand IDU to 
support these claims. The paper did however formally note the harms caused by sterile syringes 
being inaccessible, especially in prisons.216 The paper warned against the prospective harms of 
condoning or encouraging IV drug use and recommended counselling to compensate. This 
counselling was presented as conventional and professional, required by but not complementing 
syringe supply.
By July 1985, support for 'community engaged counselling' had appeared in the formal 
Departmental policy advice (Department of Health, 1985e). Community groups became considered
as potentially useful sources of information, but were not specified as potential sources of 
professional service delivery. Instead, an ambiguously named ‘community engaged counselling’ 
was referred to in a professional context, but was not defined as a skill-set, or as an agency type, or 
as an infrastructure to provide access and monitoring. No public IDU organisations then existed in 
New Zealand.
Professional medical expertise was publicly mobilised in alliance with official policies to support 
the proposed legislation changes and to establish an infrastructure for the supply of syringes. 
However, the market logistics and political logics did not necessarily align with the health 
professional logics of independence and the occupational control of territory. The goals and 
rationales differed to greatly for the different elements to simply fall into alignment. These 
differences were bridged, or evaded, by the exertions of a semiformal Ministerial team consisting 
of the Minister of Health, Michael Bassett, his new Press Secretary, Redmer Yska,217 and his 
Special Medical Aide, Dr. Michael Baker. This team linked political, drug-using, and official 
worlds by means of its greater freedom of action and fewer long-term constraints (State Services 
Commission, 1995: 25) than the systems they mobilised. As with Burnett, and later Rodger Wright,
this team was short-term, and more ‘nomadic’ than institution or career-oriented. They occupied a 
214. See later sections in this chapter on opposition to the NEP amendments to the Misuse of Drugs and Health Acts. 
Strangely, whereas public health proponents frequently argue in absolutist terms of providing unambiguous health 
benefits through monitoring public actions, often shifting boundaries to include what many people consider private, 
medical and surgical specialists have generally accepted that any health intervention includes a component of harm, 
or risk, hopefully outweighed by benefits. Yet the NEP was planned by public health specialists according to harm 
reduction logics of balancing harms and benefits, while many opponents came from medical specialty areas and 
argued in terms of absolutes, not skilled discretionary judgement of costs and benefits. 
215. The Drugs Advisory Committee, was established in 1980 as a ministerial committee offering advice on illicit drug 
policy. It came to promote a national cannabis policy that would link with policy on licit drugs, rather than treating 
crime and health aspects as separate (Abel & Casswell, 1998).
216. For an overview of changes in prison policy in New Zealand, see Newbold (2007).
217. Yska has worked as a journalist (Yska, 2007). He also published a book on the history of marijuana in New Zealand 
(Yska, 1990). He has published a social history of the emergence of youth and music culture in New Zealand in All 
Shook Up: The Flash Bodgie and the Rise of the New Zealand Teenager in the Fifties (Yska, 1993).His history of 
the city of Wellington (Yska, 2006), was well-received (Black, 2006). Yska has also published a social history of the 
emergence of the New Zealand teenager alongside  a youth genre of popular music (1993).
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single key space of activity. Each team member drew on their personal connections and expertise 
as a NEP Management Plan was assembled, decriminalisation amendments to the Misuse of Drugs 
Act were drafted, and a set of regulations was developed to work within the shelter of a slightly 
modified Health Act.
A different set of actors formed into the ‘Intravenous League’ (IV League) group. Like the ASN, 
this represented an illicit community, but was far smaller. In 1985 (Mainline, 2003c), or by another
account, in mid-1986 (Kemp, 1996: 154), the IV League was constituted from a small group of 
IDU, and received advice from a handful of supportive medical practitioners (Robinson, 1990). Its 
spokespersons were Gary McGrath and Rodger Wright (Mainline, 2003b; Wright, 1993, 1990) 
who, like Burnett, were gay and HIV-positive. The IV League was quietly encouraged by the 
Ministerial action team, and Yska probably suggested its name (Baker, 2002, pers. com.). The IV 
League helped to convince politicians and pharmacists that IDU were not, as caricatured, careless 
of their lives and health.218 The personal testimony of League members added to local research 
(Robinson, Thornton, Rout, & Mackenzie, 1987), to show that IDU re-used syringes from necessity
alone, not for irrational or ritual reasons. 
We find it terrifying that not only our lifestyles but also our lives are virtually held ransom. It 
is especially disturbing to hear terms such as “guilty victims” being bandied about by 
'moralists' (and I use the term loosely and advisedly) who would rather see no help given us, let 
us die a most horrible death than to see us survive. Ten years ago homosexuals were in this 
position, no-one would dare to be so silly as to suggest that now. Instead it is the time for 
'junkies'. The last (or nearly the last) social group that can be killed off, in the manner 
described above, quite legitimately, by people who are far to [sic] sanctimoniously smug to 
recognise the dangers AIDS presents to all New Zealanders. (Moran & Finlay, 1987)
The League did not directly confront medical authority over the accessibility and standards of drug 
treatments, but did discount medical expertise in the areas of prevention of drug use and the 
reduction of harmful practices. These arguments followed directly from the community distrust of 
medical expertise, as previously articulated by Burnett and others in the AID Support Network. 
The League made direct linkages between homosexuals and IDU when promoting syringe supply. 
The League did not just follow the gay community concerns, but also introduced a new concern, 
particular to blood-to-blood practices, of a disease agent later to be called HCV. In 1987, League 
members warned, far in advance of the later concerns of professionals, officials, and economists, 
that: “People are in grave danger of contracting not only AIDS but also Hepatitis A and B and the 
new strain: non A/non B. Surely the change and legalisation of purchase can be hastened?” (Moran 
& Finlay, 1987).
The League focused first on normalising219 the participation of IDU in health policy, secondly on 
218. See Caygill (1987b), McGrath (1987), Wright (1987), Berks (1988), Kerse (1988e), Kemp (1996, 2004).
219. This is normalisation of persons as citizens, for whom normal chances for living should be offered, in the 
Netherlands sense (Waller & Rumball, 2004: 33), rather than of increasing drug prevalence or use in the UK sense 
(Parker, Williams & Aldridge, 2002; Parker et al., 1998).
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IDU participation in health provision. The League did not prioritise general IDU rights, nor 
decriminalisation, though these were supported by many members. This enabled the League to 
avoid direct clashes over inherent differences in interests with the state legal apparatus, and with 
the drug treatment sector. The League asked for state support, being careful to specify ways in 
which such support could be evaluated and legitimised. For instance, the League did not want to 
run its own service providing agency. Instead it promoted Departmental programmes which the 
League would only have policy input into. The League was similar to the ASN in desiring a 
relationship with state agencies, but differed by avoiding issues of decriminalisation, being low in 
membership, and holding no aspirations to become a service provider. 
The principles of participation and accessibility to monitoring that Department officials and 
professionals had developed with the ASN were readily transposed to the IV League, even though 
the aspirations and defining habits of gays and IDU were in many ways very different. Injecting 
drug use might overlap with gay cultural practices, but to no significant extent. The crucial aspect 
lay not in these differences, but in the similarities of stigma and secrecy, in the similarity of 
vulnerability to HIV/AIDS, and in the similarity of potential transmission to wider, mainstream 
populations. The health policy makers were persuaded that the similarity was significant. 
Nonetheless, the police administrators zealously opposed decriminalising any part of illicit drug 
use.
However, by 1986, a growing body of evidence from overseas indicated that needle exchanges 
achieved a consistent and significant reduction in HIV transmission among IDU, while not 
increasing any drug related problems. Evidence from Amsterdam had arrived by June (Buning et 
al., 1986); from Scotland by September (Precis of HIV Infection In Scotland, 1986); and from 
Australia by November when a paper from Kate Dolan reported on the feasibility of a Needle 
Exchange Scheme (Dolan, 1986). A later police crackdown on drug use and syringe possession in 
Edinburgh caused shooting galleries to re-emerge, along with a well-monitored increase in HIV 
incidence.220 This body of evidence forced policy makers to compare two types of harm, with the 
decriminalising of syringes in needle exchanges seeming less harmful than the deaths of IDU. The 
conventional treatment policy was aimed at ‘saving’ IDU, but a dead IDU could neither be treated 
nor ‘saved’. Furthermore, until they died, an IDU could pass HIV to others, not just to other IDU 
via shared injecting equipment, but also to non-IDU through sexual connections or vertical 
transmission from mother to baby.221 Health professionals and Department officials in New 
Zealand acknowledged that they needed to motivate IDU to reduce the public harms potentially 
caused by their private activities. In the face of both moral and pragmatic reasons, even the New 
Zealand police administrators were persuaded to withdrew their previous vehement opposition to 
220. See Massam (1986) 1-4; Precis of HIV Infection in Scotland (1986); Davenport-Hines (2004: 379).
221. For discussion of 'innocent victims' see Lichtenstein (1996).
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supplying syringes. 
Between November 1986 and January 1987 the AIDS Advisory Committee recommended that a 
syringe exchange system should be developed to increase contact between IDU and education/
prevention counselling.222 The Minister, rather hesitantly, came to promote the concept in public in 
January (Bassett, 1987a), after consulting with and receiving crucial support from Caucus peers, 
notably from Judy Keall (Bassett, 2002. pers. com.; Yska, 2003. pers. com.). The Minister had also
received a supportive review of the Sydney syringe exchange pilot study (Dolan, 1986), which 
included encouragement from Dr Wodak. 
Over the period that the syringe supply policy coalesced, health and policing experts were unable 
to design a comprehensive treatment or prevention programme, for several reasons. Their mutual 
association in promoting law enforcement prevented accurate demographic and epidemiological 
data being gathered.223 Professional expertise could neither cure AIDS, nor vaccinate for HIV, nor 
treat drug problems more reliably than the faith-based self-help groups, the individual-focused 
‘rational withdrawal’ methods, or simply growing out of a drug-using career.224 Overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting models of drug use were employed by professional treatment 
practitioners.225 Myths about IDU permeated the expert advice while carrying a contagious cargo of
stigma. Such stigmatising myths included medical misinformation that IDU shared syringes for 
ritual reasons, that IDU were socially isolated, and that IDU were asexual apart from sex-work. 
The lack of reliable data on IDU numbers and practices, in conjunction with the known need of 
IDU for anonymity, ensured that community work was not directly integrated with the syringe 
supply aspect of the NEP planning. By leaving ambiguous the monitoring, activities, and nature of 
IDU community groups, the rigorous syringe supply plan was more capable of maintaining the 
enrolment of the key stakeholders, any of whose committed veto could destroy the planning.
222. See Bassett (1987a, as cited in Baker, 1987a), Meech (1987d).
223. See Kemp (1996), Zimring & Hawkins (1992: 29-31), Lungley & Baker (1989: 38).
224. See Waller & Rumball (2004: 15-16, 23, 34), Cornwell (2003: 582), Austrian (1995: 129).
225. See Courtwright (1982) for overlapping histories of treatment regimes in North America. These frameworks include 
moral vice (emphasises hedonism and issues of control); inadequate medical control (emphasises over-prescribing 
by doctors, and training of doctors); inherited physiological propensity/disorder (tries to explain why some drug 
users succeed in control and  others do not); iatrogenic exposure to addictive substances (emphasises dual diagnosis 
and self-medication); psychiatric psychosis (this became popular after changes in class, race and geographies of 
patient demographics). See Zinberg (1984) for later 'drug, set and setting' concept. See Ghodse (1989: 7-25) for a 
UK perspective at the time of NEP developments. See Zimring & Hawkins (1992) for North American perspectives. 
For a rather exaggerated essay by a UK prison doctor and psychiatrist who criticises an alliance of interests between 
injecting opiate users and treatment professionals, see Dalrymple [Daniels], 2006. Dalrymple seems justified in 
pointing out this alliance, but not in treating the groups involved as monolithic, especially in the assumption that the 
pain of opiate withdrawal is effectively the same for all.
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2   Who was to provide the NEP infrastructure?
Having received Caucus and Cabinet226 endorsement, the Minister then formally asked the AIDS 
Advisory Committee to seek evidence that could support a licit syringe supply programme and any 
associated legislative change. Previous reports from the Departmental had supported needle 
exchanges and harm reduction logics in concept, but the Department officials required Ministerial 
direction before publicly criticising the existing legislation (State Services Commission, 1995: 38) 
that prevented an official programme from functioning. Once the Minister had taken a formal 
stance, his sources of official and professional health expertise became far more closely aligned 
with his three-person Taskforce, his political colleagues, and the IDU community representatives. 
This alignment of goals and collaboration in method between different specialties constituted an 
articulation, as in a mechanism that brought about and explains such organised social activity. This 
activity began to sketchily outline the unstated and unrealised proto-boundaries of the NEP.
The support from Cabinet formed a crucial passage point227 for inter-departmental consultation. 
Between the 12th and 19th of February an inter-departmental working party, including Police and 
Customs members but dominated by Health officials, evaluated a shortlist of service delivery 
mechanisms provided by Health Department staff. This working party discussed three general 
policy responses to clarify goals and constraints, including the option of doing nothing. Three 
implementation methods were selected for further comment by various government agencies. This 
short-list featured mobile units, established clinics and medical practices, and pharmacies, as 
summarised in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Shortlist of NEP Options
Type of Site? Type of activity? Costing at 
Startup?
Costing Per
Annum?
Police approval? Counselling? Recommendation
Mobile unit.
A new type of 
clinic.
Limited clinic 
services.
$190,000 $750,100 No. 
Fears of public 
acceptability.
Yes.
AAC 
supported.
Rejected.
Adjunct services only.
Established drug
clinics, medical 
practices & GPs.
Full general 
health. 
Specialising in 
drug treatment. 
$460,000 $400,000 Yes. Yes.
AAC 
supported.
Possibly.
Supported by all parties.
Pharmacies. Full national 
dispensary 
coverage.
None.
Cheapest.
$93,000
Cheapest.
No.
But objections 
later decreased.
Referral only.
Not AAC 
supported.
Possibly.
Health specialist support, 
but not Police, nor AAC. 
Two clinic-type options appeared on the short-list, but neither was considered feasible, due 
primarily to their high costs.228 Clinics were well-established, and well-understood as sites where 
226. That the Minister had not been personally opposed to the NEP and harm reduction logics is shown by his early 
interest in the TOM article drawn to his attention by Yska, and employment of Yska as his Press Secretary. Bassett 
was relieved to find that no objections emerged (Bassett, 2002 pers. com.)
227. See Callon (1999, 1991), Callon et al. (1997), Latour (1988: 43).
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professional medical expertise would be centred and strongly resourced. However, there were 
insufficient existing clinics with the appropriate expertise and experience of IDU to provide 
national coverage.229 The AIDS Advisory Committee favoured the provision of clinics of some sort
to guarantee the availability of point-of-sale counselling as well as a wide coverage with a broad 
range of services. However, the Advisory Committee could not argue convincingly that cost-
effective geographical coverage would be provided through existing or newly established clinics. 
This led to exploring the option of mobile clinics that offered greater geographical coverage.
The New Zealand Medical Association understood that the AIDS Advisory Committee had 
strongly promoted the development of mobile clinics with the necessary staff and facilities (Baird, 
1987). However, both the IV League and police stated that mobile clinics would be too easily 
identified, would not be accepted by the public, and would not be accepted by IDU due to the 
threat to their anonymity (McGrath, 1987: 2); Stoke, 1987a). Several factors argued against using 
established treatment clinics, mobile or otherwise. Conventional clinics were labour intensive at a 
time of increasing political sensitivities over hospital waiting lists and costs. The treatment policies 
at clinics emphasised obligatory abstinence from drug use, yet the policies on AIDS emphasised 
that, while individuals needed to become accountable for preventing HIV transmission, 
nevertheless motivation changes could not be forced, nor induced through fear. 
The Department officials invited the managers of drug treatment clinics to participate in the 
planning and implementation of the syringe supply scheme. However, those that responded refused
to participate in any policies and programmes that challenged the abstinence logics of their 
treatment methods (Meech, 1987b). They offered, notwithstanding, to continue trying to reduce the
numbers of IDU through treatment, and welcomed any extra funding towards this ideal. This stance
indicates a degree of competition for funding from methods recognised as completely inadequate 
for HIV/AIDS prevention among gay men or IDU. Although members of the public consistently 
called for the supply of syringe to be restricted to drug treatment clinics, the Department officials 
rejected such scenarios as unworkable.
The working party which evaluated the range of potential NEP infrastructures rejected mobile 
clinics, and recommended delaying any decision between the established clinics and pharmacies. 
Various paradoxes and conflicts had emerged in the engagements between the hierarchies of 
officials, the professions of medicine, and the private networks of IDU. These difficulties 
combined with the need for low start-up costs to favour pragmatic proposals.230 The most pragmatic
228. These costs rose significantly over the planning period. Initial costings were found to be underestimates. The dislike 
by the police for one clinic option seems less significant because the police also objected to the pharmacy option 
eventually chosen, although their objections to pharmacies had later reduced.
229. This problem was magnified by the development of 'home-baking' forms of opiate drug supply and demand in cities,
followed by the emigration of these practices into small towns. See McGrath (1987: 1), Lee (1987).
230. Baker (2002 pers. com.) said that he enjoyed working with the pragmatic, 'make-it-work' attitudes of pharmacists.
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system seemed a user-pays framework of logistics and information. This was also the most self-
funding and cheapest to administer system. The demand from IDU customers could replace the 
top-down infrastructure of skilled disbursers requiring supervisory management in an employment 
pyramid. This user-pays aspects231 sheltered the NEP from accusations of misusing public taxes, 
and pushed many hybrid problems arising from mixing illicit and professional health systems out 
of sight. The user-pays aspects also positioned IDU as competent, independent, normal customers 
of a normal business arrangements.232 
The support from pharmacists was initially uncertain. Large sections of their profession were 
opposed to being involved in syringe supply (Lungley & Baker, 1989: 39). Some pharmacists felt 
that involvement would compromise their high status, authoritative, law-enforcing image, and 
would undercut existing client relationships. Nonetheless, the pharmacy environment was 
conducive to participation. Ever since the 1930s, pharmacists had monopolised the jurisdiction to 
dispense medications, to own pharmacies, and to run retail pharmaceutical businesses. This 
jurisdiction involved regulations that required pharmacists to run only a single business, rather than
a chain, thereby causing an oversupply of qualified personnel (Moffett, 1987b: 14-15). Yet market-
based restructuring, following the nation-wide neo-liberal changes,233 threatened many individual 
pharmacies with closures and with layoffs from assimilation by supermarket chains and franchise 
outlets. The pharmacist leaders therefore opposed being defined as essentially business outlets. 
They emphasised instead their health professional skills, which included hosting a syringe-supply 
scheme. According to the Pharmacy Council: "... the profession, in adopting an active role, will 
provide a further demonstration of the front-line position that pharmacy has in the provision of 
primary healthcare" (Shaw, 1988: 1). Although pharmacy was organised into private businesses 
where managers made tactical commercial decisions, it was also a profession, where strategic 
decisions were made collegially. Sufficient numbers of pharmacists needed to agree that 
involvement in the NEP was indeed their best strategy, both as businesses and as a profession. 
However, the pharmacy leadership did not first consult their grass-roots membership over this 
decision. This tactic of constraining the available choices added to the significant, though minority 
opposition, to providing the infrastructure for the NEP.234
During the process of gaining pharmacist support and thereby enrolling their professional and 
commercial infrastructure, the general concept of syringe supply was replaced by a more precise 
231. The user-pays aspects had been decided sometime between July 1985 and November 1986.
232. See McLeod (1988), Booth (1988), Nimmo (1995a, 1995b, 1995c). Pragmatism absorbed professionalism. The 
more general absorbed the more specialised. This absorption metaphor appears the opposite of crystallisation 
metaphors, where ‘the more structural’ fixes ‘the more general’.
233. For a review of neo-liberal changes and resistance see Boraman (2004).
234. This opposition appeared stronger in the southern regions. If not defused, it could have grown and deprived 
significant areas in the south of outlets. However, it seems unlikely that the degree of opposition could have led to a 
blanket prohibition on any pharmacist volunteering for the prospective NEP, since that also would have been 
constraining a pharmacist’s individual choice as a small business owner and a professional exercising discretionary 
judgement.
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concept of exchanging syringes combined with user-pays. Syringe exchange was demanded by 
health professionals and police to safeguard health in public-private places, such as the domestic 
environments of IDU which police searched at times, and in the fully public environments that 
were also jeopardised by discarded syringes. Exchanging syringes helped frame the pharmacist 
involvement as a public health activity, rather than as facilitating drug use, which merely supplying
syringes might seem. The NEP became more solid when the pilot-tested, semi-commercial, 
pharmacy, user-pays practice was reconfigured as an exchange model. This model was presented as
strategic and logical, whereas the community and counselling components were left tactically 
ambiguous. This model and procedure seemed rigorously health oriented, yet also pragmatic, while
being acceptable to IDU customers in a way that reduced the significance of their illicit habits, yet 
was necessitated by the very same habits.
The NEP planners knew that IDU did not perceive pharmacists as a major threat (Department of 
Health, 1987f: 6), which seemed to increase the chances of success. The expertise of the 
professional pharmacists also offered consistent standards, work, and evaluation all within a 
national scope of co-ordination. The pharmacists’ public image as self-sacrificing health 
professionals was reinforced by their involvement in the NEP, and the value of pharmacists as 
independent health practices was reinforced at the level of health policy. The pharmcists’ 
customers, now including IDU, followed in this stream. It was not until pharmacists, as a 
professional body, agreed to supply the infrastructure that the concept of a ‘Needle Exchange 
Programme’ emerged as an interplay between a solid, shaped boundary outline and a core. 
Nevertheless, much that later emerged was then amorphous, since the support from pharmacists 
and IDU could clearly not be assumed, nor directed from outside in any reliable way.
3   Pharmacists both support and constrain the NEP
Oppositions and uncertainties rapidly emerged in response to the initial plan for the NEP. The 
pharmacy profession had supported the NEP, but only in an opt-in system (Donaghue, 2002, pers. 
com.). In the first month some individual practices left and others joined, since pharmacists only 
participated to the degree that the NEP fitted in with their existing operations and commercial 
logics.235 Their resistance to any official direction of their commercial and professional activities 
created openings for alternative service providers and for competing expert advice from IDU 
groups.
The earliest estimated date for the NEP to begin operating had been May, 1987. This deadline was 
235. One pharmacist stated: “I was all for the needle exchange scheme - until I received its checklist and questionaire 
[sic]. This was supposed to be a simple scheme. I do not wish to participate now... If you don’t feel our ethics and 
training is [sic] sufficient to insure our integrity, you shouldn’t be involving us in the scheme (Booth, 1988).
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pushed back to January 1988 due to underestimating the degree of negotiation required to settle 
commercial uncertainties that emerged over supply. The early tendering had produced only one 
likely supplier, which led to an effective monopoly by Salmond Smith Biolab. Then, after 
arrangements had been settled but no shipment had been dispatched, the IV League warned that the
Australian syringes on order were too small for the particular drugs injected in New Zealand.236 
The resulting delay unravelled a degree of the pharmacists’ enrolment, (Ashby, 1988: 18, 1987) 
while magnifying the uncertainties of the planning. Nevertheless, this delay taught Department 
officials to minimise such risks by consulting with IDU, prior to decisionmaking, since IDU were  
the most committed and expert stake-holders. By contrast, the commercial supplier ‘stakeholder’237 
avoided commitment unless sufficient short-term profits, or long-term monopoly control, offered 
compelling commercial incentives. 
The NEP planners considered that frequent shifts in the buying-in costs of syringes would render 
efficient administration of the NEP impossible (Baker, 1988b). But the syringe suppliers insisted 
on negotiating for no more than six month blocs, to reduce their vulnerability to not being able to 
pass on increases in their own costs. Their insistence equated to lengthening the time taken in 
negotiations with the NEP planners, causing further delays in the starting date, with the planning 
officials being primarily accountable for such delays. These differentials in incentives induced the 
NEP planners to try to stabilise such market uncertainties, but the only mechanism, apart from 
regulations that were unwelcome in the neo-liberal political climate, was to allow increases in 
profit to insulate the syringe importers from commercial risk. This seems why the syringe costs 
actually increased for several years.238 
The increased cost loadings impacted primarily on IDU because of the user-pays mechanism, 
combined with the absence of IDU representatives in the negotiations. These commercial 
arrangements for fixing costs proceeded amicably until the negotiators were advised by Commerce 
officials that their proposed arrangements would breach the price-fixing prohibitions of the 1986 
Commerce Act (New Zealand Government, 1986). Their legal advice warned that applying for an 
exemption could be long and uncertain, since the Commerce Commission was an independent 
body (Department of Health, 1987c; Donaldson, 1987). The NEP planners needed to consult with 
Health, Commerce, and legal officials before gaining an effective exemption,239 adding to the 
236. Many drugs injected in New Zealand have been bulky due to being home prepared from poppy latex, or from being 
only partially separated from fillers in pharmaceutical pills, or from being a syrup such as methadone. (See 
Appendix 5) Because the syringes were required to be larger than initially planned, the return containers (see 
Appendix 6) also needed to be larger, which meant the Australian design could not be used. The arrangements for 
redesigning, purchasing, and the logistics of transport for syringes and containers were renegotiated. See Caygill 
(1988a), Kerse (1988c). The type of drugs is also the reason why the supply of high quality filters (see Appendix 4) 
has been so important for safeguarding the long-term health of IDU.
237. A contentious term since suppliers had no solid, committed stake in a relatively tiny market.
238. After 1989, ADIO, the peer exchange in Auckland, developed a strategy of breaking the monopoly on syringe 
supply (Nimmo, 2004. Pers. Com). The other peer groups followed ADIO’s lead, which forced officials to accept 
the peer groups selling a range of different types of syringes, not necessarily in the approved safety canister. 
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delays before the NEP started operating.
The NEP accumulated a growing number of stake-holders as its planners attempted to ‘fix’ its 
activities into a stable, predictable, accountable structure. The NEP acted as both fixed and 
comprehensive. It seemed fixed when when it reassured uncertain stakeholders by containing its 
growing linkages and costs within a changeable, semi-marketplace. Yet the need to be 
comprehensive required adaptability, which opposed being strongly fixed. This conflict increased 
when commercial uncertainties and shifting profit margins altered motivations. Moreover, there 
were no reliable data on the distribution and motivations of IDU (Walzl (1994: 45); Baker (1988b: 
73). Importers, like pharmacists, dealt with syringes in an oddly constrained, semi-commercial and 
semi-market environment, since officials:
would prefer a single cost to apply throughout the country. To calculate this we suggest that 
you average out your quoted freight rates and weight these according to the population in each 
area. ... the department has not arranged supply of these packs on a tender basis. ... [nor is] in a 
position to guarantee that any one company will be the sole supplier of the packs.             
(Baker, 1988b)
The Department held the most influence, interests, and control in this network configuration. The 
Department chose to renounce direct control and rely instead on commercial agents, complying 
with the neo-liberal policy environments and ideologies of that time. Yet rather than relying on 
open market forces, the Department proposed a form of regulated market, while reserving the 
capability to act as a governance agency by altering regulations and telling the supplier how to 
calculate costings that were required to meet the Department’s expectations. These regulations 
ensured both rigidity and flexibility. The rigidity simplified client acceptability and management, 
while the flexibility facilitated adjustments to an unknown future market. The regulatory approach 
also facilitated a competitive environment where the service providers could be potentially 
replaced. There were no hands-on direct monitoring and directives which could lock-in particular 
organisational forms, skill-sets, or specific contract outputs and thereby reduce competition. 
Nonetheless, price-fixing through central directives via non-market mechanisms, together with 
regulations that prohibited the casual entry of private entrepreneurs, established a monopolistic 
framework, within which a system of multiple service agencies developed.
The pharmacists’ professional bodies, in contrast to the syringe importer, insisted that the Gazetted 
supply price to IDU and the buying in costs from the importer should be absolutely fixed. This was
to retain their profit margin which was described as an advisory fee. For pharmacists, unlike 
importers, fixed prices removed many commercial risks while reducing their professional and 
managerial problems of price-setting. Without control of all costs, the fixing of prices to IDU 
clients entailed increased financial hazards through potential increases in labour costs or importer 
profit margins.240 The logics that supported fixed prices also supported government subsidies in 
239. As far as I can ascertain, IDU were not consulted as customers over the terms of this exemption.
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areas where fixed prices did not cover the financial risk. These risky areas included the costs of 
disposing of returned syringes, form-filling, and the obligatory ‘counselling’ interactions with 
clients demanded by the AIDS Advisory Committee. 
The pharmacists’ leaders reported their members’ dismay with increasingly detailed provisions for 
monitoring and regulation as described in the Management Plan (Coville, 1987). Yet the plan 
needed to be comprehensive and rigid to voluntarily enrol the people and agencies that wished to 
avoid the potential professional, managerial and ‘moral’ problems of being associated with IDU.241 
However, such rigidity created problems for those who became subject to the plan. This rigidity, 
together with other factors such as increased costs and the shortage of staff qualified in counselling,
led the pharmacists as a body to reject any involvement in the counselling component of the 
proposed programme. Pharmacists had already chosen a career, and it was in pharmacy, not in 
counselling. The pharmacists continued to consult with other stakeholders over the various aspects 
of syringe exchange, while making it clear that they totally approved of counselling, provided that 
they themselves were not inconvenienced by it in any way.242 
The design of the pharmacy programme had offset the voluntary participation by pharmacists 
against the removal of control by pharmacists over the professional fee component whenever 
syringe prices were being set. The controls over syringe prices were vested in the Regulations, as 
monitored and enforced by the Department, where both the regulations and the Department were 
relatively fixed and stable entities. Baker had designed the pharmacy input to be consultative rather
than negotiative,243 since genuine negotiation implied that prices might change as an outcome of 
negotiation.244 Yet if prices and costs changed, the ratio of political accountability to risk would 
also change, requiring hands-on management or hierarchal system linking implementation to policy
making levels. The fixing of costs minimised any need for continuous official supervision. 
Consultation required the Department to listen to the views of pharmacists, but not to necessarily 
act on them. Yet since the pharmacies could easily withdraw from the NEP, any long-lasting 
problems that encouraged their departure would force an official intervention of some sort to 
maintain the NEP services.
When the NEP Management Plan was released in November 1987, many pharmacists objected to 
the content and implications of the proposed official monitoring.245 Some considered that by 
definition, any qualified colleague possessed adequate training and discretion to dispense syringes. 
Several members of the Pharmacy Council insisted that any pharmacist should be approved to 
240. See Coville (1987, 1988: 1), Walzl (1994: 47-48).
241. See Salmond (1987), Dowling (1987b), Caygill (1987a), Hadley (1987).
242. See Hadley (1987). Pharmacists supported counselling, but only provided they were not inconvenienced by it.
243. See Baker(1987a), Coville (1987)
244. This seems because the willingness of negotiating parties to make compromises constitutes the basis of trust 
required for negotiations to begin and for outcomes to be sustainable.
245. See Patel (1988), Salmond (1988a), Baker (1988a), Millar (1988).
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provide a NEP outlet, since being unsuited to selling syringes equated to unsuitability for being a 
pharmacist. To act otherwise insulted their professional status, which harmed their public 
reputation and jurisdiction. In being ‘the health expert the public saw most frequently’, a dangerous
precedent seemed set by regulations that implied that their professional capabilities were 
inadequate. These Council members argued that reducing the participation by pharmacists in 
decision-making would harm rather than help the NEP. By contrast, one senior, well-established 
medical professional argued against the proposed pharmacy infrastructure of the NEP because such
involvement would detract from the professional image of pharmacists (Spittle, 1987). 
The pharmacists had historical reasons to avoid impropriety, particularly to do with illicit drug use. 
The Drug Dependency and Drug Abuse in New Zealand Report to the Government described 
widespread misuse of medication from:
Considerable laxity ... for the dispensing of prescriptions between medical practitioner and 
pharmacist ... Prescriptions were written by pharmacists and presented to the medical 
practitioner who signed them ... the average addict was most likely to be a nurse, a doctor or a 
kiwi with a cough ... [In 1947] the Director of Public Health Division told his Minister “unless 
sufficient and competent staff are appointed, I cannot take responsibility for the control of 
dangerous drugs (narcotics)”” (1970, as cited in Lee, 1987: 115).
Two years later, amended legislation reduced the maximum number of oral doses of heroin 
contained in a single prescription to sixteen. During 1947 official records show that 319 kilos of 
opium, seven kilos of heroin and 12 of morphine had been imported and presumably consumed. 
However, three quarters of the opium tincture, half of the powdered opium and one quarter of the 
cocaine went ‘missing’ from the records of prescriptions and accounts of pharmacies (Lee, 1987: 
115). This background informs a better understanding of the attitudes of the pharmacists, doctors, 
and Department officials, especially the regional 'watchdogs' such as the District Advisory 
Pharmacists and Medical Officers of Health. This history lay within the living memory of the older 
pharmacists, despite never being mentioned by professionals or officials. This history and that 
silence together inform us of the character of health research, where ‘black boxes’ of various 
shapes are best not taken at face value.
Another professional concern entangled accounts of legitimacy with those of ritualism. In late-1987
the National Society on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence promoted a campaign of disinformation,
in which they claimed that IDU shared syringes for ritual reasons. This false information promoted 
their argument that harm reduction could not be effective because it relied on control and 
rationality, whereas sharing syringes supposedly involved an irrational, uncontrolled adherence to 
rituals. Nevertheless, in April 1987, a review of IDU attending a Wellington methadone clinic had 
found that IDU had decreased their sharing and increased their sterilising of syringes despite their 
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lack of legal supplies and seemingly due to influences from within their own networks rather than 
to direction from outsiders. These data countered the attribution of ritual syringe sharing (Lee, 
1987: 114), which itself seemed influenced by many drug treatment specialists wanting to protect 
their professional jurisdiction and theory by magnifying the stigma of ‘their’ IDU clients. 
Parliament accepted the NEP legislation changes as initially drafted, then sent the Amendment Bill 
to the Social Services Select Committee in June 1987 (Baker, 1987a: 4). This process involved 
stages of ‘translation’ and ‘enrolment’, as in Latour’s descriptions of actants becoming enrolled 
into alliances (1999: 103-104) which become mobilised in projects. Latour describes enrolment as 
following from processes of translation (1999: 194-195), involving:
all the displacements through other actors whose mediation is indispensable for any action to 
occur. In place of a rigid opposition between context and content, chains of translation refer to 
the work through which actors modify, displace, and translate their various and contradictory 
interests.     (Latour, 1999c: 311)
Translation combines storied information, documented accounts, and distributions of motivations. 
The stages of the NEP enrolment involved a draft Management Plan, then consultation and 
persuasion, to prepare for the initial infrastructural consolidation. Yet the shaping of the 
Management Plan and subsequent operations depended upon the phases and delays of the 
legislative package. This package itself changed in form as it gained and lost clauses, then split into
two Acts, a Misuse of Drugs Act Amendment and a Health Act Amendment. These delays offered 
the NEP’s ‘opponents’ time to unravel the enrolments and counter the translations. The opposition, 
as Latour helps us to understand, was constituted from a range of tactics of deplacement and 
replacement, mediated by actors, actants and an obligatory passage point that could not be avoided.
Whereas some actors wanted to halt the NEP, these were mostly not in a position where their 
participation was obligatory. For some others, whose participation was obligatory, delay was 
desired to give more opportunity to reconfigure the Bills. They attempted to sap the momentum, 
and divert the trajectories of the NEP as it consolidated from a virtual concept into an actual social 
entity. Proponents of the NEP ‘translated’ around the built-in ambiguities of the NEP’s conceptual 
hybridity. Clauses of promises and evasions, laid on the conceptual table as quasi-objects, rubbed 
virtual shoulders familiarly with the objective slickness of the sterile syringes that told their own 
increasingly professional story of capabilities. IDU were mostly an invisible presence, always 
mobile, seldom tabled. Similarly, HIV was only seen and talked to in semi-human form, though 
read through biomedical and epidemiological and social science documents. This game had logics 
of play, cheating, and timetables. Once the details of the NEP Management Plan and legislation 
were publicly specified, the opportunities for alliance-building to oppose or reshape the categories 
in play also increased, despite the initial support for its general concept.
Regardless of the need for speed from the perspectives of the NEP’s planners, it was convenient for
128
Section 3:    Pharmacists both support and constrain the NEP
the NEP Management Plan to remain unfixed until well into the period of the Select Committee’s 
deliberations.246 The Bill thereby enrolled support while neutralising or evading opposition. During 
these stages its shape changed as its greater support meant that it became less or more dependent on
its fitting into the programmes of particular actors and actants. The shape also changed as the Bill 
became vulnerable, thereby needing deflection shields or armouring against opposition. As the 
proposal solidified into a Bill it had become sheltered, depositing ‘negotiation layers’ of 
parliamentary bipartisan committees in uncertain proximity to committees of health professionals 
and MPs. The Bill was also screened by other mechanisms of consultation with a more mobile 
character and uncertain scope, such as the IV League. These layers, agencies, and increasing 
documentation, in combination, presented an image of consultation and consensus that helped 
propel the legislation through the commercial, political, and professional passage points. Yet such 
an historical story of a forceful flow is countered by a better story of negotiated stages, where the 
temporal dynamics mesh parsimoniously with the character of strong antagonisms being linked 
protestingly into a legislative mechanism.
Even in a scenario where the possession of syringes became legal, the New Zealand Medical 
Association (NZMA) raised objections to pharmacists or medical professionals supplying objects, 
such as syringes, to be used in illicit activities. The NZMA exercised an authority to speak not only
for its own actual membership, but also for the minority of pharmacists who opposed the two 
pharmacy professional bodies. Warren Lindberg, the Director of the NZAF, publicly condemned 
the Medical Association as ill-informed and showing “ignorance, fear and Victorian morality” 
Lindberg (1987, as cited in Wright, 1989). At the time, the NZMA claimed to represent 4,700 
medical practitioners, which would have included about 72% of the profession in New Zealand. 
Nevertheless, there is no record that the NZMA had actually polled its own members beyond those 
directly in contact with its leadership at the time (Baird, 1987; McLaughlin, 1987: 30). Nor did the 
NZMA record the number or degree of support or opposition of those members that were polled.247 
Other medical professionals vigourously criticised even the AIDS Advisory Committee’s delicate 
stances. One lamenting doctor advised the Department:
No doubt this is a recommendation from the AIDS Advisory Council? Some of the decisions 
and recommendations of the latter have caused some concern to many of us within the medical 
profession. ... Why not forget the question of making free needles and syringes available to 
drug addicts, with all the problems that will generate ... many believe [this] would be an 
appalling decision with horrendous consequences. (Bailey, 1987: 1)
246. The timing of the process was influenced by skill in committee work. The movement of legislation through the 
Social Services Select Committee relied initially on bipartisan support. Later, when difficulties and opposition 
emerged, the timing of the progress of the legislation depended more upon the Labour dominance of the committee 
membership. Other committees were useful for enrolling parliamentary support and for reassuring the public. When 
difficulties emerged they did not meet, according to comments in Hansard by National MP, Don McKinnon 
(Hansard, 1987). After the legislation passed they vanished, having no further purpose. See Luke (2002).
247. The unaccountable authority seen exerted by the NZAF, in a context of moral agendas, clearly requires ongoing 
study. From an anarcho-sociological perspective, the NZMA was assuming the directive powers and moral authority 
of a ‘medical state’ as an anachronistic state of domination, irrationality, and ritual within a modern globalised state.
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Another emphasised that the requirements for the surveillance of the epidemiological and addiction
aspects would necessitate a high degree of bureaucratic control. He argued that the NEP should not 
be supported if IDU numbers continued to increase, and implied that the increases in Temgesic 
injecting between 1983 and 1987 were driven by the increased availability of illicit syringes.248 Yet 
he offered no alternative to the NEP if IDU numbers continued to increase (Malpress, 1987). 
Medical bodies also opposed the NEP service fees for medical practitioners being fixed. Like the 
pharmacists, these bodies resisted any external controls over their professional competency to 
practice, and objected to the time involved in record-keeping.
The Society of Medical Officers of Health only supported the NEP with the greatest reluctance. 
This Society argued for increasing funding in the addiction treatment area, but not with the intent 
of subsidising the price of syringes, or facilitating the NEP, or extending its capabilities. Instead, 
the Medical Officers of Health wished to minimise the number of pharmacy outlets, while 
increasing the funding and numbers of drug treatment clinics (Flight, 1987). They opposed the 
treatment and prescribing by GPs for people with substance dependency problems, since "more 
problems are created than solved" (Flight, 1987). However, they considered that drug clinics with 
strict protocols tied into 'self-help, 'higher faith' programmes that had a greater and proven record 
of success. These Medical Officers did not cite their criteria for drug treatment being successful, 
nor their sources of information.249
The NEP was supported by the Royal New Zealand College of General Practitioners (1988), the 
Royal Australasian College of Physicians (Stace, 1987), by pharmacy representatives, and by 
nursing bodies. Nevertheless, these bodies and the AIDS Advisory Committee did not represent 
'the medical profession' as a whole. The AIDS Advisory Committee was a particularly composite 
actant, with members selected by the Minister on advice from Department officials. Some health 
professional bodies deeply disliked the NEP, whereas others offered uneasy yet clear support. No 
dominant profession came to claim jurisdiction and accept accountability for the presence or 
absence of the scheme. This opened the territory to the strongly motivated profession of pharmacy, 
while encouraging lay input from IDU communities.
The back-stepping by medical professionals strengthened the pharmacists' negotiating hand by 
removing any existing alternative professional infrastructure.250 The logics and character of medical
professionalism, at that time, positioned pharmacists with a uniquely desirable product in a sellers 
248. Intriguingly, given his Medical Officer of Health accountabilities, Malpress did not explore the possibility of 
Temgesic medication being over-prescribed by GPs, similarly to the 1940s problems of missing opiate imports 
described previously.
249. This situation and stance seems related to Davenport-Hines' description of drug treatment history in the UK. 
Davenport-Hines describes a state agency backed, professional takeover by an abstinence-oriented, self-interested 
school of clinical psychologists and psychiatrists (2004: 365-374). 
250. Social work agencies, either public or private, might have provided an alternative model. However, social work was 
at the time a disorganised occupation, struggling against the imposition of both bureaucratic and market models. See 
Munford & Nash (1994: 11), Beddoe & Randal (1994: 26-29), Nash (1994: 68-76).
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market. The pharmacy character and logics oriented the NEP towards persuading lay customers 
into public health attitudes and product usage, rather than being merely concerned to maintain 
compliance by patients during 'treatments'. The AIDS Advisory Committee was expected, in being 
the Minister’s advisory body, to publicly support the Minister's and the Department officials’ 
pragmatic rationale for rejecting a clinic-based NEP. The Committee’s sole alternative stance was 
to offer convincing evidence against the proposals. This was difficult before the NEP began 
producing evidence. It was also unlikely since the Committee could not have easily retained its 
resourcing and influence after publicly embarrassing the Minister. Moreover, there were others that
wanted access to the Minister’s ear.
Nonetheless, the AIDS Advisory Committee did insist that the NEP be based on obligatory 
counselling at the point-of-sale, as discussed in the following chapter. The Committee also insisted 
on the obligatory exchange of old syringes for new, disagreeing with the Department head officials 
and the Minister’s NEP planning team (Baker, 2004 pers. com.). The NEP planners instead 
prioritised a cost-effective, workable exchange scheme, with counselling only a secondary goal to 
be implemented later. As its design consolidated, the NEP came to incorporate a returned syringe 
component. But this exchange aspect was achieved through incentives rather than enforcement, 
while proposals and demands for obligatory point-of-sale counselling were also rejected.
At the stage when counselling became clearly a secondary goal, the AIDS Advisory Committee 
began making formal statements of opposition to the implementation aspects of the NEP, while 
supporting the general principle that an NEP of the ‘proper, medically approved’ type should exist. 
Their arguments began to be heard and used by opponents of the NEP, for instance in the NZMA 
submission opposing the NEP legislation (Baird, 1987), and in speeches from National Party 
politicians on the Opposition Benches who had come to oppose how the NEP had developed 
despite being committed to bi-partisan support. These politicians demanded a sunset clause on the 
NEP legislation on the third reading of the Bill (Hansard, 1987), but the Labour Government 
dominated the Select Committee and had a clear parliamentary majority.251 From an actor-network 
perspective, the syringes also voted, and they carried the play.
4   What was all the fuss about?
In this story, the proponents of the needle exchange programme 'inherited' policy turf from the gay-
focused HIV/AIDS community organisers. These community organisers initially established the 
positioning of expertise, along with principles of policy and programmes, which later contributed 
251. According to The Elective Dictatorship in New Zealand (Mulgan, 1992), a system whereby the executive branch of 
government wielded ‘unbridled power’ (Palmer, 1987; Mulgan; 2004) was only beginning to shift to a system where 
select committees could act to delay or check executive dominance.
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to the shaping of the NEP. I suggest that without this prior activity, different syringe supply 
outcomes would have eventuated. However, the connections between the gay and IDU organising 
did not automatically follow, despite similar sustaining logics of a requirement for trusting 
participation, by an untrusting and untrusted marginalised communities. Nor did such organising 
suddenly emerge in the form of new global realisations. Instead, we see the environment shifting 
configurationally, in stages, where each stage seemed workable, at least for a while, yet only those 
arrangements that became workable within their wider systemic resources and constraints could 
actualise into a stable programme. This environment included technological devices, such as 
syringes, along with logics of political calculations, with codified procedures of bureaucracies, with
medical collegiality, with markets, with secret criminal networks, and with professional knowledge
activities. The NEP organising became activated by HIV, and by HIV-positive people in 
combination with the stability of long-lasting objects and institutionalised arrangements.
Policy responses to AIDS had been initially avoided by New Zealand and allied governments,252 
yet increasing scientific knowledge reshaped the political environments by shifting the boundaries 
of the known, the necessary, and the expectable. Social science research began to show how 
viruses were differently understood, widely transported, and trustingly transmitted. 
Epidemiological and physiological research suggested that the illness which had been defined as a 
'gay plague' could spread into general populations. ‘It’ could spread by means of a greater number 
of routes than had been visualised across boundaries of stigma, prejudice, law, and health policy. A
shift in professional boundaries began to be strategised, as social-material reorganising followed 
the social dangers of material connections across institutional boundaries. As shift followed shift, 
actors and actant objects became redefined and re-problematised in processes of enrolment and 
translation. The key to this process was the 'holy grail' of drug treatment professionals, that is, the 
reliable, self-sustaining change in motivation of IDU. Paradoxically, drug treatment professionals 
were not only distrusted by IDU, but also could not take part in the NEP because of their own 
treatment ideology that demanded obligatory abstinence.
Politicians could challenge the existing legislation and access funds, yet their attitude to health 
professionals was ambivalent. Cabinet needed to retain public confidence in the budgeting and 
effectiveness of the health system, particularly the HIV/AIDS policy. Cabinet had decided to 
increase political control over health expenditure by constraining or replacing professional medical 
leadership with market-oriented management directives and evaluations. For example, the 
colloquially termed Gibbs Report253 promoted a quasi-market approach to hospital policy. Yet to 
252. New Zealand’s government, and perhaps its citizens, are members of an English speaking military alliance. This 
alliance is held together not by military cooperation, necessarily, but by cooperating in information gathering 
through a global network of electronic interception sites. One term for this alliance is Echelon, and one of the New 
Zealand bases is in Waihopai (Hager, 1996, 1995). The members of this alliance include Australia, Canada, the UK, 
and the United States of America. The existence of this alliance facilitates transfers of technology and policy 
between these societies.
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maintain public confidence, professional expertise and authority over HIV/AIDS needed to be 
presented in a high profile, reassuring way. The requirement to actually constrain, while 
simultaneously promoting professional leadership, partly explains how health expertise became 
packaged in small, controllable, advisory groups, while through the same policy environment, the 
delivery of health services became offered to less powerful professions and community groups. 
The health experts who specialised in contagious diseases were drawn into informal dialogue with 
medically trained Department of Health officials. This network imported overseas models, adapted 
them to New Zealand's political, cultural, and financial environments, and consolidated them into 
packaged processes of expert advice. When a change of government to Labour in 1984 delivered 
an activist Cabinet and Minister of Health, a circle of medical professionals and health officials had
already begun to established an informal crisis advice and management team. However, a more 
formal and focused alliance of medical treatment, public health, and political expertise then bridged
the well-maintained lines of division without (overly) destabilising the wider, historically rooted 
alliances which maintained such differentials. The Minister developed contentious relations with 
GPs and hospital-based medical specialists, yet maintained mutually respectful relations with less 
dominant professionals, such as pharmacists, who wanted greater legislative protections.
The twin goals and methods of the NEP developed out of an initial categorisation of the primary 
and secondary types of health delivery. The initial application of these types of health delivery to 
IDU was normative rather than pragmatic. The initial concepts involved a goal of prescribed 
individual abstinence, rather than a goal of implementing prevention programmes through the 
voluntary compliance by IDU. But given that gay men refused to stop having sex,254 despite fears 
and incentives for abstinence, IDU seemed even less likely to stop injecting.255 The gay community
models of 'controlled practices' and of 'policy participation' had become the general policy and 
supportable as 'best practice'. Refocusing on the social aspects displaced a biomedical fixation on 
individual treatments by instead prioritising public health, syringes, and safer material 
environments for illicit practices.
The shifts between the initial concepts of primary and secondary priorities relocated the concept of 
safer material environments, along with social network environments, further within the boundaries
of official health policy frameworks. Such models threatened most of the existing medical 
jurisdictions, but privileged the public health and pharmacy jurisdictions. The NEP planners, 
despite the urgency, ensured that no hasty decisions were made until the costs and effectiveness of 
253. Unshackling the hospitals : report of the Hospital and Related Services Taskforce (Gibbs, 1988)
254. The term ‘having sex’ is clearly misleading. People ‘do’ sex because it is an activity, which is ‘done’. What they 
expect, experience, or have at various stages, is well worth study, perhaps using a participant observation 
methodology, but as a short, parsimonious indicator of an activity, the term ‘having sex’ will clearly not do.
255.  Because a prescription was being enforced, an ideological underpinning has seemed apparent, in that adherence to 
an ideology has been a further goal, one which excused or made up for the record of failure of the supposed primary 
goal of health. It does not seem unusual in a ‘messy reality’ for different goals to stack and intersect.
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both the goals and the implementation of alternative strategies had been considered by key 
stakeholders. As the organisational responses to HIV/AIDS became better established as an 
integrated strategy, the problems and opportunities of preventing HIV transmission in IDU shifted 
to include more of the public health issues that had been labelled 'secondary' in 1984. 
The conflicts over goals continued to influence the preferred means of implementing the shifting 
outlines of the tentative NEP. Yet at the same time, conflicts over implementation influenced the 
setting of the formal goals of the NEP. The goal of abstinence had already informed the 
professional methods used in existing treatment clinics. Yet the individual IDU who stopped 
injecting, and were no longer considered an HIV risk, carried no further influence in IDU 
networks. This ‘drop-out effect’ blocked individual motivation changes from propagating through 
the IDU networks (Meech, 1987e). Accordingly, the IDU social links and trust became 
increasingly acknowledged by Department officials as a resource, following the pragmatic logic 
that these aspects could not be controlled from outside. The existing model of the NZAF and its 
work on safe sex offered a conceptual tool, not of IDU controlling syringe outlets, but of IDU 
outreach being introduced as a strategy alongside and dependent upon pharmacy-based needle 
exchange outlets (Lange, 1987).
By 1987, priorities had shifted towards following and building on the existing pharmacy and IDU 
practices through pragmatic, minimalist arrangements. Unlike the enforcement of abstinence, the 
supply of syringes could be cheaply implemented. The twin goals of incremental motivation 
change and rapid environment safety came to constitute the NEP’s core activity. Sterile syringe 
supply, along with an incentive for returning used syringes, contributed to greater protection from 
the spread of HIV/AIDS and other blood-borne viruses amongst IDU and the wider community. 
Motivation change was provided through educational reading material that treated IDU as already 
motivated and competent, merely lacking in resources. Although some interpreted this arrangement
as ethically negligent, in not providing obligatory professional counselling 'treatment'256, it better 
fitted the IV League’s expert knowledge about drug use. The arrangement also facilitated policy 
change, because different aspects could be emphasised depending on context. The most significant 
shaping of this model involved the conflicts and alliances around the boundaries of health 
professionalism. These boundaries were connected to and realigned by the Department of Health 
officials and the NEP planners who promoted the legislation changes, who minimised or contained 
managerial and hierarchical influences, and who designed the regulations. Such processes inscribed
network shapes deeply into the NEP arrangements while adding the NEP to the existing health 
networks.
256. From a professional ethical perspective encouraging the use and payment for professional services is a public 
service good. The lack of such encouragement invites competition from other professions, which is not so good 
since they cannot be considered to be more expert or useful in one's own professional jurisdiction.
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The control of the AIDS Advisory Committee by medical professionals seriously threatened the 
rapid introduction and effectiveness of the NEP.257 If the 'harm reduction alliance' had turned out to
be weaker than the 'professional medical alliance', the NEP’s capabilities would have suffered. To 
counteract such potential opposition, and to begin constructing supportive institutional 
environments for a difficult project, required what actor-network researchers have termed stages of 
'translation'. Such stages describe how successive engagements, linkings, and co-ordinated activity 
can influence how a 'solid narrative' of causes and consequences becomes grouped and framed in 
motivational accounts. 
Policy changes, such as adaptations of syringe supply models from overseas, can be explained by 
tracing the sites and movements of network interactivity alongside those of key actors. Each step of
technology, geography, law, infrastructure, and expertise was simultaneously locally embedded, 
while also an opportunity for changing the local configurations of institutional and organisational 
linkages. The term 'needle exchange' travelled, but the workings and consequent meanings were 
locally assembled from what lay at hand. 
The exchange of new for used syringes was not obligated by regulation, as in some overseas 
models. The NEP has seemed better described as a syringe supply programme, with the return of 
syringes being encouraged by a price discount. Conventional anthropological concepts of gifting or
other exchanges (Titmuss, 1997; Appadurai, 1986: 3-5, 11-13, 26-28) have seemed less relevant in 
the commercial NEP environment of user-pays in a mass, highly regulated market. 
The ‘exchanges’ that constitute the NEP have been similar but different from ‘taking’, ‘getting’, 
‘gift’, and ‘sale’. The form of these exchanges could be directly and comprehensively ‘measured’ 
as the relative movements of mobile forms, such as syringes and health pamphlets. This analytical 
approach is based on Latour’s258 concept of ‘immutable mobiles’. It also demonstrates how: “the 
customary logics of small communities are intimately tied to larger regimes of value defined by 
large-scale polities” (Appadurai, 1986: 30). 
The customary logics of ‘exchange’ increasingly emerged as not only constituted from 
commodities, sites, and processes, but also as alterations in larger-scale meanings and structural 
spaces, such as of legislation, policy, and institutional boundaries. These connected the ‘gift’ of 
health protection against an unknown likelihood of infection to a known ‘value of distrust’ needed 
everyday by IDU to survive against law enforcement activity. In an earlier example of thinking 
257.  Dr. Baker, who co-ordinated the NEP developments, indicates that significant effort went into strategically 
countering the AIDS Advisory Committee proposals that would have delayed the scheme (Baker, 2002 pers. com.). 
Proposals by members of Parliament that would have placed a sunset clause on the NEP cited the criticisms voiced 
by the AIDS Advisory Committee (Hansard 1987).
258. According to Gorman (2001), who supports Latour’s project, Latour’s story of immutable and combinable mobiles 
(1987: 226-227) was not based on accurately detailed historical information, but nonetheless captures the 
significance of the historical trail of events, as well as working as a useful model in any event.
135
Chapter 5.      From pharmacy to parliament
along such lines, Simmel argued that in terms of relations between subjective values and objects: 
“we call these objects valuable that resist our desire to possess them” (1990: 67), yet also that: “the 
difficulty of acquisition, the sacrifice offered in exchange, is the unique constitutive element of 
value, of which scarcity is only the external manifestation, its objectification in the form of 
quantity” (Simmel, 1990: 100). In a needle exchange context, from professional perspectives, 
sacrifices had been made in the process of promoting an essential type of health care value.
In this second cycle centred on pharmacies and the pharmacy profession, patterns of autonomy 
from professionals, and alliances of convenience with officials and politicians, were similar to the 
previous cycle based on gay community support groups and an expert medical advisory committee.
Such similarity is partially explained through 'inheritance', as the more durable aspects of the first 
cycle are maintained by the processes of that cycle, and accordingly continue to influence events 
either directly or path-dependently. If the gay community organising activity had not successfully 
preceded the IDU-oriented developments, the concepts of communities and participation, as 
contrasted with enforcement and segregation, would have developed differently in their ratio and 
configuration. The comparative case of HCV259 illustrates the significance of this timing by being 
primarily blood-borne rather than sexually transmitted. HCV created a situation equivalent to there 
having been no previous gay cycle of policy development.
Other explanations for similarities are found in the wider network environments, where certain 
aspects and factors that previously intersected and overlapped, did so again, in combinations and 
consequences that if not identical to previous occasions, were similar enough to produce similar 
outcomes. Once again, professional, political, bureaucratic, and IDU representatives pursued 
interests and formed alliances within an overall agreement on an integrated strategic response to 
HIV/AIDS. Moreover, some of these actors, objects, and agencies were directly involved in the 
first cycle and transmitted their experience. Lines of institutional connection and division were 
reinforced, weakened, and repositioned as programmes developed through their implementation 
and evaluation in practice.260 
Pharmacists became enrolled because they and IDU trusted each other more than medical 
professionals, and IDU trusted each other, and their existing infrastructure could be rapidly and 
cheaply added to. However, since the pharmacy profession controlled drugs which could be 
diverted to illicit purposes, pharmacists could not participate in illicit activities. Nor could 
259. HCV was first raised by the IV League as an IDU problem in 1986, yet a decade of government unconcern over 
HCV transmission, and studied inaction over carrying out epidemiological surveys, followed the introduction of 
biomedical tests in 1990 (Nimmo, 1995a; Kemp, 1996). Studies from the early 1990s, for instance Woodfield et al. 
(1993), have outlined a path-dependent progress of opportunities not taken. The difference is lethally shocking, 
illustrating as a counter-history some likely outcomes if HIV had only been blood-borne, and not also sexually 
transmitted.
260. This was even more apparent later when differences between pharmacists, officials, and treatment professionals 
formed a context for NEP logics extending from stopping transmission, in a pharmacy mode, to also finding out how 
active IDU networks connected drugs, syringes, and bodies, in a professional research mode.
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pharmacists blur their boundaries with IDU, for instance in client-centred drug counselling outside 
of the clinic fiefdoms, since that would invite the harassment of staff and clients by police, or 
create a need for costly, time-consuming supervision. 
The police were enrolled through the epidemiological studies of overseas pilot exchanges that were
provided by the medical professionals on the AIDS Advisory Committee. Yet some medical 
professionals considered that the NEP was more of a problem than a beneficial innovation. The 
pharmacy-centred cycle was unlike the previous or following cycles, in that the pharmacists and 
their pharmacies were already professionally organised as an occupation. A small number of 
pharmacists certainly dispensed illicit syringes, but this grass-roots form of organising became re-
configured and legitimised through the legislation changes and the infrastructural framework of the
NEP. These changes seemed more about the numbers, percentages, and representativeness of 
practitioners than any shift in organisational type. In this pharmacy cycle, high professional service
capabilities were attained as soon as the legislation and regulations had been passed. Cheap, 
effective operations and forms of evaluation were consequently established with minimal delay.261
Because the pharmacy exchange scheme was prioritised over alternatives, the methods for 
facilitating changes in IDU motivation were left to develop from a supply and return infrastructure 
based on stand-alone private businesses, instead of the existing regulatory structures and 
expectations of conventional drug treatment programmes. Interventions could be further separated 
from the central government’s controls over expenditure by being based on a user-pays 
infrastructure of exchanging syringes. Nevertheless, interventions based on pharmacies might draw
on the existing pharmacy monitoring through Medical Officers of Health and District Advisory 
Pharmacists. The prospects for some sort of motivation change policy and programme were 
ambiguous, since the possibilities of implementation were linked to the problems of accounting for 
funding and evaluating outcomes.
The prospects for providing a motivation change component for the NEP were explored from 1985 
to 1988. During this process a 'syringe as object' focus was joined to a 'motivation change' focus. 
'Individual protection' was also joined to 'collective environment safety'. This hybridity was a 
pragmatic response to a need for an HIV/AIDS programme to be workable and substantive across 
unknown IDU practices, and without excluding useful expertise. This flexibility overcame the 
objections of medical professionals to syringe supply alone and to a lack of qualified counselling at
the point-of-sale. The flexibility also allowed a substantial programme to work around the ‘missing
actant couple’ of there being no cure for HIV/AIDS, nor for being an IDU. As a pseudo-object, the 
NEP legislatively coupled the empowerment of IDU to the stigmatising of drugs, so that:
legislative control over certain drugs of abuse is enhanced, and on the other hand, legislative 
261. Six years later an independent consultant agreed that although the pharmacy based NEP led in many ways to 
discontinuities and incoherence, it had been essential as an initial step (Walzl, 1994).  
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initiative is taken to reduce the risk of transmission of AIDS within the drug-using community, 
and from there to the community at large.  (Keall, 1987: 9)
These harm reduction logics side-stepped the dogma of obligatory abstinence, yet did not directly 
challenge the jobs and institutions which were based on a cultural ideal of prohibiting 'risky' 
pleasures. As I will describe in the following chapter, a space for IDU to provide peer services 
emerged from these logics of connecting different elements in a strangely productive, composite 
environment.
Although Department officials and health professionals accepted that IDU health equated to public 
health, conceptions of public order, buttressed by psychological and medicinal authority, were also 
potentially destabilised if IDU were presented as not requiring urgent health treatment, despite 
being diagnosed as deviant and disordered. The need to maintain public confidence and order needs
to be borne in mind as a less overt mutual goal, despite the oppositions observed between officials 
and professionals when they participated in developing epidemiological logics into a workable 
harm prevention programme.
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6Peer-professional shapings
“ an alternate approach to professionalism [is] based on a ‘partnership’ between the professional and the
client ... together identifying what the client wants and needs to know. The ‘new professionalism’
discourse constitutes professionals as ‘reflective users of knowledge and experience’ whose central task is
to develop an understanding of the client’s perceived needs ... to the negotiated outcome ... this
perspective has more to do with the development and use of interpersonal skills than the application of
esoteric knowledge [but] does also involve claims to expertise ... and to professional autonomy.”
(Professionals and practices. Tully & Mortlock, 1999: 169-170)
What were the needs of the NEP’s IDU clients, as understood by themselves and others? How did 
the resolution of such issues hinge upon the way in which passage points between recreation, 
health practice and policy-making were defined as problems? I described in the previous chapter 
how a cycle of pharmacy-based NEP developments overlaid a cycle of gay community organising. 
As with gays, the voluntary participation of IDU was desired, leading to forms of community 
empowerment through legislation changes, health programmes, and representative organisations. 
However, the participation of IDU was only as a 'normal population’ of individual pharmacy 
clients, not as a ‘valid collective identity’, nor as the providers of specialised health services, let 
alone ‘care’. This potential gap was addressed by a third cycle, during which the previous methods 
and logics were extended in what I term a ‘peer-professionalising’ development. IDU peers came 
to be employed in order to complement the exchange of syringes in pharmacies and to facilitate the
proposed professional drug counselling services in clinics. These extensions also increased the 
opportunities for further workabilities and problematisations in a developing, ramifying area of 
borderline health activity.
For instance, it seemed inconceivable in 1987 that the pharmacists who were to run the NEP could 
become sufficiently motivated and resourced to challenge the state agencies which regulated them. 
However, in 2002 a strike was called by the IDU peer group administrators against the Ministry of 
Health. The combination of IDU knowledge, peer motivation, and professional types of aspirations 
to provide adequate health services, directed the NEP into distinctive pharmacy and non-pharmacy 
courses that nevertheless remaining connected and largely aligned. How did this non-pharmacist, 
IDU capability come to directly influence the NEP, instead of remaining as a client need and a 
hands-off advisory function for a primarily pharmacy-based service? 
1   Transfiguring policy: between parliament, professionals, and peers
The configuration of actors and actants that participated in directing the NEP’s activities changed 
after 1987. Some shifted to new positions, and new actors emerged. When David Caygill replaced 
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Michael Bassett as Minister of Health after the 1987 election, the team of Ministerial appointees 
that had planned the NEP lost its coherence and tactical position. Nevertheless, the control of this 
position had become less critical after the legal frameworks shifted according to the previously 
described amendments to the Misuse of Drugs Act and the Health Act. Once the NEP became 
approved as government policy it could be openly defended, administered, and reshaped by 
Department officials. The obligatory passage point262 of vulnerability to a (rather unlikely) veto, or 
to the actual proposals for direct Parliamentary oversight through a sunset clause, had been passed 
(Luke, 2002). The controls over the interpreting and enforcing of the new regulatory code of 
permissions and penalties had returned to the Minister and the Department. 
After the position of Ministerial Aide was disestablished in late 1987, Dr. Baker was contracted by 
the Department for several months to introduce and co-ordinate the NEP. Those responsibilities 
then passed to Lorraine Kerse, a full-time Department official.263 The co-ordination of the NEP had
shifted towards the more established Departmental areas, notably the Head Office, the Health 
Development Units, and the Health Protection Programme (National Council on AIDS, 1988a). By 
March 1989, Kerse was employed as the NEP co-ordinator in a new Departmental division, once 
again called the AIDS Taskforce, founded in late-1988 (Fithian, 2005. pers. com.). This 
transfigured body differed from the two previously described incarnations of that name in being 
operational as well as advisory. The AIDS TaskForce distributed funds through service provider 
contracts which it signed-off and monitored. The AIDS TaskForce was also required to somehow 
arrange for the NEP counselling.
The AIDS Advisory Committee had insisted that point-of-sale counselling be obligatory and 
integral to the NEP.264 This was due to more than just the personal preferences of its members. The 
Advisory Committee represented widespread medical opinion which held that an intervening 
mechanism was required to effect 'IDU motivation change'. For instance, the New Zealand Medical
Association opposed the NEP legislation because: "The role of the medical practitioner is to help 
cure drug users of their habit and not to reinforce it" (Baird, 1987: 2). Many doctors felt that 
supplying syringes entailed harms and hazards.265 These medical professionals treated counselling 
as an intervention with at least two goals. One goal was to directly counteract the harms considered
inherent in injecting drug use, no matter how ‘safe’. The other was to ensure that the programme 
effectively prevented HIV/AIDS transmission. Achieving this latter goal would justify the more 
general, symbolic harms considered to be caused by injecting becoming regulated rather than 
prohibited. Such strategising seems an accepted medical practice of applying professional 
262. See Callon (1999, 1991), Callon et al. (1997), Latour (1988: 43).
263. See Moffett (1987c: 5), Baker (2002 pers. com.), Kerse (1987).
264. See Patel (1987), Meech (1987e), Weldon (1987).
265. In this usage, harms actually occur, hazards refer to the possibilities of harm, whereas risk is a precise probability of 
harm. See Appendix 9.7.
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discretionary judgement to the different likelihoods of harm and benefits arising from interventions
in the form of treatment.
One story runs as follows. Syringe supply by itself counteracted the stigmatisation of illicit drug 
use by providing an alternative framework that acted as a 'normalising' health shelter. To justify 
such perceived hazards of supplying syringes in terms of the medical ethic of 'first do no harm', 
sufficient numbers of IDU needed to become ‘immune’ to catching HIV due to their behavioural 
and motivational changes. Guaranteeing such ‘immunity’ through a medical treatment approach 
required that counselling services be imposed by conventional clinics that were controlled by 
qualified treatment professionals using a bio-psychological theoretical model of disease or 
disorders.266 
Making the counselling obligatory implied that IDU suffered from disorders, and lacked 'normal' 
capabilities. This stance positioned IDU as diseased, disordered, or non-compliant individuals who 
needed treatment, rather than standing as public citizens who needed public health systems. This is 
perhaps why a drug treatment specialist who opposed the NE being based on pharmacies requested:
"less blurring of established roles in the public's eye so that pharmacies remained clearly in their 
current position of promoting health and drug dependence clinics were seen to be continuing to 
offer treatment" (Spittle, 1987). Any symbolic 'messages' of IDU agency opposed the interest of 
drug treatment specialists in ensuring that public images of IDU portrayed either public danger or 
comparative incapability.
The police had only reluctantly come to accept the concept of the NEP, and only after medical 
specialists on the AIDS Task Force had forwarded supportive epidemiological evidence. The 
support of the police remained essential, since police harassment of IDU at NEP outlets could 
destroy the trust needed for any programme to be effective. The AIDS Advisory Committee 
insisted that the: "preventative and drug control measures by police and customs should not be 
compromised" (Meech, 1987a).267 This stance was an effective request for police support rather 
than a demand that the police contribute to health outcomes. These same medical professionals 
who had been the key to aligning police, political and public support, then insisted that point-of-
sale counselling be obligatory. Nonetheless, the NEP was increasing in its 'inertia' as a programme. 
As it gained safe passage through and away from dangerous policy passage points where the 
support from police and health professionals had been essential, the NEP gathered institutional 
'mass'. It accumulated political and professional investments in a system constituted from 
increasingly stable connections that returned unique data on IDU and IDU-related health problems.
The accepted best professional practice for modifying the behaviour of addicted patients called for 
266. For discussion of drug treatment through abstinence in New Zealand see Jenner (2001), Van Kuppevelt (2000: 
25-29, 32-33, 101-103), Collins (1988).
267. This emphasis directly opposed Baker's emphasis that police be excluded from the NEP operations. See Chapter 6. 
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a combination of controlled drug supply, surveillance, enforcement, and counselling by medical 
and drug treatment specialists (Ghodse, 1989). Patients could be rejected if they were not fully 
compliant. This model could conceivably be applied to a tightly regulated NEP that was structured 
around compelling incentives, but not to a financially constrained system, where drugs such as 
methadone were not permitted to be made available as incentives, and where compliance was 
unable to be enforced. Supplying syringes in commercial ways that empowered the IDU customers 
and did not facilitate counselling treatment would have seemed inadequate and unethical to the 
drug treatment and medical professionals. This account explains a seemingly irrational insistence 
by the AIDS Advisory Committee on making a potentially workable programme impossible to run 
in actuality. Their story was more important for not being actual, but it was a real story that had 
actual effects.
The international information presented by the AIDS Advisory Committee implied that supplying 
syringes was in fact harmful, rather than merely wasteful of the resources that could be used 
elsewhere, for instance by extending abstinence-based programmes. Syringe supply seemed 
harmful if it was misleadingly presented as a full treatment.268 It seemed harmful if it facilitated any
non-professional syringe use,269 and if it removed a disincentive to initiation into recreational 
injecting. Syringes that were disposed of in public created hazards, along with problems of 
arranging safer disposal.270 Yet such issues seemed less clear-cut from the pragmatic public health 
perspectives that centred around ensuring that injecting environments became safer. Until the NEP 
began operating, there could be no measurement of the levels of participation by IDU and the 
changes in behaviour required. With no evidence base, the funding of a new counselling 
infrastructure, or major extensions to existing systems, could not readily be justified. A 
combination of the demands by the advisory treatment professionals, the refusal by the pharmacists
to provide counselling, and the valorisation by the public health officials of the pragmatic, adaptive
'bricolage' 271 of the resources available to hand, together created a window of opportunity for new 
participants and activities. This window was opened wider by the NEP Management Plan that was 
released in December 1987, then wider again by the regulations introduced early in 1988, which 
presented counselling as a desirable option but not obligatory. 
268. Early reports of uncontrolled HIV among IDU in Italy, where syringes were legally accessible without controls, 
supported such concerns (BMJ, 1987).
269. Doctors had supported syringes being illegal except in medical, scientific, and industrial applications. Those 
reasons, whether based on health concerns or professional control of specialised technologies, remained valid, 
despite concerns over HIV/AIDS.
270. Pharmacists insisted that the Department of Health accept accountability for disposal (Shaw, 1988), whereas 
Australian measures had avoided the problem with a supply policy that did not require returns. Refer 1986 
distribution scheme (Wodak, 1987; Baker, 1987a: 72). New South Wales introduced a needle and syringe 
distribution scheme utilising pharmacies in mid-December, 1986. Dr. Wodak warned Dr. Meech that cost-cutting 
policies had removed the obligation to dispose of returned syringes, which reduced public and political support for 
supplying syringes (Wodak, 1987). 
271. See Mackenzie (2003), Law (1987), Levi-Strauss (1966: 17-36).
142
Section 1:    Transfiguring policy: between parliament, professionals, and peers
Significant numbers of IDU were considered likely to boycott a scheme based in treatment clinics, 
whereas such clinics were not prepared to participate directly and publicly in the NEP (Collins, 
1988). The Department of Health was a state agency that rationed health expenditure by restraining
the autonomy of medical specialists to offer health services that were state-subsidised. The 
Department officials planning the NEP had incentives to evade demands that entailed increased 
expenditure, yet also were required to provide counselling in ways that fitted the medical evidence 
being used by the AIDS Advisory Committee to criticise the NEP. During 1987, a new expert 
advisory body was proposed to complement or replace the biomedical expertise of the AIDS 
Advisory Committee. This proposed National Advisory Committee on AIDS was intended to offer 
social expertise, and to include a wider social range in its membership of community 
representatives. This Committee was founded after the demise of the Drugs Advisory Committee, 
and after the formation of the Minister’s Committee on Drug Policy (MCDP). 
2   What form of counselling, and who would be ‘the expert’?
Various conflicts over expertise and authority had continued in several areas of the HIV/AIDS 
sector.272 One conflict hinged upon who, using which types of expertise and monitoring, would 
provide counselling services for the NEP. The problem of counselling reintroduced issues of how 
the framing of the NEP’s goals influenced the arranging of methods of implementation. These 
issues involved boundary disputes among IDU, health professionals, and the public over how to 
reduce the harms caused by illicit drug use, yet also those harms caused by drug prohibition. Such 
disputes have continued to influence the interactions between IDU and state agencies. For instance,
IDU peers advocated for drug decriminalisation in 1990 (Kemp, 1990). In 2001, a NEP 
presentation by IDU peers to the Inter-Agency Committee on Drugs273 showed that a health goal of 
decriminalising drug use remained on the NEP agenda (Nimmo & Richardson, 2001; Jang, 2001). 
Such issues strongly motivated a small number of participants who were nonetheless strategically 
positioned. 
In 1987, the Minister of Health had insisted that counselling against drug use would be integral to 
272. NACAIDS was referred to by the AAC as "a sort of public relations group" (Dowling, 1987a). Medical experts and 
social experts argued and manoeuvred over jurisdiction in supplying advice to both marginalised communities and 
Ministers of Health, and in supplying health services.
273. The IACD is a monitoring group of officials. It ensures that policies and programmes of government agencies are 
consistent and mutually supportive. The IACD offers recommendations to the MCDP on new policy initiatives. The 
IACD first met in August, 1998. At issue were the “advisory structures which could perhaps support the National 
Drug Policy, and in particular how to involve non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other institutional actors. 
... [the Chair of MCDP] indicated that NGOs should be involved when the intersectoral work programme is 'up and 
running' and then on an 'as appropriate' basis ...” (IACD, 1998). Another issue involved preparing a position for an 
approaching MCDP meeting in December 1998, where Ministers were to consider and debate the balance between 
measures for preventing drug-related harm and measures for reducing drug-related harm. The public minutes of 
MCDP do not include any meetings between August 1998 and June 1999. The published MCDP minutes do not 
mention this scheduled debate. The following two sets of IACD minutes that might provide explanatory comment 
are not on the Ministry of Health web-site.
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the NEP, but would never be 'imposed' upon clients (Bassett, 1987c).274 The Minister considered 
IDU to be no different to gays as regarded such counselling needs (Bassett, 1987b). This type of 
counselling has seemed a form of education, similar to gay HIV/AIDS counselling in not imposing 
an abstinence ideology. During this period the AIDS Advisory Committee defined counselling as 
face-to-face education aimed at individual behavioural changes that would induce a social change 
among IDU towards 'AIDS safe injections' (Meech, 1987e). 
Counselling as defined in the initial drafts of the Management Plan during November 1987, 
involved both drug clinics and community organisations such as the New Zealand AIDS 
Foundation and the IV League (Baker, 1987b). Several types of counselling had been settled on as 
appropriate for the NEP. This list included 'real' professional drug counselling as well as a form 
developed for the NEP, consisting of ad-hoc, 'educational' counselling by peers. A category of 
'outreach counselling' was also mentioned, but was presented as quite different from the 'provision 
of advice' by pharmacists (Salmond, 1988b).
The initial concept of choosing, either as a funder or a drug user, from a list of officially equivalent 
counselling methods, was replaced in later drafts by an established hierarchy of counselling. This 
ordered list privileged drug clinic counselling (Baker, 1987c), a type which required ongoing 
involvement275 and greater commitment by IDU. Nonetheless, this hierarchy was a wish-list, not a 
directive, and certainly was not enforceable. The NEP planners presented such a counselling 
context for exchanging syringes as an ideal, to be realised at an indefinite later time. 'Real 
counselling' was not considered possible in the pharmacies where the NEP needed to be based in 
order to be viable.
The NEP planners understood that motivation change through counselling was not achievable at 
pharmacies. Instead, reliance was placed upon a leaflet, to be handed out with syringes, that 
directed IDU to counselling agencies, since: "The pharmacists see their role as an advisory one, not
counselling" (Department of Health, 1987a). Pharmacists did not want to be close to IDU, nor 
accountable for the time and costs of providing counselling. Nor did the Department planning 
officials want to provide inducements to pharmacists, since these would need to be large. These 
officials had consistently preferred the cheapest options for the NEP. However, following the 
November 1987 election when Labour was returned to government, the new Minister of Health 
affirmed the need for 'close relationships' between providers of HIV/AIDS prevention education 
and the representatives of marginalised groups (Caygill, 1987a). Pharmacists could provide 
syringes, advice, and leaflets, but not close relationships, certainly not counselling, nor any other 
274. The lack of on-going commitment to a counselling type of therapeutic relationship, also implied that any costs 
would be minimal.
275. Since people, drugs, and environments differ, counselling as treatment requires expert diagnosis and evaluation of 
available resources before any commitment is entered into. See Van Kuppevelt (2000: 34-35, 100-103)
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forms of motivation change. Dr. Baker had effectively postponed any resolution of this policy 
conflict until after the pharmacy-based NEP had begun.276 
Professional counselling, outreach counselling, and peer counselling were all listed in the NEP’s 
November Management Plan draft as interventions that might lead to motivation changes among 
IDU. The outreach services were to be provided by six half-time workers who would augment the 
preventive education and counselling role of the participating drug treatment clinics. These workers
would be based at the major treatment clinics in Auckland, Palmerston North, Wellington, 
Christchurch, and Dunedin (Baker, 1987c). The description of outreach in the 1987 Management 
Plan had been borrowed from service planning guidelines for alcohol and drug services. It has 
seemed more a process of empathising and monitoring, rather than providing resources for any and 
all who chose to use them. Outreach reached into communities to raise the levels of awareness:
of alcohol and other drug problems, creating a more understanding and supportive environment 
for people suffering from the effects of alcohol and other drug abuse, identifying persons in 
need of services, alerting persons and their families to the availability of services, locating 
needed services, and enabling persons to enter and accept the service delivery system 
(Baker, 1987c : 65).
This focus was partly on creating safer environments, with some attention given to the problems of 
marginalisation and reducing stigma, but mostly on facilitating the delivery of services by 
professionals. The NEP planners presented outreach and counselling as different needs, to be met 
by different occupational specialties. Outreach workers were to design activities that supported 
behavioural change in IDU populations, and would assist in developing new outreach services. The
primary role of outreach was to expand the scope of professional counselling services, to augment 
the preventative education and counselling role of drug treatment clinics, and to direct IDU to 
counselling services (Poynter, (undated)). Outreach was to complement and facilitate ‘proper’ 
professional counselling, not to directly provide motivation changing services in peer-to-peer ways.
This formulation of outreach entailed less autonomy, less value placed on tacit knowledge, and less
recognition of specialised experience compared with providing professional services. However, the
connections and distinctions between such outreach and 'proper' counselling remained ambiguous 
in the Department of Health reports.
The six half-time workers specified in the Management Plan were to be contracted by and report to 
officials employed by the Department of Health. The NEP workers were to engage with IDU and 
attempt to establish NEP outlets at drug treatment clinics, or other appropriate sites. IDU were to 
be induced by financial offers to attend these ‘exchange clinics’. Yet, as with the separate AIDS 
Advisory Committee proposals, reliance on inducements has seemed an admission that the concept 
276. Baker made no attempt to call a workshop, or to invite proposals from prospective providers of counselling services.
Instead, Department of Health regional officials were asked to evaluate the counselling services currently provided 
in their regions.
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was fundamentally unworkable and financially unsustainable.277 The actual job description of the 
outreach workers has seemed closer to the community health, or social work types of education, 
combined with referrals to professional counselling that might not be available, due to potential 
constraints on funding.
The workers described in the Management Plan were appropriately professional in being based in 
the existing centres for providing qualified drug treatment expertise. However, these workers were 
clearly different from the clinic counsellors in being defined as 'outreach', which implied a more 
casual level of on-going commitment in their interactions with IDU, compared with a case-
management system of client management. Whether these part-time outreach workers were to be 
drawn from professional, peer, or other backgrounds was left usefully ambiguous. 
Professional counselling was presented in the Management Plan as only one, albeit the only fully 
legitimate and proper one, of a range of counselling types that aimed at motivation change. An 
initial concept of the validity of outreach by specialised workers, holding ambiguous or no 
professional qualifications, in non-professional environments outside clinics, has suggested that the
NEP’s pharmacy outlets were being considered for such a role. 
During the same period, the literature278 on forms of non-judgemental, education-focused, and face-
to-face peer-to-peer activities began to support a concept of ‘peer counselling’ and 'peer outreach'. 
These activities were presented as related to self-help groups such as Narcotics Anonymous (NA), 
and as experimental rather than specifically detailed.279 The term ‘self-help’ group was treated for a
period as synonymous with ‘peer group’. The terminology implied, in a drug treatment context, 
that non-professional, community-based counselling was provided by ex-IDU, as in NA. However, 
'self help' in a gay HIV/AIDS counselling contexts held no implications of promoting obligatory 
abstinence.280 Such strategic slippage and differentiations provided opportunities for those who 
wanted the motivation change aspects of IDU outreach and education, as well as a segment of 
syringe supply, to quietly evade the abstinence models of the drug treatment clinics.
The timing of these cycles is again shown to be important. IDU did not need to struggle forcefully 
to escape the conventional logics of enforcement. Instead, their representatives and supporters 
fitted into a pattern, established by gays before them, of rejecting motivations of fear, and being 
unable to be forced into treatment in any affordable way. Offering financial inducements for 
compliance would seem likely to have decreased the support of the public while increasing the 
277. See Baker (1987c), AIDS Advisory Committee (1988).
278. See Neaigus et al. (1990), Dolan (1989), Read (1988), Moran (1988), Moody (1988), Mundy (1988), Kerse (1988a, 
1988c, 1988d), Wright (1988a), Friedman et al. (1987), Dolan (1986).
279. The ambiguity between frameworks of harm reduction or abstinence, and lack of details over methods and 
evaluation, would have made such concepts difficult to critique in an urgent situation of 'something has to be done'. 
It appears actors were making things up as they went along.  See Tilly (1997b: 51-108), Stinchcombe (1997: 
387-393).
280. See Wright (1988b), Payne (1988), Newmeyer (1988), Friedman et al. (1987: 1).
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costs and administrative difficulties of the NEP. Decriminalising of illicit drugs was not considered
as a harm reduction tactic, since that would work against the more general health policies of 
decreasing the rates of illicit injection. Any offer of drug decriminalisation might well have 
motivated IDU, but would have risked alienating the general public support for undertaking 
partnerships between IDU, officials, politicians, and professionals. The following stage therefore 
oriented upon a concept of facilitation, rather than of necessity or inducement.
3   Establishing IDU centres: From counselling to syringes
How did the logics of outreach that were to extend from the sites of professional expertise found in 
the clinics and the pharmacy outlets come to support peer-run contact centres? The logics of the 
NEP situation, deriving from the longer-term institutional situation where criminalising was 
constructed alongside yet separated from medicalising, required that working arrangements for the 
prevention of HIV/AIDS would somehow involve the voluntary participation of IDU. These logics 
notwithstanding, the IDU peers were not positioned for offering motivation changing services since
they were 'criminals by intent'. Most IDU peers were not qualified professionally.281 Their illicit 
experiences were not evaluated as useful, beyond the offering of advice and the provision of easier 
access for the referral of IDU to 'real counselling'.
After the NEP began operating in May 1988, the attitudes and behaviour of the IDU clients who 
participated increased in significance from the perspectives of the administrators, whose own 
performance was evaluated according to such outputs. In the same process, the occupational 
importance of the potential exchange process between the IDU peer workers and IDU clients was 
strengthened. This indicates how the timing, of first a pharmacy exchange for injecting equipment, 
and only then of a debate around competing models for motivation change, weakened professional 
claims to this territory more than would have been the case if the same changes had been 
considered together. After these initial stages had begun to make the IV League proposals seem 
somewhat more reasonable to the NEP officials, a workshop on IDU and HIV/AIDS was held in 
the beginning of June (Read, 1988). Some quite differing perspectives emerged from this workshop
when the formal proposals by Dr. Baker and the IV League for outreach programmes were 
discussed.282 A second type of IDU peer voice first appears in the records.283 
281. Any that were qualified but also remained ‘peers’ through continuing drug injection took great pains to not be 
exposed as such.
282.  The NZAF seems to have expressed its position, but whether as a specific NZAF model, or perhaps a general 
principle of participation of affected communities in programme design and delivery, was not recorded. Australian 
outreach experiences were also presented. Some programmes were centred around user’s homes. Syringe supply 
was free and exchange was not necessary. A range of syringes was available in a six-pack. No client information 
was recorded. Programmes had been established in 1987, with funding of $137,000 per annum.
283. These people later founded ADIO. An account from an ADIO founder indicates that this group’s proposals were 
criticised by IV League personnel (Watts, 2004. pers. com.). Since there were no reports of an IV League presence 
in Auckland, the ADIO group’s plans and clinic connections would have suddenly appeared as a threat to an 
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The AIDS Advisory Committee models of IDU education had involved fully professional 
counselling by means of expanding the existing clinics and GP-based drug treatment programmes, 
and by creating new mobile clinics. However, these options involved prohibitively expensive 
wages and start-up costs (Stoke 1987a, 1987b). These options also required significant incentives, 
for instance of drug maintenance or money, to counter the suspicions and requirements for 
anonymity that motivated IDU.284 Offering incentives to IDU seemed to counteract the logics of 
user-pays, complicated the preferences of the service deliverers for minimal paper-work, and 
opposed the preferences of planning officials for the lowest costs and least involvement by state 
agencies.
Dr. Baker proposed that the NEP’s range of outlets and products be expanded, and that surveillance
over the distribution patterns of injectable drugs take place. He promoted the provision of 
educational resources, outreach programmes, and self-help organisations as strategies leading to 
behavioural change. Dr. Baker wanted to extend the NEP into specific populations of prisoners, 
younger people, occasional IDU, and also into non-IDU communities, since: “The challenge is to 
establish an effective partnership between the community and the user/ex-user population to 
recognise and control the AIDS hazard which faces both groups” (Read, 1988). According to Dr. 
Baker's model, the government would provide syringes, fund IDU organisations, and embrace a 
harm reduction philosophy. Users would reciprocate by co-operating with the governance and 
evaluations of the NEP, and by establishing publicly accountable 'self-help' organisations.
Dr. Baker’s argument for a 'partnership' model seems inherently contradictory in relying on clinics 
to provide the material and geographical bases for outreach activities. Drug treatment at the time 
was opposed to the logics of harm reduction.285 Furthermore, clinics were uncontrollable because 
they were mostly privately administered, somewhat like ‘treatment fiefdoms’. Expanding their 
services would involve the difficulties of motivating the private sponsors and entrenched leadership
of existing systems which were not competitive. However, one advantage of at least utilising such 
clinics lay in not directly challenging the biopsychological models favoured by the addiction 
treatment professionals. Another potential benefit came from complying with the medical 
professional requirements of the AIDS Advisory Committee. This Committee was understood by 
other medical specialists to be advocating that all aspects of the scheme should be centred on and 
controlled by a new type of mobile clinic or existing treatment clinics (Baird, 1987). Despite these 
potential benefits, the dependence on clinics specified in Dr. Baker's proposed partnership seemed 
to entail a pervasive logic of perverse outcomes.
established set of national arrangements and actors.
284.  See AIDS Advisory Committee (1988), Stoke (1987a).
285. Hamner was the only clinic recorded as being prepared to become a supply outlet, yet only if not publicly advertised
as such. National provision of counselling seems dubious if the centres had to be as secretive as the IDU clients. For 
discussion of drug treatment through abstinence in New Zealand see Jenner (2001), Van Kuppevelt (2000: 25-29, 
32-33, 101-103), Collins (1988). For Hamner and the NEP see Crawford (1988a, 1988b).
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Dr. Baker (1987c: 3, 12) had recognised that IDU would need to be strongly motivated to attend 
clinics, as required by his partnership model. He had suggested offering easier access to methadone
as an incentive, but such inducements had been labelled as ethically unacceptable by a dismayed 
treatment specialist.286 At the time, methadone was presented as a curative treatment, not a 
maintenance, nor palliative, nor a harm reduction treatment (Jenner, 2001: 23).287 Medical 
treatment could not, at least formally, be offered as an incentive for behaviour modification, since 
that would distort the evidence base of diagnoses of relapse, improvements, or cure. Dr. Baker's 
proposed partnership model also suffered from having no material centre of activity and status to 
be controlled by the partner with the most choice and motivation about participating. This would 
have provided an incentive for continued participation by IDU. 
The AIDS Advisory Committee did recognise some of the inherent problems of attempting to 
motivate IDU to attend motivational sessions at clinics. The Committee's solution was to provide 
financial incentives, rather than inducements based on collective social interactions such as greater 
recognition and representation. The Committee had previously valorised collective social 
interactions, and downplayed an individual focus in its rationale for providing educative 
counselling rather than syringe supply alone (Meech, 1987e).288 GP counselling was generally 
supported by all participants,289 but is not discussed here, since only a few GPs stated an interest in 
providing NEP services, and none remained in the NEP by 1994 (Walker, Brady, & Baker, 1994). 
How the IV League understood counselling was also open to different interpretations. IV League 
spokespersons stated that there was a need for peer-to-peer counselling, according to the 
Community Health Outreach Worker (CHOW) model from San Francisco (Wright, 1988a). The 
League also promoted ‘self-help’ educators (Wright, 1988b) who were to draw on the locally 
developed NZAF counselling methods. These proposals suggested that 'self-help' organisation 
would overlap with the NZAF training and accountability systems, at least initially. The League 
emphasised that many IDU were, for a range of reasons, less resourced than gay men in terms of 
286. A  Royal New Zealand College of General Practitioners spokesperson commented: "Regarding Methadone 
programmes, I am dismayed at the comments made. It has some of the hallmarks of entrapment and I think should 
be reworded if at all possible. I agree with the need to spread the word through the “drug grapevine”, but it would be 
inappropriate and counter productive to put up Methadone programmes so that contact can be made with I. V. drug 
abusers by giving them Methadone" (Seddon 1988: 1). 
287. Methadone could not be offered as a bribe to induce compliant behaviour in IDU, without calling attention to how 
the barriers blocking access to methadone acted as a socially approved disincentive based on denying treatment to 
the sick. This is an example of a 'mechanism' where social and material alignments create social action. A 
mechanism is a parsimonious way of explaining both change and stabilities through the same process. 
288. The inconsistency in this AIDS Advisory Committee stance appears worth exploring in a different study.
289. Arrangements for GP counselling had an unintended effect that was unwelcome from the perspectives of 
Department of Health officials. The proposed reimbursements for GPs encouraged pharmacists to reopen the 
question of their own professional fee component in the mark-up on the selling price of the packs. GPs who 
counselled and exchanged syringes from their practices were to be eligible for a special compensation under a 
‘Triple S’ programme. If those providing Triple S funded services worked half time (20 hr week) for 45 weeks a 
year, as the workload on the Outreach counsellors was projected, their yearly income would have been $67,500, 
compared with a yearly income of $11,500 at AIDS Foundation Counsellor rates (Baker 1987c: 76). The 
Department of Health had strong financial incentives to provide counselling at AIDS Foundation rates, or below. 
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their capabilities of organising (Wright, 1987). The publications of the League did not claim that 
IDU were incapable, since they also emphasised the prevalence of recreational users and corporate 
users (Wright, 1988b). However, it was made clear that such socially accomplished IDU would not
provide their organising skills if that entailed the costs of loosing employment and social status by 
being publicly exposed as deviant.290
The IV League agreed with the AIDS Advisory Committee that syringe supply alone was 
inadequate until all IDU were consistently using new syringes. The League’s proposals aligned 
with the Committee’s in promoting the diffusion of safe injecting messages through IDU networks,
and in providing education and referral services for IDU. Nonetheless, the League differed in 
promoting motivation change in order to build self-esteem. Self-esteem would help overcome 
barriers, such as social rejection and stigma, that blocked greater control of injecting hazards but 
could be overcome through harm reduction methods (Wright, 1988a).291 The League promoted the 
empowerment of IDU. The League concepts of drug counselling were in places separated from 
HIV/AIDS counselling, yet conflated in other places. This was because the League supported 
conventional drug treatment for those wanting it, but otherwise supported harm reduction concepts 
of IDU gradually increasing their control of on-going drug use. What the League meant by HIV/
AIDS counselling, in a NEP context, combined several different concepts, yet has seemed clearly 
different, in being outreach-oriented, from the professional counselling for support, testing, and 
prevention provided by the NZAF. The IV League proposed employing three full time and twelve 
half time staff (Wright, 1988a), three more full-time staff than Baker had proposed.
The attendees at the NEP workshop in May 1988 had generally agreed that people with credibility 
to the IDU consumer group should be responsible for the design and delivery of the programmes. 
These people were to be empowered separately from the drug clinics, although they should have 
full access to the resources, information, acknowledgements and financial support provided for 
drug clinics (Read, 1988). The IV League was considered by some attendees as being just such a 
representative consumer body, and as being suited for providing the desired services under 
discussion. However, the attendees were uncertain about the specific standards required for 
delivering services. Some also disagreed about IDU being represented by a single organisation with
an overt political agenda. An alternative argument that emerged was that the IV League was not the
290. It has been noticeable that the strongest advocacy on behalf of criminal IDU and gays has come from those who 
were either or both, and were HIV positive. These people had little to lose by publicity. They could not be offered 
inducements apart from what they were demanding anyway. They could not be cowed by threats to their well-being. 
Nor did they need to fear being prosecuted. For instance, a press clipping in the Department of Health files of the 
National Archives records that: "Charges of importation of a Class A controlled drug were withdrawn against a 39-
year old Wellington man because he's dying of AIDS" (Unsourced, undated [my ref 4-79]). Even at their most 
provocative, it was far more more upsetting for officials to have HIV positive AIDS activists arrested than to adjust 
to their demands. Arresting a PWA meant that state agencies would become fully accountable for their care and 
continued well-being. Nor would such arrests promote a partnership model. HIV/AIDS activists were safe from 
arrest in New Zealand, and could concentrate on achieving policy advances.
291. The IV League considered that rates of drug dependence would also drop through empowerment strategies.
150
Section 3:    Establishing IDU centres: From counselling to syringes
only or the best way to address the problem of motivation change, since some IDU felt alienated by
its high profile. Other voices called for transitional arrangements before giving full responsibility to
the IV League (Read, 1988).
The workshop attendees recommended that Community Health Outreach Workers (CHOWs) and a
national outreach co-ordinator be employed, but did not specify by whom, nor the framework of 
accountability. Nor is it clear that the participants meant the same thing by referring to CHOWs, 
since the concept as used overseas entailed street work in a type of street drug scene that did not 
occur in New Zealand. The options for providing the best oversight for the proposed outreach 
services included the Department of Health, a national co-ordinator, a regional advisory co-
ordinating committees, and a national body of regional committees (Read, 1988). It is clear that 
centrally co-ordinated funding and direction was supported by all the participants. The attendees 
also agreed that oversight by a Committee that was close to the actual level of service delivery was 
desirable, though such a Committee would only act in an advisory capacity, not directive.
The attendees did not articulate any clearly desired governance structures for the evaluation and 
accountabilities of outreach services. Only general goals and principles were proposed. Apart from 
peer workers who were trusted by IDU having guaranteed input into the administration, no strong 
single preference for the shaping of such goals was expressed. These goals could potentially be 
attained through different assemblages of logics and methods, using bureaucratic, market, and 
professional models and mixes. The different interests and potential directions stand out because 
they were not submerged in a common framework of expertise and understandings. Nobody could 
show qualified expertise, nor clearly effective success, or even significant experience, in NEP 
outreach, motivation change, or counselling. 
The workshop illustrates the significance and inseparability of the timing and boundaries. The 
activity over the boundaries of jurisdiction of the medical and treatment professionals produced 
enough force to demand government investment in conventional 'counselling'. That force, 
expressed as a need for counselling, was not enough to delay the legalising and implementing of 
the NEP syringe supply.292 This deferred the conflict over the goals and methods of motivation 
change, which by becoming labelled as 'counselling', undermined the concept and drew attention to
the paradoxes implicit in conventional drug counselling. 
The contesting elements then came together at the workshop, where ideology-based arguments 
needed to engage with an actually operating syringe exchange programme, with its inbuilt 
evidence-based evaluation, its support from a state of public urgency, and its official codes of 
approval. Since no unmanageable problems had been reported through the recently established yet 
292. For instance, there were calls at the working party for a programme of civil disobedience over the 16 year age 
restriction on syringe sales (Read, 1988). The age limit seemed as if moral considerations were putting the lives of 
younger IDU in jeopardy, while causing unnecessary legal risks for those selling the syringes (Baker, 1987c).
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actually existing system of NEP monitoring, it was far easier to wait and see what further 
epidemiological and infrastructural data might indicate before arguing for major changes. By 
providing monitoring services, the NEP arrangements altered the frameworks of the logics of the 
different methods of counselling IDU. The logics of NEP hybridity were given time to be adjusted 
to by actors within the network of connections being assembled. 
The two goals of the NEP are seen to have consolidated in concept, but at different rates, in 
discontinuous streams of activities. The syringe supply stream was being implemented on the 
ground, but not the 'motivation change' stream. The connections between these streams had not 
been made mutually reinforcing in symmetrical, simultaneous ways. Instead they contributed to 
each other in an asymmetric, 'alternating' way. The tactics of managing consent involved deferring 
the aspects likely to be opposed to a time when the monitoring of information and new 
developments had changed the frameworks of logics involved. Furthermore, the number of 
elements requiring new arrangements, including CHOW activities, physical locations, 
accountabilities, employment protocols, and IDU involvement, took time to find suitable 
representatives. These arrangements were not initially attached to any substantial theory or model, 
which could have assisted in co-ordinating the understandings and expectations of participants into 
a working set of arrangements.
All the elements that became attached became linked to the pharmacy-based supply of syringes, 
because there was no other institutional vehicle at hand. Due to the prior conflicts which gay 
activists had largely won, the planning terrain was conducive to the logics and models of 
participation. These aligned readily with the pragmatic tendencies of official planners and 
pharmacists. The participants had no rigid social structures to rearrange, since all the participants 
accepted that the stage for operating could be small and experimental. There was a set of problems 
potentiating a solution, and a set of existing arrangements available for reconfiguration. However, 
the critical elements were not drawn from a generalised background into juxtaposition in the 
crowded ‘historicised’ foreground by impersonal forces. The reconfiguration involved strategically 
positioned, motivated participants, aligned with centres of calculation, medical knowledge and 
syringes, as part of the network activity that came to create the peer-run contact centres.
4   Two sets of IDU peers bid for official patronage: Lowest bid takes all
In the previous phase of activity in which the positioning of IDU and peers had altered, IDU had 
been acknowledged as NEP customers, rather than as patients of doctors or clients of professional 
expertise. In the next phase of activity, from May to September, several conflicts played out at 
around the same time. In one conflict, two different sorts of peers, using different sorts of 
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organising methods, influenced the political problem of providing counselling for IDU. However, I
will first discuss how a related conflict has illustrated issues of expert knowledge which have 
pervaded the NEP’s relationships between peer embedment and professionalising.
This conflict involved a dispute over jurisdiction between the NZAF and the Medical and Scientific
SubCommittee on AIDS (MASCA),293 over their respective knowledges and organisational status. 
MASCA was chaired by Dr. Meech, who had lobbied strongly, as a key medical advisor, for point-
of-sale professional counselling at all NEP outlets. The NZAF was important in being a potential 
model for providing counselling and peer outreach services, as well as being a powerful lobby 
group that strongly supported the NEP and models of peer participation. The AIDS Advisory 
Committee and MASCA had remained important sites of activity after the NEP legislation 
changes, even if less crucial than before.
MASCA took a position that supported the privileges of biomedical-based professionals to control 
medical knowledge and advice by excluding the voices of those affected by such knowledge and 
advice.294 This stance was supported by Department of Health advisors and the Minister, who 
denied requests by the National People Living With AIDS Union and the NZAF to guarantee a seat
for an HIV-positive representative on MASCA. Instead, the Minister and advisors supported a 
separation of expertise on HIV/AIDS into two committees. 
MASCA presented knowledge on 'nature' from a science perspective. The National Council on 
AIDS offered a social commentary from a notably wide-ranging, representational perspective. The 
AIDS Service Organisations opposed such separation. They supported the inclusion of the social 
expertise and ‘lived experiences’ of members of marginalised groups into all perspectives, 
especially into biomedical perspectives. This conflict over knowledge, representation, and trust was
significant in how it provided reasons for the AAC's insistence on professional counselling. 
There were two aspects of this environment of advisory expertise that resisted being categorically 
293. The AIDS Advisory Committee had been scheduled to be renamed the Medical and Scientific Committee on AIDS 
(MASCA), alongside a National Advisory Committee on AIDS (NACAIDS). From an AIDS Advisory Committee 
perspective, MASCA was the only source of expert knowledge. NACAIDS was considered “a public relations 
gimmick” (Dowling, 1987a). However, during developing conflicts over representation, NACAIDS had become 
reconceptualised and renamed as the  National Council on AIDS. MASCA became repositioned as its 
subcommittee, and renamed accordingly (Poutasi, 1988a).
294. The National Council on AIDS expertise was socially oriented, whereas the subcommittee was medically and 
physiologically oriented on individuals and aggregate populations. However, it proved difficult to maintain such 
distinctions, despite the Director-General of Health stating that the two different types of expertise conflicted, and 
accordingly, were more effective and  efficient when separated as two distinct advice streams. See Poutasi (1988a, 
1988b), Fielding (1988a, 1988b, 1988c), Caygill (1988a, 1988b). This formulation was rejected by advocates of 
each stream, each of which was claimed to be more significant than other. Dr Meech stated that social aspects could 
not be separated from medical aspects, yet that such medical advice must not be altered by non-medical people and 
perspectives (Meech, 1988a). HIV/AIDS activists stated that non-medical comments must accompany any medical 
advice, given the harm such advice could potentially cause to social programmes (Fielding, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c). It 
appears that each perspective preferred to control their own advice stream, yet needed to know immediately what 
was being said in the other stream in order to comment on it at the time, rather than later. This meant they needed to 
control their access to the other stream. The distrust between these two courtier-like factions forced them into 
mutual engagement, despite the Minister preferring them separated. Contention over membership of MASCA was 
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repackaged within tidy committee boundaries. The National Council on AIDS became responsible 
for monitoring and advising on HIV/AIDS prevention work with IDU (Pearson, 1988), though not 
on curative or physiological matters. However, the AIDS Advisory Committee also recommended, 
during its reallocation of responsibilities on its disestablishment in March, that all NEP information
continue to be sent to MASCA as well as to the National Council on AIDS. No reasons were 
offered.
The second surprising aspect involved medical professionals who became HIV-positive. The 
reports relating to these cases were to be sent to MASCA, but not specified as also to be sent to the 
National Council on AIDS. This directive suggests that at least some of the social aspects of 
medical worlds and social groups of medical personnel were claimed as falling within a medical 
jurisdiction. These aspects touch on an elite type of status, in particular that involving occupational 
roles and situations being specifically excluded from the wider public collective and particularly 
from being subjected to different expert disciplines of social analysis.295 
These exceptions illustrate how issues of control over treatment practices created or reinforced a 
line of division between the juxtaposed committees, yet also maintained a connection of contested 
privilege between them. The conflict provides a context and motivations for how the NEP was 
understood and positioned as an object of contention between different types, organisations, and 
occupational divisions of expertise. Such conflicts inform the manoeuvrings over the configuration 
of the NEP’s counselling goals, requirements, and methods.
The conflict over NEP counselling did not seem directly affected by the NZAF as an organisation. 
However the conflict did illustrate the dangers and risks, from a Departmental perspective, of too 
powerful a ‘lay’ community voice, even though such officials also opposed a too powerful 
‘professional’ administrative voice. This conflict coincided with attempts by the Department to 
restrict the expansion and influence of the NZAF (Kemp, 2004). In this climate, the Department 
officials had an interest in preferring peer group models that did not follow an NZAF pattern, nor 
were 'locked-into' the NZAF in other ways. 
After arranging the NEP workshop discussed in the previous section, Kerse contacted a variety of 
sources of expertise to gather information about the requirements for organising outreach 
programmes. She approached Marion Watson, who directed IDU education and outreach in 
Canberra (Kerse, 1988a, 1988b), and was approached by Robert Kemp,296 who worked as an ex-
inflamed by Dr. Say’s appointment after being nominated by the Venereological Society. HIV/AIDS activists 
objected because Dr. Say had publicly lobbied against decriminalisation of homosexuality, and continued to lobby 
against gay rights (Fielding, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c). 
295. One imagines issues of medical professionals becoming drug dependent, and/or injecting recreationally, would also 
be placed under 'medical' rather than 'social' control in being judged by committees of colleagues rather than Crown 
prosecutors and judges.
296. See Kerse (1988d), Kemp (1988a, 1988b, 1988c).
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IDU at the Auckland Methadone Clinic. 
Kemp proposed an outreach model that selected aspects of the previous proposals and integrated 
them in a new assemblage. This assemblage was to be a stand-alone Trust called the Auckland 
Drug Information Outreach Trust (ADIO). ADIO was similar to a treatment clinic in its 
professional supervision and networking, yet its services were delivered by IDU peers. There are 
no archived records of any equivalent correspondence between the Department and the IV League 
or MASCA. It may be that they were not aware of these negotiations. It may be that the 
Department had already indicated its preferences and had waited for somebody to offer a means of 
implementation from the private sector. The evidence here is open to different interpretations. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that Kemp’s proposal was strategically timed. By being presented after the 
alternative models, it could critique them, and be closer to the crucial decision point.297
In early June, 1988, shortly after the workshop, Kemp wrote to Kerse, criticising the previous 
proposals for providing motivation change services. Kemp argued that: “Rodger Wright’s proposal 
would require excessive human and economic resources. Michael Baker’s proposal utilises too few
people” (Kemp, 1988c). If Kemp's model was applied in five urban centres, the costs would be 
$42,145 per annum, less than the IV League proposal and equivalent to two full time staff.
        Peer Counselling Proposals between 1987 and 1988 Table 4a.
Who Site Ownership Personnel numbers Year Costings Based Time
Baker.
Department 
of Health 
official.
Department of 
Health.
Private clinics
6 half time. Not offered.
In drug treatment clinics 
in all 5 major cities.
Dec.  1987
Wright.
IV League.
Department of 
Health.
Private clinics.
3 full time @     28,750
12 half-time @  14, 039
Total
$   86, 250
$ 172, 500
$ 258, 750
Connected to drug 
treatment clinics in all 5 
major cities.
Feb.   1988
Kemp.
Methadone 
Clinic 
proponent.
Private 'shop 
front',
contact centre.
1 full time @     20,800
1 half time @    10,400
Office rent
Running costs
Total
$  20, 800
$  10, 400
$    4, 160
$    6, 961
$  43, 321
Auckland only.
Would cost $216,605 to 
extend to all 5 major 
cities.
June. 1988
Kemp's model relied on there being fewer part-time workers, which indicated that higher 
professional standards would be required from those employed. Another important difference 
297. Past that point it was free from having to compete with alternative models that had been improved by its own 
features and critique, similar to releasing policies too early in an election.
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consisted of the lower pay rates for full time and part time employees. Kemp's argument, in effect, 
was to create a more professionalised workforce with less outreach activity employed at lower rates
in a pilot project that could be easily abandoned if not proving to economically or administratively 
viable. Kemp also argued that both the overseas and local gay community models were 
inappropriate for working with IDU in New Zealand.
Kemp instead promoted flexibility and regional expertise within a national framework for: 
“Contacting and building up a network of local consumers or collecting raw data for national 
research” (Kemp, 1988a: 1-2). Kemp’s proposal did not require committing any set level or type of
employment or expenditure. It potentially incorporated Baker’s concept of partnerships and 
research, as well as the IV League’s concern for inclusion of peer expertise. It also included the 
MASCA demand for providing motivation changing counselling services, although not at point-of-
sale in pharmacies. Instead, Kemp added the provision of after-hours exchange services to his 
original proposal. Counselling was not to come to the syringe exchange, instead the syringes would
come to the peer group's motivation change and educating activities.
Shortly after receiving encouragement for the ADIO proposal by Kerse, Kemp attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to become directly employed by the Department. His proposed job description was 
to help in overcoming the opposition he had experienced when promoting ADIO's type of work 
(Kemp, 1988b). Although Kemp did not propose that there be a formal hierarchy to administer a 
collection of 'ADIOs', he did emphasise the need for high-level, Wellington-based, national co-
ordination, presumably for more than a single urban pilot study. The person evaluating this 
proposal shortly became employed by the AIDS TaskForce as just such a co-ordinator, as Kemp 
himself later became, though in a more advisory role. Similar career interests and opportunities 
meshed with the organisational framework of the proposal. The proposal for ADIO as a peer group 
contact centre was extremely experimental and risky, but also cheap, while providing invaluable 
career experience.
The sequence of archived correspondence shows that the ADIO proposal rapidly became favoured 
by Department planners. It received strong support from the Nurse Administrator of the Auckland 
Methadone Clinic (Moody, 1988). Kemp stressed the need to employ women, due to the 
connections he emphasised between IDU activities and sex work. By not being linked to the IV 
League, nor formally to the NZAF, nor to medical professionals, Kemp and ADIO avoided the 
existing conflicts, such as those I have described that emerged between the Department and the 
NZAF.298 ADIO received a funding contract and established a new service delivery model as a 
298. In February, 1988 a Department official on the NZAF Board was forced by the Department to resign due to 
perceived institutional conflicts of interest, against the firmly expressed wishes of the NZAF (Lindberg, 1988a, 
1988b). This official sat on the National Council on AIDS as the Department of Health representative (Poutasi, 
1988a). The NZAF model of community participation through an NGO had framed the provision of services and 
policy advice since 1985. Due to its success, the NZAF developed from a gay alliance opposing control of HIV/
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contact centre. This did not constitute a commitment by the Department to consider ADIO as a 
preferred model or the only source of expertise on outreach. Instead, Kerse continued to gather 
information from international sources about different outreach programmes (Kerse, 1988f). The 
contract was adjusted before signing to include the provision of after-hours syringe exchange 
services. However, ADIO was particularly significant in its timing, since a very similar model had 
already been rejected early in 1987. The 'shop-front model', which it closely resembled had not 
been initially shortlisted as a model for syringe exchange. ADIO was a repeated idea, not a new 
idea.
In February 1987, a Departmental analysis of prospective NEP arrangements, presented at the 
'Police/Customs/Health Dept Working Party on N&S for IDU', had briefly discussed the principle 
of new clinic sites (Stoke, 1987b). These were not presented as drug treatment clinics, but were 
termed ‘AIDS Shop Fronts’ that involved outreach. This was one of the first proposals that 
mentioned outreach as being different from professional drug counselling.299 The trial nature of this
shop model is clear, as are the peer engagement aspects of its services. However, the police 
perspective that outreach would involve “ a ‘plain clothes’ health care worker in unmarked [sic] 
car” (Stoke, 1987b) might explain the overall recommendation of the working party to “wait”.300
By June, 1988, Department officials had shifted from 'waiting' to more directive activity. Kemp 
notes that: 
as government activity in providing HIV/AIDS services grew, it became inclined to view the 
growth and encompassment of the AIDS Foundation with some suspicion. This led the AIDS 
Taskforce (Dept. of Health) to develop, in the words of one official, a process of “contrived 
spontaneity”, whereby members of marginalised groups would rather miraculously appear as 
fledgling organisations seeking funding. (Kemp: 2004)
In 1988 the concept of ‘shop front’ contact centres became favoured for counselling and education 
due to the invisible hands of 'contrived spontaneity'. However, in 1987 none of the working parties 
had short-listed the the shop-front concept for implementing syringe exchange. As late as 1990, a 
review of the peer groups suggested that the degree of syringe sales through the peer groups was 
too low to be of significant value to IDU consumers, and was not worth subsidising (Robinson, 
AIDS by medical professionals, to a more complex and stratified professional organisation opposing Department 
officials over the rationing of funding. Kemp (2004) suggests that Department officials in 1988 were restricting any 
expansion of this model.
299. Outreach in these terms was conceived of as connected to drug user networks, and as avoiding the problems of the 
established types of methadone programme. But any proposed links between the NEP and the existing programmes 
run by drug treatment professionals were thought problematic, since harm reduction was generally not supported by 
the established drug treatment specialists. The working party had noted that the established drug clinics and GPs had 
the most support to supply syringes, since the police approved of these two options and the AIDS Advisory 
Committee considered that counselling at point-of-sale was feasible. However, neither drug clinics nor GPs were 
considered affordable, which partly explains why the pharmacy option was later selected. Perhaps some participants 
were manoeuvring for new clinics once costs were better known and the unforeseen consequences of an innovatory 
programme had stabilised. 
300. It perhaps supports a concept that some Department officials had a long-term plan involving community groups of 
some sort running needle exchanges without professional levels of wages, and without opposition from enforcement 
agencies.
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1990: 25-26). This evaluation illustrates how the shape and pace of the NEP developments were 
uneven, despite the careful Management Plan. Significant later developments, such as the numbers 
of syringes supplied from thirteen peer groups overtaking the syringes supplied from over a 
hundred pharmacies, were neither predicted nor encouraged during the first two years of the NEP.
To operate as an exchange, agreements had to be made for ex-IDU and IDU to be officially 
approved of by local District Advisory Pharmacists as NEP salespeople. This issue had been 
contested by GPs, treatment specialists, and pharmacists, who all considered that their professional 
qualifications were more than adequate to ensure their suitability. Nonetheless, the Department 
officials disagreed, knowing from the IDU peers and their consultation with health professionals 
that strong prejudices against IDU existed among professional groups. Accordingly, the 
Department officials wished to be able to rapidly expel any professional who seemed to bring the 
NEP into disrepute with IDU. This rankled with professionals, since a state agency was 
superseding their jurisdiction over their qualification requirements in work situations. The ADIO 
model positioned professionally the unqualified and illicit IDU as equivalent or even preferred to 
professionals for becoming a type of NEP specialist. 
The contracting of ADIO constituted the second professionalising step made by IDU peers. The 
first involved becoming attached to the organising of gay-focused HIV/AIDS prevention, as an 
IDU concern within the AIDS Service Networks, then later within the NZAF. Such lobbying 
separated into a more intense, focused organisation with the establishment of the IV League. The 
second phase of arrangements following from the establishment of ADIO were more professional 
than the League, at least partly because the methadone clinic background provided effective and 
efficient knowledge of how to set up and run a small, isolated health education unit, and how to 
liaise with treatment clinics.
However, ADIO remained dependent on its continuing engagement with IDU expertise and 
backgrounds to provide its legitimacy and to avoid competition from treatment and social work 
professions. Yet as a result of ADIO’s contract with the Department of Health and the principle this
established, IDU who did not operate in an IV League mode of public politics gained opportunities 
to discretely enter a new type of work and to accumulate in number, while establishing boundaries 
and connections. The output was injecting safety but the outcome was a new occupation of peer-
professionals.
This step had come about because clinic-based ‘ex-IDU’ Aucklanders challenged the IV League’s 
claim to represent IDU voices and organisation. The League had previously been aligned with the 
Department of Health in achieving a pharmacy-based NEP through legislative change. The League 
had specialised in political lobbying, but control of the legalised NEP shifted from political to 
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bureaucratic areas. ADIO members had clinic-organising competencies, commercial associates, 
and seemed better at networking in bureaucratic situations. Their managerial and analytical 
capabilities became trusted by Department officials, which undoubtedly helped in gaining a 
contract for their model, which was rapidly copied by IV League members in other cities. These 
IDU experimented with combinations of small IDU volunteer networks, administration systems, 
peer groups, and the clinic model (Robinson, 1990). In consequence, these IDU peers became more
trusted by the Department officials and increasingly treated as professional service providers.
Christchurch IV League members effectively stopped working and behaving as the IV League 
when they copied ADIO’s organisation. They were directly assisted by members of ADIO, and 
were occupationally shaped by the requirements of ADIO’s type of contractual relationships with 
the Department of Health. IV League members who started peer groups in different cities arranged 
for supportive clinic personnel to sit on their Trust Boards. Meanwhile, ADIO began to exhibit 
more peer activity than in its initial period of gaining the trust, and a contract, from the 
Department. There seems to have been a diffusion of practices in both directions. IV League 
political interests seemed to have been excluded from Department negotiations during this period 
of change, yet became more flexibly and capably expressed through peers running outreach shops, 
while ADIO gained national resources and influence through a network of peer groups that rapidly 
expressed solidarity as allies against common problems. All these parties wanted improved 
methadone and other drug treatments, wanted official acceptance of harm reduction, and wanted 
evidence-based drug use policies. They also wanted to place HCV transmission onto the political 
agenda, despite official disinterest.
These developments may not have occurred if MASCA had not demanded obligatory counselling 
at point-of-sale, or if many other ‘chancy’ factors had not contributed to a unique cultural, political,
and geographical environment. The aspects of the development of the NEP are explainable in terms
of wider conflict theories,301 even if the outcomes in any situation were unpredictable. The 
MASCA proposals to lock-in a programme that institutionalised funding for a professionalised 
counselling service seems understandable from a perspective of territorial jurisdiction. After all, the
HIV/AIDS gay activists had used a similar tactic to institutionalise the funding of programmes 
under the control of community organisations. But although these tactics were equivalent, the 
outcomes were not.
The MASCA rationales were based on public health promotion, although also clearly 
professionally self-interested. Such self-interest, combined with public well-being, and also with a 
health professional’s distrust of government expediency,302 was shared by some Australian health 
301. See Immergut (1992), Abbott (1988, 1992a). 
302. Wodak had written: “Although I am not opposed to this [supply only] system backing up other outlets which 
emphasise needle and syringe exchange, we now have the ghastly prospect that the Government policy may 
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professionals (Wodak, 1987). As the threat of HIV transmission was seen as less urgent, New 
Zealand governments and state agencies reduced the NEP’s budget during the early 1990s. These 
agencies ignored forms of health provisions that were not self-funding, such as HCV prevention 
and outreach in general. The continuation of IDU services became reliant on the voluntaristic ethos
of the IDU peers along with support from allied AIDS service organisations.
The NEP developments have illustrated the difficulties encountered when principles of medical and
biomedical treatment come to be applied to public health and state policy. Medical ethics demand 
that practitioners treat human needs in actual practice, whether or not a theory is available. The 
requirement is to ‘treat all’.  But does that include those who do not wish treatment? This principle,
or logic, potentially conflicts with another medical principle of ‘first do no harm’, and accordingly, 
requires expert trained discretion in application, as well as funding to meet the costs of treatment, 
training, and supervision. The MASCA proposals in 1987 and 1988 were never realisable in that 
financial and political climate where state agencies were rejecting the logics of health budgets 
being controlled by professionals, and rejecting the related logics of public health aspects of 
contagious diseases being provided through a centralised hierarchy.
As it happened, the AIDS Advisory Committee and MASCA were wrong about IDU attending 
needle exchanges needing professional counselling at point-of-sale to prevent HIV transmission. 
There were a range of reasons for their mistaken prognosis. One involved IDU exercising greater 
self-motivation, as individuals and networks, than those treatment professionals were capable of 
acknowledging. Another reason is that the printed education material, including the IDU magazines
produced by the peer groups, helped in constructing a sense of a national IDU community. It is 
significant that the pool of HIV in New Zealand, after its testability became possible,303 began and 
remained extremely low. It also seems likely that the presence of IDU peers in the socially 
responsible, health-promoting occupation of HIV/AIDS prevention has contributed significantly to 
how IDU perceived themselves and their injecting practices. The representation of IDU in a 
inadvertently be exacerbating the problem by increasing the stock of used needles and syringes in circulation. The 
politicians are unwilling to take that extra step to needle and syringe exchange because of the political cost” 
(Wodak, 1987: 1). Wodak had professional research interests in syringes being returned, having carried out several 
surveys that sampled returned syringes for HIV indicators. Wodak’s work positioned syringes as a cheap and 
effective way of monitoring IDU health, but effectiveness and efficiency dropped if low return rates lowered the 
validity of the syringes sampled. A week earlier the Minister had written to Dr Meech stating that a law to increase 
the availability of needles and syringes was essential.  In this letter the Minister wrote pointedly about: “ a 
suggestion by the AIDS Foundation that a specific AIDS prevention education committee be established to develop 
a coordinated approach in this area. I am conscious of the fact that the AIDS Advisory Committee consists mainly of 
expert individuals rather than representatives of the wide range of organisations and government departments that 
must be mobilised in the fight against AIDS. Some concern has also been expressed to me at the lack of non-
medical and non-technical representation on the AIDS Advisory Committee though I do not see this as a major 
criticism. I would therefore appreciate your committee's comments on the question of expanding the membership of 
the Advisory Committee or forming a separate advisory body to expand the scope of the AIDS campaign” (Bassett, 
1987a). However, no law change would have been necessary if syringes were only available through prescription by 
health professionals.
303. This phrasing is to emphasis how without testability there was no way of identifying HIV as the cause of AIDS. 
There is no way of correlating or otherwise establishing strong causality, with an element that cannot be identified, 
and accordingly, cannot be 'presented' as being present. 
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national programme would have encouraged other IDU to think in terms of national collectivity 
and general principles of community health. Professional intervention was not needed in many 
situations because the ‘patients’ were interacting with each other in more professional ways. 
However, although the practices constituted a public health success, the diffusion of 
professionalism to lay IDU, and more so to the peers in the NEP, involved a loss of territory to 
conventional professions such as medical specialists and mental health/addiction specialists 
respectively.
Counselling had been demanded by medical professional and police. Without the arguments for 
counselling it would have been far harder to overcome opposition to the NEP from police and 
medical professionals on the AIDS Advisory Committee, who feared that HIV transmission would 
not be reduced through the supply of syringes alone. The Committee members had predicted that 
the exchange system would not work adequately. However, the system worked sufficiently well to 
almost eliminate HIV incidence among IDU, and professional counselling proved to be less 
necessary than initially claimed. The epidemiology of HIV/AIDS provides evidence that IDU were 
more capable and 'normal' than a variety of participants had supposed.
5   Autonomous peer groups ‘transfix’ the problem ... by not properly fitting
Medical professionals might have been expected to oppose the contracting of peers to provide 
professionalising types of services. However, a range of reasons why they could not are discussed 
in this section. In brief, the timing was fortunate for peers to professionalise, since the logics of the 
situation were hard to resist once a working model that illustrated hybrid NEP logics and methods 
became operational. The participation by marginalised communities in HIV/AIDS prevention had 
become a policy requirement. The AIDS Advisory Committee had to accept Ministerial decisions, 
and could not directly provide alternative services, nor control funding. The nature of the medical 
professional objections to peers involved their systemically underrating of the capabilities of IDU 
and peers. Consequently, peer-professional developments were not foreseen. Nor could medical 
professionals reasonably oppose a cheap pilot project that facilitated rather than replaced 
professional counselling.
The NEP developments in 1988 were founded on conflicting hybrid goals and methods. 
Department of Health officials had prioritised the public health logics of improving the safety of 
material environments by supplying and retrieving syringes. The AIDS Advisory Committee and 
drug treatment professionals had promoted the treatment logics that demanded motivation change. 
Both stances were supported in overseas literature on needle exchange experiences,304 which helps 
304. These reports originated from practitioners who provided counselling, and were only compared with less successful 
exchanges in different regions or countries. Locational differences in IDU practices and clinic practices were not 
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to explain how these conflicting concepts of treatment and harm reduction became combined in the
NEP. The Committee’s attitudes defended the territory and status of the treatment specialists, but 
presented drug users as too foolish or irresponsible to learn to inject drugs safely without 
professional control. This conflicted with the pragmatic ambiguity that facilitated the enrolment of 
disparate groups such as IDU, whose voluntary participation as clients were required. The AIDS 
Advisory Committee tactics threatened the viability of a NEP by demanding higher professional 
standards. To resist this tactic,305 issues of motivation change were deferred until after the 
legislation change, and after a pharmacy-based NEP began operating. A consensus, supported by 
codes of practice, was established in stages.
Later in 1988, motivation change, linked to peer outreach, was presented as a complementary add-
on to an ideal model of professional counselling linked to conventional drug treatment. Peer 
counselling was promoted as being more valid and accountable than merely a pragmatic, ad-hoc 
measure, yet was not presented as competing with the provision of expert professional services. 
This tactic successfully gained ADIO a pilot contract in Auckland for a year, then further contracts 
in other urban centres with increased funding for twenty years, and continuing. The success of this 
trial model appears partly due to problems being isolated and addressed close to their source, rather
than flowing back to the Department of Health, and partly because the surveillance aspects of 
record keeping produced information about illicit drug use that could not otherwise be accessed. 
Such information could not be supplied by the IV League, because the League was not providing 
exchange services and had no systemic operations that could regularly collect surveillance 
information on IDU.
As general concepts of community empowerment seemed to health officials to be increasingly 
applicable and significantly affordable, developments such as the NEP diminished the control of 
established health professionals in areas where the drug treatment field overlapped with HIV/AIDS
prevention. Existing professional programmes for drug treatment were offered extra resources as 
part of an integrated HIV/AIDS prevention strategy, but were not allowed to destabilise an NEP 
model based on IDU community networks. In these direct and indirect ways, peer participation 
became framed and reframed as possibilities and opportunities, rather than as a risk of lowering or 
destabilising the existing professional standards.
Since the existing treatment(s) for drug use were not considered to be sufficiently effective, and 
considered. Nor was the counter-case that IDU could modify their own practices without interventions by employed 
experts. Overseas models were used to imply that in New Zealand, professional counselling must be obligatory, to 
ensure that equipment being provided was actually used in ‘healthy’ and cost effective ways.
305. In such tactical manoeuvring, all  participants seem united in wanting effective and efficient outcomes. All also had 
interests that might support or oppose, and be supported or opposed, by how a NEP might be implemented, 
understood, and develop in unknown ways. I noticed that those participants who had HIV/AIDS spoke, wrote, and 
acted most directly, yet also that they were active for shorter times than others who redirected their work and 
influence after their deaths into less straightforward channels.
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since most IDU already successfully avoided policing efforts, alternatives to abstinence and 
enforcement were required. Because of the way HIV acted within human and non-human vehicles, 
along material and communicative pathways, prevention tactics needed to be multiple. Because of 
the human and political urgency, the integration of multiple elements needed to take priority over 
the existing territorial boundaries. This realisation extended the arrangements developed several 
years previously around gay men, when gay community representatives forced themselves and 
their perspectives into the Minister’s expert advisory committee.
The law changes in 1987 brought about new occupational opportunities. Since the pharmacists in 
the NEP already had an occupation, which they did not propose to change, new actors found 
opportunities to develop a counselling niche. This niche bordered the pharmacy NEP, but involved 
positions which pharmacists and conventional counsellors needed to avoid. Treatment 
professionals risked losing their existing claims to jurisdiction over expertise, legality, and 
occupational territory by becoming peers who associated with IDU, rather than exerting control 
over IDU. The connections between HIV/AIDS and drug legislation acted to detach the 
professional claims to expertise over IDU from the political accountabilities to protect the general 
public. The IDU peers drew on the principles and protocols developed through the gay community 
cycle. Despite their stigma the IDU peers gained in overt significance and status by the shaping of 
a NEP around its becoming acceptable to IDU, then on the increasing focus on IDU attitudes and 
participation in the initial evaluations of the NEP. 
In 1988, pressures from medical professionals and police to provide specialised counselling led to a
new set of paid and accountable peer service providers, in a new system of funding, monitoring and
evaluation. These IDU and ex-IDU were employed to provide ‘peer counselling’, outreach, and to 
facilitate professional counselling. These developments led to IDU directly participating in the 
NEP as service providers for peer outreach counselling. This process was shaped and timed by a 
need for state agencies to provide for professional counselling in ways that fitted with the 
regulation of the pharmacy-based NEP, yet did not impinge on the commercial arrangements of 
pharmacists. 
Several types of counselling were referred to in Department of Health reports from 1986 to 1988. 
Whether the type which peer groups provided was one of these, or a combination, or a new type, or
actually not counselling at all, was extremely ambiguous and has remained contentious. Yet by 
forming organisations for this professionally justified reason, IDU peers also established an 
infrastructural capability to address absences in the equipment aspects of the pharmacy based NEP.
The consequent modification of longer-term institutions and logics of health provision inform 
understandings of how IDU peers later became major participants in making policy. 
163
Chapter 6.      Peer-professional shapings
The NEP might have developed without a notable interplay between peer and professional aspects, 
if not for beginning with such shifts in understandings, and being shaped over a period by changes 
in the local positionings of such actant306 arrangements. Medical, mental health, and drug treatment 
specialists responded to the distrust and non-compliance of IDU by ignoring and avoiding this 
reshaping of the NEP territory by viruses, drugs, IDU, pharmacists, legislation, and syringes 
working in combination. The absence of established professionals opened a window of opportunity
for the provision of syringes by pharmacists, then by IDU peers, in experimental, hybrid 
occupational forms. The neo-liberal government policies of decentralising and commercialising the
provision of health services encouraged organisational independence at the interface with 
communities.
Peers could work cheaply as after-hours volunteers in the evenings and weekends when IDU were 
expected to be injecting. Keeping used syringes for return made public environments safer, and 
increased the measurable NEP outputs, but at the cost of exposing IDU to arrest or harassment. 
However, peers could motivate IDU clients to return syringes simply by asking and approving of 
returns, in face-to-face interactions. Because of the IDU peer participation in exchange activity, the
logic of the 'clinic' aspects of the NEP connected to the logics of the collective, networking aspects 
of illicit activity. Needle exchanges have been too delicate to alter such cultural arrangements, 
despite their success. Yet their success may be defined in terms of current perceptions of the 
distinctions between crime and health, whereas their organisation depends upon simultaneous 
engagement with crime-making, health-making, and law-making agencies.
In these ways, aspects of community representation and service delivery merged to a degree, while 
remaining as identifiable separate strands that were active in alliance, yet also in opposition. The 
creation of the NEP in 1987 allowed the underlying sustainability of peers as quasi-professionals to
become apparent in the working out of political arrangements. During 1988, the framing and 
organising of the NEP moved to an 'internal', implementation arena of 'shaping' the terms of the 
306. 'Actant' is an actor-network term for an effect or site of significant activity involving shifts in meanings and 
representational narratives. The activity is always interactive and an actant can never be alone. The consequent 
complexity draws attention to tactics of simplification and boundary-setting in practice, while rejecting claims of 
prior large-scale or universal entities that ‘simply exist’ rather than being interactive and changeable. This co-
dependency of activity and entity, and consequent explanation based on experienced rather than postulated 
phenomena, radically works around the ‘structure-agency’ division within which many sociological understandings 
have been framed. This reframing is co-dependent on widening the metaphysical field beyond the Western Christian 
historical lineage that privileges unitary models in either personal or impersonal forms. Or subjective-objective 
binaries. In so doing, both foundational and accumulative structures are added to by network and self-maintaining 
structures, which dramatically repositions structure and agency in the same actancy, not only in grounded practice 
but also in conceptual representation of wide spaces and temporal durations. (See Chapters 2 and 3, and Appendix 
9). The term ‘actant’ includes humans and non-humans in assemblages which drive and block activity, while 
actively maintaining or altering the conditions of possibility for potential activity. (In my opinion, this framing is 
shared by Buddhist lineages and is found in the practices of ‘dependent origination’ sometimes termed ‘co-
dependent causation’. In the Mahayana and Vajrayana traditions such practices emphasise compassion rather than 
dispassion.) Actants, accordingly, are the focus of actor-network analyses of how social-material actions can be co-
ordinated and consolidated into understood events and effects. The term ‘actant’ does not necessarily denote self-
conscious agency, unlike the term ‘actor’ and most sociological uses of the term ‘agency’. However, the aspects of 
agents and agency that involve representation overlap with actor-network uses of actants. See Latour (1987: 84, 89) 
164
Section 5:    Autonomous peer groups ‘transfix’ the problem ... by not properly fitting
peer’s involvement. A national syringe supply coverage by commercial pharmacies, with at least 
several in each city, was joined to outreach, non-profit, corporate societies, with one in each major 
city centres. Peers followed 'to the side' as outreach providers, until suddenly, the peers became 
providers of a peer-to-peer counselling service that Department of Health officials could 
defendably fund. From actor perspectives, pragmatism and strategies mixed in systemic 
connections where practices involved adjustments that drew on the cultural contingencies of 
material environments. From institutional perspectives, structural work on boundaries mediated 
change and stability. From historical perspectives, cycles of phases from community to corporation
to professional, merged into events. In 1988, the 'window of opportunity' for IDU peers to enter the
NEP was shaped by multiple factors. These included the differences between counselling theories, 
the difficulties of providing such services, and participant understandings of how a counselling 
interaction impacted on other social relationships. Such factors inform issues of expert authority in 
the later NEP contexts. However, it is not possible, in this exploration, to go further than 
identifying the most significant of the factors involved. The thesis illustrates how both contingent 
and patterned connections influenced the development of peers against professionals but into peer-
professional hybridity. A hybrid stability emerged in accumulating cycles from the shaping 
processes of an interactive heterogeneous environment, as it partially consolidated as a settlement 
of differences.
Actor-network methods can analyse aspects of an erratic, discontinuous, messy, and unpredictable 
reality without privileging a simple and convenient but misleading account. Different social 
networks, each with solid reasons to distrust the corporate identity of members of the other, needed
to ‘exchange’ not only syringes, but also goals and trust. ‘Users’ could not trust ‘the medical 
profession’, which could not trust ‘the state apparatus of health officials’, who could not work 
covertly against their fellow justice officials who enforced the existing drug prohibition legislation.
The NEP has often been understood by participants as simply a struggle to achieve a seemingly 
obvious and desirable goal. Yet I have shown that the resilience and successes of the NEP could 
not be explained, or researched, without seeking out multiple voices, perspectives, moralities, and 
logics. 
My descriptions and explanations have relied on initially paying close attention to the sequencing 
of events, alongside structural boundary dynamics, because these factors linked to my emerging 
analysis and provided the criteria for my ongoing sourcing of information. This ensured that the 
for a usage that emphasises the tactics of actants representing and being represented in narratives. Latour 
demonstrates how the links between actants and agendas can be presented in stories, but where actants may become 
‘repositioned’ and turned against the originator of their representational story. Latour specifically equates agents 
with actants (1999: 178-180). In general, actor-network approaches are grounded in localities of situated 
knowledges and interactions, which are followed closely, with a sensitivity to the effects and events that become 
consolidated and packaged through the circulations of references and objects. Actancy can be described as a 
“material semiotics” (Law, 2007:1).
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case revealed itself in its quirky complexity rather than being invented as the simplest story that 
reduced the gaps to be filled in (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 192, 264). My use of analytical 
narratives entailed finding a productive way between the messy, detailed complexity of life, and 
the smoothness of an event as understood and strategically deployed by participants. Participants, 
including researchers, tend to ignore those records of the past that do not seem useful in the future. 
They constitute their present moments out of that evidence that cannot be avoided and out of 
desires yet to be achieved. This will be seen as I describe, in following chapters, how the NEP 
participants after 1989 reinterpreted the hybrid NEP goals from health professional to also 
commercial professional, and from motivation change to also the logistics of syringe circulation. In
1988, similar processes of interpreting reshaped the health professional expectations and legitimacy
of the NEP. The shaping of this new environment has continued to be significant, yet so also have 
been the timings of critical events, and the alignment of a range of institutional and personal 
interests. These aspects can inform the current NEP participants about how their environment 
might have been different, and how a changing environment may be stabilised in more or less 
useful shapes.
Decisions are often explained by who makes them, within an environment of specified needs. But 
decisions are also influenced by constraints on time, access to information, and legitimacy. When 
concepts of partnership and consensus are deployed in explanations of HIV/AIDS policy, it seems 
useful to consider the numbers, spaces, interests, and logics that are excluded from explanations. 
Analyses frequently overlook how decisions are always made in actual places, with parameters and
connections that are more or less difficult for different people to use. The NEP’s decision-making 
was forced into constrained sites, where there was only room for representatives, not those being 
represented. The urgency and closeness made the personal qualities and positioning of 
representatives as influential as those wider networks of IDU, politicians, officials, and 
professionals being represented. These local differentials explain how particular participants were 
not looked for nor invited where an absence of room had been carefully arranged as tight, closed 
spaces by officials and professionals who wanted it that way. However, such decisions could only 
propose, not dispose, since the workability of proposals depended upon the configurations of 
resources and motivations in wider network environments. 
In the following chapter I describe the founding and ending of peer group in Christchurch. New 
actors, without the experiences and perspectives of the NEP planners, dealt with the difficulties, 
opportunities and uncertainties of the initial NEP environment. In Christchurch, IDU peers became 
more professional within the local niche environment offered by the NEP. But their professional 
capabilities needed to be stably aligned with IDU needs for secrecy, and with ‘ex-IDU’ peer 
dependencies on medication and direction from treatment clinics (Valentine, 2007: 506-508, 512).
166
Section 5:    Autonomous peer groups ‘transfix’ the problem ... by not properly fitting
7CIVDURG: A case of peer-professional disarrangements
“The true picture of the past flits by ... seized only as an image ... every image of the past that is not
recognized by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably”
(Illuminations. Walter Benjamin, 1999: 247)
1   How do small peer-professional groups sustain themselves?
What do peer-professionals want? I described in chapter 4 how gay organisations that provided 
HIV/AIDS support services became established at a grassroots level, then rapidly gained a form of 
representation at health policy levels. Yet, after reconfiguring as a corporate NGO that 
'professionalised' itself, the NZAF lost a significant degree of its direct access to policy-making. I 
then described in Chapter 5 how the NEP began operating from pharmacies under the general 
supervision of the 1988 AIDS Taskforce, a unit of the Department of Health. I went on in Chapter 
6 to describe how IDU groups emerged to provide peer outreach, education, and counselling. The 
Christchurch Intravenous Drug User Resource Group (CIVDURG), began operations in January 
1989. It might appear that once the Auckland Drug Information Outreach (ADIO) group became 
established as an autonomous, service-providing organisation, its urban-centred community-based 
model simply diffused southward. Nonetheless, a model of a simple diffusion307 does not 
adequately match the more complex story of these developments.
CIVDURG had been preceded in Christchurch by an illegal syringe supply service provided by 
Pollards Pharmacy from 1985 to 1987.308 CIVDURG operated from January 1989 to November 
1994. In 1995, after an interim period of several months under the ad-hoc NECO309 group of IDU, 
the Drug Injecting Services of Canterbury (DISC) Trust began operating. The DISC Trust has 
provided the only peer-based outreach and needle exchange services in Christchurch since March 
1995.310
How then have some forms of organising lasted much longer than others? How have their 'internal' 
arrangements within organisational boundaries meshed with external connections across such 
boundaries? How did criminal and professional activities combine without prior models of best 
307. For discussion on the quantitative modelling, statistical or conceptual, of theoretical and substantive types of 
‘diffusion of practices’, in various contexts, particularly those involving hard to specify heterogeneous elements, see 
Blossfeld & Rohwer (2002: 178-180, 255-264). In general, these authors suggest a high degree of caution in an 
attempt to predict substantive events, due to the high degree of ambiguity of the substantive areas being studied, and 
unavoidably arbitrary research decisions needed to be made, overtly or covertly, in even the best of research designs.
308. Pollards Pharmacy joined the NEP in May 1988. See Mainline (2003b) for details of this story.
309. NECO stood for Needle Exchange Consumer Organisation. It was formed directly from IDU networks in response 
to the threatened loss of peer needle exchange services in Christchurch.
310. The material in this chapter has been selected from CIVDURG minutes, logbooks and other documents; from 
Department of Health, Public Health Commission, and Ministry of Health reviews of the NEP; supplemented by 
interviews with participants. I also draw on my own experience as a CIVDURG Trustee from 1989 to 1992, and 
briefly in 1995 to wind up the Trust.
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practice and of appropriate aspirations?
Four configurations of networks contributed to the founding and stabilising of CIVDURG. The 
first consisted of the local New Zealand AIDS Foundation (NZAF) networks and resources. The 
second was the Department of Health officialdom, especially the AIDS TaskForce co-ordinator in 
Wellington, the Christchurch Medical Officer of Health, and the Christchurch District Advisory 
Pharmacist. The third assemblage of connections consisted of the local IDU networks. The fourth 
was centred on the personal networks and the intensely motivated aspirations of two people, then 
domestic partners, who had adequate motivation, organising skills,311 and active IDU connections. 
When the NZAF became aware of the need to rapidly establish a peer outreach and after-hours 
needle exchange group in Christchurch, they looked for potential founders. In February 1988, 
CIVDURG's founder met Rodger Wright at a drug treatment centre while Wright was carrying out 
a survey of the knowledge held by IDU about HIV/AIDS.312 Following this meeting the founder 
and her partner left their voluntary work with the Christchurch Unemployed Rights Collective and 
became involved in the Christchurch Branch of the I.V. League, which had been active since 1985. 
They then took part in the July 1988 training intake for NZAF volunteers. Local NZAF personnel 
encouraged them to negotiate a contract with the AIDS TaskForce. Any others attempting to start a 
competing peer group in Christchurch would not have benefited from such supportive, wide-
ranging connections.
In August 1988, according to the founders’ account, the IV League activities and organisation in 
Christchurch ended.313 However, they considered that more could be achieved for Christchurch 
IDU, so began organising a local Outreach Group (CIVDURG, 1991b). In December 1988, they 
received confirmation that they would become personally contracted to the AIDS TaskForce to 
found a peer group that would become a legal entity and hold any future contracts.314 
CIVDURG was registered as an Incorporated Charitable Trust in March 1989 (CIVDURG, 1991b),
with this couple as its sole employees. In this process of incorporation they detached themselves 
from their previous IV League associations. Wright had co-founded the IV League and represented 
IDU to Parliamentary Committees (Wright, 1990). He was the key IV League participant in 
Christchurch, yet was neither an employee nor a trustee of CIVDURG when it began.
Groups such as CIVDURG have been described as following in the model of the Auckland Drug 
Information and Outreach (ADIO) model.315 This ADIO model could describe the groups in the 
311. One had managed a hostel in the UK, and also had brief experience of video and script production work 
(CIVDURG, 1991b).
312. This survey was part of Stephen Lungley’s ‘Baseline Study’ (Lungley, 1988). See Robinson (1990: 3). 
313. I have not found any description by Rodger Wright of these months. Robinson notes in his review of the peer groups
(1990: 4, 13), that the Dunedin peer group wanted to develop a drug treatment consumer group similar to the IV 
League.
314. This was the pattern with the initial five groups (Robinson, 1990: 6, 16).
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five major cities.316 The AIDS TaskForce contracted such privately incorporated, autonomous 
groups to provide the outreach and after-hours services for the NEP. The initial intent of this 
isolation was to: “assess local needs, reflect these needs in the services offered, and gain support 
from health professionals in their region” (Robinson 1990: 6). This stand-alone form of 
organisation reduced the wider costs and accountabilities of governance, for instance in: “the 
possible diluting effect on funds if the existing total amount is distributed among all area health 
boards. Currently services are ... provided in five board areas” (Robinson 1990: 19).
The TaskForce began contract negotiations with several other prospective peer groups, for instance
one in New Plymouth. This indicates that there was an initial policy of increasing the numbers of 
the isolated peer groups. However, the TaskForce could only afford to sign a contract with the 
Dunedin peer group (DIVO), by drawing on emergency funds (Norrie, 1989). The TaskForce could
not afford to contract more groups, especially after the funding for AIDS was reduced in 1989 
(Fithian, 1989).
CIVDURG copied ADIO as a structural model, but also resisted many of ADIO's goals and 
methods, while drawing on different local network resources. ADIO had been started by people 
such as Mary Foley, Robert Kemp, and Erin Watts (2004, pers. com.) who worked professionally 
at the Auckland Methadone Clinic. Similarly, the Christchurch Alcohol and Drug (A&D) services 
had a strong, supportive connection with CIVDURG. By contrast, CIVDURG's two employees 
were clients of the A&D services, received a methadone supply,317 and were not employed as 
qualified therapists. The two employees distrusted the more professional organisational practices, 
aspirations, and personalities they perceived as characterising ADIO (Co-ordinator 1989d).318 
The Co-ordinator and her partner disliked being advised by the ADIO co-ordinator on how to 
organise their Trust Board. Kemp, the ADIO Co-ordinator: “... immediately started telling us who 
to get on the Trust but although some of our names might not be as well known as ADIO's 
equivalents they are all very committed to actually doing something, not figureheads. Besides, we 
can always ask more [trustees]” according to the CIVDURG Co-ordinator (Co-ordinator, 1989d).319
The CIVDURG Co-ordinator prioritised the enrolment of supportive contacts in her selection of 
Trustees. Rather than looking for well-known names in the field, she considered that: “we have a 
315. See Robinson (1990: 3), Foley (1989 as cited by Co-ordinator, 1989d).
316. Auckland, Palmerston North, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. See Chapter 6 for a more detailed description 
of different tendencies over regional and urban aspects of NEP policy. 
317. Robinson notes: “Only one centre adopted the view of those working in the drug treatment and rehabilitation field. 
This centre employed staff who had been "clean" for several years. The paid staff in the other four centres are all 
either currently on the methadone programme, or have had recent drug using experience” (1990: 15, 23).
318. Despite ADIO’s stated intention of eventually becoming a user-run operation (NSERCM, 1989).
319. Later events showed that starting with high profile Trustees and not driving them away was more important than the 
CIVDURG co-ordinator (1989b, c, d, e,; 1990a, b) had realised. The CIVDURG Logbook covering 1989 shows 
several hopeful comments about prospective professional trustees, yet none were prepared to be associated with the 
CIVDURG Trust. DIVO administrators were well aware that the Department of Health officials considered 
professional management capabilities to be crucial for retaining funding (Coville, 1993).
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good mix of Trustees - users, ex-users, social workers, Ian Smith from the NZAF, and an ex-addict 
Doctor (Who is now a Dr, at the A & D centre!), and our epileptic comic artist” (Co-ordinator, 
1989d). CIVDURG's founders were  “a bit suspicious of people with university degrees who 
become professional drug-abusiologists” (Co-ordinator, 1989d).320 
The CIVDURG founders advocated for better access for IDU to methadone services (Robinson, 
1990: 13), but did not attempt to copy ADIO’s project of setting up an alternative methadone clinic
on ADIO premises.321 CIVDURG's founders were also suspicious of an ‘empire building’, pre-
arranged, national structural model for the NEP’s peer group development. They were sceptical 
because: “... it looks as though Roberts [322] purporting to work out a national policy on IV drug use
in NZ when he has already worked out exactly what he wants to do as in the report!” (Co-ordinator,
1989d.). They were:
a bit suspicious that ADIO are basically trying to set up another methadone clinic. In ChCh at 
least the existing Alcohol and Drug clinic could introduce exactly the same basic scheme if 
they were given more money and resources ... Reports [323] like ADIO's seem geared more to 
the needs of the service providers rather than the addicts themselves.    (Co-ordinator, 1989d) 
The CIVDURG founders preferred a model of building from the grassroots up and extending a 
network of alliances. This hands-on approach involved getting “out of the office, contacting users, 
doing workshops abd [sic] getting to Dunedin to help them set up their own IVDU group - 
hopefully more along the lines of the IV Union and CIVDURG than ADIO” (Co-ordinator, 1989d).
Kemp in turn seems to have placed little confidence in CIVDURG’s Co-ordinator, who recorded 
that: “all Robert said about us was that he hoped we survived as a couple of groups had already 
folded and if we did too it might mean the end of funding!” (Co-ordinator, 1989d).324 However, on 
a visit to Christchurch, Kemp asked the co-ordinator of the Christchurch Branch of the New 
Zealand Prostitutes Collective (NZPC):
to do work with IVDUs apart from Prostitutes who use, she wasn't interested but it seems to me 
that he's not taking us very seriously, he behaved as though he thought we were a bunch of 
incompetents which isn't the message we're recieving [sic] from everyone else who actually 
knows us!  (Co-ordinator, 1989d)
CIVDURG was certainly modelled on ADIO and assisted by ADIO. Yet it was shaped more by the
local Christchurch environment of 'dense' long-term networks of health professionals which had 
been recently added to by personnel from AIDS Service Organisations.325 From a personal career 
perspective, the professionalism and scale of ADIO's capabilities created dangerous comparisons 
320. See also NEXUS (1990e, f), NEXUS (1990a, b, c, d), NEXUS (1992), NEXUS (1993a, b).
321. See Robinson (1990: 14), NSERCM (1989).
322. Robert Kemp, then ADIO co-ordinator.
323. “... a massive document (a feasibility study) about wide-spread, easy-access low dose methadone maintenance 
proposed mainly by Mary Foley” (Co-ordinator, 1989d).
324. Intriguingly, I found no records or other referents to any other groups collapsing, although at least one had a very 
dynamic Trust Boards with high turnover. Kemp may have been referring to non-IDU groups.
325.  See Brown, (1999), Robinson, (1990: 13, 19, 23), Co-ordinator (1989d).
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that threatened both the IDU norms and the employment aspirations of CIVDURG’s founders. The 
founders had been extremely poor, with few prospects for conventional employment.326 Prior to 
founding CIVDURG they were nominally self-employed (Robinson, 1990: 16, 18). CIVDURG 
offered an uncertain and indefinite type of job security when it opened its doors to the injecting 
public on January.
Picture 2: CIVDURG seen from the street at dusk (Personal records. 1989-early 1990s)
(The stairway leads up to the office and counter. We would come down if anyone with mobility problems
asked us to, but such arrangements were not adequate.)
CIVDURG faced four specific local difficulties. First, the lease of the initial premises was opposed 
by some neighbouring businesses for supposedly attracting undesirables into a tourist area 
(Matterson, 1988). Second, CIVDURG’s peer organisers experienced a general stand-off attitude 
by ‘self-help’, ‘higher power’ therapy and abstinence-oriented organisations of ex-IDU.327 Third, 
there were initial difficulties with the different perspectives and expectations of the District Area 
326.  None in their social circles had been recently employed, except in Government work schemes (Robinson 1990: 18).
327. However, there were greater connections and fewer problems with professionally qualified treatment professionals, 
to whom requests for referrals were often made. A&D staff sat on CIVDURG's Board until 1990.
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Pharmacist, who was employed by the Department of Health to monitor pharmacies. Fourth, there 
was also a conflict with a different peer group of ex-IDU women who were not ‘higher power’ 
oriented but took an abstinence stance on drug use.328
These problems were overcome or ameliorated through the resources and trust that was produced 
from the numbers and strategic positioning of the local connections. Shortly after CIVDURG was 
founded in 1989, Ian Smith, the Regional Training Co-ordinator of the NZAF, became the 
Chairperson of the CIVDURG Trust, until resigning in 1990 to undertake HIV/AIDS organising 
work in Thailand.329 Smith's liaison/Chair role on the CIVDURG Trust Board was taken over by 
Marie Glenys, a qualified and influential NZAF counsellor (New Zealand AIDS Foundation, 1988: 
4). Several other CIVDURG trustees were professionals, one working as an established A&D 
counsellor, another as a GP. Nonetheless, the connections with IDU networks were essential, and 
familiarity between peers and clients is often apparent in comments in CIVDURG’s day-books. 
Yet these connections were not particularly useful in organising the group.330 
The most productive connections drew on a separate network that overlapped with IDU networks. 
The Co-ordinator and partner, the Trust Secretary, two Trustees, and two core volunteers, had been 
meeting every week for several years as part of an anarchist-inclined group that ran role-playing 
games.331 The two core volunteers from this group who were not initial trustees joined the Board 
within a year. The Co-ordinator's partner, a historian who ran a role-playing game, was employed 
by the CIVDURG Trust Board as an outreach co-ordinator. The Co-ordinator, who had prior 
managerial experience, was also employed by the Board as the office manager.332 
The Co-ordinator was on methadone maintenance treatment (Robinson, 1990: 15, 23; Lewis, 
1989). This would not normally be appropriate to specify. However, there are three justifications. 
First, since the NEP is significant, the crucial influences on the key actors involved in the 
developments need to be included in the analysis. Second, the key actors chose to position 
328. This group was not involved in providing needle exchange services, but did provide counselling for motivational 
change of women IDU. The founding CIVDURG Chair of the Board also belonged to this group, until conflicts of 
interest led her to resign her CIVDURG Trusteeship.
329. See CIVDURG (1990b); Smith (2004) pers. com.
330. Several IDU volunteered for short periods before being asked to leave due to petty theft or drug using or selling at 
work. This was a manageable problem. See Robinson (1990: 15-16, 23).
331. Advanced Dungeons and Dragons, Call of C’thulhu, Traveller, Stormbringer, and Flashing Blades attracted our 
attention. Some of this group were members of the Christchurch Unemployed Rights Collective (CURC). There was 
little work at that time in Christchurch, apart from temporary government schemes. Many people had time on their 
hands, and the social activities of some followed drug and political routes, that is immediate or deferred 
gratification, rather than solid mid-future prospects of family and employment. It was a pointlessly happy time. The 
country had been invaded from within, the previous social accountabilities were becoming only memories, but no-
one had yet come to round up the young single criminals, and the disruption to centralised state sector approaches 
had created difficulties for the police. Anarchists were perplexed, but many felt it their duty to enjoy themselves no 
matter what the risks. One friend blew himself up outside the Wanganui Computer Centre in an act of political 
martyrdom. I volunteered for army training, learning how to fire howitzers. Others preferred drugs. With the 
government in the throes of neo-liberal ecstasy, everything made sense, for any alternative was defined as ‘non-
sense’.
332. All these players used illicit drugs, about half injecting opiates, the rest preferring marijuana and psychedelics. All 
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themselves in a public gaze, and be rewarded for their activities, which they themselves 
represented as being of major public significance. Accordingly, their independence, or lack of 
independence, is of analytical concern. Third, the CIVDURG co-ordinator strategised her 
positioning between being on treatment and running a needle exchange in ways that initially 
benefited the empowerment and safety of Christchurch IDU, yet eventually jeopardised these 
goals. The power the co-ordinator exercised in this situation requires paying attention to her 
dependency on A&D professionals. Fourth, anonymity and confidentiality has already been 
thoroughly breached by her treatment service providers in combination with the District Advisory 
Pharmacist, as well as being published in Robinson’s NEP review of 1990. Consequently, the co-
ordinator's methadone treatment details entered records accessible by the AIDS TaskForce 
officials. Significant aspects of CIVDURG cannot be understood without knowing this important 
reason why its manager needed to be particularly protective of organisational information, and 
particularly personal in her selection of Trustees. There were IDU types of secrets to be protected. I
have taken care to only present the minimum personal information needed for this analysis.
In February, 1990, the co-ordinator became accepted onto an ‘Addiction Studies’ course 
(CIVDURG, 1991b). This course was the minimum requirement for becoming qualified as an 
Alcohol and Drug Counsellor in New Zealand. The professional counselling training was most 
likely embarked on to be combined with peer outreach activities, though this had never been 
formally ratified as a Trust goal. This professional career aspiration seems a more individual 
variation on the ADIO proposals for improved models for methadone services. However, the 
CIVDURG Co-ordinator’s tactic required fewer resources, support networks, and planning 
because, unlike a new model for methadone treatment clinics, it did not compete for territory with 
existing professional institutions. 
In earlier chapters I described how needs that were strongly IDU peer and significantly 
professional emerged from a reconfiguration of existing institutions due to HIV/AIDS. These needs
created a niche environment that also involved both peer and professional connections. These 
needs and environments, accordingly, linked peers to the possibilities of entering a conventional 
career strategy. The connection had been constructed for abstinent ex-peers and was supposedly 
closed to IDU peers. Yet it appeared to open up due to the influence of the peer-professional logics 
and practices of the NEP. The normalisation, not of drugs, but of drug users, was making 
increasing sense to some treatment professionals. This attitude shift in some treatment specialists 
was helped by health networks, political goals, and occupational possibilities becoming re-
articulated through exposure to the peer-professional model, which seemed manageable when 
consumed alcohol enthusiastically, and most smoked tobacco. At the time, several of the opiate injectors were 
recreational users, developing habits during 'poppy season', then withdrawing and using regularly, but not 
dependently, over the rest of the year.
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supervised. However, as the co-ordinator's personal activities moved away from the sheltered niche
of combined peer and professional activities, towards the conventional professional types of 
activities, it became more difficult to hold the IDU and professional relationships in alignment.
While studying for the addiction counselling qualification, the co-ordinator began filing case notes 
on some clients. The Trust Board had insisted that the co-ordinator receive supervision 
(CIVDURG, 1991a). However, whether that supervision had covered the contents and procedures 
of taking case notes on NEP clients was later impossible for the Trustees to ascertain. In December 
1994, client case notes were found in CIVDURG's files, causing ethical and legal problems for the 
Trust Board and the interim NECO management collective. The Board had never held supervisory 
control over these activities, nor is recorded as having delegated such control to the co-ordinator’s 
treatment providers or to the Central Institute of Technology (CIT) which provided and oversaw 
the counselling training. Taking case notes may have been represented to the Department of Health
as peer outreach work, but IDU peers themselves were in no doubt that such actions went well 
beyond the parameters and ethos of IDU peer behaviour and motives.
The case notes created problems for the Board because the practice offended against community 
values and undermined requirements for informed consent when recording personal information. 
All knowledge from the period when the case notes were created had disappeared, or was not 
trusted. The Board could not know what the participants had expected at the time, or later, 
regarding the use such notes might be put to. There was no professional system of extended 
collegiate accountability to assist in transferring information in a trustworthy way between the two 
eras of management. Clumsy inquiries would have generated rumours that would have harmed the 
reputation of the exchange even further among IDU.333 The later IDU peer-professionals considered
such note-taking to be completely unacceptable334 from both peer and professional perspectives. 
IDU do not generally write about each other, because it would seem intrusive and only conceivably
intended for harmful purposes. Members of an IDU network would become dependent on the 
writer’s discretion and on the uncertain circulation of such writings. IDU do not usually record 
anything that might harm them later. It is an oral culture. Some IDU might accept that an unknown 
researcher could safely record personal information, since such researchers would only know what 
IDU tell them. But a peer would know far more harmful information, which gives IDU more cause 
to avoid becoming dependent on the motivations and competencies involved in such writings. The 
notes breached IDU norms of an equal and oral culture. Moreover, the note-taking breached 
professional norms of clear chains of supervision and accountability. 
333. I could not write about this if ten years had not passed, and if the writing did not contain reasons for readers to 
accept that such situations could never happen again.
334. When CIVDURG collapsed these case notes were found and handed over to the Community Law Centre for 
supervised destruction. IDU working at the exchange had no idea of their content or legal status and found them 
unacceptable when they learnt of them.
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CIVDURG had not been able to pay its two full-time employees from the income from selling 
syringes, nor from its AIDS TaskForce funding after the initial ‘start-up’ contract period ended.335 
It had relied instead on extra income from agencies such as the Community Organisation Grants 
Scheme (COGS)336 and the Lotteries Board.337 When funding pressures escalated after 1989, the 
AIDS TaskForce responded to requests for funding increases with the suggestion that one paid 
position should be disestablished. In 1991, the co-ordinator became the sole paid position, required 
to achieve administrative, educational, networking, sales, and outreach goals. This workload forced
the co-ordinator to increasingly depend on the commitment and expertise of volunteers.338 
However, as later events illustrated, many peer and professional volunteers came to consider the 
co-ordinator incapable of working effectively with others outside of drug-using types of activities. 
Moreover, these volunteers usually held additional accountabilities as Trustees. Their trustee 
accountabilities conflicted with the personal link with the co-ordinator that had first drawn them 
onto the Board.
The response of the peer Trustees on the Board to such difficulties can be divided into three 
tendencies. There were the co-ordinator loyalists who wanted the Trustees and volunteers to be 
more supportive of her personally in order to continue the collective goals of the organisation. 
There was a ‘make the co-ordinator constitutionally accountable’ bloc which accepted the logics of
a corporate infrastructure and accountabilities despite their drug-using and anarchist sympathies. 
Finally there was a ‘hope things can be gradually improved without major changes’ bloc where 
motives and the degree of future planning were not clearly stated in discussions.339 All these 
perspectives valued stability and productivity, but in increasingly antagonistic ways. 
In actual conflicts, the loyalists and the gradualists allied more often than not, while the 
accountability bloc trustees experienced increasing reasons to resign, rather than remain 
accountable for the continuing management problems. Such problems not only included internal 
issues of competency, but also external issues of image and reputation. The internal issues included
the specification of employee rights and accountabilities which had never been formalised.340 The 
external issues included two criminal convictions during this period. In 1990, the Treasurer was 
335. The initial contract was with two individuals who founded CIVDURG, not with its Trust Board, although the later 
contracts between the AIDS Foundation and the Trust Board were never referred to at the time as any different from 
the original contract. This matter did not seem relevant to the Trustees until several years later, when Trustees were 
concerned to establish what the historic salaries had been, to provide arguments for extra funding for non-budgeted 
services, and to evaluate the employment needs of the Trust. However, by that time there was no  surviving record 
of the original contract, and other problems seemed more urgent.
336. COGS and the Lotteries Board were community grants organisations that distributed funds from the Government.
337. Robinson notes: “Both ADIO and CIVDURG have received additional grants from other sources to repay 
overdrafts. For example current [sic] CIVDURG expenditure of $70, 680 per annum is considerably greater than the 
Task-force grant of $54,000 per annum” (1990: 18).
338. This was a general problem according to Robinson (1990: 16).
339. DIVO minutes record similar conflicts until 1992, as did the IV Union in 1989.
340. It was difficult and legally risky to fire the co-ordinator, since no standards existed to compare her performance 
against. When the co-ordinator started bringing her lawyer to Board meetings, any remaining internal trust vanished.
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convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, and in 1992, the co-ordinator was convicted of 
stabbing a victim over an associate’s debt for an illegal firearm (Christchurch Press, 1992: 5). After
the assault conviction, the co-ordinator’s goal of becoming qualified as a professional drug 
counsellor appears to have no longer been openly supported by her course tutors.
These incidents risked opening up the discretely private world of the Trust to scrutiny from outside.
In both cases the reputation of CIVDURG, the NEP, and the Trustees was preserved only by the 
NEP link not being reported in the media. These incidents created difficulties for the Board’s 
supportive stance on employing IDU. In March, 1990, an amended CIVDURG Constitution 
required that the Board: “acts as an advocate for IVDUs when issues pertaining to intravenous drug
use arise” (CIVDURG, 1990a). In October, the AIDS TaskForce asked the Board to state its 
policies on drug-using by employees. The Board responded that drug use was ignored, as a private 
matter, unless it impacted on work performance (CIVDURG, 1990a). 
Although an employee’s work performance could potentially be monitored and managed by the 
Trust, convictions for crimes created organisational hazards that were difficult to manage, and 
could not be prepared for in advance. Any publicised incidents of assaults and drug manufacturing 
seemed likely to decrease CIVDURG's professional reputation and longer-term capabilities. 
Furthermore, the work performance aspects of substance use341 could not be managed effectively if 
the Trustees felt obligated to protect such employees. Yet, CIVDURG's problems did not cause the 
major changes to the NEP that had concerned Kemp in 1989. This was because Kemp and those 
Department of Health officials who were formally accountable for the NEP refused to receive the 
requests for help from several CIVDURG Trustees.342
From a perspective outside the Trust, protocols around the formal autonomy of CIVDURG and 
lack of any specified due process meant that complaints by individuals, even Trustees and 
officeholders, could readily be ignored. I surmise that these Department officials also knew that if 
the complainants had wished for media publicity, this would already have been generated, and the 
situation would be apparent to all. From an insider perspective, the co-ordinator’s peer status 
helped to deflect any expectations of her being accountable as an employee and as a Trustee for 
long-term organisational stability. IDU do not expect other IDU to be accountable over long 
periods. The peer trustees had reasons to feel uncertain in the middle of an inherently unstable 
situation of conflicting values. The Department officials had reasons to not acknowledge any 
problem. They could not intervene in a private corporation except through the terms of their 
funding contracts. These contracts were supposedly secret, and a conflict which triggered their 
341. I use the term 'substance' to refer to licit drugs such as alcohol and nicotine as well as illicit drugs.
342. Complaints by the Treasurer, which I witnessed and supported as Secretary, were not responded to by the 
Department of Health officials. In 1992, Kemp was reported by the co-ordinator as assuring her that: “ ... the 
Department of Health Wgtn didn't give much credence” (Co-ordinator, 1992b: 1) to Trustee complaints to Christine 
Nottingham, who was the first point of contact between the NEP and officialdom. 
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becoming public knowledge would escalate existing problems with other peer groups. Nor was the 
political timing suited for the supporters of the NEP to wish to bring problems of institutional 
unaccountability to the attention of politicians and unfriendly officials, for instance in Justice or 
Treasury sectors. It seemed possible, at any time in the early and mid-1990s, for the peer groups to 
be abruptly reconfigured.343 Nonetheless, the rationale for the Board to assert control involved the 
damage done to the longer-term prospects of IDU empowerment. In covering up the co-ordinator's 
immediate problems, the Board invited further problems. From the IDU peer Trustee perspective 
held by a minority on the Board, the on-going incidents made it more difficult for later Boards to 
justify employing IDU managers. 
This environment, contributed to by Department of Health officials as well as by IDU, acted as a 
‘separating mechanism’ for peer-professional hybridity. The logics and expectations formed lines 
of division that combined with wider institutional contours to create increasing difficulties for 
professionalising projects. The interplay of officialdom, health professional service aspirations, 
IDU cultural norms, and the need to guarantee an IDU-friendly syringe supply provided incentives 
for peer-professionals to leave CIVDURG's Trust Board. On the other hand, a single dominant 
peer-professional had incentives to remain on the Board and as an employee, through tactics of 
separation from the IDU network ethos and ethics towards those of full professionalism. Yet the 
only way to carry out work of professional quality in this field was through the peer groups and 
there was only one in each city. 
From many peer perspectives, the co-ordinator’s assault conviction was, in itself, of minor 
significance, although the circumstances gave cause for alarm.344 Nonetheless, the assault 
conviction had disturbing peer-professional connotations. Some IDU had concluded that the NEP 
connection had influenced the co-ordinator's access to the most desired level of opiate maintenance
treatment. The assault and conviction would have altered any DSM IV diagnosis in terms of any 
social and legal problems related to drug misuse and to the requirements for continuing 
maintenance treatment, as would be known to those on the long waiting list for treatment. This 
situation jeopardised the professional reputation of the A&D Services, as well as the moral 
understandings of peer 'equivalence' held by many IDU. However, CIVDURG's Board treated such
consequences as 'private' business rather than as part of the Board's accountability to protect the 
reputation and capabilities of the organisation.345
343. Kemp considered that “Christine [Nottingham] & another (new) woman would be the ones important [sic] regarding
proposed changes to the structure of IDU Outreach” (Co-ordinator, 1992b: 1).
344. From a different peer perspectives, the idea that the assault could easily have been avoided was more important, 
because no IDU appreciates their affairs being probed into by police due to avoidable behaviour by someone who 
should have more self-control in broad daylight on a public street. The methamphetamine manufacturing conviction 
of the Treasurer was not considered significant at all, apart from in the formal sense. This period was before the 
moral and media panic over the use of ‘P’ (strong smokable methamphetamine), which became a staple of the New 
Zealand drug market in the late 1990s. This was the first conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine in the 
Canterbury region. The recipe was sourced from the internet, and no gang associations were involved.
345. Several peer-professionals did not accept the co-ordinator's actions, but were outvoted.
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The assault conviction also influenced the addiction counselling training. When other students and 
the Course Executive had learnt in 1990 that a morphine-dependent student might become qualified
to practice (Co-ordinator, 1991), a concerted attack was mounted on the co-ordinator’s enrolment. 
Local tutors and supervisors responded with a strong defence. An overseas expert offered cautious 
approval for substance-using counsellors, provided a close supervisory structure was maintained 
(Wodak, 1991; Parrish, 1991). The issue helped to open up such courses to those not ideologically 
dedicated to abstinence, yet who could be trusted to uphold the quality and reliability of the 
qualification, and accordingly, gain access as proponents of harm reduction to professional forums 
for treatment specialists. But the assault conviction seemed likely to reverse such gains and to 
exclude recreational or dependent substance users from becoming qualified practitioners. Such 
damage to the prospects of harm reduction angered some peer-professionals on CIVDURG’s Trust 
Board, who wished to minimise any further damage.
The last of the CIVDURG Trust's effective chairpersons had qualified as a health professional and 
worked at the A&D clinic. This extremely professional peer also assisted the members of the 
Prostitutes Collective in their street outreach at night (Reed, 2004. pers. com.). In late 1992, after I 
had left CIVDURG, this chairman stated that either the co-ordinator or he must resign. The Board 
was loyal to the co-ordinator, and the chairman left.346 There followed a period of diminishing 
professionalism and increasing control of the Trust by a smaller number of peers. These peers 
seemed, on average,347 loyal more to each other than to the professional goals of the trust, or to the 
NEP, or to acting as a voice for IDU. This loyalty created a problem in terms of professional 
concerns for maintaining public trust and accountability, which in a peer-professional situation, has
seemed better if continually increased, not merely maintained. However, CIVDURG’s situation 
also accords with conventional professional interests in minimising or deferring external scrutiny.
After the Chairperson had been induced to leave in late-1992, the co-ordinator recruited an 
accountant who was surprisingly supportive, for a non-IDU who did not work in the drug treatment
area.348 CIVDURG began to regain financial stability, but the accountant, being terminally ill with 
cancer, died before managing to improve the core sustainability of the organisational structure. 
Only the ability to produce audited accounts and the immediate management of cash-flow were 
improved. By mid-1993 there were no health professionals, no fund-raising specialists, and no 
independent peer-professionals left on the Board, according to the few minutes of meetings.349 Nor 
did any strategic plan emerge to address these deficiencies and extend services. 
346. There are no minutes of this crucial meeting. The report is anecdotal, from reliable sources. The chairman did not 
appear in any later minutes. The authority of the co-ordinator had become unchecked. Resignations over the 
following months left the Trust Board gutted by mid-1993.
347. In arriving at this generalisation I considered the Trust Board decisions, as minuted, to provide an average of the 
peer-professional attitudes in terms of being more peer tending or more professional tending.
348. The link to this accountant may have been the co-ordinators membership with him in a local book society.
349. Most meetings over that period are recorded as being cancelled due to lack of a quorum. Letters and notices were 
circulated requesting volunteer workers and prospective Trustees to attend planned meetings. 
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During the period of organisational disintegration that I have described, no alternative models for 
peer outreach were proposed. I found no description of IV League proposals for Christchurch, from
when ADIO was founded and received state agency approvals and contracts, to the stage of 
CIVDURG’s founding. Despite publicly supporting CIVDURG, Wright had felt personally 
betrayed at being excluded from the resources of CIVDURG (Reed, 2004, pers. com.). Indications 
of conflict between Wright and the CIVDURG co-ordinators continued for eight months, until a 
negotiated compromise led to Wright becoming licensed in June and joining the Board in August. 
However, Wright did not then take any significant part in CIVDURG activities. He worked instead 
along different connections that did not depend on CIVDURG and could not be compromised.350 
Until he died in December, 1993, Wright dedicated himself to educational work in schools, taking 
full advantage of the rare opportunity to work within the education system on a health syllabus for 
AIDS education. 
During this period from 1989 to 1995 the NZAF and New Zealand Prostitutes Collective developed
an increasingly coherent working alliance. By contrast, CIVDURG became increasingly defensive 
and isolated from the regional AIDS service organisation networks, according to evaluations of the 
NEP in 1994 (Auerbach, 1994b, 1994c, 1994d). The Prostitutes Collective opened a small needle 
exchange where not only sex-workers, but also IDU who wished to avoid CIVDURG could access 
syringes. However, the provision of NEP services in NZPC premises became part of national 
protocol that developed in the early 1990s. Such protocols were approved at a policy level, and 
only coincidentally ameliorated the differences between sex worker and IDU representation in 
Christchurch. CIVDURG’S isolation due to its interplay of personal and structural problems 
escaped official notice.
2   Evaluating a private site of peer-professional hybridity
I have described how the private nature of CIVDURG, combined with its contractual funding 
structure, led to some evasion of accountability and increasing capture by a strategically-positioned
employee. From an external perspective, CIVDURG was an autonomous peer-based exchange in a 
contractual relationship with a state agency. However, CIVDURG was subject to the same NEP 
regulations that controlled the pharmacy exchanges. Regular surveillance and evaluation by state 
agencies was potentially provided by the local Medical Officers of Health and District Area 
Pharmacists, as well as through the reporting provisions written into CIVDURG’s funding 
contracts. Nonetheless, Pollards Pharmacy had sold syringes illegally for several years, in plain 
sight of the District Area Pharmacist, and continued to sell single syringes illegally.351 This 
350. The minimising of Wright's previous efforts, and his unrecognised work on the National Council of AIDS, as well 
as his public speaking as an IDU person with AIDS, especially in youth education through school visits, were 
reasons for the DISC Trust to rename the exchange premises 'The Rodger Wright Centre'.
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suggests that much might, and did, evade such a regulatory regime.
CIVDURG also caused surveillance and evaluation problems for the District Area Pharmacist. The 
part-time peer workers had to become registered as ‘suitable’ by the District Area Pharmacist.352 
However, he had no way of knowing whether the applicant was suitable or not, beyond checking 
for a minimal knowledge of the hazards of sharing syringes and the NEP Regulations. The quality 
of sympathetic engagement with illicit drug users, which the District Area Pharmacist was 
employed to detect, deter, and report in pharmacists, was exactly that required for peer needle 
exchanges. He had no way of telling if a prospective syringe seller was likely to use or sell drugs 
on the premises. Instead, he relied on recommendations from CIVDURG management and the 
A&D centre (Lewis, 1989). 
The necessity to engage with IDU required the District Area Pharmacist to depend upon the 
surveillance provided by A&D treatment professionals, yet also upon CIVDURG's peer expertise. 
The District Area Pharmacist could not arrive unannounced to inspect the peer exchange, as he 
could at pharmacies. The exchange was closed during scheduled visits from officials, so that IDU 
clients were not observed. The District Area Pharmacist stated that the : “policing of who sells N/S 
packs at CIVDURG is impossible” (Lewis, 1989).
The small, solid core of part-time volunteer workers that emerged over the first year were skilled, 
acceptable to clients, reliable, and discreet. The Trust then requested three more part-time workers 
to be registered, including Rodger Wright.353 This request was made because greater numbers 
reduced the problems in scheduling shifts and carrying out outreach activities. Notwithstanding, the
District Advisory Pharmacist complained to the AIDS TaskForce co-ordinator that too many peers 
had already been registered, citing the support of the Medical Officer of Health (Lewis, 1989). 
However, CIVDURG was a shop-front as well as a peer outreach centre as well as a professional354
contact and referral centre.
In 1989, CIVDURG was a shop with a single product, as illustrated below. Also illustrated is the 
effective equivalence of the hands on either side of syringes, as the exchange is made. One set of 
hands could not be closely monitored without the other being included.
351. Mr. Pollard had highlighted the inaction of professional and state authorities by showing how easy it was to reduce 
HIV transmission, while also covering his costs. Mr. Pollard continued selling syringes as part of the new NEP, but 
was not popular with the District Advisory Pharmacist, who informed the AIDS Taskforce that Mr. Pollard was 
selling off old stock rather than the regulation syringe brand. Mr. Pollard was also accused of selling singles, rather 
than the regulation ten-pack.
352. See, for example my registration in Appendix 2.
353. Wright was the most experienced peer educator in the country, having worked with politicians and IDU from 1985.
354. Robinson notes aspects of non-professionalism, for instance that: “Training usually consists of sitting in on a session
with other volunteers” (1990: 16), yet also of professionalism: “... a bewildering variety of potential tasks that staff 
could be involved with, each requiring differing skills and experience. For example, the initial step of setting up a 
service required facilitation skills while the next stage of networking with other agencies and developing services 
was a community work task. Running the centre requires administrative skills and the outreach work, including 
preparation of material, is an educator's job” (1990: 16).
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Picture 3: The act of exchange (CIVDURG Archives)
CIVDURG’s funding contract was negotiated yearly and required quarterly reports. The work 
requirements included long-term strategy. medium-term administration as well as short-term shop 
management aspects. Moreover, peer employees had not competed for their jobs, they had not been
selected for their skills in office management, nor for their robust psychological disposition. In 
consequence, extra staff seemed required to help, but according to the NEP Regulations, such staff 
needed to be approved through a registration process.355 
Nevertheless, the Department of Health and the Medical Officer of Health acted as if they 
considered the outreach work and the off-site education work to have a specific limit, beyond 
which the NEP activities were not to be considered valid. Yet this limit seemed of their own 
creation, since in outreach activities, more workers are more effective, managerial problems aside. 
The official attitude, as enforced by these Department of Health officials, was that low numbers 
were more than adequate. The peer members of CIVDURG were extremely upset that such 
355. Nobody knew in the initial years how much work was involved in this new peer-professional environment. It was 
not like a standard pharmacy, where needle exchange sales were easily added to the standard daily repertoires. 
Instead, new systems appropriate for a peer exchange and for a volunteer work force had to be developed and 
constantly modified. New standards of appropriate and inappropriate client interactions had to be worked out. A 
constant flow of information from IDU networks was required to indicate how the services and personnel were 
perceived, and what unmet needs might exist. CIVDURG peer-professionals needed to obtain information, evaluate 
it, pass some of it on to state authorities, while ensuring that CIVDURG was not perceived by IDU clients as helping 
police.
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decisions seemed made by low-level functionaries, influenced by ignorance and perhaps prejudice, 
in the absence of clear and transparent policy. 
The District Area Pharmacist's logic and restraints stifled the provision of peer outreach through 
the networks of volunteers. His activities also promoted an assumption that peer outreach 
connections were not valid. In 1990, the terms of reference for an evaluation of the peer groups did 
not include any reference to or description of outreach, despite the groups often being labelled as 
'outreach groups' (Kerse, 1990). Between 1991 and 1993 this perspective was strengthened by the 
Department first indicating its opposition to providing sufficient funding for a dedicated outreach 
co-ordinator, then eventually refusing such funding. 
Nonetheless, CIVDURG personnel had found outreach prohibitively difficult outside of their 
personal networks. New Zealand did not have street drug 'scenes'. What outreach work remained 
seemed to require access to situations of injecting in private residences. Only people with prior 
invitations could carry out such outreach. Accordingly, efforts had shifted towards providing 
educational written material with an outreach component to the IDU who had been attracted to the 
central city exchange site. It was hoped such material would circulate around the local network 
connections of IDU.
A 'shop-front' was easy to make into a 'instrument' for educating and communicating with IDU. 
Just as the NEP’s funding streams mixed user-pays with state contracts, so also were the senses of 
ownership, images, and resources of the NEP premises mixed between private and collective 
organising. Management could legitimately minimise personnel, since achieving reliable standards 
with larger numbers entailed increased supervisory costs. This conventional shop model treated 
part-time staff as interchangeable, the only constraint being the difficulty of recruiting 
replacements if current staff left. Unless specifically countered, the commercial and privatising 
logics inherent in the funding contracts impelled CIVDURG towards minimising labour costs, and 
away from employing or supervising larger numbers from marginalised communities. This 
problem increased after the Employment Contracts Act was passed in 1991, because expenses for 
volunteer workers were then legally obliged to be administratively accounted for, with a similar 
order of administrative costs as if the volunteers were fully employed.
Peer workers could potentially be recruited from clients, if such clients became known, possibly 
through a drop-in type of programme. However, given the risks of current drug users actually 
injecting or trading drugs on the premises, many co-ordinators, volunteers and Trustees did not 
want to run such risks. A 1990 review of the NEP commissioned by the Department of Health 
noted that one of the peer exchanges promoted a drop-in environment, some tolerated it, and some 
opposed it (Robinson, 1990). A review commissioned by the Ministry of Health in 1994 paid less 
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attention to this aspect, but emphasised a series of conflicts between the Trust Boards and their 
employee managers (Walzl, 1994). This suggests that the risks of drug use on the premises had 
been successfully managed between volunteers, Trust Boards and employed managers, but that the 
somewhat related risks of employment by a Trust Board could not so readily be managed.
In the 'shop front' approach, IDU clients brought in and utilised their personal and peer 
understandings. These aligned with the material and symbolic environment maintained by peers 
who were also professionalised, and constituted 'meaningful' places and experiences. The peer 
workers were recognised as being part of the IDU networks, but these networks were treated as less
important than the effectiveness and efficiencies offered by the systems of providing educational 
materials, information, and syringes through the shop-front infrastructure. This co-ordination of 
specialised systems seems a recognisably bureaucratic approach. As enforced by the District Area 
Pharmacist, it was also a professional approach. Aspects of registration, such as a standard 
qualification and limitations on numbers of practitioners, were more important than promoting the 
individual differences and increasing the numbers of peer volunteers.
A different model might have treated the part-time workers as unique, because each controlled 
access to a different personal network of IDU. These networks were not static, regular linkages 
where the even diffusion of neutral information could be relied upon. The IDU networks were 
constituted from continuing and changing interactions. Such networks produced somewhat durable 
patterns of interactions. These acted as boundaries and channels, partly due to their material 
aspects, which took energy and organising to alter, and partly because human expectations and 
social technologies made some activities easier, at the expense of others that became more difficult.
The movement of syringes and information along IDU network connections was more or less 
difficult, depending on the positioning and changes in meaning associated with the activity of such 
moving. The public access to the central exchange site partly overcame the particular boundaries 
that protected any injecting activities that happened in private homes.
In such IDU networks, the information from some people and organisations was more trusted than 
from others. Even if information passed through or around boundaries, it changed in its meaning, 
especially that of trustworthiness, depending on its source and route. This was why DIVO, for 
example, ensured that its IDU personnel were of high standing in local IDU networks. New peer 
personnel have been required to be approved by DIVO's existing peer-professionals as well as by 
being selected by the two356 DIVO co-ordinators (Richardson, 2003. pers. com.). This collective 
logic did not eventuate in CIVDURG, where a managerial logic open to self-interest and narrow 
356. DIVO has, after learning about the implicit problems of becoming dependent on a single co-ordinator, insisted that 
there be two co-ordinators. One specialises in outreach, the other in managerial accounting. This basic safeguard 
seems to have worked very well for providing continuity of organisational memory and avoiding co-ordinator 
capture.
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perspectives held sway. In making 'safe using' information follow the actual IDU networks, the 
number of peers would be increased to maximise the coverage of IDU networks. In this model 
there was still ‘carrying’ of messages and meanings, yet nothing was carried in quite the same way,
because IDU experiences and practices were different. The principle of 'safe using' might have 
been formulaic and universal, but the mix of peer and professional methods and contexts of drug 
use were not, since the personal relationships, local cultures, and types of drug using practices were
complex, changeable, and dense with desires and fears.
The District Area Pharmacist dealing with CIVDURG had been acting as if a manager in terms of a
more bureaucratic model. This might have been appropriate under the IV League proposal for peer 
outreach workers to be employed within a Department of Health hierarchy. It was not appropriate 
for the contractual and autonomous peer outreach model that actually eventuated. As this peer 
model developed, IDU access and coverage increased, yet so also did managerial needs, since 
individual IDU resisted a one-size-fits all management style. Intriguingly, the District Area 
Pharmacist treated the CIVDURG co-ordinator as if both were directly accountable to the AIDS 
TaskForce. Both also ignored the co-ordinator's accountability to the CIVDURG Trust Board as an 
employee. Robinson (1990: 19-20) also noted such tendencies towards discounting the autonomous
authority of the Trust Boards.
The relationships of trust inside CIVDURG were initially strong, despite the later problems. By 
contrast, the regulatory supervision by the Department officials was initially problematic, despite 
later ameliorating. The shifts in both sets of parameters of trust occurred in an environment of 
reduced financial resources, of regulations that prohibited the safer supply of preferred injecting 
equipment, and of consequent constraints on service coverage. The IDU clients trusted the 
CIVDURG peer personnel to embody the expertise of current IDU, while also providing types of 
information and a distance from law enforcement characteristic of the professional health sector, 
while also being professionally competent in managing the needle exchange infrastructure and 
premises. Yet the health agencies that funded CIVDURG, and sheltered the IDU clients, trusted 
that illicit drug use would not occur, either on the premises or within the boundaries of the service 
provision aspects of the programme.
These developing problems erupted when the District Area Pharmacist informed the AIDS 
TaskForce that the CIVDURG co-ordinator was not an ‘ex-user’ as originally claimed, nor was 
compliant on a maintenance programme, but had been supplementing her medical opiates with 
street drugs (Lewis, 1989). The District Area Pharmacist hoped: " that the grant of money to 
CIVDURG in ChCh is not being used to pander to the drug-related needs of the group’s staff" 
(Lewis, 1989: 1).357 The information that he acquired about the CIVDURG staff from the A&D 
357. One issue is that most illicit drugs in New Zealand are Government subsidised medicines that become diverted to 
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sector was expressed in terms of an abuse of trust. However, the treatment clinics did not have 
exchanges on their premises, in order to avoid compromising their regimes and logics of enforcing 
abstinence. The surveillance by the District Area Pharmacist and A&D staff illustrated the inherent 
hybrid ambiguity and conflicts when IDU were also professional colleagues who operated their 
own health service agency.
The District Area Pharmacist was accountable for promoting the NEP, which had been limited to a 
pharmacy-based scheme, but had come to include peer perspectives and peer practices. 
Nonetheless, he was acting as if the NEP was still a pharmacy-only programme which merely 
required complying with official regulations under authoritative supervision. It seems likely that no
officials had informed him that the autonomous peer groups would be highly responsible for their 
own management, and far less open to external monitoring than the pharmacy NEP outlets.358 The 
prospect of further alienating distrustful IDU through surveillance of their medical records would 
seem to jeopardise the combined peer and professional character developing in the NEP. State 
agency officials, who needed to be negotiated with over funding and performance contracts, had 
come to hold information about the non-compliance of peer-professional negotiators with their 
opiate maintenance regime of treatment. In this incident, peer-professionals gained extra reasons to 
keep information from treatment specialists and the District Area Pharmacist, yet these needed to 
be co-operated with to improve the IDU and public health outcomes of the NEP.
It is difficult to see how health sector employees could realistically control 'criminals' who were not
dependent on their treatment services.359 Such attempts problematised the preferred collegial 
practices of the same professionalism that, in theory, legitimised the surveillance of patients. The 
District Area Pharmacist’s complaint seems to have been ignored by the Department’s NEP 
authorities. These Department overseers needed working IDU peer co-ordinators more than they 
needed critics who could not themselves undertake such work. I find no record of further 
complaints, despite later problems. This suggests that such surveillance was no longer used so 
directly. Because the peer group environment involved pervasive entanglements among its peer and
professional shaping of crucial permissions and autonomies, ‘peer-professional’ types of activities 
illicit markets and use. Another is that many drugs would be paid for from state supplied incomes. It is not actually a 
crime in itself to direct state income to illicit ends. A further issue is that illicit drug use requires one to be 
consistently dishonest when communicating with enforcement authorities.
358. Trustees such as myself considered the accusations to be a private medical issue and a Clinic regulatory issue rather 
than a needle exchange issue. The peer Trustees could not really believe that members of the public would be so 
naive as to imagine that peers would not have to be current illicit drug users to maintain peer access. These Trustees 
were not aware of any need for outreach because they had been recruited to run the exchange and do organisational 
and survey work. They had absolutely no idea of the history of events that had led to the formation of the NEP and 
the peer groups. The CIVDURG Trust board was later required by the AIDS TaskForce, in 1990, to formalise its 
position on drug use by employees. The Board unanimously agreed that, providing drug use did not interfere with 
work capabilities, off-site employee drug use was a private matter, and none of it’s business. Drug use by personnel 
in general did not seem to affect CIVDURG's capabilities since, being always stigmatised for drug associations in 
any case, the Trust was not brought into any extra disrepute. 
359. It is only the client’s dependency on Methadone Programmes that allows the enforcement of ‘treatment’ regimes.
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and perspectives became selected for, not only in the peer groups, but also across the boundary 
connections into adjoining organisations and occupations.
It can be seen here that the peer-professional logics of such situations stabilised the peer aspect of 
the NEP and reduced the contagiousness of blood-borne diseases, yet were themselves contagious 
to a degree. The District Area Pharmacist’s position was not workable if it conflicted with the IDU 
realities that made peer needle exchanges necessary. However, close contact made conflict 
inevitable because of different operational and cultural expectations. ‘Neutral zones’ of 
expectations, such as the NEP peer group policy of ‘neither condemning nor condoning illicit drug 
use’, were introduced and maintained in order to facilitate such separation.360 As these logics 
became apparent, the state health sector largely abandoned attempts at local control in detail. 
Instead, evaluations based on quarterly reports became formally relied on. 
When the peer group co-ordinators wrote the quarterly reports, any problems of structural relations 
between the Trust Boards and employees remained invisible.361 The peer exchanges were left to 
regulate themselves through attrition, being mentored at times within the local health sectors and 
by AIDS service organisations, and supported in general by a secure, though minimal, financial 
foundation of user-pays sales (Kemp, cited by Brunton, 2004 pers. com). The first significant 
disagreement between CIVDURG’s co-ordinator and Trust Board involved responses to a robbery 
and assault at the premises in April 1991.
Picture 4: Working by myself on an evening shift (Personal records, 1989-early 1990s)
A volunteer/Trustee working alone at night was assaulted with a broken bottle (part. obs.).362 The 
360. Such separation is artificial and misleading, yet, for that very reason is extremely useful and health promoting. It 
does not even seem unusual in type, only in the intensity of its managed contradiction.
361. Funding agencies had to insist that annual reports from South Island groups must be sighted, authorised by the 
Boards, and co-signed by Chairs of Boards. The need for such demands indicates how inconvenient some co-
ordinators found such scrutiny.
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assailant was not a member of any IDU client group.363 After the assault, issues of worker safety 
were discussed, leading to disagreements. This was the first time that any tension between Trustee 
and worker roles seemed both contentious and significant. As workers, peers generally felt they 
should follow the co-ordinator’s directions, and as Trustees, they wanted such co-ordination to be 
provided. Yet in being Trustees as well as workers, they also wanted to discuss the issue further 
and see if arrangements for greater safety could be workable and affordable, especially for women 
alone on the evening shift. There was no security architecture such as grilles and barriers. 
The co-ordinator resisted any discussion of extra expenditure, while working herself only during 
the day with staff at neighbouring shops on hand. Accordingly, some peer Trustees began to lose 
confidence in the co-ordinator's sensitivity to Trustee and worker perspectives. They began to feel 
that despite supposedly employing the co-ordinator, contentious decisions were being made not by 
the Trust Board in the Trust’s interests, but by the co-ordinator, somewhat in her own interests. The
co-ordinator, in turn, began to lose confidence in the support of the peer Trustees. She began to 
introduce more loyal personal friends onto the Board, relying on the existing trustees not being 
prepared, as peers, to challenge the suitability of another IDU without clear cause. 
By 1994, Rodger Wright had died, and the internal trust connections of CIVDURG had collapsed, 
as had external trust connections with local AIDS service organisation branches, and with 
community health groups. This increasing isolation placed strains on the trust connections with 
local IDU. In terms of being an IDU resource, and as representing local IDU, trust was diminished, 
and seemed heading towards dissolution. These increasingly inter-linked problems would have 
been a traumatic experience that most likely worsened the co-ordinator's “fragile psychological 
disposition” (Christchurch Press, 1992: 5). These problems also diminished CIVDURG’s stability, 
since the co-ordinator proved impossible to separate from the organisation without legal battles and
counterproductive publicity. This structural problem could not be acknowledged outside the 
organisation without jeopardising the funding.364 Such problems seem an inherent risk when 
contracted public health agencies are essentially autonomous, while those with inside knowledge 
have funding incentives to keep silent.
There were public or at least officially recognisable indicators of CIVDURG’s problems. In June 
1994, at an IDU Group Meeting with the Public Health Commission to discuss forming NENZ (as 
discussing in following chapters), all delegates except one were co-ordinators or trustees. The 
362. See Christchurch Press (1991a: 3, 1991b: 2), Keenan (1991). The worker was dazed but recovered within days. The 
assailant suffered vascular, tendon, and nerve injuries to the inner wrists from a broken bottle that required 
prolonged medical treatment. The assailant's recovery was impeded by being repeatedly assaulted in prison by 
inmates who disapproved of aggravated robberies of needle exchanges.
363. He was a member of a small group of ‘homeys’ who had threatened several people in the area over the preceding 
weeks. They had severely injured a Japanese tourist in the preceding week.
364. When DIVO suffered a lesser degree of such problems, the Southern Regional Health Authority reduced its already 
minimal funding until proof of stable Board functioning was provided. Yet the only proof lay in surviving for a 
period without complaints, while cutting back services due to the reduced funding.
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exception was CIVDURG’s combination co-ordinator/trustee (Auerbach, 1994c). By then, being 
both co-ordinator and trustee was a matter of survival, since there were only two other Trustees 
recorded in CIVDURG’s minutes.365 CIVDURG’s Constitution, as amended in 1991, called for a 
minimum of twelve Board members: “with a balance between IDU members, health care workers, 
and other interested individuals” (Co-ordinator, 1994).366 
In addition, a report on needle exchange issues by Kelly Auerbach (the NEP Co-ordinator 
employed by the Public Health Commission in 1994), contained lists of the problems experienced 
by the regional AIDS Service Organisation branches (Auerbach, 1994d). The New Zealand 
Prostitutes Collective branch in Christchurch reported problems with CIVDURG’s lack of 
confidentiality. The NZAF noted that they never heard anything from CIVDURG. Yet the Southern
Regional Health Authority described its relations with CIVDURG as happy and healthy (Auerbach,
1994d).367 
By 1994, the contract negotiating agency for CIVDURG had devolved from the Department of 
Health, through a brief interval with the Public Health Commission, to the Southern Regional 
Health Authority (SRHA). The SRHA acted on behalf of the Ministry of Health to provide regional
health services. It was only after CIVDURG’s outputs as provided in the Quarterly Reports started 
to indicate reducing sales368 that the SRHA later claimed to have become concerned (NECO, 
1994c; Nimmo 1994a). Nevertheless, such evaluation by contract outputs seemed somewhat more 
effective and efficient than surveillance by the regional health officials. Yet such monitoring 
entailed a delay until IDU responses, as changes in purchasing behaviour of IDU networks, became
recorded as sales data. 
Falling sales statistics created a problem for the SRHA officials. The Ministry of Health and SRHA
staff could not take over the affairs of an independent organisation, especially without themselves 
having access to the relevant expertise. Yet there were no similar organisations that might be 
offered a contract. The Ministry of Health had minimised the number of contracted peer groups, 
and the CIVDURG co-ordinator had not wanted competition. None of the health and social work 
professions or organisations in Christchurch had attempted to provide alternative peer needle 
exchange services at a level adequate for the city-wide IDU networks. 
365. CIVDURG formally claimed five Trustees including the employee (Auerbach, 1994c, 1994d), but three could not be
produced in the flesh at meetings according to minutes of meetings throughout 1994 that could not begin due to lack 
of a quorum. One was a Samoan elder who told me that she was extremely annoyed at being misrepresented. She 
had merely attended a meeting in response to a request, and had only agreed to ‘consider’ becoming a trustee. She 
had considered otherwise, and had not attended further meetings. However, her name had been placed on official 
documents as a trustee. Good relations with the Samoan community had been jeopardised in this tactic.
366. This clause had been inserted as a long term safeguard at the instigation of peer-professional Trustees who wanted to
counteract the stacking of the Board by the co-ordinator (1994 pers. obs.). 
367. The SRHA was later sufficiently concerned that CIVDURG's problems did not become public knowledge that it 
made its offer of future funding contingent on maintaining secrecy (NECO, 1994d). 
368. Sales might be expected to plateau at some stage, but never reduce across a region in a short time. Sales reduction 
limited to any single outlet implied that clients were preferring to go to alternative outlets.
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The two directions and forms of trust that sustained the peer exchanges were no longer aligned. 
The IDU and AIDS service organisations had ceased to trust the co-ordinator. However, the 
Ministry of Health and SRHA officials remained trusting, since their information and capabilities 
had become dependent on the peer-professionals they had contracted. The Ministry connections 
with CIVDURG were centred on two types of contract. One focused on improving mental health 
outcomes, for instance through printing several issues of a magazine. The second type of contract 
aimed at running a shop and maintaining a legal corporate identity, but not of continuing 
community engagement and outreach. Formal outreach by supervised employees was not funded as
a primary goal, even if mentioned as a desirable secondary goal. IDU goals of autonomy and 
decriminalisation were not funded by the Ministry, although any surveillance information provided 
by peer-professionals was desired. CIVDURG's collapse seems inevitable due to these 
misalignments, yet also strangely delayed. The delay was, I think, partly due to the earlier setting 
aside of the District Area Pharmacist's criticisms of CIVDURG, but mostly due to the SRHA's 
incapacity for evaluating across the boundaries of its contracts with peer groups. When relevant 
criticisms were made, officials had to rely on previous records and trust.369 Yet these were 
inherently private.
The peers involved in NECO, which stepped in between CIVDURG and the DISC Trust 
management, were unaware of the history and structure of the funding situation. The SRHA’s 
books were not open. An official representative of the SRHA declared that even if the NEP 
services continued there was no guarantee of continued funding, and that any possibility of funding
depended upon there being no publicity about what had occurred (NECO, 1994a, b). This 
perspective encouraged forming an alliance with the NZAF in order to ensure continuation of 
services, since the peers in NECO could not access bridging funds.
3   Peer-professional patterns emerge from private problems
This account has emphasised how entrepreneurial founding situations, combined with requirements
to maintain a multi-stranded support network, created systemic difficulties. A peer-professional co-
ordinator came to distrust the Trust Board which was founded to employ her. This distrust was 
reciprocated, yet due to the hybrid niche in which the peer groups operated, there was no effective 
external accountability. The registration process provided a significant governance function by 
369.  Helen Clark had, as Minister of Health, attempted to enforce a directive that employees could not sit on the Trust 
Boards of peer needle exchanges. This directive was opposed by the AIDS TaskForce, which wished to preserve the 
presence of two exchange founders on their respective Boards. It seems unfortunate that Clark was not successful, 
given later events. However, National won the 1990 elections and the new Minister allowed the directive to lapse. It 
seems that no official was prepared to enforce it without Ministerial support. A compromise was negotiated whereby 
employees could sit on Boards but not vote on their own work conditions. This did not prevent employed co-
ordinators from influencing the work conditions of peer Trustees.
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recording the identities and limiting the numbers of the part-time workers. Such limitations 
restricted those activities where effectiveness was directly proportional to the numbers of peers. 
Because this aspect was not formally recognised, the informal outreach provided by the peer-
professionals was excluded from formal monitoring procedures, and could not be easily evaluated.
CIVDURG's initial viability depended on receiving the direct and continuous approval of the 
District Area Pharmacist, and indirectly on the hierarchical Department of Health structure that 
linked surveillance to funding. The Department of Health funding contract enabled CIVDURG’s 
service to potentially become more specialised by employing people with professional skills. 
However, the funding also created more dependency on official monitoring and approvals than any 
unfunded, volunteer-based community groups would normally experience. Nobody in this situation
was sure who was accountable to whom, and in what ways. There had been no testing, no 
persuasion, to define the extent of rules and possible ways around them. This initial pattern 
continued because the funding contracts did not significantly alter this situation, and the IDU 
networks were generally unconcerned so long as the syringe supply continued. State agencies and 
AIDS service organisations could not directly intrude into private peer organisations without 
adverse consequences. Because the peer groups had been planned to maximise the benefits of local 
autonomy (Robinson, 1990: 6), specific goals and resources needed to be dedicated to overcoming 
the vulnerabilities of isolation. However, these conflicted with personal goals of career 
advancement and protection of privileges, in ways that could not be controlled by a Trust Board 
that allowed itself to become dependent on a key employee.
CIVDURG helped to normalise the self-injection of illicit drugs and to construct a concept of an 
‘IDU community’. However, at least three differentiations of this concept immediately appeared. 
One consisted of IDU who were not linked with needle exchanges. Another consisted of NEP 
clients, while the third consisted of peers who worked in exchanges, or in other harm reduction 
sites. Peers were the most visible, publicly useful, and accountable of these three groups. 
Accordingly, they came to represent the others through the accounts and data they produced, and 
through their visible compliance with funding contracts and regulations. The peers told a story that 
was reasonable, with no counter stories.
The peer-professional NEP services in New Zealand continued to operate and gain experience of 
the new field, with all except CIVDURG increasing in capabilities and resources. They were not 
absorbed back into the conventional health professions after an experimental initial phase. Two 
factors have seemed involved. One was the continuation of drug prohibition.370 The other factor lay
in how state agencies found it productive and stabilising to contract professional health services to 
370. Despite its medicalising having reduced somewhat, as drug taking for recreational reasons became less indicative of 
a psychological dysfunction.
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small, funding-dependent, and legitimacy-seeking groups. Unprofessional activity by these groups 
could be ignored, because the short-term concerns of all stakeholders to avoid publicity were 
aligned. Larger health professions, such as pharmacy, had more numerous and wider-ranging 
strategic options in their conflicts and negotiations with officialdom. The pharmacy members of the
NEP were more independent, yet were expected to fix their own internal problems. Mr Pollard's 
illicit pharmaceutical syringe supply illustrates how such expectations and actualities of autonomy 
might become aberrant due to urgencies, such as the public fears of HIV/AIDS. Peer-
professionalism explains why criminal associates were allowed to begin a second strand of the 
NEP public health services, despite their activities representing an illegal type of practice and 
person. Such representation became less acknowledged as a formal goal after the initial two years 
of the NEP. Yet such representation seems implicit and expectable, since health provision had in 
general been organised as a high status, legitimised activity.
CIVDURG’s development and collapse was partly a matter of a unique place and persons, was 
partly caused by the national health sector environment, was partly due to the trajectory of an 
increasingly isolated organisation, yet was also an aspect of the institutional culture of NGO AIDS 
service organisations. Local organisational problems were pervaded by their peer-professional 
institutional environment. This environment was initially vertically-oriented due to being 
positioned within the Department of Health hierarchy, yet was also horizontally-orientated through 
connections with health treatment organisations and practitioners, while also being pervasively 
peer-oriented due to IDU being 'everywhere'.371 This peer-professional environment characterises 
the case of CIVDURG. The desire of a peer co-ordinator to access morphine maintenance 
conflicted with her professional desires to improve her qualifications through an addiction 
counselling training course. The desire to access morphine maintenance also conflicted with her 
professional requirement to prevent conflicts of interest with the health professionals on the Trust 
Board of the peer group. These conflicts, and distrusts, were too intense to be hybridly twisted into 
productivity.
CIVDURG did exhibit a hybrid type of occupational and organisational interactivity around new 
boundaries. Even though extremely small and limited in some ways, in other ways it participated in
providing national coverage along with somewhat similar peer groups which shared its operating 
regulations, harm reduction principles, and funding regime. It offered a form of organised 
collective representation to its IDU clients, while offering peer-professional career aspirations to 
employees. CIVDURG engaged with regional AIDS service organisation branches and drug 
treatment agencies. These alliances required differences and conflicts over territories to be 
negotiated. CIVDURG provided adequate health services for several years while developing a 
specialised expertise. However, CIVDURG’s boundaries shrank. CIVDURG resisted becoming 
371. See Fougere (2001) on concepts of heterarchy in New Zealand health sector developments.
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intermeshed between the core hybrid activities, an evaluation structure, and a distributed identity 
that could increase its quality of care. It did not provide a sustainable model of empowerment, was 
not financially stable, and continually lost its initial structural alliances. 
CIVDURG was part of a new type of state agency activity that was simultaneously public and 
private, lay and professional. In its surveillance activities, and in being itself monitored in part, 
CIVDURG produced group labels, forms of privileged information, and boundaries that articulated
a changing network. This interactivity made it feasible to separate Canterbury IDU networks into 
somewhat more measurable and controllable groups, such as opiate, ritalin, methadone, and steroid 
injectors. CIVDURG was acting in part as a state agency in carrying out such surveillance and 
‘community-boundary-establishing’ work. Yet, CIVDURG also carried out work that normalised 
and even valorised illicit drug users. Such work destabilised the conventional state agency goals of 
law enforcement, and of maintaining stigma by allowing or causing harm, as in punishment and 
deterrence or restricting health care to deviant groups.372 CIVDURG's formation and collapse 
inadvertently contributed to new understandings and connections between IDU and peer-
professionals. In the process, the possibilities and expectations experienced by participants 'drove' a
reconfiguration of expertise and practices, from Pollard's in 1985, to CIVDURG in 1989, to NECO 
in 1994, then to the DISC Trust in 1995.
These difficulties resulted in CIVDURG moving from a peer-professional environmental niche, to 
becoming exposed and vulnerable as 'peer'. As an autonomous organisation dominated by a single 
employee, the co-ordinators substance problems became the organisation's problems, as both lost 
their shelter in the professional health sector. CIVDURG became and remained structurally 
integrated into one personalised whole, due to its Trustees taking an unprofessionally low profile. 
This environment was initially an experiment, but continued because the alternatives seemed too 
difficult, and officials were very cautious of a public backlash (Fithian, 2004. pers. com.). In 
consequence, conflicts between collective IDU practices, professional accountabilities, official 
codes, market contracts, and community group co-ordination were repressed.
The DISC Trust, which was set up after the collapse of CIVDURG, achieved far greater control of 
its finances. It re-established mutually beneficial relations with health and AIDS service 
organisation networks, while keeping any internal problems away from adverse media or 
community criticism. Peer and professional roles were restructured into a more corporate form of 
peer-professionalism which involved clearer layers of authority and accountability. A peer-oriented
volunteer-worker layer was separated from a professionally oriented governance level of trustees. 
The separation was maintained through a managerial level consisting of a single employed 
372. For instance, IDU were deterred from illicit drug use by the mental health hazards and removal of agency caused by 
imprisonment. They were also not provided with a comprehensive youth focused harm reduction programme in 
schools to prevent neophyte injectors from catching HCV.
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manager. This structure focused much of the distress and risk and uncertainty inherent in ‘peer-
professional' working environments through the single link of this manager. Whether more general 
community empowerment goals have been achieved by selecting managers who are unusual, or 
trained to handle such stress, seems an illustrative question. 
The institutional configuration and wider environmental contours of the NEP has seemed to 
provide conditions that have encouraged a structural bias against managers being IDU, or being 
dependent on illicit substances. However, removing a structural bias towards ‘co-ordinator capture’
by making managers accountable and easily replaced, has increased peer empowerment by 
minimising the problems of harmful management that in the case of CIVDURG, drove peers away 
from participating. How organisational goals of convenience and stability interface in peer-
professional ways with IDU empowerment seems a crucial issue deserving of further study.
CIVDURG was founded in an entrepreneurial spirit and times, with active mentoring from the 
NZAF. As with other peer groups, the qualities suited for innovation were not so suited for stable, 
incremental growth and networking. The DISC governance model has appeared successful, not just
due to the counter-example of CIVDURG, but because it has lasted the distance and continued to 
innovate. CIVDURG need not have collapsed if different people had been Trustees, and if 
Department staff had acted as public servants rather than contract managers. However, the key 
point is that the DISC Trust has not needed to rely so heavily on such contingencies. 
The DISC Trust managed to attract a number of younger anarchist peers and a qualified journalist, 
who provided a sequence of editors for the Trust's peer magazine for ten years. If anarchists remain
with an organisation, it indicates that its communication and exercise of controls is relatively open 
and accountable. Nonetheless, it would be unwarranted to assume that structural boundaries fully 
explain the record of stability of the DISC Trust, or that the lack of organisational structure 
adequately explains the instability of CIVDURG. 
I would suggest that a certain hybrid character has been equally significant. This character has 
involved the encouragement of professional attitudes, the demonstration of solidly organised 
innovation, and a collegiate way of organising which has been oriented towards collective mutual 
interests combined with public accountabilities. The importance of this differentiation is that, 
although located in organisational activities, the stratified model of DISC Trust peer-
professionalism could extend further into institutional arrangements. This appears a not 
unreasonable prospect, since the DISC Trust has formed several satellite peer groups and given 
them autonomy once they became established. The extension of this model has not required major 
policy changes or special exceptions by state agencies.
In this specific, close-range account, peer-professionalism has been presented as a situational type 
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of hybridity where stigmatised non-professionals took on professional attributes and aspirations. 
They did this in spaces that had been opened by the withdrawal of professionals from an 
occupational territory designated by the government. This territory involved inviting IDU 
participation in a public health programme by providing distrustful IDU with motivation changing 
services, 'safe using' information, and injecting equipment. In the case of CIVDURG, harm 
reduction logics provided a link between the criminalised and medicalised aspects of IDU 
existence. Syringes and information then travelled along this logical link, partly in response to how 
such activities came to make sense to participants, yet also partly constituting these participants. 
Accordingly, peer-professional perspectives continue to seem useful in analysing the linked 
activities of health professionals, hedonistic and marginalised lay networks, illicit markets, and 
state agency officialdom.
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Section  3
Trust, Representation, Regional Infrastructures
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8Blurring trust boundaries: returned syringes talk about their IDU 
Objects of knowledge are material-semiotic generative nodes. Their boundaries materialize in social
interaction. Boundaries are drawn by mapping practices; “objects” do not preexist as such. Objects are
boundary processes. But boundaries shift from within; boundaries are very tricky. What boundaries
provisionally contain remains generative, productive of meanings and bodies. Siting (sighting) boundaries
is a risky practice.
(Objects As Actors: The Apparatus Of Bodily Production. In Situated Knowledges. Donna Haraway,
1999 [1988]: 185)
What factors influenced the returning of used syringes before the NEP was modified by the free 
one-for-one exchange scheme in 2004? These potentially incriminating syringes have constituted 
one of the few reported situations where people have offered identifiable samples of personal tissue
to agencies of the same government that continued to proclaim its intention to prosecute them. Did 
the price discount for returns simply remove such considerations, or have additional factors been 
involved?
In this chapter I will look at how such questions can be approached by searching out the most 
intense situations of potential trust and distrust to see what actually happened when IDU clients 
returned used syringes and were monitored at NEP outlets. This analysis continues several themes 
laid out in previous chapters where I explored how the early development of peer participation was 
shaped by links of differences and similarities with medical and other health professionals. I will 
focus on the actualities of information and information-bearing objects that have required or 
produced trust and distrust. I will describe how small numbers of IDU became 'professionally 
active' in the gathering of information for epidemiological research as well as for evaluating the 
NEP.
I begin with names, since the ordering of information involves the ordering of categories in 
processes of patterning, grouping, and the naming of names. Needle exchanges have appeared 
strangely and indicatively named. The focus on ‘needles’ seems odd when a hypodermic syringe 
includes a needle, yet a needle does not include a syringe. However, the term ‘syringe exchange’ is 
not generally used in New Zealand. People refer to the ‘needle exchange’, which seems more 
redolent with meaning. The needle is inscribed with meanings that include the syringe more than 
the meanings of the syringe include the needle. I presume this because it is the needle, not the 
syringe, that penetrates the skin and simultaneously slips inside the sensibilities shaped into social 
membranes as moral boundaries (Douglas, 2002: 66, 160-172; Otis, 1999). 
Syringes act to locate and feed the hollow needle in measured ways, yet the needle also measures 
its length inside human bodies, as an invasion to some or as a cyborg celebration of calibration and 
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precision to others. The precise amount of drug being injected is generally very important to IDU, 
who balance maximising reward and minimising risk in any instance of injection, yet who also 
attempt to control the risk or degree of dependency.
In such activity and representations, the movements of objects such as syringes and needles are 
seen to relate to changes in meanings, as names act as entities in stories which link archival 
accounts of the NEP to current injecting and administrative practices. Syringes have not only 
carried and performed symbolic meanings. When used syringes have been returned for exchange, 
they have carried bits373 of users’ bodies, making the actual ‘whole’ body of an NEP client 
accessible to biomedical analysis and trials of ownership. Accordingly, syringes have carried trust 
and distrust, being simultaneously connected in embodied embedments, and disconnected as a form
of commodity used in a range of exchanges of knowledge.374 
The circulation of syringes across market exchanges of property, among differently motivated 
people, and between the areas and types of mutually exclusive logics of institutions, has involved 
instances of NEP peers coming to represent IDU, and of IDU coming to represent syringes. These 
two form of representation have been mutually influencing. They have overlapped to form a zone 
of activity, where information about other network participants, and about motivation changes by 
IDU, has contributed to the methods and goals of the NEP.
To provide empirical detail and lay out the linkages of the pragmatic necessities, health goals, and 
the trust that I argue contribute to the ethos and an ethic of the NEP, I have built up this chapter 
using three sections. In the first, I account for the foundational contingencies and the continuing 
environment of decision-making. I do this by showing how returning syringes was needed for the 
NEP to be acceptable to the public and to health professionals, despite being problematic and 
costly. 
I then outline in the second section how biomedical testing began to ‘follow’ syringes and IDU in 
processes of surveillance, producing information and evaluations. I first focus on gay community 
concerns over threatened biomedical claims to the ownership and redefining of gay collective 
identity, in this way contextualising and leading to specifically IDU aspects of trust and distrust 
due to biomedical forms of monitoring of syringes. I then present what was publicly known about 
the protocols of monitoring returned syringes. 
In the third section, I relate particular consequences of these developments to my argument for the 
general hybridity of the NEP and to its specifically peer-professional aspects. I draw attention to 
373. ‘Bit’ is used here in the sense of a discrete physical object, a partial condition, and an informational object that is the
smallest, irreducible reference to a single feature, in this case genetic identity.
374. An informative comparison is to condom use, which has been resisted by some men because semen in the condom 
has the capability of travelling further afield than desired and becoming accessible to harmful witchcraft. Witchcraft 
has been understood as strategies for control over uncertain unwelcome events, which might well include having 
one’s DNA recorded in a commercially valuable database of known IDU. See Barnett & Whiteside (2002: 331).
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the way the NEP peers and syringes were constituted as representing IDU communities, yet while 
also modifying IDU life-worlds. In these processes I show how both became institutionalised as 
worthy of trust, while requiring to be trusted for the NEP to be workable.
1   Making syringe returns count
Although medical professionals in 1987 had demanded that the exchange of syringes be obligatory,
in contrast to supply alone; the health officials planning the NEP had introduced a system of 
standalone supply. This was paid for and therefore largely controlled by IDU clients, with only a 
discount to encourage exchanges. Obligatory exchange, if frequent, reduced the likelihood that 
used syringes were available to be reused, which reduced the possibility of sharing. Obligatory 
exchanges also reduced the likelihood of used syringes being deposited in public places. Obligatory
exchange, accordingly, helped to preserve the public and political support for the NEP. However, 
the incentives for the NEP’s providers of syringes to encourage returns were modest, and countered
by disincentives.
In May 1988, various health professionals had agreed with the AIDS Advisory Committee that 
replacing the goal of obligatory exchange with voluntary exchange was unacceptable.375 This 
demand from a health professional perspective was connected, via the NEP’s user-pays commercial
environment, to an inbuilt conflict of interests between the price discount on returned syringes and 
the seller’s mark-up on the buying-in costs of every syringe supplied. A director of a methadone 
service commented: "It would appear that those professionals prepared to do this work are being 
asked to either subsidise the departments [sic] costs (of providing a financial incentive to IV users 
to return old syringes), or discourage users from returning needles (and thus get the higher service 
fee)" (Gray, 1988). If a discount applied, the mark-up reduced, creating a disincentive for sellers to 
handle returns. Since the extra labour of handling returns did not generate extra payment, 
profitability per item dropped below that of a non-return transaction.
Since the professional fee components and the returns incentive were of the same order, there was 
little financial incentive for NEP outlets to encourage returns. Yet police and medical professionals 
argued vehemently for returns being a foundation of the NEP. This situation added to the need for 
voluntary peer workers who could implement the policy goals that were directly distrusted by other
stakeholders. The low level of financial motivation for pharmacists to encourage the return of 
syringes could be overcome by trusting in peer workers who, in being trusted by IDU, could 
motivate IDU to return used syringes without needing to increase the financial incentives to IDU.
The NEP’s harm reduction logics involved the increased participation and inclusion of 
375. See Gonin & Wilkie (1988), Freebairn (1988).
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marginalised groups through proxies, in contrast to directly funding the marginalised groups. It 
would have been politically very difficult to directly fund criminal drug injectors. Yet such logics 
nevertheless promoted IDU needs and motivations over those of pharmacists.376 Nonetheless, the 
NEP depended on retaining the numerical support of pharmacists, while trusting that such 
pharmacists would be motivated to “do the right thing” (Baker, 2002 pers. com.) for professional 
reasons, without an external structure of incentives.
The following extract in May from a Wellington newspaper editorial touches on the difficulty of 
creating trust, and on the significance of the manner in which the returned syringes publicly 
legitimised the NEP, since: "... the scheme’s success or otherwise now depends on chemists and 
drug addicts building a sufficient level of trust to reduce the number of dirty needles in circulation, 
and thus reduce the spread of Aids" (Evening Post, 1988). This mix of regulation and pragmatism 
was not contractual. It was not based on negotiated conflict. It was based on several types of trust, 
one of which required all of the participants to stabilise the programme and maintain its 
sustainability. 
The effectiveness and efficiency of supplying sterile syringes was maximised by detailed planning, 
but the ecological, ‘whole system’ concept of ‘circulation’, where exchanges and returns would 
ensure that ‘what goes around comes around’, received far less attention. Returned syringes were 
more ambiguous in their constituents of identity and meaning than sterile syringes. This ambiguity 
increased due, in part, to the IDU-focused goals of safer syringes within private environments 
conflicting with the non-IDU goals of safer public environments without used syringes. Guarantees
of adequate financial reward and national coverage, in a supposedly user-pays market system, also 
led to ambiguities and quirky workarounds. 
Pharmacists both for and against the NEP were united in refusing to be accountable for the disposal
of returns (Department of Health, 1987c), while Department of Health staff were reluctant to risk 
contagion377 by contact with returned syringes (Hadley, 1987). The NEP infrastructure increasingly
utilised market arrangements and constraints. These made up for the deficits, or reduced the 
financial commitments to the short-term, rather than entering into long-term official or professional
arrangements that entailed the acceptance of accountability within a health framework. However, 
these tactics did not provide a mechanism for seamlessly coupling the costs of disposing of returns 
to a central, co-ordinated infrastructure, nor to the income-generating area of ‘user-pays’. The 
376. The NEP did indeed contain a built-in perverse incentive for service providers to discourage returns, since that 
meant a larger profit on each sale (Stephenson, 1988). The NEP planners presumably realised that the reliability of 
returns statistics would be improved, since there was no incentive for pharmacy owners to inflate the return rate. Yet 
the arrangement created incentives for staff to record a non-return sale as a return sale and pocket the discount. It is 
hard to know how much this factor has contributed to inaccuracy of records.
377. This anticipated contagion was specifically from HIV, but one seems justified in suspecting that, given the 
professionally qualified background in medicine of most Department employees at that time, fears of biomedical 
contagion were actually reinforced by stigma.
199
Chapter 8.      Blurring trust boundaries: returned syringes talk about their IDU 
disjunctive logic of the NEP’s market strategy avoided the political, legal, and cultural difficulties 
of making commitments to the stigmatised practice of drug injection, yet increased the financial 
difficulties of co-ordinating the NEP.
Syringes needed to be returned to reinforce the hoped for motivation changes in IDU, and to 
protect public environments. Yet the costs of counselling IDU and disposing of used syringes were 
both potentially high. Professional counselling was immediately recognised as entailing major 
problems of supply and cost, and was accordingly avoided.378 However, the ‘non-professional’ 
waste disposal costs were only belatedly recognised, and could not be avoided. In June 1987 the 
Minister had recognised that the disposal of used syringes was a crucial factor in the feasibility of 
the NEP (Bassett, 1987d). But after David Caygill replaced Bassett as Minister following the 1987 
election, this precautionary realisation seems to have been overcome by a need to push rather than 
delay the scheme (Caygill, 1987a).
The regional decision-makers within the Departmental hierarchy considered that the projected 
numbers of returns would be fewer than could justify establishing a standardised recovery and 
disposal system. One Medical Officer of Health considered that there would be only be a few 
pharmacists involved, whereas any commercial disposal services would be prohibitively expensive 
even if throughput was small (MacDonald, 1987). Another considered that only twenty-eight 
syringes would need to be collected per pharmacy per month (Riggir, 1987). As a result of such 
localised regional perspectives, along with funding uncertainties, as well as the need to wait before 
gaining more accurate sales data (Baker, 1987a), a fragmented range of local disposal systems 
became established in an ad-hoc, bricolage fashion. Their presence, once in place, worked well 
enough to delay the construction of a national disposal system that could be uniform and integrated
with the syringe supply system.379
In 1987, the NEP planners had estimated the buying-in cost of the ten-pack of syringes to be $2.50,
as available at the NEP outlets. Because disposable syringes are cheap, this cost might look high, 
although it included the costs of producing and importing relatively small numbers of safety 
containers. These costs presumably included printed material, packaging, and local transport. A 
further $2.00 was added to this amount to cover disposal costs (Department of Health, 1987d). 
The $2.00 for disposal costs was an estimate from the feedback from the regional health officials 
who reported on their local capabilities for handling returned syringes. This disposal cost 
component was presumably designed for some state agency to collect from the pharmacy outlets, 
378. As previously discussed, another reason for this avoidance was a lack of confidence that such counselling would be 
effective if reliant upon voluntary participation by IDU. 
379. See NEP (2000a), NEP (2000b), Walzl (1994: 44), Walker, Brady, & Baker (1994: 2, 31). Later problems of 
disposing of diabetic syringes could have been avoided if both syringe supply systems had been integrated at this 
early stage.
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or from the syringe importers. The collected funds would then, presumably, be directed to the 
specific state agency sites where the actual transport and disposal costs of returns were being 
incurred. However, by February 1988 the budgeted disposal costs had shifted from the health 
sector to the commercial sector. These costs consequently increased from the estimated $2.00 
within the official health sector to an open market, commercial quote of $15 per ten-pack container 
(Health Development Unit Rotorua, 1988).
Initially, the increases in the disposal costs were somehow avoided or absorbed by local units of the
Department of Health (Robinson, 1990; Walzl, 1994; Walker, Brady, & Baker, 1994: 2, 31). At 
some stage, extra funding was presumably made available to compensate these Departmental 
units.380 Despite the claims of being ‘user-pays’, it is clear that the NEP was centrally funding a 
significant percentage of the costs of handling the returned syringes. These costs included a 
component derived from pharmacist’s time, which could not easily be measured, could hardly have
been been fully compensated, and therefore could be considered voluntary. Only the costs of 
importing, packaging, and transporting the syringes were met by IDU through user-pays. 
In the late-1980s, the neo-liberal changes across the state sector included the introduction of 
commercial logics and procedures to the internal administration of hospitals (Barnett & Barnett, 
2004). The governance of hospital budgets by clinicians was steadily replaced by regulatory 
regimes and managerial requirements to avoid financial losses. These changes accelerated after 
National became government in 1990. Along with a new framework for general employment that 
drastically reduced union rights (Boraman, 2004), the Department of Health was transformed into a
governance-only Ministry. The Departmental hierarchy was destructured381 into a distributed 
system of funding agencies and service providing agencies that were rigidly split. The funding 
agencies received policy goals from the political level and broke these down into various types and 
packages of services to be purchased, along with agencies that were contracted to provide such 
services according to specified contractual outputs (Barnett & Barnett, 2004). 
The new framework, along with its supportive ideology, created difficulties for any regular use of 
Department of Health resources for disposing of returned syringes. However, charging the 
consumers of services then transferring the accountability to NGOs through a contract mechanism 
was approved in principle since it fitted with the new market model for state activities. This market
environment encouraged the addition of service providers for an essential service, yet with no 
380. I have found no direct references in Archives. However, such extra funding may have been contentious and made 
through a single decision of a single agent. Such a decision would be less likely to be recorded.
381. I reject the term restructure and use the term destructure because the overall degree of structure was less in the new 
system. Whereas a hierarchy depends on structure for its unity of activity (actual or imagined), the new system 
depended upon contracts that were negotiated between more isolated governance entities. Such contracts were more 
contestable than the hierarchy of an agency of Parliament. Such negotiations were less predictable. The hierarchy 
applied all the time, in every decision made by bureaucrats. The contracts were negotiated at most yearly, causing 
time to be organised, or structured more finely and pervasively in a hierarchy than in a contract cycle.
201
Chapter 8.      Blurring trust boundaries: returned syringes talk about their IDU 
effective competition, which created incentives for the price of the ten-packs to rise, or for user-
pays funding to be supplemented by state agency disbursements. The disposal costs382 could not be 
avoided, being essential, yet also could not be hidden for long in an ideologically rigid schema of 
contractual outputs and accrual accounting. 
Lorraine Kerse, who was appointed as NEP co-ordinator following Dr. Baker, rapidly realised that 
the budgeted cost of $28,000 per year for nation-wide transport and disposal of returns could not be
met (Kerse, 1988g). The prior work on budgeting for the NEP’s infrastructure would need redoing 
urgently, or extra funding found to prevent the  unravelling of the tentative stability of the NEP 
enrolment of divergent interests. Apart from the increases in the disposal costs per pack, the 
indications were increasingly that the NEP would be more utilised than initially assumed, rather 
than less. This was, in hindsight, to be expected, since Dr. Baker’s initial estimate of IDU numbers 
was based on systemically skewed data. These data were based on inherently inaccurate drug 
treatment records, and were only later corrected by more useful and valid data from the regular 
NEP operations and the occasional epidemiological studies. 
Uncertainty in the amount of demand for services and syringes did not affect the basic supply 
operation of a user-pays scheme, provided the users were not deterred by the price of the syringes 
from participating in sufficient numbers and frequency to prevent HIV transmission. However, 
uncertainty in demand did affect the syringe disposal costs that the Department of Health was 
committed to meeting, despite the political pressures to contract out services, to limit the financial 
risk, and to invite competition (Walzl, 1994: 44). The NEP costs were already high. The delivery, 
printing, and packaging fees ensured that before the professional fees-for-service and the returns 
incentives were added, an industry standard price of less than ten cents per syringe had increased to
about a dollar. Extracting the waste disposal costs from a user-pays system would have added an 
extra party to the already somewhat contrived arrangements. Yet, if no further agencies became 
involved, the Department of Health would have been forced to shift from a purely governance role 
to becoming a commercial participant and negotiating partner. The degree of safer syringe use 
needed to lower HIV prevalence and satisfy political goals was unknown at the time. Accordingly, 
any disincentives to IDU, such as increases in prices, potentially jeopardised the NEP’s linked 
goals of motivation change and safer injecting environments.383
The return of used syringes was considered essential for the political sustainability of the NEP, as 
well as to achieve its immediate goals of reducing HIV transmission (Walker, Brady, & Baker, 
382. For instance, Christchurch Hospital management had refused permission for their incinerator to be used, because it 
was already over committed and under-budgeted (Department of Health, 1987e; Thompson, 1987). A Christchurch 
clinic requested access to the waste disposal facilities of the scheme, despite wanting nothing to do with supplying 
syringes (Edwards, 1987) .
383. It seems likely that user-pays funding made it easier to get the legislation enacted by reducing immediate budgeted 
costs. User-pays funding reduced the Departmental infrastructure required, reduced public opposition, and 
accordingly, reduced political opposition. User-pays also followed the pattern set by the illicit pharmacies.
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1994: 30-32, 36). However, because medical and other health professionals did not trust IDU, they 
wanted to make the return of used syringes compulsory. Nonetheless, the health and political 
officials who planned the NEP trusted IDU sufficiently to offer an option of saving money by 
deferring the purchase of new syringes. Certainly the NEP’s health information directly encouraged
IDU to use a new syringe every time. But the NEP’s financial logics encouraged IDU to clean their
syringes with bleach several times before returning them. After all, exchange was not obligatory 
and syringes were not free, even when discounted.
IDU payments did not meet all of the NEP costs, since the essential syringe disposal costs were 
met through state funding. Because the syringe disposal system had become state-subsidised to a 
degree, IDU who chose to clean and reuse syringes were reducing the overall costs of the NEP. 
This compromise between pragmatic and precautionary arrangements ensured that a workable goal 
of reducing the circulation of used syringes among IDU was achieved in flexible ways. IDU were 
encouraged to participate at their own chosen level, rather than be forced into compliance. IDU had
less reason to resist the monitoring arrangements, for instance by one person buying in bulk and 
reselling outside of the regulated system. Because IDU were not discouraged from using the 
pharmacy exchanges, and were actively encouraged to use the peer exchanges, they provided an 
accessible, large enough group for sentinel surveillance.
2   Sentinel surveillance of people, returned syringes, and trust
In 1985, biomedical testing issues provided a focus for turf wars between medical experts and gay 
HIV/AIDS community organisers over the composition of the expert committees that advised the 
Minister of Health. One such conflict centred on the control and infrastructure of testing for HIV, 
both as personal diagnosis and sentinel surveillance. The conflicts over who would take on which 
roles, using what forms of expertise, translated into a trial of strength over the sites and 
infrastructure for accessing members of a marginalised community and manipulating the 
interactions of people, expertise, and information. 
Given that the testing techniques were at least partly medical, the conflicting parties agreed that 
clinics of some sort would be needed. Nonetheless, given that the community expertise was also 
committed to precautionary approaches and trust relationships, the model of the clinic and its 
linkages to other community and health sector infrastructures were highly contentious. The 
concerns about testing community members had focused on guaranteeing personal anonymity. 
However, such guarantees entailed collective control of the quality of clinical information by 
communities which were collectively affected by the use and public representation of that 
information. The control of the location and personnel involved in testing had been made a 
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community-defining issue. By 1987, gay-focused community groups, such as the NZAF, had 
ensured that biomedical testing was not restricted to the STD clinics associated with the clinical 
speciality of venereology, nor restricted to the Communicable Diseases Bureau of the Department 
of Health. In a variety of complex ways, the inspection and empowerment of marginalised 
communities became overtly linked in new organisations, as discussed in Chapter 4 and 5.
Similar logics involving the increased hazards of HIV transmission being caused or magnified by 
stigma were found in both gay and IDU social networks. These logics created a receptive policy 
environment for IDU to also become conceptually framed as a community. The Ottawa Charter 
(1986) did not distinguish between homosexual and injecting practices, treating both as 
marginalised, whether associated with individuals, groups, or communities.384 However, the 
bureaucratic logics of state agencies required an organisation of some sort to represent and provide 
health services to marginalised communities. Public officials were uneasy when working with 
private individuals and groups (Baker, 2002. pers. com.) who, unlike officials, did not work within 
a structure of overt accountabilities. Public funding could be more readily justified when given to a 
registered corporate body, as in the initial funding packages that kick-started the NZAF and Needle
Exchange New Zealand (NENZ).385 In corporate bodies, accountabilities were specified to 
particular officeholders and constitutional codes. Such accountabilities were specified and  
legitimised by annual meetings where a membership might alter such arrangements or indicate 
approval. If unfortunate events occurred, officials dealing with such bodies were unlikely to 
themselves be held accountable.
Competent, professional IDU did not self-organise in public, because any potential goals of 
decriminalisation which might justify the difficulties and dangers were clearly unachievable in the 
short term due to the range and fundamentalist fervour386 of opposition. Public exposure increased 
the hazards that included arrest, ineligibility for health insurance, barriers to entering other 
countries, loss of professional reputation, and reduced employment opportunities. IDU faced 
greater legal hazards than gays, which gave IDU greater cause to protect their privacy. No public 
IDU groups were known in New Zealand until the IV League was encouraged to form by 
Department of Health officials.387 However, the IV League was not encouraged to expand beyond a
small number of IDU. IDU representatives were not initially considered as independent service 
providers, unlike gay community representatives. Although New Zealand IDU were known to 
384. I consider communities to be groups that define themselves as self-perpetuating through an infrastructure of care.
385. See Chapter 4 for the NZAF founding, and Chapter 9 for the NENZ founding.
386. By this I mean that opponents of decriminalising drug use of various sorts did not generally appeal to rational 
arguments, but to a dogmatic code that defined drug use as ‘evil’ and more specifically defined the altering of mood 
and consciousness as ‘evil’. I do not mean that such attitudes were actually written down in a seminal religious text. 
The closest to an actual text would be Leviticus, but only in the sense developed by Mary Douglas (2002: 51-71) in 
her analysis of the abominations described in Leviticus where in-between, liminal, ‘impure’ states were presented as 
‘evil’ and socially dangerous.
387. See Baker (2002) pers. com, Kemp (1996), Robinson (1990).
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effectively communicate through market and social networks, such as “the drug grapevine” 
(Seddon, 1988), IDU were considered, and considered themselves, to be incapable of self-
organisation in any conventional political or commercial senses (Wright, 1987).388 Nonetheless, the
logics of motivation change required officials to encourage IDU to participate through incentives 
and by lowering barriers to employment. Both expressed a mutual interest in minimising public 
exposure.
For instance, by March 1987, the Department of Health officials planning the NEP considered it 
necessary to categorically reject any attempt to record NEP clients in a register. The officials 
certainly wanted to record more accurate and relevant statistics for evaluation purposes, as well as 
developing epidemiological models, but: “this requirement could act as a barrier to people utilising 
the exchange scheme, preferring to continue to share needles rather than risk their anonymity by 
having to register into the scheme” (Department of Health, 1987b). 
The absence of registration of NEP clients is significant because precise evaluation models, based 
on correlating client motivations, behaviour, and syringe movements, required the clients to be 
individually identified. Without identification, procedures of marking individual syringes and 
measuring their movements were pointless, as well as counter-productive and costly. This is 
because they would create a separate data-set, leading merely to speculation over the relationship 
between the syringe movement data and IDU data. An effective procedure needed to obtain data 
that tied together the key components of the mechanism involved, namely drugs, money, IDU, 
social networks, NEP outlets, and syringes. Without the general registration of NEP clients, any 
studies necessarily relied on obtaining individual consents in a process that, in being an exception 
to normal procedures,389 risked introducing forms of experimental and observer bias.
One reason for IDU to distrust being identified was specified in the Department of Health policy 
advice warning that: “ chemists may wish to use the scheme as a method of catching drug addicts 
by reporting needle purchasers to the Police” (Department of Health, 1987c). Yet the Minister of 
Health was urged to put NEP clients onto a register “otherwise you won't be able to catch up with 
them” (Williamson 1987: 1). Notwithstanding, the Prime Minister wrote to a disgruntled opponent 
of drug use, that “we must work closely with, rather than against, those groups that are at greater 
risk of acquiring and passing on AIDS” (Lange, 1987). Members of the Labour Government 
Caucus recognised that the NEP was a target for public distrust which had to be assuaged or 
distracted for the NEP to be effective, and for political risks from the health sector to be justified to
388. See Blewett (1997), Hulse (1997), Price (1992) for Australian and North American discussions of IDU self-
organisation. IDU participation might have been expected to emerge by itself in secret market networks, 
multiplicities, or even pluralities of organisations, but the private nature of such organising, even if small in 
numbers, would have problematised negotiations.
389. In one case, I have heard of IDU clients exchanging their identity numbers, which effectively destroyed the validity 
of the methodology of the study (Nimmo, 2004. pers. com.) 
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Cabinet colleagues (Bassett, 2002. pers. com.). In August, 1987, a senior Department official 
emphasised that: “it was important to evaluate the needle exchange scheme in view of the 
controversy” (Stephenson, 1987a).
Shortly after Bruce Burnett’s statements of opposition to compulsory HIV testing (AIDS 
TaskForce, 1984), the existing anonymity protocols and other protocols applying to voluntary 
testing situations were being rejected by the AIDS Support Network. The AIDS Support Network 
instead began publicly offering precautionary medical advice on prevention and palliative care, 
within a theoretical framework of HIV/AIDS focused psychosocial counselling that insisted that 
the: “sociological and political aspects of the AIDS epidemic must be included within the medical 
response” (AIDS TaskForce, 1985b). The service delivery and information gathering aspects 
became woven together into a new form of expertise outside of the existing professional and 
official health arrangements.390 
Only those IDU who had consented, or had been forced by Court orders into treatment, were in 
contact with health authorities. This ‘captured’ group seems to have been presented at times as 
representing all IDU. A representative from an Auckland Drug Dependency Clinic considered that 
IDU, presumably those in treatment, but presented as IDU in general, would have no objection to 
being screened, along with prison inmates (McDonald, 1985). Nonetheless, at least one medical 
opinion from the UK expressed a more cautionary and realistic stance, acknowledging the: 
“widespread fears about confidentiality ... [but] most drug users will co-operate with voluntary 
testing if they are sure it is confidential” (BMJ, 1987: 389-390). It seems unlikely that undisclosed 
IDU would willingly participate in any programme of any sort if their identity thereby became 
known to enforcement or treatment authorities. 
In September 1987 the proposed evaluation procedures for the NEP included monitoring the 
pattern of syringe sales and returns, as well as the seropositive rates of IDU, although the 
methodology had not been finalised with the National Health Institute (Johnston & Patel, 1987). 
Two weeks later an article in the Medical Journal of Australia promoted syringe exchange, rather 
than supply only, specifically to enable unlinked sentinel surveillance. The procedure envisaged 
entailed the collective monitoring of returned syringes with no link being attempted to any 
particular individual clients (Wodak, Dolan, & Imrie et al., 1987). The monitoring of returned 
syringes in New Zealand was first reported in the NEP Management Plan (Baker, 1987a). The 
Management Plan scheduled three monthly seroprevalence testing of all returned syringes, over a 
390. This was similar in some ways to post-1960s strategies by many women to resist or side-step a male-dominated 
jurisdiction by medical professionals over the bodies and information taken from patients. Women activists worked 
in unifying strategies, through the development of feminist theoretical frameworks; and by diversifying the range of 
health care practices accessible to women. In consequence, many women increased their awareness of their bodies 
as consumers of existing male dominated medical commodification services. Some women professionalised, 
becoming providers of models of care that resisted biomedical methodologies. Such models included nursing, 
midwifery, woman run health clinics, and alternative healing practices.
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one week period, and also suggested testing returned syringes for individual blood types to see if a 
mix of types could provide a measure of the trail of any sharing of any individual syringe.
The Management Plan also outlined methods of encouraging motivation changes in IDU. These 
included a counselling component involving IDU peers, along with clinic-based counselling. Peer 
experience became a crucial feature of the peer group services because it encouraged IDU to 
identify with and support the goals of the NEP. One goal of the December draft of the Management
Plan was to: “provide ongoing surveillance information on HIV seroprevalence amongst IVDU’s, 
most of whom would not normally present for testing” (Baker, 1987a). The returns testing goal and
method emerged before IDU peers were considered as not just involved in the same programme, 
but actually running exchanges and offering access to normally non-compliant IDU in an 
alternative site to a pharmacy or drug treatment clinic.391 
The Management Plan outlined the initial stage of conceiving of the NEP as enabling information-
gathering, by means of the recognising and enhancing of IDU peer expertise, as part of an 
integrated mechanism. A second level of hybridity developed, building on and overlaying the 
initial level where small numbers of pharmacists acted illicitly to address the immediate problem of
preventing HIV transmission. This intensified, second-level hybridity consisted of the NEP’s own 
integrated sentinel surveillance and self-monitoring capability becoming joined to the peer and 
professional practices, mutually antagonistic, that had previously made such measurements too 
difficult. IDU did not particularly want to be monitored, professional biomedical and drug 
treatment specialists did not particularly want to obtain information through such methods as the 
NEP, particularly information that indicated the poverty of conventional research methodology in 
this area. IDU peers later found they did not want to be positioned in the middle of such 
antagonisms. Yet the pragmatic productivity of the hybrid logics involved could not be withstood.
Apart from the IDU peers, the NEP’s stake-holders were professional health workers or those 
employed by state agencies, who normally would work against rather than with IDU. Such stake-
holders were forced to rapidly change their stance, and could not act authoritatively in their new 
stance, because IDU participation was voluntary rather than enforced, and formed a crucial 
indicator for evaluating the workability of the NEP. Attempts to enforce compliance would not 
only have risked IDU participation, but would also have compromised any methodology of 
measuring effectiveness and efficiency. For this reason, the surveillance of syringe movements and 
HIV prevalence in peer-run needle exchanges became coupled with the calculation of IDU 
391. In May 1987, the Minister had reassured Dr Meech that: "counselling agencies be established in all health districts 
and area health boards and that the medical officer of health of each be given the role of co-ordinating them. I 
imagine that these counselling centres will be willingly established by appropriate organisations or interested 
groups" (Bassett, 1987c). Peers might have been considered at this stage, but no other evidence has suggested that 
IDU groups, rather than conventional medical professionals and treatment agencies, were being considered as 
counselling providers. The statement could be construed as a challenge to medical professionals and treatment 
agencies to create new centres from their existing resources, or risk official direction of their industry.
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populations and the evaluating of the overall NEP in official-run policy centres. There were then no
other indicators that could be relied on to evaluate the NEP, as shown by the cost overruns caused 
by the inaccurate data generated by treatment practitioners.
The long-term evaluation of the NEP required an immediate survey of HIV prevalence among IDU
to establish a baseline for later tests to be compared against and transmission rates calculated.392 
The earliest survey used blood samples and interviews, after informed consent had been given, 
from IDU at a Wellington treatment clinic. However, this survey had been restricted to low 
numbers, at a site that was too localised to provide information for reliable national planning 
(Robinson et al., 1987). For such purposes, to reduce selection bias, evaluation based on sampling 
methods needed a high compliance rate, and a more representative sample than a treatment clinic 
could provide. Since IDU attitudes to giving samples for testing were unknown outside of such 
treatment clinic situations, neither the validity nor the cost effectiveness of such tests could be 
easily defended in advance. Nevertheless, returns testing seems to have become tacitly approved, 
since no objections or advice is found in the recorded responses to the Management Plan, despite 
the Plan offering no protocols for NEP clients to be informed and to offer or deny consent. 
In terms of the ethics of partnership with affected communities, asking IDU to give their informed 
consent was similar to asking gays and MSM. If the request was genuine, it might be refused. 
However, asking for consent from IDU would not only introduce delays, but would reintroduce a 
degree of volunteer bias if IDU objectors refused to return syringes over the sampling period. In 
1989, Dr. Baker, by then positioned as a researcher attempting to develop a returns testing 
procedure in a pilot study, contacted one peer group to specify the issues, suggesting that:
If we are to justify providing increased resources for preventive education work then it would 
be useful to be able to target these more precisely. ... It is hard to see any ethical objections to 
this method of testing as it is totally anonymous, there is no possible way of linking a sero-
positive syringe to any individual ... I believe that it is important that the community of interest 
are consulted regarding all research of this type and I would be grateful if you could discuss 
this proposal with the members of your organisation. Please let me know as soon as possible if 
your organisation is broadly in favour of this proposal going ahead or if you have objections. 
(Baker, 1989: 1)
Information about the testing might, or might not, leave the exchange, depending on how its 
membership and controls over information were construed. Nonetheless, the movements of the 
returned syringes and the access to information by clients would initially be controlled by the peer 
personnel. Peers were represented in Dr. Baker's letter as experts in the likely consequences of such
movements of information and syringes. This letter positions the peer personnel as capable of 
giving consent on behalf of the IDU clients, as well as being the controllers of infrastructure and 
knowledge, while positioning the illicit IDU as a valid ‘community of interest’. 
392. A diagnosis of AIDS could be so long after infection with HIV that little information of immediate use in managing 
a community programme could be expected.
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Dr. Baker was direct in his approach. He left the difficult, discretionary issues to those whose 
communities were involved, who were more experienced, and who had most to risk. Dr. Baker had,
in May 1988, offered an effective 'model contract' of peer outreach. He proposed that IDU peers 
would promote IDU participation in epidemiological surveys in return for health benefits (Read, 
1988). The mechanism of this ‘exchange model’, as directly discussed by these individuals in their 
active networks, involved specific circulations of information, intertwining with shifts in 
motivation by all participants, along with movements of objects and the alterations of meanings of 
objects, words, and agency.
There was a chance that these peers would not agree, from either IDU or professional perspectives, 
to accept accountability for representing IDU. No-one knows whether the research could have 
taken place without consents. However, in 1992 unlinked HIV seroprevalence testing of attendees 
occurred without consent at STD clinics in Auckland and Christchurch. The Auckland and 
Canterbury Area Health Boards' Ethics Committees approved those studies without directly 
informing, or imposing a condition of informing, either the public or those being sampled, or 
informing the groups that represented those having tissue taken for such surreptitious analysis.393 
The New Zealand Prostitutes Collective (NZPC) had, in good faith, encouraged sex-workers to 
attend these clinics. When the NZPC discovered their inadvertent role in contributing to such 
testing without consent, they withdrew their good-will and co-operation.394Their stance was 
supported by other AIDS Service Organisations, such as the NZAF and the NEP peer groups 
(CASONZ, 1991b).
If any commercial agencies had forced or tricked their customers into such biomedical testing, 
without informed consent, the research would probably have been unacceptable to IDU, to the 
AIDS Service Organisations, and to academic communities. By contrast, this episode of testing 
was accepted by medical experts when it was carried out by their colleagues in an official 
programme, despite or because of an expectation of resistance and distrust by the marginalised 
community involved, and their representatives. If state agencies had utilised research based on the 
393. See Dickson, Paul et al. (1993), Paterson (1996: 40-41). Paterson minimises the problems associated with studies 
lacking informed consent. He was later appointed the Consumer Health Advocate. He has been strongly criticised by 
a womens' health consumer group for promoting policies that have further reduced consumer protections for control 
over their bodies and personal information (Auckland Women's Health Council, 2004). These policies were 
promoted by Paterson who was acting, in part, as a representative of communities, but not consulting with 
community groups.
394. “NZPC have been told by Sexual Health Services to use only their services in diagnosing and treating resistant 
ghonorhea [sic], and so sex workers were encouraged by NZPC to go to the Sexual Health Service. NZPC were not 
aware that data was going to be collected for CDC. A letter needs to be written to the CDC Journal saying that the 
research is not acceptable social science ... A letter has been written to HRC re Sentinel Testing Surveillance for 
HIV at STD clinics, and the HRC has responded to the letter and  passed on the concerns to the Epidemiology 
Group. The letters received seem to gloss over these concerns. STD clinics need to be approached and their 
unlinking procedures inspected. ... The question  of who is monitoring the research was raised” (CASONZ, 1992: 
4-5). The NZPC was not satisfied with the safeguards and accountability procedures, and would not act as a 
'collection agency' for social science research when participants were not offered informed consent (Healey, 2004. 
pers. com.). Further criticism of the human tissue surveillance being carried out without fully informed consent was 
made by womens’ health groups, for instance Coney (1988).
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deception of IDU or peer-professionals, the network of trust connecting IDU to such state agencies 
would have been jeopardised. Peers would have experienced greater difficulties in encouraging 
IDU to bring in returns. For instance, one peer-professional noted that: “Most clients report that 
their reason for not returning syringes is their fear of being prosecuted for that equipment, or that 
the police will send the equipment to ESR for analysis to support a more serious charge” 
(Blacklock, 1998). As Kemp pointed out in relation to IDU fears of being identified: “if the Health 
Department, why not the Police?” (1990: 7). Urging IDU to keep used syringes for later exchange 
would seem to invite unnecessary risk of arrest unless fears of prosecution were reduced to an 
equivalent degree, yet the prosecution rates did not reduce (Blacklock, 1998). 
According to Dr. Baker, ESR Health ‘routinely’ tested returned syringes to determine the 
geographic distribution of HIV infection among users of the NEP (Baker, 1994: 1). Baker again 
described an arrangement as being a form of exchange in a semiformal relationship. He gave 
‘ownership’ and credit to the outreach groups for choosing to participate, stating that: “The 
achievements of DIVA and other outreach groups in New Zealand are to be commended. ESR wish
to acknowledge their support and assistance, for without their help the above studies could not have
been completed” (Baker, 1994: 1). DIVO minutes record that Dr. Baker supplied such references in
support of grant applications, further supporting the concept of a mutual benefit contract (DIVO, 
1994c). Official recognition was also received from Healthcare Otago's Health Protection Unit & 
Communicable Disease Centre, which willingly acknowledged that:
the statistical information on trends of certain communicable diseases provided by your 
organisation is extremely invaluable for epidemiological purposes. Our organisation looks 
forward to an enhanced working relationship with DIVO in the most important field of 
communicable disease control and surveillance. We can only hope and encourage that funding 
of your organisation is kept at a sustainable level ... (Gradwell, 1994: 1)
These arrangements, together with the way they were reported, could be interpreted as contractual, 
but given the lack of specified time periods, outputs and date of agreement, seem more collegial or 
a cross-speciality collaboration.
In Christchurch, CIVDURG’s co-ordinator supported the proposal to test returned syringes, yet 
worker-Trustees, such as myself, were urged by the co-ordinator to not mention the testing 
procedure to clients.395 In Dunedin, the DIVO co-ordinator responded to Dr Baker's letter by 
recording concerns, before consenting, stating that: “working trustees are agreeable with this, but 
we do not feel  in a position396 to tell our clients that your study on returned syringes for HIV 
antibodies is being carried out” (Lee, 1989: 1). The phrase ‘feel safe’ indicates that the testing of 
returned syringes was considered at least potentially harmful if it became known in IDU networks, 
395. No reasons were given, apart from 'upsetting people'. A clause in the CIVDURG guidelines instructed workers not 
to talk outside CIVDURG about any internal matters that would bring the Trust into disrepute. However, this 
rationale was never specifically invoked to my knowledge while I was a Trustee.
396. In the original text the term ‘safe’ was crossed out and replaced with the phrase ‘in a position’ as I have represented.
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even to those who stood to benefit in some ways from the outcomes. For instance, Kemp 
commented that the: “NHI [National Health Institute] claim that their methodology will allow the 
pin-pointing of positive equipment to individual pharmacies. However, this would most likely be 
counterproductive ... it would raise fears amongst consumers of being identified” (Kemp 1990: 7). 
No records of any attempt to directly inform clients have been found in the archives of CIVDURG 
or DIVO. Nonetheless, if the peer personnel had passed on the information about the testing, it 
would have circulated without leaving a record.
These aspects of following syringes and putting them on trial show how the movements of 
information and equipment were joined in processes of monitoring and evaluation. IDU were not 
just subjects in the sense of being objectified. Instead, due to the syringes and their peers on the 
NEP their already existing but conventionally discounted network agency became intensified by 
means of the network aspects of a more intense surveillance. The surveillance required 
participation. 
Any analysis and understanding of these developments, as well as the more delicate aspects of 
network agency, would seem to benefit from a Foucauldian perspective on ‘productive power’ and 
self-surveillance, found for instance in academic literature on governmentality.397 Yet this detailed 
case example of the NEP shows how the details could not readily be followed and foregrounded 
from their inconspicuous background using a Foucauldian approach, which tends to use historical 
cases illustratively rather than groundedly. Instead, we see that anthropological, actor-network 
methods are more crucial for more closely following and more readily finding these sorts of 
relationships in the everyday life of people, objects, language, and institutions. And indeed, in the 
sub-discipline of governmentality, where crime and health intersections are also studied, the more 
useful work solidifies its theorising in grounded, case study approaches.
The NEP’s peer organisations, being positioned in the middle of opportunities and boundary lines 
amongst institutional topologies, might have been expected to develop an expertise in surveillance 
on behalf of the agencies they represented. However, peer needle exchanges were also developing 
distinct organisational identities, while increasing their peer-to-peer networking in infrastructural 
and commercial ways. This ‘self-centredness’, in contrast to acting as the agents for others, 
encouraged the development of capabilities that were organised around their peer activities in a 
newly meaningful occupational centre, rather than around  IDU ‘grapevines’ or webs of state 
agency officialdom. 
The meaning of the activity was not irrational, nor deviant, nor escapist, as drug activities were 
often labelled, nor an unquestioning obeying of orders. Instead, the meaning was constituted and 
expressed as ‘work’, with its corollary strands of meaning that linked to values of dignity, 
397. For governmentality analyses in this area see Rose & Novas (2003), Rose (2001), Rose & Miller (1992).
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legitimacy, and reward. Nonetheless, these peers represented IDU and syringes against the 
professional medicalising claims to rightfully and legally control IDU, drugs, and syringes. Yet in 
accomplishing this representation, the peers increased their professionalism. This process required 
increasing self-evaluation, and a more discretionary control of objects and information, beyond any
immediate accountability to IDU or state funding agencies. These professional goals emerged from
a collective network need to represent and care for IDU, yet these professional activities 
destabilised and altered a founding IDU community ethos of secrecy. These paradoxes, which may 
be less uncommon if looked for elsewhere, seem usefully conceptualised as hybridity, particularly 
of a peer-professional kind.
The peer groups accepted a position of representing IDU, rather than attempting to transfer such 
authority and accountability to local IDU networks and individuals. When IDU visited a local 
exchange, they might be interacted with in terms of a range of individual connections, different 
drugs, and shifting market aspects. Yet in a different context they might be grouped and referred to 
as ‘the consumers’ of a health service. In this particular instance of testing returned syringes, a 
concept of a single IDU ‘community of interest’ was promoted by the gathering and centralising of 
two forms of representation. First, the single occupational type of peer representative was asked for
approval. This was also a tacit request for permission to proceed, since the peer groups might have 
chosen to not send their collected returns for testing. Second, a single site of evaluation was 
arranged for the syringes to be gathered, and where all the information from the material syringes, 
and also from the compliance of the peer groups and pharmacists, could be collected in a single 
type of place.
The IDU ‘community’ was enrolled in a project of producing epidemiological knowledge, yet also 
in producing further funding, providing support for policies on NEP developments, and 
constructing ‘layers of value’, as if wrapping new layers of meanings around IDU, peers, and 
syringes, while tying these configurations into a package folded from the articulated necessities of 
peer-professionalism. Certainly there are other processes in which IDU have been presented as a 
singular group. Drugs and syringes are often represented in media as a singular phenomenon. 
However, peer groups and peer-professions seem particularly significant because in New Zealand 
there were no other licit sites where IDU were represented and could be directly negotiated with 
through a simple, single letter.
The 1987 Management Plan had scheduled three-monthly testing intervals, while Kemp had 
advocated for ‘frequent’ sampling of returned syringes by the Area Health Boards (Kemp, 1990: 
6-8). However, apart from a reference to a prior pilot study in Wellington, Baker et al. (1992) 
seems the only published and accessible report of returns testing in New Zealand.
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Dr. Baker’s research results supported the efficacy of the NEP, as well as a need for greater 
outreach, along with wider and longer duration access to methadone programmes. This New 
Zealand research was combined with similar North American and Australian research to argue for:
greater collaboration with members of the local drug-using subculture in conducting 
surveillance and prevention activities ... exchange venues should continue to be used as a 
venue for [syringe] testing, perhaps using more direct techniques to measure seroprevalence, 
such as saliva testing which appears to be more reliable and may be more acceptable to IDUs. 
More specifically, we suggest that this baseline survey should be periodically repeated to 
provide information on HIV infection trends perhaps with some modifications. For example, 
although the method used in this survey (i.e. unlinked testing) proved to be very effective in 
maintaining the anonymity of participants, it would be valuable to collect demographic and 
behavioural information to assist in targeting prevention efforts.  
(Baker, Brady, & Tobias, 1992: 15)
No further reference to syringe surveillance has been found until 1994, when the DIVO minutes 
(1994c) casually mention that returns were being collected for testing. It was difficult to trace this 
reference further. Nonetheless, a syringe return testing study was undertaken in 1994.398
Similar testing of returned syringes occurred in the United States. A study based in Connecticut,399 
attempted to use such syringes to compensate for the perceived drawbacks of the self-reporting bias
of a volunteer study. The study design used a tightly controlled monitoring system that followed 
the movements of individual IDU and individual syringes through the exchange process. This 
procedure was coupled with a mathematical model that described IDU and syringe movements 
within a network configuration. This model estimated the circulation activity of IDU and syringes 
by measuring the return rates. The modelled calculations were used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the syringe exchange. The description of this process is consistent with actor network language in 
its positioning of needles as actants, for instance in the: “behavior of needles ...[in] a data collection
system for ‘interviewing the needles’” (Kaplan & Heimer, 1994a: 567-8).400 
According to this study, information about the reduction in needle circulation times and participant 
motivation was ‘encoded’ in the ratio of distributed needles being returned. The return ratio 
described the relative reduction in circulation times and the penetration of new syringes into the 
population, since: “In a needle-exchange program, the rate at which needles are exchanged is a 
398. A report entitled 'Analysis of Returned Syringes to Map the Regional Distribution of HIV Markers in New Zealand 
Injecting Drug User Populations' , by Walker, N., Brady, H., & Baker, M. in 1994, is referred to in 'Progress on 
Health Outcome Targets' Public Health Commission (1995: 121-122, 149). However, the report by Walker et al. 
(1994) was not in the public domain. I eventually unearthed this report, which had been held by the Ministry of 
Health, but had not been released to me as part of the ‘complete file’ on the NEP. Because it had been privately 
commissioned to the ESR it was being treated as private rather than public information, despite being commissioned 
by the Ministry of Health.
399.  See Kaplan & Heimer (1994a, 1994b). See also Kaplan (1994), Myers, Heimer, Liu, & Henrard (1993), Heimer, 
Kaplan, Khoshnood et al. (1993), Kaplan & Heimer (1992a, 1992b), Kaplan (1991), Kaplan & O'Keefe (1993), 
Kaplan & Soloshatz (1993), Heimer (1995), Heimer, Kaplan, & Cadman (1992), Heimer, Myers et al. (1992). This 
study was preceded by a more conventional study in Florida (Chitwood et al. 1990).
400. See discussion of actor-network methods in Chapter 2. The U.S. study differed from actor-network approaches in its
positivist emphasis on measurements of actual entities being obtained through a rigid research instrument. It did not 
explore how the research instrument being relied on was an effect produced by network interactions that were even 
more precise and significant in understanding researchers and those researched as the same ‘case’.
213
Chapter 8.      Blurring trust boundaries: returned syringes talk about their IDU 
function of client participation in the program” (Kaplan & Heimer, 1994a: 570). I agree that this 
ratio can be used to evaluate such programmes from the outside, but the ‘accuracy’ or better, the 
‘relevance’ is less certain than might seem, since it depends on the degree to which the functioning 
of the IDU network does not change after being calibrated through baseline studies. 
By contrast, the history of the NEP has featured significant and continuing change, though more at 
some times than others. It seems clear that the syringe measuring technique would become 
inaccurate if changes in IDU motivation led to changes in behaviour, yet these specific changes 
were a primary founding goal of the NEP in New Zealand. Nor does this U.S work make any 
reference to obtaining the informed consents of those being measured.401 Yet any increases in 
distrust by IDU for this syringe exchange programme due to surreptitious testing would seem to 
alter the precision of the model, and perhaps even the logic and practices of the mechanism 
involved.
NEP syringes began to be labelled by the importer in the early 1990s, to identify them for legal 
purposes, but each individual syringe was not uniquely marked. The labelling practice ceased 
because the costs were unsubsidised, which increased the price of syringes and heightened the 
access barrier for clients. The practice also undercut the promotion of a partnership concept by 
reducing funds that might have become redeployed into health promotion activities. No published 
New Zealand study has reported using individually marked syringes. This is significant because 
unique identifiers on syringes would be needed to calibrate Kaplan & Heimer’s mathematical 
model for precise evaluations of syringe exchanges and associated rates of injecting drugs in 
specific local environments.402
The Management Plan described a procedure that searched for multiple blood-types, to identify 
shared syringes (Baker, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c). In mid-1988 such a procedure was specifically 
proposed (Baker, 1988c), but no actual instances of trying to identify particular individuals, even if 
anonymous, have been recorded. Nor have I found any proposals for analysing the DNA in blood 
remnants from NEP syringes. However, in 1998 it was experimentally demonstrated to be 
technically feasible to analyse any human and viral DNA in used syringes through PCR 
amplification techniques (Rich et al., 1998). The research that established this technical capability 
seems unlikely to have been purely disinterested. For example, the isolation of human DNA from 
household dust was only investigated in 2008 (Toothman et al., 2008). Such NEP capability and 
forensic interest in DNA in syringes seems well-matched, and feasible to put into practice. Police 
401. The 1993 report on this needle circulation theory was criticised by several UK researchers (Green, et al., 1995), who
briefly mentioned consent issues among other methodological problems of indirect testing. Heimer responded that 
he was not permitted by the study sponsor to use more valid, direct methods, and that a mathematical instrument 
effectively magnified the reduced power of indirect testing (Heimer, 1995: 597).
402. Although a rigourous study of this sort would be needed to calibrate the algorithm, provided situations then did not 
change, such an equation could continue to be applied to seemingly non-intrusive sales and return data.
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could seize syringes for testing in searches of people and houses. The police could presumably also
legally intercept syringes between exchanges and sites of professional destruction, since any 
returned syringe represented a clear reason to believe a crime had been committed.403 
Anonymity was easy to build, as a protocol, into the early stages of the New Zealand syringe 
testing procedures. It would have taken a special effort to record fingerprints from the syringe 
bodies or to analyse identifying biochemical data from the blood traces. The test protocol called for
batching the washings from a number of syringes, which would remove any specific 
correspondence with any individual injector. In a system that complied with medical protocols and 
ethics, the risks to anonymity have seemed non-existent. However, such risks would increase if 
agencies not bound by medical protocols and ethics gained access to the returned syringes. 
These risks would also increase if the technical difficulties and costs of testing reduced, as would 
be expected if political and policy directives led to the procedures becoming more common and 
requiring less supervision. Furthermore, the centralised funding and more scrupulous record-
keeping needed for controlling a strictly one-for-one needle exchange was conducive to forms of 
intrusive surveillance using marked syringes. The biomedically testable activities of needle 
exchanges are seen in these incidents of surveillance to have enacted, and become enacted, as a 
trial of the embedment of the connections between people and objects, objects and viruses, viruses 
and people, and people with people. These networks linked information about syringes, as objects, 
to forms of public representation and trust that, in part, constituted people as subjects.
Any increases in distrust could have caused future research to become more difficult, and less 
financially justifiable. The connections between people, and people with objects, could have 
carried aspects of distrust that outweighed the aspects of trust. As the logics and methods of NEP-
based monitoring consolidated, the uncertainties about peer participation reduced by becoming 
negotiated and shared among the relatively known NEP stake-holders, while excluding the more 
unknown IDU networks. As such uncertainties reduced, evidence that supported the peer-
professional role was created in the same measuring, monitoring and calculating processes that 
supported the overall effectiveness of the NEP . Both the NEP and its peer-professionals attained 
greater capabilities through the 'expert legitimacy' associated with these episodes of unlinked 
sentinel surveillance (Baker, 1994; Gradwell, 1994). Nonetheless, the absence of a fully 
standardised longitudinal monitoring programme points to the difficulties inherent in the 
403. That this was not known to happen would not stop cautious IDU from taking no chances. The police were at times 
reputed to charge people with possession of syringes. However, although the legal defence under the NEP 
amendment to the Misuse of Drugs Act was specific, the charge was one of general drug-using paraphernalia, in a 
separate section. This made it very difficult for peer-professionals to prove whether or not police were regularly 
charging people with possession of NEP syringes, since the police could, years later, claim the paraphernalia was 
related to the use of non-injectable drugs. Adding to such difficulties, most IDU would not go to the expense of 
defending a possession charge, since it would most likely be accompanied by several other charges for which no 
statutory defence existed (Blacklock, 2003. pers. com.).
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framework and expectations entailed by this type of surveillance.
In New Zealand, principles that testing protocols and ethics were founded upon anonymity and of 
voluntary participation had been publicly acknowledged by expert advisory committees.404 These 
principles were restated in 1990 with the release of the ‘New Zealand Strategy On HIV/AIDS’ by 
the National Council on AIDS (1990a).405 The single exception to these principles consisted of 
unlinked sentinel surveillance. Although these principles mostly addressed issues of individual 
anonymity and consent, conflicts emerged between an individual’s ability to choose not to be 
tested, the need to maintain trust in health care policy and community wellness care systems,406 
general principles of community participation and empowerment, and situations such as the non-
consensual testing of returned syringes. The guidelines argued strongly against attempts to mass 
screen entire populations, yet accepted mandatory, anonymous, unlinked mass screening for ‘at 
risk’ individuals and groups. This surveillance was not considered unduly costly nor unnecessarily 
intrusive (National Council on AIDS, 1990a: 50-51).
The guidelines for testing those people or groups believed to be at greater risk emphasised the 
problems of definitions, identification, enforcement, and subsequent action. These guidelines did 
not specifically cover the surveillance of syringe returns, nor IDU at needle exchange sites. In a 
technologically related but culturally different context, the testing of donated human tissue for HIV
was considered not only acceptable but mandatory to protect recipients of donated body 
products.407 
The guidelines on screening attendees of STD clinics, and on testing anonymous populations stated
that:
mandatory testing would act as a disincentive to them and to others. However the anonymous 
unlinked testing of these people could serve as an indicator of the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in 
these groups. ... It is sometimes suggested that the ethical and social problems associated with 
mandatory screening of population groups could be overcome by anonymous screening, as 
there would then be no means of identifying HIV infected individuals. In this case, the 
information could only be used for research purposes such as monitoring the progress of the 
epidemic. For this reason the Medical Research Council Committee on AIDS Research is 
considering ways of implementing anonymous screening studies to determine HIV prevalence 
in society. (National Council on AIDS, 1990a: 51-52)
Such considerations were most likely interrupted when the Health Research Council replaced the 
Medical Research Council in 1990. However, the latter Council had been deliberating on this issue 
since 1987 (Malpress, 1987). Such prolonged deliberation with no resolution indicates that the 
404. These committees included five versions of the AIDS Taskforce, the AIDS Advisory Committee, the National 
Council on AIDS, and its subcommittee, the Medical and Scientific subcommittee on AIDS (MASCA).
405. However, the New Zealand Labour Government in its last months, and the following National Governments, refused
to be bound by the National Strategy On HIV/AIDS. These governments treated the New Zealand Strategy On HIV/
AIDS as an advisory rather than a policy document.
406. For an outline of these important differences, which had been changing since the 1960s, see Grace (1989).
407. An ‘unfortunate exception’ has existed for HCV. Haemophiliacs and other blood recipients were treated as 
experimental cases, by being denied screening of essential medical products for two years .
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issues involved were thought overly problematic, non-urgent, or better left unresolved. Moreover, 
this specific problem fitted into a general pattern of health ethics that had developed in Western 
health care and associated research, as well as in New Zealand, as I will briefly outline.
At the time of the first testing of returned syringes, and later episodes in 1994, the professional 
frameworks of regulations and best practices for obtaining human tissue samples were unclear, 
negotiable, and shifting (Grace, 1989). This situation was not unusual. Specific conflicts of 
principle, such as those erupting at different stages in the development of HIV/AIDS policy, were 
likely to suddenly highlight long-standing ambiguities and conflicts. The ethical guidelines and 
conflicts of the health professions have long roots, for instance in the Hippocratic principles of 
treating promptly, without denying treatment, provided that first and foremost, no harm was likely 
to result from treatment. However, the development of these principles in New Zealand after the 
Second World War followed the Nuremberg Code, which emerged from the trials of German 
doctors by a special United States court in 1947.408 Nonetheless, the Nuremberg principles were 
rarely, if ever, cited in New Zealand as being the most significant and strongest expression of the 
need for informed consent by participants in experiments. 
New Zealand perspectives on health ethics have seemed more specifically influenced by the U.S. 
Public Health Service Tuskegee Experiment (1932-1972), and by New Zealand’s ‘Unfortunate 
Experiment’ by clinicians at National Woman's Hospital.409 The ‘unfortunate experiment’ altered 
the public and legal status of medical professionalism.410 This stream of legislation that followed 
has appeared to slow or in part reverse a tendency for the guarantees and protections of the 
Nuremberg codes of informed consent in experiments on humans to be sidelined in favour of the 
authority and convenience of medical researchers. In consequence, New Zealand ethics committees
became far more empowered and central to research during the 1990s and the mid-period of my 
study of the NEP than had previously been the case.411
408. This trial by a US panel followed the more general Nuremberg trials of Nazi administrators by an International 
Court (Whitaker, 2003: 234-235). Nonetheless, its findings were presented, and have been interpreted across 
Western societies as having a timeless validity as a universal ethical principle while, somewhat in contradiction, 
setting a global legal precedent located in history.
409. See Cartwright (1988), Coney (1988), Bunkle & Coney (1987). This key conflict can be followed in an ongoing 
debate in the New Zealand Medical Journal. See Baird (2005), Tolich & Baldwin (2005), Baird (2004), Williams 
(2004), Heslop (2004a, 2004b). In this debate, later commentators from within the medical professions have 
redirected the emphasis from patients’ trust in Dr Green onto the handful of whistle-blowers within National 
Woman’s Hospital and the whistle-blowers’ inadequacies in not using a professionally acceptable, methodological 
critique that remained within medical circles. See also later commentary by specialised community health ethicists 
(Women’s Health Action Trust, 2006). Baird (2005, 2004) is the same medical authority who when leading the 
NZMA in 1987, opposed the NEP legislation on behalf of medical professionals across New Zealand (Baird, 1987). 
Nonetheless, according to a mainstream media article by McLaughan (1987: 30), the NZMA had not actually polled 
its own members beyond those directly in contact with its leadership at the time. This claim did not lead to any 
lawsuits, and was not retracted. According to anecdotal accounts, the NZMA stance presented to Parliament by 
Baird was based on a canvas of only its Wellington members (McLaughlin, 1987: 30).
410. The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Allegations Concerning the Treatment of Cervical Cancer at National 
Woman's Hospital and into Other Related Matters (Cartwright, 1988) into the treatment of living patients by 
medical professionals provided strong evidence and rationales for legislation changes (Coney, 1988; Bunkle & 
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These frameworks for tissue sampling without consent remained ambiguous in 2006, according to 
the Guidelines for the Use of Human Tissue for Future Unspecified Research Purposes: Discussion
Document which advises that: “There are currently no specific guidelines covering this area. 
However both researchers and ethics committees have highlighted the need for a consistent 
approach.” (Ministry of Health, 2006a: 1).412 In New Zealand in 1987 the only relevant long-
established protocol was the Human Tissue Act (New Zealand Government, 1964), which governed
the collection and usage of organs and tissue samples collected from deceased persons and had 
little guidance to offer in situations of live donors who might be unknown and might be identified.
In 1990, after being employed by the AIDS TaskForce to co-ordinate IDU aspects of the NEP, 
Kemp attempted to organise funding and administrative support from Area Health Boards (AHB) 
for regional health promotion related to HIV/AIDS and IDU outside of urban centres. In his 
attempt to enrol AHBs in HIV/AIDS prevention work, Kemp designed a plan for the AHBs to be 
funded through the AIDS TaskForce for regularly testing the returned syringes (Kemp, 1990). This 
procedure would have established a permanent infrastructure for providing epidemiological data. 
Kemp emphasised how such information would allow scarce funds to be better targeted towards 
the more problematic regions. Kemp did not discuss any protocols over confidentiality, nor 
anonymity. He did advise that the AHBs should employ: “a resource officer/advisor who would 
also have the role of empowering local consumers to help form their own AIDS prevention 
networks” (Kemp, 1990: 10). Such people would presumably collect the returned syringes for 
testing, but the ownership of the resultant information would seem to be held by the funding 
officials on the AIDS TaskForce or the regional administrators on the AHBs.413 This proposal 
appears the first and last time that a New Zealand peer-professional advocated such surveillance.
The NEP peer-professionals on the National Council on AIDS (NCA), firstly Wright then Kemp, 
helped develop protocols about returned syringes. The resulting principles emphasised that 
Coney, 1987, Women’s Health Action Trust, 2006). By 1993, such factors had contributed to the Privacy Act (New 
Zealand Government, 1993). In 1994 these concerns influenced the Health Information Privacy Code (New Zealand 
Government, 1994b) and the Health and Disability Commissioner Act (New Zealand Government (1994a). These 
were followed in 1996 by the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights (New Zealand 
Government, 1996a).
411. These ethics committees became provided with their own regulatory and monitoring framework, for instance in the 
Operational Standard for Ethics Committees (Ministry of Health, 2006c). Nonetheless, medical attitudes continued 
to provide cause for public concern. For instance, the organs from deceased babies had been collected at Green Lane 
Hospital since the 1950s (RSNZ, 2002) in a matter-of-fact way which was at times casual and at times ‘over-
enthusiastic’. This collection provoked revulsion when eventually revealed, since many parents were unaware of 
such practices and had thought their children had been cremated or buried whole. In another instance, North Health, 
the Northern Regional Health Authority, claimed that it had a right to prevent disclosure of its protocol of 
decisionmaking, since this was deemed its ‘intellectual property’ of commercial value. A ruling by the Ombudsman, 
Michael Elwood (1996, as cited in Women’s Health Action Trust, 2006) was required to clarify for North Health 
that the data and protocols handled by its ethics committee fell under the disclosure provisions of the Official 
Information Act (1982), rather than just the forms of legislation designed to protect private property. Furthermore, 
the relevant ethics committees of North Health clearly had not considered the heart collection at Green Lane 
Hospital to be of significance.
412. Operational Standard for Ethics Committees (Ministry of Health, 2006c).
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decisions over disclosure needed to minimise any loss of confidence in the overall care system by 
HIV positive persons and caregivers (National Council on AIDS, 1990a: 48-49). The NCA 
promoted a precautionary logic, that: “Since compulsion will prejudice gaining the co-operation of 
those involved, testing to influence behavioural change needs to be done voluntarily and with 
informed consent” (National Council on AIDS 1990a: 50). Nonetheless, this wording refers to the 
testing of a set of individuals only, with no mention of any collective community consent. 
The National Council on AIDS defined confidentiality and anonymity as applying only to 
individuals, not directly to groups nor communities. This contrasted with Bruce Burnett’s and the 
AIDS Support Network stance414 which included the representation of community concerns along 
with preventing the control of gay collective identity from falling into the biomedical, 
individualising methodologies and interests of researchers. The guidelines emphasised links 
between behaviour change and respectful treatment of members of ‘marginalised groups’. 
However, issues of ownership and control of surveillance data by communities and networks were 
not addressed, while issues of community and network distrust were only partially acknowledged 
and from a perspective that seems already headed in an individualising direction. There seems to 
have been no discussion by IDU or peers that was equivalent to, or re-articulated, the analyses by 
gay community organisers about the potential meanings and dangers of HIV testing.415
The NCA guidelines did not address issues of IDU community participation in disseminating the 
data they had contributed to. The guidelines offered several arguments against compulsory testing 
of perceived higher risk people and groups. Yet the same guidelines justified testing without 
specific consents for research which benefited the mainstream and supposedly unified social 
collective of the general population. How IDU were marginally positioned as ‘co-operative’ 
participants, but without consent, in such a unified majority collective, was left unaddressed.
In 1992, the surveillance of returned equipment was supplemented by episodes of sampling the 
saliva of NEP client volunteers who had given their individual informed consent. The high 
compliance rates by the IDU clients increased the power and cost effectiveness of the first study in 
Dunedin (Dickson et al., 1994. See also DIVO, 1991a, 1991b). In the report on the initial testing of 
413. Whether IDU would have supported the control of information about their practices being held by AHBs seems 
uncertain, given the AHB goals of providing abstinence-oriented drug treatment services.
414. Gay representatives valued such tests for removing the necessity to screen blood donors on a basis of sexual 
orientation, yet did not trust any other than gay representative organisations to keep the recorded results of testing 
(Bayer & Kirp, 1992: 22-24; AIDS TaskForce, 1985b).
415. Another potential issue involved the expenditure on HIV as compared with HCV monitoring. By 1992 it was known
that HIV rates in IDU were consistently low, presumably due largely to the NEP. However, the first study of the rate 
of new hepatitis C infections among injecting drug users was only released in 2000. This was over a two year 
period. Previous tests had only recorded prevalence, not incidence. See Brunton (2000). Peer-professionals had co-
operated with HIV testing for epidemiological information that benefited the wider population, and received 
compensatory benefits, in accord with Baker's concept of exchanging mutual benefits. IDU co-operation over HIV 
sentinel surveillance might have also been exchanged for funding HCV surveillance. This would have benefited 
marginalised IDU communities by supporting peer-professional calls for improved NEP arrangements. Why this did 
not happen is unclear.
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returned syringes, saliva methods had been suggested as a potentially more reliable and acceptable 
method (Baker et al., 1992). Yet the acknowledged benefits of saliva testing do not completely 
explain why there were no reports of syringe testing after 1994, since the two methods were 
complementary, not alternatives. The results of the initial saliva tests were more convincing 
because they could be compared with the results from the non-voluntary samples from the syringe 
returns testing. Such comparisons ensured greater confidence that the saliva studies were not biased
by IDU avoiding the exchanges during the period of the trial. The high compliance rate would have
been misleading if there had been any significant avoidance of the survey.416 
Nonetheless, financial concerns provide one feasible reason for not continuing with testing returns. 
High testing costs would seem unjustifiable once the HIV levels of IDU had been consistently 
found to be very low. The ethical and methodological difficulties of testing returned syringes may 
also have become less justifiable as the political urgency and government expenditure on AIDS 
decreased. However, saliva sampling itself was later replaced by the technique of finger-prick 
sampling (Kemp et al., 1998), specifically to be comparable with Australian data.417 This later 
testing programme was Australian-funded, which removed any choice over methods. 
There seem to have been instances of stake-holder agreement, but no clear, publicly stated, general 
agreement that forms of involuntary syringe testing were desirable policy. The Public Health 
Commission's Advice to the Minister of Health, in April 1994, recommended that: “periodic 
anonymous unlinked serum surveys for HIV on blood in returned Needle and Syringe Exchange 
Programme syringes, though subject to limitations and inaccuracies, are feasible and could show 
trends” (Public Health Commission, 1994a: 28). Despite such hesitancy over the methodology and 
benefits of such surveys, the Minister was urged to undertake surveys, every three to five years, of 
the: “... serology of blood in returned syringes [and] unlinked anonymous surveys of HIV infection 
in STD/sexual health clinic attendees and injecting drug users” (Public Health Commission, 1994a:
30).418 
The recommendations of the Public Health Commission notwithstanding, the last reported syringe 
testing occurred in 1994, with no reported reason for the absence of later reports, or for the 
recommended protocol being abandoned. I found no references to any public discourse about 
surveys of anonymous, non-linked samples of human tissue in returned syringes. Nonetheless, in 
the 1994 returned syringe study the authors note: “To reduce the potential for alarm and 
416. A methodology for providing the greatest comparative power would minimise IDU abilities to avoid making returns 
during the collection period. This could be achieved by not informing NEP clients about any testing. Such a 
methodology would destroy IDU trust in the NEP and be far more costly than useful.
417. In the early 1990s there were problems in gaining HCV prevalence data from small blood samples, and saliva 
samples. These problems had been resolved by the mid-1990s, but funding for seroprevalence surveillance and 
incidence studies was not available. New Zealand researchers therefore used Australian funding and standard 
methods when opportunities arose, according to Brunton (2005. pers. com.), Barnett (2004. pers. com.).
418. Serology refers to the study of blood serum for its antibody content. Seroprevalence refers to anything measured in 
blood, such as viruses.
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misunderstanding about the purposes of the study, all known IDU groups were consulted prior to 
the start of the study” (Walker, Brady, & Baker, 1994: 7). Nonetheless, conflicts and debate 
emerged over the use of samples taken at STD clinics for purposes not related to the reason for 
taking the sample, and over the Guthrie database of blood samples from new-born babies.419 In the 
case of NEP syringes, policy statements have only referred to the possibility of monitoring, along 
with the desirability that such surveillance be anonymous. A widespread yet unvoiced reluctance to
continue the practice, or to refer to the practice, seems apparent, despite some aspects of returns 
testing seeming useful. 
If consent and control problems had been recognised, yet had not been considered significant in 
terms of consulting and negotiating, then questions arise over the protections of the: “rights and 
dignity of population groups directly affected by HIV/AIDS” (National Council on AIDS, 1990a: 
3). These are the general principles of the Ottawa Charter (WHO 1986), the World Health 
Organisation’s Global Programme on AIDS, and the World Health Assembly Resolution 41.24, 
which New Zealand cosponsored (National Council on AIDS, 1990a: 1-2). This lack of discussion, 
let alone guarantees or protocols, seems indicative of a social perspective on surveillance that 
ignored or even conflicted with the perspectives and interests of an IDU population considered 
directly at risk of transmitting HIV/AIDS. Although syringes and IDU counted, particularly by 
producing records of numbers, the protocols of biomedical and epidemiological have not counted, 
at least in the positive numbers. These protocols seem to have counted for zero, unless their actual 
absence makes a negative account necessary.
3   Surveillance and feedback within complex network patterns
A professional level of epidemiological surveillance of IDU and their practices had become 
possible due to the closer connections and the new forms of access made possible through the NEP.
Nonetheless, such surveillance and evaluations were considered to potentially lower the rates of 
voluntary participation by IDU, since IDU had reason to distrust and avoid any surveillance that 
they could not control. Yet IDU networks had survived and were shaped through forms of skill in 
manipulating the evaluations of pharmacists, doctors, and police, while seeking out trusted peer 
connections. 
Trust and distrust have been crucial for IDU. Yet the surveys that sampled volunteers relied in turn 
on widespread trust of an IDU kind, because high compliance rates were needed for the findings to 
be methodologically convincing. Those carrying out the saliva sampling survey in Dunedin had 
been concerned about the uncertain propensity of IDU to participate, and were relieved when 
419. See Paterson (1996: 40-41), Johnston (2004), Auckland Women's Health Council (2004), CASONZ (1992).
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excellent response rates were obtained (DIVO, 1991a, 1991b; Dickson et al, 1994). Low 
compliance would have diminished the representational validity of the sampling methods, while 
suggesting that unaccounted for factors were significant, thereby reducing the accuracy, relevance, 
and predictive capabilities of such surveys. Low capabilities also made survey-based research 
proposals more difficult to justify on cost-benefit grounds. For all these reasons, trust, distrust, and 
participation rates influenced the capabilities for evaluating the NEP. 
Evaluation of the NEP was considered necessary, yet not through direct individual surveillance. 
This seemed dangerously close to ‘working against’ the people and groups whose participation was
needed. The primary desired outcome for sexually active people was a motivation change that led 
to the behavioural change of using condoms, which were legal and readily available. Health 
promotion policy readily focused on how distrust would lead to ineffective or worsened health 
outcomes through non-compliance. In the case of IDU, safer technologies, environments, and 
practices of syringe use were desired alongside motivation changes towards greater control. The 
motivation change aspects were similar, but the legal aspects of the technologies involved created 
differences and difficulties. Unlike condoms, the syringes supplied and promoted were only semi-
legal. They were illegal and could become prosecution evidence if intended for any illicit purpose 
such as drug injection. The licit possession of syringes became both connected and differentiated 
from the illicit possession of drugs, due to the NEP legislation.
The testing of returned syringes between 1989 and 1994 benefited IDU and needle exchanges in 
several important ways, while not seeming harmful. Involuntary syringe surveys complemented 
rather than competed with the voluntary participation of IDU clients in the surveys that measured 
HIV prevalence, IDU motivation, and injecting practices. Despite differences in how the 
procedures positioned IDU, the syringe, saliva, and finger-prick forms of monitoring relied 
increasingly on the premises, systems, and participation of peer-professionals working in needle 
exchange outlets. The saliva and finger-prick samples could certainly be taken at pharmacy 
exchange outlets, but the logistics of interviewing amid more 'normal' surroundings were easier to 
arrange at a peer exchange outlet. 
These types of surveillance were intended to measure changes in the activities of viruses and the 
activities of the NEP. For some researchers, surveillance appeared primarily motivated by 
epidemiological goals (Dickson, 2004. pers. com.). For others, the goals appeared both 
epidemiological and administrative.420 For the peer-professionals, the surveillance through syringe 
testing helped to consolidate their autonomy, their representation of IDU, and their ties of trust 
joining IDU to those overseeing the NEP.
The provision and return of syringes provided direct health benefits that were demonstrated by 
420. For instance Baker (1994, 1989, 1988c, 1987c), Walker, Brady, & Baker (1994), Baker et al. (1992), Kemp (1990).
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rapid and continuing decreases in HIV prevalence among IDU. The circulation of syringes also 
provided cost-effective ways of measuring attitudes of compliance and trust among IDU. 
Evaluations of gay-focused health promotion have seemed more community-based and 
epidemiological than equipment-based. By contrast, the NEP’s emphasis on measurements and 
evaluation shifted from specifically funded research about individual IDU practices, towards 
systematised hierarchal reporting built into the NEP mechanisms. As quantities of such information
increased, the quality remained limited by funding caps and contractual disconnections between 
Department of Health managers and local co-ordinators. The Department managers did not receive 
empirical information relevant to specific problems through their formal channels, which 
presumably increased the influence of any informal connections.421
The surveillance of syringes and NEP clients increased the representativeness and capabilities of 
the peer exchanges, and accordingly, increased the resources indirectly available to IDU. Yet some 
particular forms of testing reduced or threatened individual the agency of IDU in a different way. 
The potential autonomy of IDU in egalitarian networks became reduced because their embedded 
knowledges about drugs, injection, and fellow IDU became more categorised and commodified. 
The pervasively distributed, local information started to be handled and represented by a restricted, 
specialised type of ‘peer expertise’. This peer-professionalism became acknowledged as effective, 
efficient, and trustworthy because its monitoring capabilities connected and brought together in one
package the previously separated parts of drug-using networks. Such surveillance acted across 
cultural boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, across the geographical sites and places of syringe 
movements, across the mixed motivations of IDU, and across the changes in populations of viruses 
and antibodies. These centralising aspects seem inherently problematic for agencies that argue and 
produce information according to a single professional or official standard of evidence, while 
exercising representation on behalf of others who have no public voice to insist on their diversity 
and uniqueness. Yet, instances of peer group collapse, such as CIVDURG, illustrate the problems 
of unprofessional peer activity that relies overmuch on evading common standards of prudence and
trust.
421. Correspondence between the NEP co-ordinator and the Christchurch District Advisory Pharmacist (Lewis, 1988) 
illustrates problems of obtaining scientific information rather than speculation over the content and rates of returned 
syringes. The District Advisory Pharmacist systematically opened return containers and hand counted the individual 
syringe numbers, since the NEP Management Plan had made no provision for such monitoring. Hand counting was 
contrary to best practice and involved significant risks of needle stick injury and HCV transmission. The District 
Advisory Pharmacist was: “in no doubt that it is unrealistic to ask the pharmacist to count or even guess at the 
number of syringes" (Lewis, 1988). Another early problem involved poor quality syringes that caused vascular 
damage to IDU. Mr Pollard arranged for an engineer to take micro-photos of a sample of the supplied needle tips, 
which he supplied to the NEP co-ordinator. He reported: “The degree of barbing on both is sufficient to confirm 
such statements [by IDU complainants] as “there was meat on the end of it” ... [I] trust that your officers will be 
requested to take rapid action to rectify a supplier’s fault which, to say the least, is surprising in a major contract 
(Pollard, 1988). The Department of Health had relied on its contract with the manufacturer and importer for quality 
control of this health product. Mr Pollard had sold syringes illicitly before joining the NEP. He was distressed at 
being forced to sell harmful products instead of the high quality syringes he had supplied to Christchurch IDU at 
cheaper prices than permitted by the NEP regulations.
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The incidents of testing reinforced the regular monitoring that connected IDU with peers, but in 
different ways according to the shape of the connections involved. Even though IDU range in their 
capabilities, from people desperately wanting withdrawal treatment to those holding down 
professional jobs and controlling their careers, participating in the testing and monitoring of other 
IDU was a completely different sort of activity and a connection that only made sense in a new 
type of officially-approved occupational environment. 
Such connections and resulting knowledges contributed to IDU and peers becoming differently 
represented. The NEP allowed its IDU client populations to be directly measured and recorded in 
terms of the numbers of visitors and syringes. These populations were a large fraction of the total 
IDU population.422 The measuring activity blended much of the variation of IDU into a single client
population as a totalising effect. These systemic ways of measuring did not require active 
participation by IDU. The exclusion of IDU agency reduced political problems of public and 
official acceptability at the crucial stage when legislation change required the enrolment of 
supportive factors.
It became easier for peer-professionals to represent an unproblematic, manageable, ‘trustworthy’ 
IDU community. Nonetheless, it was the solid infrastructure and alliance building of the peer-
professionals as representatives and long-term stake-holders, rather than the less predictable 
actuality of IDU and non-professional network practices, that was being represented. As in the 
formation of the IV League,: “Politicians are uneasy about individuals and groups ... they are much
happier if an organisation can be presented ...” (Baker, 2002. pers. com.). IDU as peers became 
represented as more known, and more trusted, as participants in health policy and programmes. The
NEP peers provided greater access to IDU through such developments, while simultaneously, 
sterile syringes were supplied and used syringes removed from risk situations.
It is important to attend to what was being represented. Actor-network approaches draw attention to
how the relocation of meaningful objects often involves significant translations and re-
representations. We have seen how syringes moved from place to place while altering in meaning 
to participants and policy-makers. Such representations were not only enacted by labelled lists of 
NEP goals, methods, and data; but also by how syringe information was referred to in specific 
contexts, and by whom it was moved about. The difficulties of representation increased in 
significance according to the work of connecting and disconnecting the information attached to the 
objects that defined individuals as lay or professional, as criminals or health promoters or law 
enforcers.423 Representation has been seen in how the understandings of participants 'carried' and 
helped co-ordinate other elements and people in these networks. The symbolism and potentials for 
422. It would not have been 100% because some IDU do not go to needle exchanges (Jang, 2005. pers. com.).
423. See Moore (2004), Gomart (2002a, 2002b), Gomart & Hennion (1999), Harper (1997), Callon (1999, 1991).
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action of the syringes carried expectations of how living people and viruses, with 'their' filters, 
sterile water and drugs, might or should behave. Representations contributed to the networks within
which information was interpreted, and which were effected as a result. Syringes represented peers 
and IDU in some contexts, whereas peers who filled out syringe records, and IDU who took part in 
surveys, represented syringes in other contexts.424 That is not to say they were identical or even 
equivalent, but rather that they modified each other, and in so doing, modified their extending 
networks. These entities and activities have been usefully understood as hybrid networks.425 
I point out how syringes have, as hybrids, acted simultaneously as objects, information and 
representations which connected IDU bodies to drugs as co-constituents of networks. Syringes, as a
mass-produced, identical, commercial commodity contrasted with both bodies and drugs in 
seeming to be less complex, less value-laden, and more ‘pure'. As these sterile syringes were used 
they moved to an impure form, which carried bits of bodies, retained traces of drugs, accreted 
information in official records, and exuded representation. If one assumes that ‘pure’ information 
cannot exist in any active way outside of its physical embedment in locations, objects, and 
interactions, then there is nowhere else for much of such representation to be carried, apart from 
these embodied and 'positioned' circulations of syringes.
In the hybrid syringe mechanism I describe, the changes in these circulations, for instance of 
physical movement and network positioning, consequently entailed changes in the representational 
activities. Changes in the control of movements and positionings, for instance of syringes and peer-
professionals, influenced how network elements were re-represented as a constructed effect by 
other network elements. Shifts in the methods of HIV sampling, and in the numbers of syringes 
returned, caused peer-professionals, along with IDU, to interact differently with the more distant 
actants that constituted their network. The consequent difficulty lies in selecting the markers or 
measures for the story of the significance of how things changed empirically, or how change was 
empirically resisted.
An evaluation of a hybrid environment needs to take all the contributing entities and processes into 
account, partly by conceptually identifying and naming them, while also following how their 
mechanisms of interaction have actually worked empirically. This is why both the interests of 
participants and the activities of objects have been combined in my descriptive explanations, and 
why biomedical testing is an appropriate area for following the workings of such a combination. 
Returned syringes, as objects, represented IDU by being considered more trustworthy than the 
users themselves. The results of such testing supported the initial NEP and helped it to consolidate. 
424. See Latour (2004, 1999b, 1999c, 1993, 1987) for discussion of interests and consequences of constructed 
conventional ‘modernist’ binarisms whereby ‘nature’ is used to explain the ‘social’ and the ‘social’ to explain 
‘nature’.
425. See Chapter 1, 2, 3, and Appendix 9, particularly 9.5 for discussion of hybridity.
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The HIV prevalence that was reported did not justify changes to the NEP, yet was sufficient to not 
induce complacency, given the explosive increases in HIV observed among overseas IDU, as 
described in Chapter 3 and 5. The testing of returned syringes seemed less of a gamble426 than 
trusting IDU self-reports, or trusting peer-professional influence over IDU. 
Self-reported information from anonymous IDU volunteers came to be considered more cost-
effective and more generating of trust than testing returned syringes. This was because IDU proved
to be compliant with ‘their’ peer-professionals. Approvals from peer-professional gatekeepers were
needed to provide opportunities for testing and to enable better evaluation of the programme. Yet 
each time such approval was obtained, the IDU in contact with needle exchanges, and the peers 
who represented them, became more trusted. This meant they became collectively more competent,
better resourced, and of higher status through being presented as ‘trust-worthy’. Eventually, as 
these episodes and relationships accumulated and became more expectable, IDU and peer-
professionals acquired new opportunities to monitor drug treatment agencies. Peer control of 
syringe returns and motivation change both required, and generated, trust and representation.
As well as both IDU and peers being represented by networks of syringes, statistics, and stories, 
peer-professionals also claimed to represent IDU through organisations. The forms of connection 
that increased trust and representative voices also contributed to representations of needle exchange
peers as different from IDU. IDU had been characterised as incapable of self-organisation, and 
differentiated from gay-dominated groups such as the NZAF. Some researchers have commented 
that the systemic controls involved in medicalising processes (White, 2002: 40-52) are necessarily 
connected to various social controls involved in marginalising and criminalising processes.427 
Others have noted that a lack of IDU self-organisation has been a rational reaction to IDU 
environments. These commentators emphasised that minimal self-organisation is not a determinist 
law applying to hedonistic, self-medicating, or addictive practices of chemically modified 
physiology. For instance, Price (1992) has offered examples of groups that had been labelled as 
unorganisable, yet managed to mobilise around mutual interests and group concerns and so to defy 
obstacles that had made them seem powerless to outsiders, and to themselves (143). Price 
supported his perspective by offering an account of an AIDS education group that represented IDU 
in Baltimore. Members of this peer group reported that in responding to the challenges presented 
by HIV/AIDS, the barriers to IDU self-organisation were surmountable, yet only if ex-users who 
promoted abstinence ideologies were prevented from participating (Price, 1992: 143-144). 
Price’s account in 1992 of the experiences of the Baltimore peer group are not surprising. Due to 
harm reduction principles being formally legitimised, for instance in the Ottawa Charter principles,
426. For discussion of relationships between trust and gambling, see Sztompka (1999).
427.  See, for example, Jenks (2003), Garland (2001, 1999), Haggerty (2001), Agger (1998: 140, 172), Muir & Ruggiero 
(1994), Becker (1964). See also ‘Governmentality’ literature in general.
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together with the empirical actualities of criminal and health enterprises, needle exchanges could 
only work in ways that followed the actually existing drug markets. Changes towards health and 
wellness could influence IDU through example and environment, but could not enforce motivation 
and behavioural change without destroying the peer-professional types of credibility, along with 
the viability of the NEP. 
What is also apparent is that apart from being represented by having stories told about them, IDU 
had, to a limited extent, began a new way of exerting formal representation outside of their 
resistance tactics in court and treatment environments. Such representation was presented in 
submissions to select committees on health legislation and government programmes, as well as in 
letters to the public needle exchange magazines produced by the peer groups. Such representation 
was also expressed in accounts of the injustices and inequalities suffered by would-be consumers 
of addiction treatment services to which access had been denied, and in negotiations with 
researchers. Most of this representation has been facilitated or directly initiated, by peer activities. 
The representation of IDU emerged from the professional effectiveness, efficiency, and 
sustainability of the peer component of the NEP. Such professionalism risked distancing ‘peer-
professionals’ from the drug markets and social networks around which the ‘demand side’ of IDU 
worlds have been organised. However, if it were not for drug use being criminalised, peer-
professionals would not be so necessary, nor so scarce, nor in consequence develop such a degree 
of influence and significance. IDU, being autonomous and ineradicable, represent peer-professional
capabilities perhaps more than peer-professionals represent IDU. They diverge, and modify each 
other, yet each is constituted as each other's resource, provided that HIV is present to activate their 
binary coupling while destabilising the simply dualistic aspects. Although synergies between peer 
and professionalism are seen, excess distance between them causes problems for the representation 
and trust which influence the motivation change and the return rates. Whether peers can adequately
represent themselves in conflicts with more professional segments of the NEP environment 
remains a critical issue for on-going study. Provided injectable drugs and syringes remain illegal, 
the network of conditions within which used syringes are returned will provide a key focus for such
studies.
High return rates have indicated that most IDU have continued to trust the NEP’s peer-
professionalism. Yet, a significant percentage of IDU have not returned every syringe, despite the 
financial incentives. This has, presumably, been due to convenience aspects, combined with a fear 
of being taken into custody on a holding charge. However, it would be technically and legally 
possible for used or returned syringes to be analysed and entered into a database by forensic 
scientists at the ESR. Such actions would be in accord with policies and laws designed to expand 
the DNA databases. 
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Early in the NEP, informal understandings led to a precautionary approach in which:
It is recommended that police not [orig.] be involved in day to day administration of the 
scheme or have access to local data collected as a result of its operation. ... The 
recommendation that police not be closely involved with the operation of this scheme is a 
carefully considered policy. This is based on extensive feedback from users and ex-users 
whose major fear is that the exchange scheme will be used to assist police drug surveillance 
work. To allay this fear it is considered essential to maintain a visible separation between this 
scheme and drug enforcement.  (Baker, 1987c: 17)
When NEP surveillance information became available it was gathered and deployed according to 
general health goals and logics, yet also to facilitate the administration, and to provide reassurance 
for crucial NEP stake-holders, particularly the police. Yet IDU also required reassurance that the 
police were not being helped to arrest them, and their peers, by means of the NEP’s information. 
Problems of IDU trust could readily emerge in cross-agency integration, where health agencies 
‘share’ evaluation data with police. 
The details of information sharing between health and policing agencies have not been publicised, 
yet this seems cause for concern rather than complacency, since the increase in such sharing has 
been publicly promoted as a general and pervasive output intended to enhance the integration and 
efficiency of government.428 Since IDU are not able to ascertain where such sharing stops, they 
would seem to require forms of reassurance that their interests were not compromised by taking 
part in surveys which provided information that police would use in more effective harassment and 
prosecution of their peers. Yet since IDU do not trust state agencies and professionals, the peer-
professionals who have made these surveys possible would seem appropriately positioned to offer 
more rigourous guarantees. However, they could not offer any guarantees based on evidence 
without being able to follow and scrutinise that information as it moves to higher-levels. Yet it 
seems likely that police would object to such scrutiny, showing how that which was workable 
when divided and siloed would be far more difficult and probably unworkable when seamlessly 
joined. 
How consents and control might transform over such transfers of information leads to questions of 
whether the degree of informed consent in testing returned syringes has been appropriate and 
adequate. Trust and distrust seem inherently involved because if information carries representations
of oneself or a group, even though each individual is anonymous, one’s or one’s group’s public 
aspect becomes a story told by others, and less of one’s own voice. This would seem overpowering 
rather than empowering.429
The sentinel surveillance of seroprevalence and programme evaluation have been seen to connect 
428. It might be argued, however that such goals and methods are intended to enhance governance rather than 
government. This question, posed in the midst of such changes, cannot be argued further without comparative 
information from a range of empirical case studies.
429. Except in the Foucauldian sense of becoming assimilated into one’s own production of identity.
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criminal IDU worlds to the professional and bureaucratic worlds of state agencies. Since distrust is 
indicated to be pervasive, to resist surveillance, and to be magnified by the prospect of 
surveillance, the exchanges of surveillance with health benefits must have involved increases in 
trust. This environment positioned peer representatives as an essential connective element that 
guaranteed IDU participation in such surveillance, as well as in their overt, primary work in 
changing motivations. However, creative distrust has been required as an essential focus for 
motivation change towards safer using, because, desperate situations exempted, syringe sharing 
takes place between people whose private relations or moral standing have motivated them to trust 
each other too much (Plumridge & Chetwynd, 1998).
AIDS activists and community organisers have publicly challenged some conventional frameworks
of understanding, preventing, and treating the personal, cultural, and political consequences of HIV
transmission. For example, an ACT UP spokesperson has emphasised that “AIDS is not what it 
appears to be ... AIDS is a test [my emphasis] of who we are as a people [my emphasis]” (Russo, 
1991: 301-302). Michael Brown has explored such insights geographically, insisting on “constantly
rethinking where citizenship really occurs [orig. it.] rather than automatically jettisoning state-
centred spaces for those associated with “civil society”” (1997: 119). 
HCV intensified and extended such trials of the interactions where planning-centred activities of 
state interact by means of personal activity with the distributed goals and resistances of a civil 
society. Furthermore, the crucial objects of interaction together with an actor-network approach to 
explanatory accounts, have been seen to be threaded by a situated biomedical expertise in 
technoscience430 practices that include the practices and capabilities of seroprevalence and forensic 
testing. Such expertise has been seen to mediate and be mediated by interactive links of trust and 
distrust amongst key identities and interests, while informing and configuring alliances that 
intersect managerial and health professional forms of authority, in practices of governance by 
means of intermediaries. 
Factors including financial costs, lack of precision, uncertain validity, and requirements to adhere 
to overseas standards, have all suggested that returned syringes were not being tested after 1994. 
However, the episodes of testing provided useful information along with certain costs, while being 
increasingly technologically feasible, while the analysis of costs from the NEP’s founding period 
seems increasingly overwritten by more recent agendas in the policy arena. There are no formal 
guarantees that syringe testing would not happen again, nor are there peer-professional protocols to
control any such reoccurrence.431
430. See Haraway (1991a, 1991b, 1997: 4, 2000a, 2000b), Latour (1987: Ch. 4).
431. It might have been argued that such precautions would alarm any ‘naive’ NEP clients, but such an argument does 
not appear in any records. If the absence of discussion is explained in such a fashion, then by implication, instances 
of syringe testing might have continued and also not appeared in any records. In general, secrecy of any sort seems 
likely to breed distrust, although it seems that people can learn to trust in a ‘balance of distrust’.
229
Chapter 8.      Blurring trust boundaries: returned syringes talk about their IDU 
I argue that these considerations outline the overall configuration and muted articulation of an 
‘internal ethic’ that specifically inheres to needle exchange goals of safer using environments and 
IDU motivation change. According to this ethic; if NEP activities are justified due to reducing 
harms in both IDU and general non-IDU communities; and if such protection is dependent on 
maintaining trust relations between state agencies and IDU via IDU peer representatives; then no 
matter how convenient for governance, enforcement, and evaluation purposes; nobody should 
permit the ongoing maintenance of trust to be undermined by the non-disclosure of surveillance. 
This ethic has emerged immanently, rather than intruded ‘from elsewhere’.
The returning of used syringes promoted the sustainability of the NEP by removing a potential 
cause for public and political opposition. However, the returning of syringes remained a matter of 
public accountability to state agencies, rather than a private need for which individual IDU could 
be made responsible. This meant the costs and arrangements for motivating IDU to bring returns, 
and disposing of those returns, aggregated into large financial numbers and large political 
problems. The logics of returns promoted centralised organising, where IDU and peer 
representation was carried by syringes as objects, and by syringes as a system of logistics. By 
making it possible for IDU bodies to be acted on at a distance, the supply and return of syringes has
intensified relationships of trust and distrust.432 Returned syringes altered such relationships 
according to how information, syringes, and bodies were used and circulated in combination and 
collaboration. The logistics of syringe movements, when combined with biomedical testing 
technologies, represented forms of peer-professional control and accountability. Distrust and trust 
also explain how precariousness and silences may be notable in some aspects of needle exchange 
environments. Aspects of distrust and trust found in syringe movements not only clarify the 
shaping and stabilising processes described previously, but also indicate potential ‘turning points’ 
for future changes. 
This chapter has explored the biomedical testing and monitoring of syringes in relation to the 
commercial infrastructure of the NEP, and its reconfiguration of relations of representation 
between IDU and peer-professionals. In this outline of an ethos of the NEP, or at least a significant 
strand in its account, I have specified and consolidated key aspects of trials of biomedical authority,
research, trust, which I suggest, consolidate into an ethic of harm reduction. I proceed in the 
following chapter to explore an interwoven strand consisting of the development of an 
infrastructural configuration. Syringes became commercialised as a ‘commodity of deviance’, 
while peers became professionalised as health actors who ‘specialised in deviance’. As the 
432. How and to what degree IDU might be particularly concerned about such issues, as individuals or groups or 
networks, seems difficult to evaluate. Surveys of client attitudes to peer exchanges have indicated high satisfaction 
and little desire for changes apart from those already pursued by peers (Aitken, 2002). However, there are no safe 
means for IDU to discuss issues nationally, except through peer-professional representation. Who would want to 
confuse health promotion messages and provoke IDU distrust by raising contentious issues of representation?
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transport of syringes developed, various cultural motivations, regulations, and financial incentives 
increased in significance. Yet as in the ‘trials of trust’ I have described, the commercial 
infrastructure involved antagonisms amid the regional administration and the occupational 
accountabilities. I will describe how these antagonisms increased the hybrid, peer-professional 
standards and capabilities of the NEP. 
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9Sustainability: Representation through commercial practices 
Simplexity is the tendency of simple rules to emerge from underlying disorder and complexity, in
systems whose large-scale structure is independent of the fine details of their substructure. Complicity is
the tendency of interacting systems to coevolve in a manner that changes both, leading to a growth of
complexity from simple beginnings ... unpredictable in detail, but whose general course is
comprehensible and foreseeable.
(The Collapse of Chaos. Jack Cohen & Ian Stewart, 1995: 3)
In the previous chapters I described the founding of the NEP in terms of a peer, official, and 
professional co-adaptation brought about by the intensifications and shifts that followed the 
defining of HIV/AIDS as an urgent political and public health problem. I followed the ways in 
which the work practices that I term peer-professional, along with goals of surveillance and 
representation, became partially separated from specifically IDU, official, and professional 
activities. I outlined the formation of a hybrid niche environment. This was walled off, in a knotted 
re-configuration of institutional boundary ‘lines’ that delineated the conventional institutions of 
crime and health. Nonetheless, my initial focus on how the NEP was shaped as an occupational 
space did not address how certain founding arrangements lasted for over twenty years while others 
did not. Since these stabilities were distributed across key incidents, durations, and distances, they 
were only sporadically touched on when tracing the more consistently stranded details of temporal, 
eventful developments in Section 2 of this thesis. Furthermore, my starting focus on the early 
periods of the NEP’s shaping did not adequately explore the continuing construction of a policy 
consensus, nor the limitations on any empowerment of marginalised groups, nor the co-ordination 
and the shifts of marginalised peer-professionals closer to elite policy communities.433 Accounting 
for such dynamic, unstable aspects has required a further stage of analytical tightening and 
integrating in this chapter. 
As the NEP developed and consolidated it did so in particular places, partly following and partly 
resisting its founding principle of national coverage. I briefly referred to this aspect in earlier 
chapters, but here I account for these ‘locational processes’ in more empirical detail, utilising both 
geographical and actor-network approaches. I found that the national systems of professions, 
legislation, policy, and fixed prices were important, but too dislocated to explain much about 
change and stability. Instead, I will draw attention to the linkages and gaps between secretive sites 
of injection, information-producing NEP outlets, contestable regional identities, places considered 
deserving of financial expenditure, and various ‘centres of calculations’ (Latour, 1987: 229) that 
informed the national NEP policy. Significantly, while four of the five initial urban peer groups 
433. See Brown (1999), Lindberg & McMorland (1996), and Plumridge & Chetwynd (1994) for previously theorised 
accounts of these issues in New Zealand contexts. See Chapter 2 for Australian and generalised accounts of HIV/
AIDS policy change that influenced New Zealand NEP developments.
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survived, all of the four state agency bodies that successively co-ordinated the NEP had been 
disestablished by 1995. Yet in 1995, Needle Exchange New Zealand (NENZ) was incorporated as 
the federation of autonomous peer groups, then continued to survive as a national co-ordinating 
body for over a decade. NENZ, accordingly, seems to exemplify stability. Nonetheless, the 
autonomy and centralisation of NENZ developed in conditions and episodes of instability. How did
the alternative forms of national co-ordination and capabilities come to not work when NENZ did?
I argue that the NEP’s significant places and conflicts over policy became linked by means of 
commercial and managerial practices into network effects that I account for as a fourth cycle of 
corporatising and professionalising events. The activity of this cycle centred on the objects, 
movements, difficulties, goals, practices, and alternatives from which NENZ was constituted. 
NENZ was founded on goals of achieving greater efficiencies, competencies, and representation 
for its member peer groups. This set of goals was planned and then consolidated in a commercial, 
corporatised direction, while retaining IDU values of egalitarianism alongside health advocacy 
values of empowerment. The consequent increase in the commercial professionalism of the NEP 
both aided and compromised its health professionalism, making some shapes of organising and 
logics434 more stable or otherwise sustainable than others. In 2003 the Public Health Service 
Handbook (Public Health Service, 2003: 78-82), depicted the NEP as a large, well-run, prestigious 
programme. However, such stability, expansion, and status did not ‘just happen’, and certainly not 
smoothly. Though NENZ survived, its path has at times been highly uncertain. NENZ has been an 
effect interwoven from the national, regional, and urban systems of transporting syringes that 
developed as a layering of, but not a separation from, the representation of the member peer groups
and the IDU clients. At times the transport and representation came into conflict.
Some peer exchanges that IDU had attempted to organise were never funded and so never 
eventuated,435 CIVDURG eventually collapsed, and other peer groups experienced cycles of crises 
and resuscitations. Some peer-professionals wanted to increase the numbers of local peer 
exchanges by incrementally expanding beyond urban centres, whereas others wanted to consolidate
the NEP’s mid-level administrative infrastructure into regional blocs that ‘covered’ rural areas at an
official level, instead of ‘on the ground’. Nonetheless, any prospective mid-level administrative 
‘centres’ for the NEP that appeared, disappeared just as rapidly, as did the Area Health Boards 
(Kemp, 1990). Swings between regional and national centres, and between high and mid-level 
official agencies such as Regional Health Authorities, the Public Health Commission, the Health 
Funding Authority, and the Ministry of Health, also created administrative disjunctures, which 
encouraged administrative logics to rely more on market processes than on longer-term planning. 
434. Such organising logics changed according to a participant’s position in the health sector between IDU networks and 
official hierarchies, and in the degree of shelter from a neo-liberal policy environment.
435. This illustrates how a user-pays system could only assist, not totally support a peer exchange outlet. 
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The available records indicate that the NEP’s goals were consistent despite their division, while its 
workable practices were often opportunistic. These linked wide and long term differences express 
several distinct aspects of hybridity. Yet these goals and practices were strategised towards trials of
strength and workability, and adapted at particular moments as a result of such trials, in ways that, 
like a personal career, were neither predetermined, nor purely sprung from chance. All of the 
alternative proposals for administrative territories, specialisations of practice, and types of 
regulations, made sense. Yet each made additional sense as described from particular perspectives 
and positionings that outline different variations of a peer-professional situational logic.
The NEP’s commercial and health aspects have contributed to several key turning points,436 even 
after the crucial initial choice of a model for delivering services based on commercial pharmacy 
practices (Robinson, 1990: 26). First was the emergence of the peer groups that later federated into 
NENZ. One turning point in 1995 involved peer professionals selecting and employing the NEP 
co-ordinator. Another in 2001 featured the narrow avoidance of a nation-wide strike by the peer 
groups. A further cusp in the NEP’s trajectory arrived in 2002 with the publication of an external 
review (Aitken, 2002), independent of the Ministry’s gate-keeping and influence. This review 
evaluated the federated peer groups as being uniquely responsible for an extremely high level of 
service delivery.437 At any of these cusps, things might have developed differently, raising the 
question of whether the survival of NENZ has been purely due to chance, or to any selective 
conditions in its environment of mechanisms, or to other processes and entities that might explain 
patterns of events. 
I have not attempted to offer a detailed description of the network of urban exchanges,438 since the 
complexity of the individual character of the existing groups, in their local environments, cannot be
adequately handled here. Instead, I have condensed selected events and periods into a generalised, 
more abstract account. This story-telling method of integrating path-dependent factors and network
conditions has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.439 I first developed an eventful model that 
436. These 'points' did not cause things to happen, rather, they were produced as notable events from network effects, 
path dependencies and cyclic effects. 
437. A later turning point in 2004, most likely of great significance, has involved the shift from obligatory user-pays 
funding to state funding of a voluntary free 'one-for-one' scheme in 2004. Although still being adjusted in terms of 
logistics and record-keeping, this innovation has begun to alter the NEP framework and mechanisms which have 
evolved and consolidated over 16 years. For instance, up-to-date record-keeping becomes more necessary, yet 
perhaps resisted at local levels. Pharmacists and peer groups are no longer paid directly by IDU clients, but by a 
centralised disbursement system, which requires greater professionalism by its users, yet creates greater 
vulnerabilities to local agency. A concurrent legislative shift from possessor to police in the onus of proof for 
syringe possession has not necessarily constituted a turning point because there is no regular record of the police. 
IDU, or defence lawyers changing their behaviour. However, there has been a single instance in 2007 of a Dunedin 
Court of such charges being dismissed by a Judge, on expert advice from the local peer group and NENZ, leading to 
expressions of interest from defence lawyers (Henderson, 2007. pers. com.)
438. This is partly because of the time requirements in tracing the missing information about peer groups that never 
happened. I found references to several, though only one in the Motueka district as a detailed proposal. I suspect 
there could be many more. 
439. And also discussed in Appendix 9. In brief, historical sequences and interactional structures offer different 
perspectives on characteristics, direct causes, and selective conditions, yet to explain persistent patterns of activity, a 
mechanism or a model, expressed through a narrative, is required. A model describes the named objects and 
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specified how the stability of the hybrid NEP infrastructure was produced from peer group 
autonomy, within a national federation, combined with national aspects of commercialising and 
professionalising. I then attempted to describe the activity of this model in terms of mechanisms 
and sequential effects that explained the manner and consequences of different regional 
administrative blocs being proposed but not eventuating. 
My explanation develops in four steps. In the first I will outline the conditions of unaddressed 
needs of central, high-level co-ordination and of national coverage by the peer-based services. 
Section 2 begins with the establishment of NENZ as a body that was expected to further develop 
the NEP’s commercial expertise, along with the representation of its peer member groups, at a 
national level. This has been significant since its founding members intended NENZ to enhance 
their autonomy, while not being limited to merely facilitating their regional expertise. Section 3 
lays out the development of conflicts between NENZ and the Ministry of Health, particularly over 
the goals of increasing the services and funding to reduce hepatitis C transmission. I will describe 
how attempts to provide free syringes outside of official support frameworks had been a founding 
goal of NEP peer-professionals. I will also describe how this goal reduced the capabilities of the 
NEP by adding to the difficulties of working alongside pharmacists, by increasing conflicts 
between particular regional groups and NENZ, and by directly involving health officials and peer-
professionals in each other’s territories. I will show in section 4 that although such ‘partnerships’ 
involved a degree of consensus, or shared goals, they are better characterised by the trials of 
strength and capabilities as described in the previous four sections. These trials involved 
antagonisms between health professions and governments over health budgets, as well as conflicts 
between criminal injecting practices and state officials over the enforcement of prohibition 
legislation.
1   Multiplicity and fragments: Market networks and central incoherence
In 1987, the NEP planners needed to provide more reliable and wider-spread services than the 
illicit pharmacy syringe supply system that had sprung up from the ground. The planners promoted 
a model that combined national direction by Department officials, funding through ‘user-pays’, and
implementation through contractual market arrangements. The Department was not to have any 
role in the logistics of supplying syringe packs, but would instead: "function in a regulatory way to 
ensure that specifications meet the demands of the scheme as a disease control measure and that 
identities of interactivity from the outside, a mechanism describes the shaped agencies involved in the exercise of 
energies, entropy, and assemblages from the inside, following the opportunities and constraints as they influence one 
of many futures to become history. Such a narrated model can be tested and improved through application to unique 
events; in the process revealing connections and patterns. Such narrated accounts are interactional in that a reader 
could not make sense of it without drawing on their own accounts, which are not totally the same, nor totally 
different. See Chapter 2 and 3.
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these specifications are being complied with" (Baker, 1988b). The planners did not want the 
expense and other costs of direction by officials to compromise a simple exchange of syringes for 
cash. User-pays transactions separated the funding needs of the moment from the potential systems 
of bureaucratic governance, while being an approved practice of the IDU, GPs, and pharmacists 
who all ran private businesses of different types.
When the NEP was introduced it featured no continuous bureaucratic or political direction. Yet it 
required consents of various types from a political environment that demanded accountability, 
generally through extensive and rigid regulation when illicit drugs and criminalised desires were 
involved (Johnston & Patel, 1987; Stephenson, 1987b). Pharmacies were selected as outlets partly 
because they offered commercial expertise in dispensing syringes within a monitored health 
framework. This seemed very useful in enrolling public, political, and professional support. The 
peer-professionalism I describe would have been resisted more strongly if the initial NEP had been 
overtly peer influenced, rather than such aspects becoming public and extending in stages 
(Robinson, 1990: 26). The pharmacy NEP model solidified some connections across the conflicting
boundaries of crime and health by entangling them in normal, everyday work. Pharmacy work also 
emphasised the overtness of the commercial arrangements rather than the exceptional forms of 
organising that featured unusual education programmes, special events, and discreet outreach. 
Normal commercial activities reinforced the need for peer participation while reassuring the 
stakeholders that IDU clients would not be deterred by media attention. The commercial pharmacy 
aspects of the NEP helped the new peer-professionals to counter the exceptionalism and stigma440 
that attached to purely IDU-connected aspects of peer outreach groups (part. obs. 1989-1991).
The NEP environment was hazardous due to the fragmentation and unpredictability of the health 
sector ‘destructuring,’441 and to the associated budget constraints. Furthermore, being an exception 
to the prohibition of drug paraphernalia and the criminalising of self-medication created a 
hazardous isolation. Hazards notwithstanding, commercial expertise was ‘normal’ in being 
approved and pervasive in a neo-liberal era. Previous peer organisations such as the IV League, and
previous peer occupations such as political lobbyist, had been unstable in the sense of lacking the 
normality of such organisational and occupational support. Pharmacy exchanges stabilised the NEP
440. The extent of this stigma is indicated by NEP pharmacists in Christchurch being considered “the lowest of the low” 
(CIVDURG, 1988a) by their colleagues. The District Advisory Pharmacist commented that the number of outraged 
pharmacists was small but vociferous (CIVDURG, 1988b).
441. My use of the term 'destructuring' refers to the fragmentation of a previously more integrated and centralised 
hierarchal system of bureaucracy. It also refers to the resultant difficulties in communication and predictability 
having been intended to disrupt previous structures and encourage more vulnerable structural innovations. The term 
‘restructuring’ is often applied to  the neo-liberal state sector changes after 1984, but the term destructuring seems 
more apt. This is shown in the difficulties experienced by the peer groups which, in being isolated at a low level of 
service delivery, were caused by a logic of permitted, or deliberate, central oversight. The reformulated health sector 
was denied previous structural arrangements and left with only market methods and logics. Yet the goals of the 
health system remained inherently caring and careful rather than commodified and entrepreneurial. Because there 
was less structure to achieve health goals, destructuring has been used as a more precise term than restructuring. 
236
Section 1:    Multiplicity and fragments: Market networks and central incoherence
by treating syringes as a highly regulated, but otherwise normal commodity, to be transported, 
counted, and made accountable in conventional commercial ways. 
The NEP planners realised that a working structure that necessitated firm contracts and required 
repeated evaluation needed to be accepted by stakeholders ahead of the legislative deadlines. Such 
planning was difficult because the enrolled stakeholders could not be supported in a mutual 
alignment by a well-established body of theory or practice, as occurs in the dominant professions. 
The NEP methods were more pragmatic than theoretical, and the Ottawa Charter was a theory of 
ideals and high level strategy, rather than procedures that enrolled all the NEP stakeholders in 
clearly defined roles. Instead, the pharmacists, advisory committees, medical associations, and 
police were all well-resourced in their independent motivations, their different theories, and their 
intersecting rather than shared practices. Consequently, changes to the NEP involved formal and 
genuine consulting with stakeholders who could not be safely ignored (Fitzgerald, 1995: 3, 6, 14). 
An important exception lies in the area of peer group organisation. For instance, in 1990 the 
National Council on AIDS policy recommendations (1990a: 80-81) were for local peer groups to 
be left alone to manage their own arrangements, provided that national protocols and goals were 
being pursued and the expenditure was accountable.442 The peer groups were contracted to provide 
services, not to follow any particular internal structural model, nor to fit into any external 
governance environment. Political and bureaucratic institutions were not established at a national 
level. Accordingly, a space opened for mid-level, 'implementational' national developments that 
were promoted through improving the commercial infrastructure and market efficiencies. These 
disciplined efficiencies required that the logistics of transporting and exchanging syringes, along 
with the accompanying activity of IDU motivation change and representation, produced 
professionally accountable records. Successful commercialisation seemed a valuable asset to the 
NEP outreach goal, given the vulnerability of IDU to accusations of irrationality, non-compliance, 
and lack of control (Nimmo, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). 
From 1990, the policy, advisory, and service delivery aspects of the Department of Health were 
financially restricted, and in 1993 these became fragmented into an array of more isolated, 
competitive, risk-minimising, and vulnerable agencies (Thomson & Wilson, 2001: 241, 242). The 
NEP was considered too unimportant to require direct political direction from Cabinet, yet after the
AIDS Task Force was disestablished by August 1991 (Penrose, 1991), no single state agency was 
accountable for the national co-ordination of HIV/AIDS prevention and policy, including the NEP 
with its inbuilt antagonisms.443
442. This policy was formulated when Rodger Wright was the IDU representative on the National Council. 
443. The National Council on AIDS never received full government support for its National Strategy, and was itself 
disestablished only several years later. It, or an equivalent, has since been reconstituted, but similar issues of 
ambiguity of role and uncertain government support have become apparent in 2007. Since it does not seem to meet, 
or address crucial issues in other ways, apart from nominally existing, the newer Council seems decorative at best.
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In 1988, the IV League444 had recognised that its 'charismatic' type of entrepreneurial445 health 
promotion and organisational model was suited for political lobbying, yet unsuited for providing a 
national outreach programme that linked cohesively with the pharmacy-based NEP. IV League 
spokespersons suggested a compromise consisting of a tightly structured, service delivery-
orientated organisation of peer educators, employed and supervised by the Department of Health.446
This organisation and system would have its personnel and other peer resources supplied by the IV 
League. However, the AIDS TaskForce official administrators did not accept that the IV League 
could represent the differences among IDU, nor the collective needs of IDU, in this way.447 These 
officials desired a wider range and larger numbers of IDU representation, yet did not wish to be 
directly accountable for supervising such representatives.
Robert Kemp had initially promoted ADIO as being locally representative and having a low public 
profile, in contrast to the national IV League. By later persuading the Department of Health to add 
a commercial syringe outlet to ADIO’s peer outreach activities, Kemp produced a hybrid 
organisation and duplex system of accountabilities in stages (Kemp, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c). The 
double accountabilities and resultant uncertainties were offset against the opportunities inherent in 
making two types of opposed activities mutually supporting. However, Kemp wanted a further 
stage that involved developing ADIO, and any peer groups following its model, into regional 
service and administration blocs. Kemp argued for a national structure of five regional blocs for 
peer activities, rather than urban centres with the same number of outreach employees but less 
coverage and fewer resource commitments (Kemp, 1988a).448 
The supply of syringes at ADIO centred around a single operational site where expenditures could 
be largely met by user-pays income. The extra funding for education and outreach could be readily 
controlled by state agencies through service contracts. The loss of regional coverage, the 
consequent disincentives to outlying IDU prospective clients, and the loss of total coverage, were 
accepted by government politicians and official agencies. Any alternative arrangements of regional 
blocs would have increased costs and reduced the benefits of a user-pays model. The Department’s 
need to minimise its financial and administrative accountabilities perhaps explains why Kemp’s 
regional bloc model was rejected. Outreach needs were unevenly distributed across a regional bloc,
444. The IV League consisted of two spokespersons who lobbied at a national level and travelled around the main cities 
encouraging IDU to form groups. By 1988, several groups had formed in a loose federation. However, there was no 
regular service delivery component, only intermittent AIDS TaskForce contracts to carry out surveys. The 
spokespersons could speak as HIV positive, gay men who were also IDU. This gave them credibility and official 
access as individuals, but not funding for the organisation they founded.
445. Entrepreneurial here refers to being innovative and catalysing change, not to being profit-focused.
446. In 1990, this concept was revisited as an option in Robinson's recommendations on peer group development (1990).
447. As also found in Robert Kemp’s initial proposals for ADIO.
448. If these were administered at mid-level, since the previous pattern of Department of Health hierarchy could not be 
guaranteed, they would also be administrative blocs. Since local differences would be averaged within the blocs and 
reduced in number between the blocs, a single standardised pattern of organisation was indicated. Kemp seemed to 
be preparing the way for an administrative hierarchy that could be employed  to direct local peer group affairs from 
a central national position. 
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since IDU actually injected drugs for private reasons, not to fit into public administration models. 
The rejection of regional blocs effectively ensured that outreach remained dependent on user-pays, 
with many gaps, such as rural areas, prisons, and youth. In 1987, outreach was not expected to be 
user funded, yet by 1994, a Ministry of Health analyst assumed it would be, which indicated some 
changes in the policy environment (Walzl, 1994: 52). 
ADIO worked by requiring those already identifying as IDU to be personally motivated to visit its 
urban-centralised outlet. At the time, outreach was an ambiguous concept with a diversity of 
interpretations. The IV League proposals presented outreach as complementary to, but different 
from professional counselling (Wright 1987, 1988a). Counselling was to be provided at different 
types of centres, such as drug treatment clinics, but outreach was to be peer-to-peer, close to 
everyday injecting activities. The ADIO model effectively combined these different activities by 
requiring IDU to visit a needle exchange for syringes as a regular activity that exposed IDU to 
peer-professional environments of combined counselling-outreach. The ADIO model competed 
with any counselling services being provided to pharmacies by some other agency. The supply of 
syringes and the accompanying peer outreach had become channelled into a shop-clinic model. 
IDU, as clients, customers, peers or patients, circulated to and from a centre of controlled access to 
health products. This system was cost effective and workable, yet inherently linked the health-
oriented outreach to the commercial aspects of user-pays and the logistics of moving syringes. By 
being founded as an experiment in outreach, and in being successful, ADIO effectively 
consolidated its organisational and market concept in a commercially stabilised way that was 
urban-centred, regionally-absent, yet dependent on the national co-ordination provided by state 
funding agencies and regulations. These developments have been discussed in more detail in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
In 1990, Kemp was employed by the AIDS TaskForce to explore the service provision potential of 
the recently created Area Health Boards (Kemp, 1990).449 Kemp proposed that the TaskForce 
would fund the Area Health Boards to provide epidemiological testing programmes for returned 
syringes, and employ at least one outreach/advisor per region.450 Kemp argued that the TaskForce 
needed to monitor HIV prevalence among IDU more intensively in both non-urban and urban 
areas. This would help prevent a critical mass of HIV-positive IDU emerging, by providing data for
prioritising and legitimising needs-based expenditure. Kemp’s proposed system for monitoring 
relied on frequent, large-scale HIV seroprevalence testing of returned syringes (1990).451 However, 
the TaskForce had no secure funding for the national coverage of non-urban regions. Even if 
449. There were fourteen Area Health Boards, of which five included peer groups in their regions.
450. Kemp appears to have changed his stance since 1988, when he critiqued the IV League proposal for employing three
full time and 12 half-time outreach workers as "excessive human and economic resources" (Kemp, 1988a).
451.  Kemp acknowledged the significant dangers of IDU distrust in testing returned syringes, since: “it would raise fears
amongst consumers” (Kemp 1990: 7).
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funding had been secured, the Area Health Boards refused to provide services under the 
TaskForce’s direction, which forced the TaskForce: “to respect the autonomy of AHB’s [sic] in 
deciding best how to allocate services in their region” (Kemp, 1990).452 In effect, Kemp attempted 
to sell these services to the Area Health Boards, since they could arrange for professional expertise 
in co-ordinating regional administration, and because they had seemingly more secure funding than
the TaskForce. Kemp did not attempt to build such a testing and outreach programme through the 
existing TaskForce-funded peer groups, even though these had already co-operated with existing 
centres in epidemiological testing, as discussed in Chapter 8.
Kemp’s concerns have seemed well-justified by the potential rapidity of HIV transmission amongst
social and market networks of secretive IDU. However, his plans required linking peer-
professional activities to an already existing infrastructure of regional health administration.453 The 
logics involved seem similar to those of universal primary health coverage, but instead focused on 
a marginalised and geographically unfixed community. The administration of such plans did not 
rely on the existing pharmacy network and so could not readily share their management costs. 
Accordingly, the proposed system could not be self-funding through user-pays, yet the Department 
officials and politicians did not consider that it required state funding (Aitken 2002: 45). Kemp’s 
attempts at constructing a nationally co-ordinated health infrastructure based on Area Health Board
support for peer group outreach was not sustainable in the neo-liberal health sector environment of 
the time. 
Kemp's approach of trying to build up elements of a fragmenting health sector involved trying to 
align many opposing or self-interested elements in stable arrangements. This may be another 
reason, apart from the high management costs of the peer groups,454 why Kemp advised against 
increasing the numbers of exchange outlets (1990). This advice contradicted the National Council 
on AIDS recommendations to increase peer group numbers. Kemp’s advice also indicated a shift in
AIDS TaskForce strategies from its initial goals of increasing the number of groups.455 However, 
452. A locally controlled Area Health Board might not prioritise preventative work designed to empower marginalised 
communities.
453. When Rodger Wright resigned in 1990, due to increasing illness, Robert Kemp was appointed IDU representative. 
Although having proposed the isolated urban peer group model, Kemp had also recommended larger geographical 
administrative blocs (Kemp, 1988a). This model seemed to entail larger administrative loads and greater strains on 
the abilities of IDU to work to professional standards, or to require increasing numbers of non-IDU or ex-IDU to 
work as administrators. Kemp seems to have envisaged such models in terms of “a wider perspective” (National 
Council on AIDS, 1990b: 1). Kemp’s attempts as NEP co-ordinator to re-organise the peer groups from urban 
centres into blocs would have entailed peer group reformulation into a bureaucracy. This would have created 
difficulties during a period (1990 to 1995) when increases in group numbers and funding were successfully resisted 
by state funding agencies. It would also have disrupted the protocol of non-interference in the internal organisation 
of peer groups, while reducing the responsiveness of groups to local conditions by widening and diluting their focus. 
Kemp’s attempts at co-ordinated coverage were rejected by the peer groups (Nimmo, 1994a). Distrust of centralised 
authority, and consequent awareness of interplay between bureaucratising and co-ordinating of peer-professional 
influence on the NEP, later contributed to the federal rather than bureaucratic shape of NENZ.
454. High compared with the private sector. See Robinson (1990: 16, 18-19).
455. The AIDS TaskForce co-ordinator of the NEP initiated discussion with several peer group proponents during 1989, 
and planned a West Coast fact-finding survey aimed at starting a peer group.
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no more funding proved available for plans for wider coverage by a more effective or efficient 
administration, than was available for increased numbers of peer groups.
Kemp made little headway with the Area Health Boards before his initial support base as a 
contracted AIDS TaskForce employee disappeared upon the disestablishment of that body. 
Although Kemp successfully shifted to becoming employed by the NZAF and New Zealand Drug 
Foundation as 'National Advisor IDU/AIDS', the NEP stakeholders had been careful to ensure that 
such positions: “were consultative not executive” (CASONZ, 1991c).456 In 1992, Kemp released a 
policy paper on IDU community development. This paper proposed that the peer exchanges should 
not increase in numbers, but should instead consolidate into regional blocs. The recommended 
number of blocs had reduced from five to three since 1988 (Kemp, 1992a, 1992b).457 Two North 
Island blocs and one South Island bloc were proposed. The suggested benefits included reducing 
management costs while increasing coverage and consistency in service provision. However, Kemp
could only propose, not dispose (Kemp, 1992b). Groups such as CIVDURG (1993) and DIVO 
(1993a) opposed the altering of sustainable local arrangements which at that time were addressing 
a network of personal, organisational, IDU, and AIDS Service Organisation needs. Such regional 
resistance helped to prevent any administrative restructuring that seemed to jeopardise the existing 
IDU community developments.
State agencies could not easily assist in such administration building projects, since an existing 
protocol emphasised that: “it would be inappropriate for the Department to intervene in a matter 
which is internal to [a peer group]” (Van der Lem, 1991). The boundaries between internal group 
arrangements and external arrangements were fairly ambiguous. State agencies in a neo-liberal 
environment would not have been interested in being directly accountable for matters that touched 
on private group arrangements.458 This protocol of non-intervention added to the recommendations 
from the National Council on AIDS (1990a: 80-81) to let the regional peer groups develop their 
own methods of health promotion. The protocol and recommendation opened a space for 
commercial opportunities that were pursued through management logics of effectiveness and 
efficiencies. For instance, ADIO began in 1993459 to openly sell non-regulation syringes suitable 
for steroid users. ADIO also supplied the NEP pharmacies in Auckland with bulk-ordered injecting
456. The DIVO co-ordinator considered the appointment had been rushed and manipulated (CASONZ, 1991a; Lee, 
1991).
457. Contrary to the National Strategy of the National Council on AIDS (1990a: 108), of which Kemp was the IDU 
representative, and contrary to Kemp's job description from CASONZ to work with users to set up new groups 
(Lindberg, 1991a, 1991b). It seems apparent that, given the tensions of this co-ordinating role and the need to 
maintain trust, the reinterpretation of these accountabilities would not have occurred without compelling reasons.
458. The only direct intervention had been by Helen Clark, the Minister of Health, in 1990. Clark had instructed that co-
ordinators of IDU groups and IDU employees not be Trustees. This prevented employees controlling the conditions 
of their employment, and reduced problems of employees being effectively unaccountable. See Robinson (1990: 
20).
459. Before this illicit syringe supply became normal, earlier problems with police needed to be resolved. The police had 
objected because on arrest, IDU had stated that they had bought illicit 1 ml syringes from ADIO (CIVDURG, 
1990c). 
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supplies.460 By 1995, ADIO supplied twenty different combinations of illicit needles and syringes 
with the informal knowledge of Ministry of Health officials.461 Such demand-side, market models 
of consumer choice and commercial efficiencies shaped the consequent administrative 
developments in several ways. Since the government funding and NGO grants reduced as HIV/
AIDS seemed less of a public threat, the need for commercial expertise was increasingly 
emphasised. The peer co-ordinators could resist pressures to reduce their wages, because income 
increased as the number of sales increased and costs decreased due to commercial efficiencies. The
outreach became subsumed into the peer 'shop' exchange, rather than being attempted in stand-
alone ways that required dedicated funding to be first separated from the syringe logistics, then 
justified in an activity that had been notoriously difficult to monitor. The professional and official 
types of health administration that depended on external funding through hierarchal structures or 
contract negotiation cycles, or private grants from charitable agencies, became complemented, 
though at times conflicting, with management methods that focused on the efficiencies and 
motivations of open market interactions.
2   NENZ: An emergent, centralised professional body
In August 1989, a body called the Community AIDS Services Organisations of New Zealand 
(CASONZ) was formed by the NZAF (National Council on AIDS, 1989d; CASONZ, 1990a) in 
response to recommendations from the World Health Organisation462. CASONZ included all the 
AIDS service organisations that worked in the area of HIV prevention and AIDS support and were 
funded by the AIDS TaskForce. CASONZ did not carry out service work. It’s quarterly meetings 
depended on AIDS TaskForce funding. 
CASONZ provided a forum for sharing information and developing research, policies, strategies 
and initiatives. It co-ordinated advocacy while also providing advice for the AIDS TaskForce. 
CASONZ represented marginalised communities, pressured the TaskForce to lobby for increased 
AIDS funding, and criticised some details of previous expenditure.463 As the government 
expenditure on AIDS lessened, so did the TaskForce budget on which CASONZ depended to 
function (CASONZ, 1991b). The archived CASONZ records stop in April 1992.464 By then the 
AIDS TaskForce funding and staffing levels had ceased to function adequately for providing 
460. These products included sterile water, filters, and antiseptic skin products, and tourniquets.
461. See DIVO (1994a), Nimmo (2004 pers. com.), Beswick (1995a).
462. The WHO promoted an international model called the International AIDS Service Organisation group.
463. For instance, on a womens' health pamphlet that the AIDS Service Organisations said was misinformative and 
wasted funds (CASONZ, 1990c). CASONZ attempted to provide a forum for sharing information; co-operating on 
research, policy, strategies and initiatives; co-operating on advocacy on policy issues, legislation, and funding; and 
acting as an advisory group to the AIDS TaskForce. In 1989, the AIDS TaskForce was very supportive of 
CASONZ, but the AIDS TaskForce membership and goals changed rapidly during the following years.
464. During this period, peer groups were informed by the AIDS TaskForce that they should approach their local Area 
Health Boards for support, since their core funding was not guaranteed to be secure (CASONZ, 1991b).
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information and maintaining connections to other state agencies. The AIDS TaskForce was itself 
disestablished by 1993, further isolating the NEP peer groups.
The absence of regional administrative blocs meant that the peer groups remained isolated, since no
‘middle layer’ of communication and connections could take over from the TaskForce’s higher 
level co-ordination of administration and funding prioritisation.465 The peer-professional groups 
wanted to deregulate the NEP, since the costs of importing, packaging, and transport were tied to 
the regulatory environment of Department price setting, as described in Chapter 5. A more 
professional image, and a more central coherent position from which to lobby for funds and 
deregulation, seemed needed. The peer groups' shared concern for: “the importance of a national 
spokesperson on IDU issues” (DIVO, 1993b), led to calls to form a national organisation. 
Nonetheless, this concept of national, central co-ordination did not become sufficiently 
problematised, nor enrol sufficient well-positioned support until promoted by the Public Health 
Commission.466 This Commission had been founded in 1992, then empowered a year later under 
the Health and Disability Services Act 1993. This Act separated the previous Department of Health
into a policy-only Ministry and a Public Health Commission. The Commission was accountable for
directly funding any national aspects of implementation of the population-based, public health 
policy.467 The Commission was more independently positioned, and more distant from political 
influence than the Ministry of Health (Thomson & Wilson, 2001: 241). The Commission 
contracted services from provider groups and was closer to the sites of implementation of service 
delivery. The Commission competed with the Ministry in terms of policy control, while 
confronting various agencies, such as the Alcohol Advisory Council (ALAC)468 and Customs, 
whose income and rationale for existing relied on the alcohol industry. These agencies contributed 
significantly to the disestablishment of the Public Health Commission in 1995 (Hutt & Howden-
Chapman, 2001: 261, 266). 
465. Several employment problems had been limited in the extent of their damage to relatively isolated and discreet peer 
groups. The same problems, if erupting across more numerous connections in a more public environment would 
have been extremely damaging to the NEP’s public and political acceptability.
466. The Public Health Commission’s involvement in commercial aspects of substance control policy is analysed in 
Thomson & Wilson (2001) for tobacco, and Hutt & Howden-Chapman (2001) for alcohol. In my reading, the Hutt 
& Howden-Chapman account is sceptical towards arguments that pleasure is a social good. It does not clearly 
distinguish pleasure from dependencies, or from desired commodities. It critiques the way “poor definitional and 
analytical rigour” associated with post-modernism had aided industrial lobbying. It neglects the way that everyday 
experiences of pleasure from alcohol use made a mockery of well-intentioned but authoritarian medicalising 
arguments which had excluded public goods of pleasure from analytical and policy considerations.
467. The Public Health Commission seems to have relied on rigourous evidence-based reports, somewhat in contrast to 
Treasury and the Ministry of Health at times (Hutt & Howden-Chapman, 2001). The Commission was concerned 
with harms caused less by intense substance use, but by moderate long-term use of licit substances, such as tobacco 
and alcohol. Its evidence-based analysis of harms led it to a generalised and aggregated analysis of whole 
populations, rather than a stigmatised minority who used illicit drugs. Accordingly, instead of allying with police 
and law enforcement against relatively vulnerable people, such as IDU, it challenged extremely well-resourced 
corporatised industries with many political and Departmental beneficiaries. Such a stance did not endear it to those 
who wished to manage rather than minimise the harms associated with the profits, and taxes, of such industries. A 
population health perspective was highly political.
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The Public Health Commission had become responsible for contracting the peer groups on behalf 
of the Ministry of Health (Ministry of Health, 1995a: 4). The peer groups generally agreed on the: 
“importance of developing and maintaining a good relationship with the Public Health Commission
... and sharing of resources” (Clayton, 1993). However, peer groups such as CIVDURG and DIVO 
had come to oppose losing their close connections with their regional funding agency, which 
seemed better informed on local needs after initial difficulties. To these groups, being funded by 
the Southern Regional Health Authority seemed no less secure than by the Commission.469
NENZ had been conceived of in terms of national scale public health goals and methods, but as 
specified by officials of the Public Health Commission rather than of the Ministry of Health. The 
initial models called for NENZ to bulk fund the peer groups and to distribute information. It was 
clear from the peer discussions that bulk funding involved a degree of hierarchal control that would
shape any representation over the policy goals, methods, and evaluation of the NEP (1995 part. 
obs.). The groups did not agree on formally establishing NENZ until the proposals for bulk-funding
were dropped in late 1994. This minimised the criticisms that were based on distrust of empire-
building and threats to autonomy, and allowed the interests of the peer groups and the Commission 
to become better aligned. The foundations on which the peer groups all agreed to federate included 
the co-ordination of services and information, the provision of representation in future negotiations 
with the Public Health Commission and Ministry of Health, and implementation of specifically 
national types of activities (Auerbach, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; Luke, 1994). 
By November 1994, the Public Health Commission officials had become frustrated by two years of
lack of progress towards national co-ordination, and consequently refused to fund any further 
meetings. Instead, they urgently encouraged the incorporation and initial funding of NENZ by 
offering a one year, $25,000 contract to improve the co-ordination of the peer groups. This was 
effectively a payment for NENZ to become a legal entity. The officials finally acted with such 
rapidity and inducements because the government had announced the Commission's immanent 
disestablishment. 
The Commission officials had been both freed470 and challenged to use their available resources 
towards more directly fulfilling their mandate to protect public health in evidence-based, nation-
wide ways. The Commission consolidated a financial commitment for public health promotion 
activities by creating and contracting a legal, national organisation with a public health-oriented 
constitution. The aims of this Constitution included HCV prevention, and the objectives were 
468. The Alcohol Advisory Council of New Zealand (ALAC) was established in 1976 to encourage responsible use and 
minimise misuse of alcohol. ALAC is funded by a levy on alcohol sold in New Zealand. The levy has been collected 
by Customs, and other agencies.
469. See DIVO (1993a, 1994b, 1994d, ), CIVDURG (1993). Neither SRHA nor Public Health Commission could offer 
multi-year contracts around which stable professional planning could be based.
470. The officials could then afford to take political and career risks, because their agency would not exist later to 
transfer accountability for consequences to themselves as individuals.
244
Section 2:    NENZ: An emergent, centralised professional body
designed to facilitate professional capabilities, such as internal evaluation, library resources, 
training and education resources, and gaps in the coverage of harm reduction services (Harris, 
1994: 4-5). Other objectives specified defending the human rights and civil liberties of IDU, while 
promoting the interests of Member Groups and their clients in relation to regulatory and statutory 
bodies. A further objective promoted the national purchasing of NEP supplies. In so doing, the 
Public Health Commission prevented the Ministry of Health from halting or undermining the 
formative shaping of NENZ.471
When the Public Health Commission was disestablished in July 1995, its contracting 
accountabilities were transferred to a single national funding body. This was a nominated RHA472 
rather than the Ministry of Health. Whether and how this RHA, or NENZ, should act for the 
Ministry in an implementation and co-ordination role was negotiated around mid-1995.473 The 
negotiators accepted that there was:
little effective evaluation of the scheme; return levels of used needles/syringes are largely 
unknown and where they are known, they are shown to be low; IDU outreach groups have 
become increasingly frustrated by a scheme which they see as not working ... [the] fragmented 
administrative and contracting systems in existence; the continued sharing of used needles ... 
[the] use of injecting steroids is increasing ... [The] declining interest in the scheme among 
pharmacists ... further threatens coverage. (Ministry of Health, 1995a: 3-4)
The Ministry of Health accepted that its own educational material was seen by IDU as: 
“propaganda” (Ministry of Health, 1995a: 8), and that continuing high rates of HCV might result in
high treatment costs. The Ministry officials also expressed disquiet over the significant cost 
increases to what they had imagined was a pure user-pays scheme (Ministry of Health, 1995a). 
Such fears seem to have been countered by separate fears of the political risks of adverse publicity 
(Walzl, 1994), along with a reluctant, tacit admission that HCV prevalence required additional 
motivation change among a non-compliant population of IDU. Given such considerations, the 
commercial viability of the NENZ proposal made more sense than the Regional Health Authority 
or Ministry alternatives, despite forgoing the efficiencies and controls offered by bulk funding. No 
alternative to NENZ could offer the advantages of dedication and experience identified by Walzl 
(1994) in his analysis of the national transport and packaging logistics.474 Furthermore, NENZ had 
taken up the initiatives developed by ADIO to actively:
471. This was quite intentional, as expressed informally to peer representatives, including myself, at the time.
472. This RHA was North Health, further from the South Island than the seat of Government and state agencies in 
Wellington. 
473. This negotiation was premised on the Ministry of Health commissioned Walzl report (1994), on an internal Ministry
of Health review of management issues (Fitzgerald, 1995), and on a review by Kelly Auerbach (1994d) 
commissioned by the Public Health Commission. Auerbach was the peer group negotiation co-ordinator previously 
employed by the Drug Policy Forum on behalf of the Commission. It seems that this roundabout system of funding, 
also seen in Robert Kemp’s employment, allowed research and co-ordination to occur that was impossible under the 
constrained HIV/AIDS and HCV budgets. Instead, drug education funds were employed for this purpose, illustrating 
a way in which harm reduction policy made inroads into previous abstinence promoting funding streams.
474. The RHAs were too regional and disconnected to provide co-ordinated national planning. The nationally 
accountable Ministry of Health resisted providing actual coverage because it avoided implementation role where 
possible. 
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recruit new pharmacists and to try to create a support service for them in order to increase their 
retention in the programme. Secondly we were trying to break down the “pack” service model 
(and break the Salmond Smith Biolab monopoly) and encourage pharmacies to sell single fits, 
filters, and sterile water”.  (Nimmo, 2006. pers. com.)
The reluctant acceptance and support of NENZ by the Ministry of Health shows the significance of
the peer groups having attained commercial competencies that were self-promoting and public, 
though illicit. The illicitness has seemed to express a deviant social value, and been tacitly 
recognised as such, by the same officials who then attempted to regularise, normalise and make 
formally good what was already actively good by being formally bad. Not only had syringe prices 
been minimised through the commercial arrangements and logics, but other goals had also become 
possible. The commercial expertise helped to stabilise the unfunded peer-professional attempts at 
improving syringe supplies, at providing other IDU services, at empowering IDU through 
employment, at trialling methods of motivation change of IDU, and at representing IDU to health 
and police agencies. These harm reduction projects were then linked by peer-professionals and 
officials to a nation-wide infrastructure that was professionally run and accountable in the form of 
NENZ. Such scope and stability increased the prospects for peer-professional bodies to supply 
expertise for on-going research and governance projects. 
NENZ was created through an alliance with officialdom, albeit a shifting set of officials. 
Notwithstanding, NENZ followed a Public Health Commission reflex tendency to attempt policy 
inputs that generated resistance from other, more politicised agencies. These attempts were both 
problematised and productively leveraged by NENZ’s closer involvement than the Ministry in mid-
level implementation of health policy. In 1995 the Ministry became NENZ’s funder ‘partner’ but 
also a negotiating opponent.475 Ministry officials inherited the Commission’s contract for NENZ, 
imagining: " that the NENZ proposal would largely operate as a user pays supply scheme” 
(Ministry of Health, 1995a: 3).476 Instead, these officials found themselves negotiating over a one-
off, $80,000 establishment grant and an annual operating budget of $120,000, for what they 
understood to be an outreach co-ordinating body. NENZ eventually satisfied the Ministry that it 
could efficiently improve the NEP services at little extra cost, and without directly increasing the 
funding or the Ministry’s accountability to the urban peer groups.477 NENZ, accordingly, came to 
employ the NEP co-ordinator and was contracted by the Ministry to provide this service.478
475. The peer groups were separately funded through the Northern RHA.
476. Whether this impression had been deliberately, or carelessly, created by the Commission, or due to wishful thinking 
by the Ministry, is unclear.
477. Regional level negotiation, especially over extra funding that had not been budgeted for at a national governance 
level, would have set an irritating precedent for the Ministry governance model.
478. NENZ was not the only co-ordinating body. In 1995, the Ministry of Health also created a NEP stakeholder’s 
committee that included the Ministry, RHA, Pharmacy Guild, Pharmaceutical Society, and peer groups. However, 
this committee was advisory only. It did not directly implement policy, nor co-ordinate delivery of services. Because 
it could not control crucial mechanisms, and has not caused any key events, it is not discussed in any further detail. 
Refer McNicholas et al. (1996, cited in Kemp (2004). However, the Stakeholder Committee has been active in a 
network sense of facilitating and shaping aspects of communication.
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By April 1995 the need to lower the prices of the syringes along with the costs of their distribution 
and disposal led to further proposals. These were for the packing and transport work to be 
incorporated into the NEP infrastructure rather than being commercially contracted out. Such work 
was offered to NENZ in the form of a commercial contract, intended to advance the non-profit 
health goals of the NEP. Simon Nimmo, the key NENZ negotiator,479 informed the peer groups: 
“we are required to develop a tendering document offering our services to the Ministry ... with a 
view to us taking over supply and distribution of all packs from the 1st of October 1995” (Ministry 
of Health, 1995b: n p).
The Ministry of Health’s neo-liberal environment and pragmatic principles of organising health 
services fitted well with proposals for local communities to be serviced by regionally contracted 
local community groups. Yet such principles also promoted the representation of consumers and 
the management of health services at mid-level by private agencies. NENZ could justifiably be 
funded for its consumer representation at a Ministry policy level, and as a provider of mid-level co-
ordination of service implementation, yet also work between these levels as a provider of 
experimental pilot programmes that engaged directly with IDU.480
These developments of national co-ordination were somewhat akin to Kemp’s earlier proposals, 
were related in their logics to the even earlier IV League proposals, and still bore the 1985 gay 
activist imprint of community empowerment. Moreover, because these sequences of development 
were combined with constant, institutionalised shapes of opportunity and distrust, the regular 
circulations of syringes and money helped to consolidate events in new unpredictable forms and 
understandings. The trajectory of NENZ was very much like a personal career in being both 
structured and random (Abbott, 2001: 161-164). Nimmo emphasised such peer-professional 
aspects when he noted that moving into this new occupational territory and status entailed greater 
accountabilities, since: 
The provision of packaging and distribution of all needles and syringes is a key control area in 
terms of the programme. By taking control of this area and the production of educational 
materials used in the scheme, the members of Needle Exchange New Zealand are effectively 
taking control of the programme (under contract to the Ministry of Health) with the exception 
of the regulatory aspects. While this is desirable in terms of health goals it carrys [sic] a 
substantial responsibility with it. (Nimmo, 1995b)
Nimmo linked his emphasis on health goals to a Ministry of Health requirement that the financial 
proceeds were to promote education, not regional salaries, nor unaccountable overheads. He 
described the profitability as negligible and the administration overheads as considerable, yet 
nonetheless desirable for improving relations with local pharmacies. The latter point is significant. 
After the NEP was founded in 1988, the number of participating pharmacies had dropped 
479. Nimmo had succeeded Kemp as ADIO co-ordinator, then became the NENZ co-ordinator after Auerbach in 1995.
480. See Nimmo (1994a, 1994b), Walzl (1994), Fitzgerald (1995), CIVDURG (1995).
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significantly in the early 1990s (Nimmo, 2004. pers. com.). In response, ADIO had instituted a 
policy of recruiting and supporting pharmacies. ADIO had also bypassed the original sole supplier 
of syringes481 and bought a range of injection equipment directly, and illicitly, from pharmacy 
wholesalers.
By June 1996, IDU groups transacted 56% of the NEP injecting equipment ordered from 
wholesalers (Kemp, 2004), largely through the co-ordination provided by NENZ. NENZ gained 
greater control over the lowering of costs than had pharmacies, yet could not easily control the 
range and bookkeeping arrangements of the discounts offered by its member groups. The NEP 
stakeholders approved of passing on the profits from any economies of scale into the better 
provision of education materials. However, the NEP pharmacists objected if the regulated price 
was reduced or undercut by the peer groups, since such competition impacted on their profitability. 
The more the peer groups took control of their commercial operations, the more their scope and 
scale of purchasing and selling increased. Yet this increase risked a conflict with the profitability of
the same pharmacies that guaranteed national coverage. Peer groups could not provide such 
coverage. The trial that emerged was a trial of professionalism. The peer groups were challenged 
by the situation that they increasingly controlled to use that control to work with, rather than 
against, the NEP pharmacies. By forming NENZ, and prioritising relationships with pharmacies, 
the peer groups developed a method of increasing their professionalism along several fronts that 
reinforced each other.
After a hesitant start, Ministry of Health officials encouraged NENZ to develop in this professional
way that mixed the health logics for supporting pharmacies in collegial systems, with the 
commercial systems of logistics that risked undercutting pharmacies (Nimmo, 2004. pers. com.; 
Ministry of Health, 1995a). However, since NENZ was a facilitating rather than a regulation 
enforcing organisation, it was the autonomous member groups that provided the primary influences
on its direction. They voted to professionalise rather than bureaucratise, which enhanced rather 
than diminished their autonomy as peer-professional groups and as a peer-professional 
occupation.482 After the mid-1990s the peer-operated exchanges began to increase in number, yet 
also in scope and professionalism, with the assistance of NENZ. NENZ has seemed a professional 
instrument for facilitating new peer groups, reorganising costly areas of the NEP infrastructure, 
passing savings back into the equipment supply and motivation change components of the 
programme, and supporting high level negotiations over policy direction. 
481. This was Salmond Smith Biolab formed in 1986 from the merger of Salmond Industries and Smith-Biolab merged 
to form Salmond Smith Biolab Ltd with Biolab Scientific Ltd named as the scientific supply division within the 
Group.
482. I acted as a CIVDURG representative at this meeting. Although CIVDURG was in dissolution, I reversed the 
previous objections of CIVDURG representatives to joining NENZ, and conveyed the views of the Christchurch 
exchange workers, which firmly supported NENZ. One of the first acts of the DISC Trust was to join NENZ. All 
those attending the formative NENZ meeting wanted more professional, peer delivered services for IDU, and none 
advocated for a NEP bureaucracy. Officials were regarded with wariness, even when supportive.
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The then existing types of NEP service contracts remained with Regional Health Authorities,483 
while those agencies existed, because responsiveness to local IDU environments remained a 
significant goal. NENZ was useful in a different way by being directly and rapidly talked to, as a 
single voice that was more directly accountable to the Ministry of Health through its funding 
contract than any regional group could be. Accordingly, NENZ did not become disestablished as 
had previous national co-ordinating bodies such as the Public Health Commission, the National 
Council on AIDS the various AIDS TaskForces, and CASONZ. NENZ was more sustainable in 
how it could utilise commercial logics to align its accountabilities to the Ministry and to its 
member groups. NENZ's distance from IDU life-worlds, while drawing on the experience of 
dedicated peer personnel, was undoubtedly a strategically significant factor in avoiding problems 
such as those that CIVDURG experienced. However, personal dedication and a clean record would
not by themselves have been sufficient to drive the tough bargaining that represented IDU against 
an extremely powerful state agency. The relative stability and bargaining capabilities of NENZ 
seem best explained by its development of commercial logics, practices, and expertise while 
retaining the shelter of a specialised, health professional niche, and the shelter of illicit IDU 
associations. 
The education and harm-reducing, outreach aspects of the NEP could never be income earning, yet 
were attached to the logistics of circulating injecting equipment through the commercial logics of 
accountancy. NENZ was not only an entity that could be named as if a single solid actor, but was 
also an effect that emerged between a network of stakeholders who used a range of organising 
logics. This effect partially compartmentalised such contradictions in a specialisation of expertise. 
This made the problems of internal hybrid conflict more manageable, while also encouraging the 
IDU involved in providing the NEP services to act more effectively by drawing on a range of peer-
professional identities. NENZ accommodated hybrid conflicts, and lifted them to a more 
professional level of abstraction and accountability in long-term planning. However, NENZ also 
engaged in direct service work and research that benefited the peer groups, while providing co-
ordination services.
In actor-network terms of 'translation' (Callon, 1991, 1999), NENZ first 'problematised' by defining
a problem in terms of NENZ being a solution. This led to regular interactions in the form of yearly 
meetings funded on a one-off basis. Then the interests of the individual stakeholder groups were 
problematised and satisfied by being included as essential in the development of a more solid 
relational proposal. When the interests were committed, the connections and divisions of activities 
483. The history of changes from district branches of the Department of Health to Area Health Boards to Regional Health
Authorities to the Public Health Commission, to the Health Funding Authority, to the Ministry of Health, and to 
District Health Boards over a twelve year period cannot be discussed here. Suffice it to point out that health funding 
directed at a stigmatised community has to be ring-fenced or centralised to prevent local majority communities 
diverting such funds into majority health concerns at the expense of marginalised communities.
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became more solid. This solidity began to create aspects of an entity that was partially responsive 
to its mechanisms through its participating agents and its systems of distributed intelligence. This 
made it possible to do political 'boundary work' within NENZ, while also requiring such work to 
ensure that the actants, such as people, objects, and information, were mobilised in the needed 
shapes and sequences of the NENZ 'mechanism'. NENZ represented the regional groups, not any 
particular person, yet it worked through a collaboration of individual actors and objects. Different 
arrangements and loyalties were possible. NENZ collectivised the groups, ameliorated some 
differences, and reinforced other differences. This mobilisation of representation offered greater 
potential benefits, yet also greater potential conflicts. As a participant, I had hopes, and took risks. I
exceeded my formal authority as a CIVDURG representative, rather than risk the peer alliance 
being lost and the DISC Trust developing different goals of national co-ordination. If the NENZ 
proposal had collapsed later in 1995, I would not have been surprised, since there was no certainty 
to be found anywhere. Yet documents and objects began to move, commitments solidified, and 
organisation emerged regardless.
On a wider front, health professional types of goals and ethics are seen here to be entangled in 
market logics and expertise in budget management. It suited the Ministry officials and Nimmo to 
encourage the development of such expertise. The move repositioned peers from being only 
colleagues and competitors of pharmacies, to also being somewhat akin to ‘pharmaceutical 
salespeople’, a post-war professionalised occupation involving commercial expertise in a narrow 
range of commodified health products (Greene, 2004). Market expertise involved skills in contract 
negotiation. However, bureaucratic expertise in management was required to link personal skills, 
be those formal contract market or informal drug market proficiencies, with structured, stable 
organisations. This development shows how solid demand for peer-professional NEP services 
became meshed with a solid organisational capability, and in these ways, attained the status and 
resources of state agency funding.
3   Commercial logics, regional divisions, professional representation
In 1989 it was difficult to monitor syringes for HCV seroprevalence because the techniques 
required more blood than was usually found in returned syringes. By 1992, the voluntary testing of 
NEP clients had proved feasible and received peer-professional support, as discussed in Chapter 8. 
This method permitted larger blood samples, and in being workable, increased the professional and
official awareness of HCV prevalence. Nonetheless, changes in policy were slow and were not 
based on previous models that presumed a national strategy. Instead, a range of ‘action memos’ 
were published during the mid-1990s, yet in 1997 a Ministry of Health official responded to 
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requests for increased funding by referring to HCV as a personal health rather than public health 
issue (NEP, 1997). This was despite HCV being a contagious disease that, as with HIV, would 
have far lower incidence if the ‘pool’ of persons with the virus in the community was reduced in 
numbers by treatment and prevention programmes. 
Before 2001, according to a Ministry of Health official, there was no comprehensive HCV 
prevention policy (NEP, 2000b). Nor have health professionals published a comprehensive model 
of HCV transmission and treatment suited to New Zealand situations, and by which policy 
outcomes might be evaluated by specialist groups and the public. The founding NEP logic has been
to increase IDU access to syringes and improve motivations to safer injecting practices by means of
trusted intermediaries. Despite the prevalence beginning and remaining high among IDU, the NEP 
logic has remained the only strategy for reducing the incidence and consequent prevalence of HCV.
To increase access to syringes by IDU, the purchase price needed to reduce. The price was kept 
high by user-pays funding, and by rigid regulations. These regulations required that only value-
added packs of syringes that contained printed educational material could be sold (CASONZ, 
1990c). Officials in the Department of Health and the later Ministry of Health refused to address 
these problems, despite repeated requests from the peer groups. After NENZ became established, 
the peer-professionals attempted to reduce the purchase prices of syringes through two methods. 
One was to deregulate, the other to increase funding levels. As might be expected in a hybrid 
situation, the two methods frequently entangled.
Between 1990 and 1996, most peer groups had carried out illegal trials of at-cost or free syringe 
supply (Nimmo, 2004. pers. com.). These trials were ignored by officials, yet the significant 
increases in sales and returns provided evidence of barriers to access by IDU. Such trials were 
funded out of the existing peer group budgets, as a benefit to their IDU constituency. It seemed 
impossible for the regionally isolated and financially constrained peer groups to subsidise the cost 
of syringes, without reducing other areas of service provision such as managerial wages and 
volunteer expenses. These restrictions reduced the NEP goals of empowering the marginalised IDU
communities by reducing the numbers and status of peer representation, and by 'isolating' the 
normality of peer-controlled activity within a limited compartment of the health sector.484
Data from the free syringe supply trials showed that pricing barriers compromised the NEP goal of 
always using a new syringe for injecting, yet also seemed to be unfair competition from the 
perspectives of pharmacists (Henderson, 2005. pers. com.). The NEP pharmacists were more 
professionally constrained by regulations and could not reduce their fixed prices. Yet these 
pharmacists did not want the NEP regulations changed to 'unfix' the prices, fearing budget 
uncertainties and the possibilities of disputes with IDU clients, as discussed in Chapter 5. Nor 
484. See Smith ( 2003. pers. com.), Aitken (2002: 48-49). 
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could the pharmacists operate at a loss. Furthermore, by buying as a single bloc the peer groups 
benefited from economies of scale that were not available to individual pharmacists. Despite being 
normal in overseas programmes, free syringe supply schemes actually risked destabilising the 
hybridity between the pharmacists and the peers in the NEP. 
In May 1996, the Drug Health Development Project (DHDP) peer exchange in Wellington, began a
free one-for-one trial exchange organised by Robert Kemp. Over 700 IDU clients became 
registered (Kemp, 2004), showing how the demand from IDU overcame their needs for anonymity.
This was the first financially sustainable trial because it was funded by the local Regional Health 
Authority (RHA). This official support also caused a potential problem, since the RHA was a state 
agency, and had been induced into 'inadvertently' breaking a law. The trial was halted, in extremely
ambiguous and contested circumstances, in January, 1997.485 Two reasons have been offered. The 
trial had breached the NEP regulations that required a single, fixed nation-wide price. Furthermore,
the trial had featured continuing requests for funding increases, which worried the officials 
concerned (Nimmo, 2005. pers. com.). Yet arguments continued and regulatory opinions shifted as 
regards the first rationale. Furthermore, NENZ member groups had reasons for supporting, yet also 
opposing the trial.486 
The trial was supported because its data created an evidence-base for lobbying for free syringe 
supply,487 which was the single most significant goal of all the peer-professionals. Furthermore, the 
peer groups had contributed significantly to achieving cost reductions through wholesale 
purchasing of syringes, and insisted on these savings being passed on to IDU consumers, to help 
reduce access barriers. The trial supported this goal, even though the funding streams were 
different. Furthermore, the halting of the trial breached an understanding that breaking the 
requirement for a fixed price would be ignored if the new price was lower than the regulation price 
(Blacklock, 1997). Yet the trial also created significant problems for the NEP co-ordinator’s 
attempts to recruit and retain pharmacies (Henderson, 2004. pers. com.; Nimmo, 2004. pers. com.). 
Officials in the Ministry of Health tried to retrieve the situation by creating a special legal 
exemption for the prices charged, or rather not charged, by the Wellington peer group. This would 
have left the prices for the other peer groups and pharmacies far higher. The 'instability' this would 
have caused needed to be formally brought to the attention of Ministry officials by its legal division
(Ministry of Health, 1996). The prospect of direct control of local price differentials would have 
startled many officials in the short term. In the longer term, the situation appeared very similar to 
485. See NEP (1997), Blacklock (1997), Poutasi (1997), Ministry of Health (1996, 1999).
486. All NENZ members wanted to reduce the financial access barriers to reduce HCV incidence. However, there 
seemed a possibility that completely free supply might be forced by one-size-fits all regulations onto other groups 
unable to sustain the financial burden. This would have opened such groups to the risk of collapse and takeover.  
487. Supply was emphasised over exchange because although return rates had seldom risen over 50%, there had been no 
reported problems from syringes being disposed of in public places.
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how the peer groups started in 1988, with ADIO being initially an exception, then rapidly 
developing into a model of exceptionalism in an environment of contradictions that favoured the 
expansion of such models. 
The DHDP free trial undercut the NENZ negotiating strategies, which depended upon stable 
national balances of costs and benefits. These became destabilised by a regional initiative that 
relied on exceptional funding and regulatory circumstances. Free exchange, funded by 
Government, was only achieved as a national policy in 2004, after a decade of official inaction, and
only through direct Ministerial intervention that overturned previous Ministry policy. NENZ also 
needed to retain the support of pharmacists in order to provide national scope of NEP coverage. 
However, since pharmacists would not participate in any system that removed their service fee, 
free syringe supply required careful planning and gradual approaches. Such constraints, combined 
with an understanding by stakeholders that the overall funding requirements would not 
significantly increase (Ministry of Health, 2000), led to regulated price controls being replaced by 
downwards pressures in response to market conditions from 1998 (Aitken, 2002: 67, Ministry of 
Health, 1998b). Syringe prices dropped over the following year in gradual, manageable ways. At 
this time the DHDP withdrew from NENZ.
In order to reduce the syringe purchase price through a different method, Ministry officials and 
NEP peer-professionals wanted to reduce the packaging, transport, and disposal costs. This entailed
shifting towards a more open market, less price-fixed system. Once single syringes had been able 
to be sold in the early 1990s, though not licitly, rather than only in packs that included a return 
container, the supply of empty safety containers became a significant unallocated cost. This cost 
was assumed by state agencies specifically responsible for public health. The peer groups began 
supplying pharmacies with syringe packs in a commercial distribution system. However, the peer 
groups used the profits to subsidise the public health aspects of the NEP, such as 'sharps bins' and 
personal returns containers (Kill, 1998) which had become increasingly difficult to supply 
(Blacklock, 1997). In return for providing free returns containers, NENZ received an informal 
undertaking from the Ministry in May, 1996, that: “price regulation would not be enforced if 
outlets priced below the recommended level” (Blacklock, 1997).
In 2001, NENZ developed greater bargaining resources due to a commercial expansion through a 
Ministry of Health service contract to transport returned syringes for disposal. There had been a 
period from 1993 to 1995 when no system for the recovery of returned syringes existed. This was 
due to the Ministry replacing the Department of Health in 1993, destroying the Departments 
systems of syringe recovery, but not replacing that system (Walker, Brady, & Baker, 1994: 2, 31). 
Matters were left to market forces. After 1994, under a scheme called Outlet Support Service, 
individual peer groups and commercial operators had been contracted to collect the returned 
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syringes for incineration in local hospitals. However, the scheme had been fragmented and difficult
to manage (Henderson, 2005. pers. com.). Nonetheless, in 2001, the Ministry of Health suddenly 
needed to purchase waste disposal services for transporting the returned syringes when the 
regulations from the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act (New Zealand Government, 
1996) came into force. These regulations increased the costs of transporting hazardous wastes by 
increasing the quality controls required. The disposal contract required the people transporting 
syringes to be appropriately qualified and to maintain a rigourous record-keeping system.488 In 
response, NENZ created a commercial subsidiary called Needle Exchange Services Trust (NEST) 
which employed three people. One was the NEP Co-ordinator, who supervised two driver/
educators, one in the North Island and one in the South Island. This commercial yet not-for-profit 
activity made other NEP duties, such as political representation and advocacy, more stable and 
financially sustainable.
NENZ could undercut commercial prices, while offering pharmacy support services, by being 
dedicated to NEP outcomes rather than to profitability. The health and commercial expertise of 
NENZ aligned with the other hybrid professional aspects of the NEP, and with the expectations of 
Ministry officials. However, NENZ’s increased bargaining capabilities extended its activities into 
the policy and budget setting spaces of governance. NENZ represented IDU in their being a 
marginal community, and as consumers of NEP services, and also as being a key factor in the 
provision of public health. Accordingly, potential policy challenges to the Ministry jurisdiction 
over health outcomes and health rationing became more likely. However, the health and 
commercial professionalism of NENZ had become aligned with the Ministry in a network of 
provisional trust and circulation of syringes and money. Any abrupt local shift in this network 
jeopardised the wider stability.
Conflicts between state agencies and peer consumer representatives emerged because service 
deficiencies were caused by the regulatory controls that held prices high and created access 
barriers. The prosecutions for the possession of NEP syringes had continued. The informal 
arrangements for the supply of sharps bins and returns containers were not honoured by new 
commercial entrants to the NEP syringe supply market (Blacklock, 1998). Such conflicts 
intensified because increased IDU access to syringes to reduce HCV transmission required 
increased resources. Yet the state agencies and peers had different understandings of the hazards 
and costs of HCV.489 In these later years the Ministry of Health proved reluctant to extend its 
488. See Ministry for the Environment (2005a, b), New Zealand Government (2001).
489. HIV/AIDS has been accepted as a public health hazard. By comparison, from its emergence as a testable disease, 
HCV was addressed as public health where this overlapped with existing HIV prevention measures. Where such 
measures needed to be extended “to combat the further spread of the disease amongst IDU, ... [the Ministry of 
Health negotiator] responded that the issue was dealt with under Personal Health in the Ministry” (NEP, 1997). The 
‘public safety component’ of the NEP included purchase and delivery of returns containers and sharps bins 
(Ministry of Health, 1999). These helped to prevent needle stick accidents to the general public, in contrast to the 
deliberate sharing of syringes, yet HCV could transmit in either case. This categorisation would seem to require 
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‘partnership model’ of harm reduction and community empowerment from HIV to HCV 
prevention. 
The NEP transactions shifted around, 'hunting' for the most supportable arrangements. Commercial
transactions that had been an IDU responsibility, as in the user-pays arrangements, became less 
influenced by profit motives and service fees, even becoming intermittently state-funded. The 
transactions, such as waste disposal, that had been a state agency responsibility, moved from an 
unsheltered external market environment closer to a less competitive, less ‘for-profit’, more 
professional position inside the NEP. In these developments, commercial expertise seemed 
effective and efficient, in contrast with the uncertainties associated with the peer representation of 
IDU. Peer influences had originally depended upon the NEP goal of motivation change. This goal 
had been heavily and systemically de-emphasised, with priority given to the economies of the 
movement of syringes by peers. However, as shown, syringes carried their own forms of 
representation, surveillance, and meaning. Peers became separated from IDU in the degree of 
control of syringe movements and associated surveillance, yet only partially. Because of the hybrid
environmental needs, syringes carried a public health need for IDU empowerment, and peer-
professionals wanted to empower IDU.
In becoming a single actor with a monopoly over the disposal of used syringes, peers had achieved 
a place at the policy table. Yet the increasing expenditure on the NEP gave the Ministry of Health 
increasing reason to distrust the capabilities of the peer-professionals for loosening budgetary 
purse-strings. Although the results of testing returned syringes in 1989, 1990, and 1994, had shown
HIV to be controlled, the available information on HCV prevalence indicated increasing 
requirements for expenditure on treatment.490 
In 2001, as frustration by peer-professionals, and a need for Ministry of Health officials to defend 
their policy jurisdiction intensified, conflicts broke out during negotiations over the ‘rescue 
package’ for the collapsed IV Union peer exchange in Palmerston North. The IV Union had 
exceeded its budget by running a free syringe supply, a problem perceived by NENZ as a symptom
of a national issue that: “... levels of government funding under contracts are insufficient to provide
the services which we [NENZ] collectively contract to provide” (Ministry of Health, 2001: 1). 
NENZ threatened to undertake rolling strike action at the thirteen peer group needle exchanges. 
This would have halted the supply of syringes and the collection of used syringes from all two 
hundred and eight outlets, amidst frenzied media coverage. NENZ wanted the Ministry of Health to
HCV prevention to compete for private health funding, and would prevent any comprehensive HCV minimisation 
programme. Perhaps nothing else so indicates how a communicable disease was not considered a public health issue 
when minimising the chances of accidental exposure left ‘only’ IDU liable to future HCV harms.
490. See Sheerin, Green & Sellman (2003, 2001), Easton (2002), Carter et al. (2000), Nesdale et al. (2000), Kemp & 
MacDonald (1999), Judson (1999), Kemp et al. (1998), Brunton et al. (1996), Robinson et al. (1995), Brunton 
(1994), Woodfield et al. (1993).
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lobby for increased government funding to pay sustainable rates for the contracted services needed 
to improve the NEP health outcomes.
The Ministry of Health officials refused to negotiate outside of the existing budget constraints, 
acting as rationing agents rather than as community health advocacy agents. NENZ had acted to 
increase the funding of a peer group by invoking a concept of collective contract negotiation. This 
threatened both the Ministry bargaining position and the established governance system for the 
peer groups. The Ministry officials could not easily start up new peer groups outside NENZ 
without jeopardising the stability of the NEP. However, the NENZ collective stance also 
conceivably threatened the autonomy of those peer groups that were well-resourced, while offering
benefits to the lower funded groups. The Ministry officials only avoided industrial action by 
promising to enter into genuine contract negotiations and guaranteeing that the NEP would be 
reviewed by an independent researcher.491 NENZ insisted that the selected researcher be from 
outside New Zealand and otherwise outside the influence of the Ministry.
Shortly after the strike had supposedly been settled, an official wrote on behalf of the Ministry to 
NENZ stating that they had ‘no confidence’ in the NEP co-ordinator. Among other responsibilities,
the NEP co-ordinator was employed to act as the primary negotiator for NENZ. The Ministry 
official also stated that they had lost confidence in NENZ itself, since NENZ members had voted 
unanimously, in an emergency meeting, to support the strike.492 Such actions were not considered 
'constructive and practical' by these Ministry officials.493 Shortly after this vote,494 these Ministry of
Health officials negotiated privately495 with the DHDP group in Wellington for it to assume the 
management of the Palmerston North group. According to NENZ sources, Ministry officials had 
delayed negotiating over the Palmerston North contract until the exchange was financially 
irrecoverable. The IV Union in Palmerston North could not provide a viable alternative to being 
taken-over once it was unable to trade or employ staff. This seems in some ways similar to the 
CIVDURG situation described in Chapter 7, but without the outcome retaining local representation
of local IDU situations through organisational autonomy. 
Nimmo presented the issue as one of organisational autonomy, and requested an apology from the 
491. As it turned out, New Zealand being a small country and the Ministry of Health very influential in any researchers 
career prospects, a researcher was recruited from Australia. This indicates the careful weighing of official influence 
necessary when evaluating state agency commissioned research in New Zealand.
492. Henderson (2005 pers. com.); Nimmo (2004 pers. com.).
493. The official who made this comment had previously been employed in the RHA that had supported the Wellington 
peer group trial, and had a connection with that trial. Nimmo had been reputed to have anonymously informed the 
Ministry about the trial, making the RHA involvement impossible to be ignored. Nimmo denies this, and has pointed 
out other reasons why the trial embarrassed its funders. A complex tangle of issues is clearly involved. 
494. Some sources suggest before the vote, despite it being unanimous.
495. There has been some disagreement among the groups over the degree of private negotiation involved, but it seems 
clear enough that it was sufficient to surprise and anger other peer groups in NENZ. Whether the production of such 
division was a longer-term goal of Ministry officials has been impossible to track further, but does not seem out of 
the question.
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Ministry of Health for overstepping appropriate boundaries in the internal affairs of private 
corporate organisations. No apology was forthcoming, in fact the Ministry officials made it clear to
NENZ that, despite the strike being settled, they intended to pursue the matter by targeting the 
negotiator rather than the negotiation (NEP, 2001). A well-informed source reported that the NENZ
Trustees were informally advised to drop the matter or risk further reprisals.496 Since the Ministry 
of Health funded NENZ, Nimmo had little choice but to resign.497 
These conflicts among people, among peer groups, as well as between Ministry of Health officials 
and NENZ employees, all reduced the ability of the peer-professionals to trust each other. They 
also distrusted the Ministry, which had, for the first time, been seen to covertly intercede in the 
administration of a peer group (NEP, 2001). The Ministry was observed using its funding and 
regulatory powers to form a ‘favoured’ regional bloc, using external controls,498 in a way that 
undercut the legal autonomy of the peer groups and undercut the NEP’s method of health 
promotion. 
The Ministry file on the NEP contains no references to any workshops, discussions, negotiations, 
or other consultation with the NEP stakeholder groups in this shift to a new policy. Nor has any 
document on this new national NEP strategy been published.499 The Ministry perspective appears to
have been that the peer groups had accepted an obligation to provide services, but did not have a 
'right' to negotiate for improved services by threatening to withdraw existing services. Ministry 
officials, by contrast, reserved the right to negotiate with NENZ on the basis of excluding the peer 
group membership's choice of co-ordinator and negotiator. This conflict involved aspects of 
bureaucratic solidarity, opportunistic market negotiations, and a tangle of professional ethics. 
The conflict problematised concepts of trust-based partnership between marginalised communities 
and officials. A decade of Ministry restrictions on service provisions, HCV prevention being 
treated as ‘private health’ rather than a general public risk to youthful drug experimenters and any 
drug user in prison, and inaction over continuing arrests of IDU500 for possession of syringes, had 
496. This source is not named for obvious reasons.
497. However, Nimmo has also referred to the withdrawal of support by Karen Blacklock, another key NENZ 
spokesperson, as contributing to his resignation.
498. However, it must be kept in mind that ADIO had also started peer exchanges in other cities or towns and kept them 
centrally managed, also forming a regional bloc. The southward movement of this bloc has stopped at the level of 
Tauranga/Mt Maunganui. Such bloc formation relates to a NEP issue of service gaps and regional coverage that has 
been of concern since the peer groups began. Yet these are political blocs on the NENZ Board, not actual service 
delivery blocs providing adequate coverage on the ground.
499. These breaches of the principles of open and transparent government are of concern since, if a small cabal of 
officials within the Ministry decided to dictate policy for reasons of personal interest, or to cover up previous 
malfeasance, the outputs would be similar. Such situations of uncertain trust do not seem conducive to effective and 
efficient management, especially in situations where distrust is endemic, such as the intersections between crime and 
health promotion in the NEP.
500. NENZ collected details and aggregates on such arrests throughout the 1990s. Despite supporting the 1987 legislation
and  statements of support for the programme, police also desired to retain their powers of arrest. The ability to 
harass IDU with holding charges aids police abilities to gather information, even when no serious intent to lay 
charges is present at the time of arrest. According to Ericson & Haggerty (1997), information gathering is the core 
activity of policing.
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minimised peer-professional trust in Ministry officials, none of whom remained from the NEP’s 
formative period. 
The NEP peer groups attained a long-standing goal through the strike, since the settlement initiated
a fully independent external review. This was carried out by researchers from Australia who had no
record of strong links with Ministry personnel, nor career interests in receiving future commissions 
from the Ministry.501 The report from the review recommended the provision of state funding for a 
free, one-for-one syringe exchange system. The quality and public nature of the review (Aitken, 
2002) could not easily be ignored, yet even so did not lead to decisive action by the Ministry.
Ministry inaction notwithstanding, the review helped to gain the support of the Associate Minister 
of Health, who was politically and philosophically disposed to the concept of free provision of 
essential health needs. The review provided sufficient evidence to justify the expenditure on a 
Ministerial-directed policy goal of a free one-for-one syringe exchange system. The combination of
authoritative public evidence and the Minister’s ‘private’ influence over policy overcame the 
official resistance to promoting a free, one-for-one exchange system as a goal. The previous record 
of Ministry officials suggests strongly that the NEP review and the free one-for-one scheme only 
occurred because of the strike threat, which Ministry officials themselves attribute in significant 
aspects to the NEP co-ordinator, Simon Nimmo. 
Nevertheless, the free one-for-one scheme itself has changed the interplay of stability and 
uncertainty from which the NEP’s sustainability has previously emerged. By becoming more 
dependent on centralised government funding, the autonomy of the NEP outlets has been reduced. 
The acceptance of centralised funding would seem to entail increased control by state agencies 
over the ways in which the funded services were provided, along with increased vulnerability to 
swings in government policy, as illustrated by difficulties experienced by Australian needle 
exchange groups (Kemp, 2003; Brunton, 2005. pers. com.). 
A significant degree of financial independence had for a decade helped peer-professional groups to 
negotiate with rather than be directed by first the Department and then the Ministry of Health. Even
though NENZ itself was centrally funded, its threat to strike shows that its policy was directed 
more by its members’ needs than by a concern to appease the hand that fed it. The strike led to the 
loss of a skilled and spirited NEP administrator. Nonetheless, the hybrid health parameters of the 
NEP seem just as risky to exceed by becoming overtly politicalised as by being overly peer, or 
overly professional. Yet I consider that the peer-professional groups would have achieved much 
less if they had been directly employed or otherwise more closely administered by the Ministry, 
since they would have fewer options to propose unwelcome policies, to adopt independent stances, 
501. I would be far less likely to have written this social history if I was a young social technician type of researcher 
wanting to specialise in health analysis in New Zealand, and looking to forward my career at any price. Fortunately 
for this research, I can be honest because I am independent in years, resources and most of all, in attitude.
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to disobey superiors, and to demonstrate their expert capabilities. The NEP gained significant 
capabilities of community empowerment and providing health services by surviving as a 
independent, commercially accountable type of semi-health professional. I do not consider that 
these widely distributed and rapidly adaptive capabilities could have been achieved through any 
central or regional administration that was associated with close direction by state agency officials. 
4   Alliances and antagonisms between government and governance
I have described how the NEP’s forms of community representation and health provision were 
sustained, largely through increases in stability but also through sudden changes, by means of a 
commercial infrastructure constituted by a combination of syringe transport, peer employment, and
professional practices of accounting and administration. Yet this was not an open market 
environment. For most of the NEP’s history, the purchasing, transporting, and sale of injecting 
equipment occurred within a highly regulated framework. Such regulations could not be formally 
disregarded or broken, because they sheltered NEP activities and personnel from the criminal law 
that prohibited illicit drug use. Nonetheless, these regulations were frequently ignored in practice, 
or worked-around in discrete complicity with state agencies. This flexibility came from the 
distance and discontinuities of administration, and from the legal autonomy of the peer outlets, 
backed up by expectations that services would be provided using commercial methods, as in the 
initial planning around a pharmacy system.
A ‘shop-front’ dispensary model of exchanges run by peer groups consolidated alongside 
pharmacies because an improved supply of syringes seemed an achievable goal for a type of 
public, ‘non-closeted’ IDU who desired better health outcomes for their peers. A peer-run shop 
could provide printed health information alongside the sterile injecting equipment that IDU desired.
Peer-run shops seemed capable of delicately altering IDU social networks by creating a resource 
and support centre, while not increasing media problems, nor unforeseen political costs, since a 
public shop could not permit any private activity of injecting on its premises. The shop 'activity' did
not involve point-of-sale, peer-to-peer counselling. It only influenced IDU motivations through 
understandings gathered from printed educational material, or more pervasively from the way 
syringes as objects became normalised and rationalised. However, the shops did provide a stable 
environment where peer-to-peer services, and peer empowerment as health specialists, could 
become associated with and supported by syringe logistics. This stability was reinforced by the 
minimising of financial costs to the public partly through the user-pays system and partly through 
avoiding a bureaucratic system of administration that depended upon officials.
The NEP overcame the difficulties of its institutional environment, and of the more short-term 
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public urgency over HIV/AIDS, by consolidating as a simple, workable concept. By becoming 
workable, the difficulties became the foundation of the NEP’s productivity. Nonetheless, such 
difficulties explain some of the rigidity of the eventual Management Plan. As the plan 
consolidated, the difficulties and opportunities for opposition increased because more details could 
be specified and opposed, both empirically and symbolically.502 At this stage it became useful to 
reduce flexibility and enforce rigidity, satisfying one set of stakeholders while challenging a 
different set who could not be satisfied to accept the plan as an non-modifiable whole, or to reject it
and therefore become accountable for proposing a workable alternative.503 
After 1988, as the NEP extended in corporatising and professionalising with the emergence of the 
peer groups, a more flexible hybridity emerged as the regulatory framework was ignored, or 
informally modified, then eventually rescinded. The commercial logics and practices that first 
accompanied then superseded such regulatory directives facilitated the further consolidation of 
peer-professionalism. This was partly due to the neo-liberal funding and policy environment, and 
partly because the longer the NEP offered cheap and effective health outcomes, the less public 
support was needed from the medical professions.
The peer-run shop-front model had not been present when the requirements by police and medical 
professionals for IDU counselling had initially been formalised. The model emerged through a 
bending, shifting, and reassembling of strands, some illicit and some professional, into a new 
configuration of peer-professionalism where IDU self-help methods remained significant as an 
alternative.504 However, the well-organised movements of the syringes and other objects added 
stability and reliability to the institutional configuration of the NEP’s necessity. 
As the NEP adapted to an increasingly neo-liberal state sector environment during the early 1990s, 
it’s activities became differentiated into several layers of contractual arrangements. These 
connected a grounded network of IDU practices with high-level policy decisionmaking, yet 
simultaneously distanced IDU from direct supervision by state agencies, while providing spaces for
self-directed NEP activities. The peer-professional representatives of IDU occupied and stabilised 
these spaces by forming alliances among state agencies, several health professions, and IDU. 
502. For instance, when the Management Plan was publicly presented, the AIDS Advisory Committee could directly 
criticise its lack of obligatory exchange and professional counselling, but not before. Furthermore, pharmacists were 
concerned to minimise unpredicted cost increases.
503. Whereas in some policy-making of this strategic type the urgency is carefully engineered, for instance by interested 
officials holding agendas who thereafter can claim to be disinterestedly following their ‘neutral’ due process in 
directing the consultative mediation between public and private interests, in the case of HIV/AIDS the urgency was 
genuine. 
504.  Syringes were moved initially along grass-root networks, then by illicit pharmacists, then by licit pharmacists in the
NEP, then by IDU peers, then by sex-work peers, then by ‘Key IDU’ in the West Coast pilot programme. By 1995, 
ADIO openly provided twenty different combinations of needles and syringes, quite illegally, yet purchased in an 
open market with the knowledge of the Ministry of Health (Ministry of Health, 1996). In 1998, somewhat 
unbelievably, and seemingly with intent to mislead,  police claimed that “there is still a market in stolen syringes 
and needles” (Ronald, 1998). Any such theft seems irrelevant, except as an alternative, self-help measure by IDU 
that would become significant if the NEP did not exist.
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Peers did not ‘leap’ into these spaces of opportunity; rather, they followed a retreating 
professionalism to which they remained attached, and to which they attached their NEP variety of 
peer-professional concerns. This social resource developed by inverting illicit, inappropriate 
knowledges and practices, then extending the resultant productivity into wider network activities 
that were successfully translated as appropriately healthy, within boundaries.
Although the transport of sterile and used syringes became increasingly organised and 
‘professional’, the general terrain of IDU trust and distrust remained largely unchanged due to the 
continued prohibition of drugs. Boundary lines were shifted, but only in local sites that remained 
local. The NEP was frequently described as a success story for harm reduction policies. 
Nonetheless, the NEP, considered as a site in interactional spaces,505 did not demonstrate any 
significant capabilities of extending its environment by demands ‘from the inside’. Instead, 
openings to territory emerged from the outside environment of commercial, official, and 
professional practices. 
Useful descriptive concepts can be found by following the actual connections that constituted the 
NEP’s hybrid network. We can see how boundaries of insideness and outsideness followed the 
materialities and logics that made some arrangements more possible and desirable than others, 
depending on the positioning of the actors in their adaptive networks. The syringes moved from 
health territories and practices of control to illicit zones of deviant or informally contested control, 
then circulated back again as returns that constituted an implicit trial of intersecting goals and 
complicit rationales of control. Yet, since this circulation was achieved through commercial logics 
and practices, the institutional boundaries of crime and health lost some definition and coalesced 
somewhat towards a less distinctive 'normality'.
The NEP’s development has involved both the extension and consolidation of its forms of activity. 
By extending its communicational linkages to allied AIDS Service Organisations, such as the 
NZAF and NZPC, the NEP could draw on two models of organisation that offered different forms 
of peer support against national, institutional types of difficulties. By contrast, the consolidating of 
a regular, controllable movement of syringes across the internal-external boundaries of the NEP 
provided an internal cohesiveness from its specific mechanism and organisations, rather than only 
as a programme. The original pharmacy-based NEP consolidated in two ways. 
First, its hierarchal structure of governance and surveillance by officials tended to already be 
singular and centralised, despite local differences in environment and enforcement. Certainly, local 
AIDS co-ordination committees were added to these pre-existing pharmacy monitoring systems. 
The Christchurch Committee was recorded in CIVDURG logbooks as significant in facilitating the 
505. Peer needle exchanges operated in an increasing number of types of places, and with different hopes for counselling 
and/or peer outreach. However, there has only been a single set of regulations and one model of commercial and 
record-keeping practice.
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local AIDS service organisation and health sector networks.506 Nonetheless, there are very few 
records of such committees communicating with the AIDS TaskForce. It is possible that there were
few unmet co-ordination needs at a national level, unlike during the later periods of the NEP.507 
The second form of consolidation involved the way infrastructural problems and oppositions were 
successfully addressed, worked-around, or resisted, at the NEP’s middle and late planning stages. 
In this second way, problems were solved or moderated through reconfiguring processes. For 
instance, fragments of official bureaucracies were combined with webs of commodity exchanges 
and IDU drug markets. The connections that constituted the environment of assemblages were 
added, removed, or modified in their positional activity. Each connection contributed to the 
boundaries of understanding of the participants who maintained their structural environment 
through everyday occupational relational interactivities. Yet each connection also contributed to a 
path-dependent, materially solid, locational environment. Path-dependent factors limited what 
could have happened. However, not everything that could have happened did happen (Abbott, 
2001), because the connections were influenced by chance and human agency. Some connections 
occurred at a specific time and place because a specific people with motivation, resolve, and skill 
occupied a suitable place during an opportune time.508 
The initial geographical boundaries of the peer groups were decided in an environment dominated 
by pharmacy practices. The peer groups then became dominant in terms of driving the changes in 
NEP policy, yet the NEP pharmacies remained essential en mass, because the small numbers of 
peer groups could not provide national coverage.509 The NEP pharmacies in the small towns and 
rural areas remained essential, while those in the cities remained in the syringe business only by 
providing services to IDU who had a choice to go elsewhere. However, the pharmacies existed in a 
commercial environment, needing to make a profit to cover wages and overheads. Localised 
experiments in free supply, from a perspective of a pharmacist’s professional ethics, constituted 
shoddy business practices. Significantly undercutting a fellow professional’s cost-plus pricing 
structure was morally unacceptable to pharmacists, yet some NEP peer managers who were 
oriented more towards political and official alliances, at times overlooked the need to maintain this 
crucial connection between health and commercial professionalism. The free one-for-one system 
that was introduced in 2004 required NENZ to reimburse pharmacists for their NEP contributions, 
and otherwise offer formal recognition of the difficulties faced by pharmacists. 
506. This was in Christchurch, which has high levels of health sector networking. Other cities could have been different.
507.  It may also be that the pharmacists in the NEP remained centrally co-ordinated through the pre-existing hierarchy of
officials, such as local Medical Officers of Health and District Advisory Pharmacists, as well as the professional 
bodies of the Pharmacy Guild and the Pharmacist Society. The Guild represented the commercial interests of 
pharmacist practices, the Society represented the professional interests of qualified pharmacists.
508. We see this in Bruce Burnett, Gary McGrath, Rodger Wright, Michael Baker, Redmer Yska, and Michael Bassett. 
Later we see Robert Kemp, Simon Nimmo, Catherine Healey, Stephen Lungley, and Nigel Dickson providing key 
influences, links, research, and decision-making.
509. See also Appendix 7, where a condensed history with statistical data is summarised.
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As the peer groups’ outreach focus was supplemented by a syringe supply focus, then by a research
and surveillance focus, then by national co-ordination through federating, their professionalism in 
health promotion increased, yet was largely stabilised through their shop-based, commercial 
professionalism. They extended their activities from isolated shop-front outlets by means of 
increasing their control over syringe supply, coming eventually to run the syringe disposal 
collection system. Their product of appropriately packaged and understood syringes was in high 
demand with no alternative, yet was also highly price sensitive since the reuse of syringes was easy
and familiar to IDU.
The proposals for regional management blocs made little sense in the NEP environment, since the 
problems that the NEP initially focused on were understood by participants as local or national, 
rather than regional. The transport of syringes between national and local sites was adequately 
addressed in commercial practices that did not require nor wished to afford the overheads of 
regional administrative blocs. A thick administration would have provided for training of a greater 
number of mid-level personnel. Yet it would have been harder, if administrative rather than 
representative logics applied, to ensure that these were peer professionals rather than other types of 
administrators. However, a national professional body that represented local groups, and by 
extension local IDU; that set standards and controlled entry into this market; made a great deal 
more commercial sense. 
Higher-level state agencies were accountable for enforcing the constraints over the NEP funding 
and maintaining general jurisdiction over NEP policy. These agencies had interests in protecting 
their policy and strategy turf. Yet, the succession of officials who implemented these 
accountabilities also needed the NEP to work effectively and efficiently. This co-ordination 
required a national network of communication linkages, within a mutually agreed upon system of 
specialised roles and accountabilities, closer to sites of implementation and commerce than could 
be supplied by a governance-only Ministry of Health. From this perspective, a national co-
ordination body also made sense.
Both the Ministry of Health officials and the peer-professionals came to simultaneously support 
and undermine the NEP in the process of constantly producing its stability from a changing 
heterogeneous environment. Paradoxically, the achievement of greater stability led to instability, 
since peers came to shape the negotiating environment through their control of commercial 
infrastructure, while being vulnerably isolated in their public activity of representing IDU. Their 
commercial accountability and expertise provided the stability and connective linkages that 
sheltered the autonomous groups from their isolation and closeness to the often chaotic IDU 
environments.
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As the NEP’s co-ordination centralised, such shifts were accompanied by changes in 
representation. The state agencies that handled the NEP’s funding contracts became first de-centred
in shifts from the AIDS TaskForce to Regional Health Authorities. From then the agency oversight 
increasingly reverted to centralised controls over contracts. Yet this was at a higher, more remote 
level of governance where officials were less familiar with the history and specific sensitivities of 
NEP work. As awareness of hepatitis C prevalence belatedly increased, in terms of the national 
financial and political risk, the sites where funding was negotiated moved closer and higher to the 
level of the regulatory and policy-setting agencies. Meanwhile, NENZ became more engaged in 
facilitating service provision, arranging for a syringe returns service, and negotiating to extend the 
national coverage of the NEP’s locally-centred, peer-based services. The stability and effectiveness
of the mid-level co-ordination of NENZ led to increasing influence over policy, and accordingly, to
extend up and into an inherently professional type of territorial conflicts with a policy-protective 
Ministry of Health. 
The crisis erupted when it did partly due to inflammatory media tactics by several peer-
professionals in Palmerston North, but also because NENZ acted overtly in its representation of the
collective autonomy of the regional peer groups. This act of representation ‘flattened’ the 
hierarchal distances and stages that presented boundaries excluding the individual peer groups from
the Ministry of Health’s ‘property’ of government. As with the earlier concepts of bulk-funding the
peer groups, this representational activity threatened the autonomy of the stronger groups, which 
were better positioned to establish mutually satisfying relationships with their local funding 
agencies. 
NENZ’s move also threatened a previous state agency tactic of divide and rule. It threatened long-
standing desires shared by health officials and some like-minded NEP peer-professionals for 
solidly-established regional blocs which would occupy the places and space between urban peer 
groups and a single national co-ordinating body. There was no need for ‘thick’ mid-level blocs if 
NENZ provided regional services that covered the gaps between the city-centred peer groups, yet 
NENZ was beginning to provide just such services through NEST, its syringe return subsidiary. 
The capability for collectively funding negotiations that NENZ potentially offered would, if 
successful, increase its viability as a preferred model in both the commercial and health senses of 
professional service delivery through peer-professional governance. The logics and practices of 
peer-professional environments and goals usefully explain much about the strike threat and 
resulting negotiations. This peer-professional account, emphasising the hybridity of the  networked 
environmental conditions, seems more explanatory than any concept based only on strategising by 
individual personalities, or by particular interest groups. 
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Two periods of political connectivity stand out. The first, between 1988 and 1995, was shaped by 
the ADIO model supplanting the IV League model, then consolidating as a loose assemblage of 
five isolated peer groups. These groups were locally different but shared an equivalent role in a 
commercial infrastructure based on a user-pays, demand-driven, syringe supply system. Central co-
ordination lapsed rather than increased over this period. The second period, after 1995, involved 
increasing co-ordination by NENZ of a formal federation of the peer groups. During this later 
period the NEP’s national capabilities began to increase, while conflicts intensified between several
models of peer-professionalism. 
In the first period, health and commercial logics continued to differ, and accordingly, continued to 
produce their hybrid peer-professional stability between, rather than amidst, local and national 
aspects of the NEP. In the second period, regional arrangements with other AIDS Service 
Organisations and bureaucratic agencies increased the regulatory scrutiny, reliability of funding, 
and overall central control of the NEP. 
Nonetheless, the regional arrangements at times resisted becoming accountable to NENZ as it 
developed as an autonomous professional body that represented both its member groups and the 
NEP’s IDU clients. Such divisions were expressed in historical incidents, but were shaped from a 
mix of political and geographical boundary activities. During each of these two periods, different 
geopolitical administrative blocs were proposed. Overlapping sets510 of NEP actors desired 
different types of commercial, educational and outreach activities, quality of coverage, local IDU 
responsiveness, and professional standards of accountability. 
The political traction of NENZ was not supplanted, unlike the case of the IV League, which the 
Department of Health excluded from funding and influence in the same period that it contracted 
ADIO (National Council on AIDS, 1988b: 6). Instead, NENZ re-configured ADIO’s ‘outreach 
clinic/shop-front' concepts into a more workable form. NENZ drew more on IDU moral norms, 
seen in the IV League principles of mutual benefit, egalitarianism, and professional health delivery,
yet increased its competencies by emphasising and extending the commercial pharmacy norms. 
The result was both peer and professional. It depended on grass-roots IDU participation, yet was 
autonomous as an organisation, and was nationally co-ordinated in collegial ways that combined 
egalitarianism and specialisation of expertise. Most significantly, this combination only provided 
sufficient stability to align its different elements into a more productive mechanism, not to 
reformulate them into a non-conflicting, non-paradoxical, clearly-bounded machine-like whole. 
The latter goal, of union rather than an exceptional mechanism of alliance, was understood by all 
the NEP actors to be unworkable in the wider institutional environment where drug injecting 
remained highly individualised and criminalised.
510. Such sets might further consolidate and become distinctly different, but that has not happened before October 2007.
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The NEP’s increased commercial efficiencies and managerial expertise have assisted in the 
delivery of peer-professional services, such as providing representation, advice to state agencies, 
input into training in related fields, IDU support and research, along with the development and 
monitoring of models of motivation change (Keene, 1997: 150-2). Nonetheless, commercial 
practices also worked against one of the crucial methods of influencing IDU motivations. The peer 
groups initially relied on volunteers who were informally reimbursed ‘under-the-table’. However, 
over time, the NEP’s employment practices became more professional, either self-impelled or as 
required by the Employment Contracts Act (New Zealand Government, 1991). 
Pressures from the wider environments of employment law and professional best practices of 
employment led to IDU volunteers becoming legally employed as workers. Because this legal 
compliance was more expensive than the illicit reimbursement methods, it drained the limited 
budgets of the peer groups. According to standard commercial logics, the overall numbers of peer 
personnel were decreased unless extra funding could be found. In consequence, the informal 
outreach carried out through the personal networks of peer volunteers shrank, and has been linked, 
by one peer-professional manager in Dunedin, to a levelling of the numbers of syringe sales 
(Richardson, 2004. pers. com.). 
The opportunities and problems of informal outreach have not appeared significant because the 
numbers of IDU participating in the NEP has not been a standard output in the funding contracts, 
while such funding has increased in importance compared with the user-pays funding. This 
example illustrates how the hybrid mechanisms of the NEP involved social, commercial, legal, and 
professional logics, such that privileging any single logic actually altered the whole mechanism in a
seemingly irrational, unpredictable manner. More specifically, oppositions between empowerment 
through formal employment, and outreach through informal networks, seem to characterise the 
peer-professional hybridity of the NEP. This innate opposition in the midst of productive 
combinations renders the administration and co-ordination of the NEP a matter of complex 
uncertainties that require a professional type of discretionary expertise.
The peer groups were encouraged by the logics of a hybrid niche created by the NEP to become 
more professional, without losing their ‘peerness’. As professional health promoters, they shared 
concerns with doctors. Because they were more illicit and stigmatised, they could not afford to lose
their ‘health shelter’, even though this was where the injecting practices and drugs they represented
in the form of IDU communities were medicalised. The peer groups needed to ensure that their 
activities did not move outside their sustaining hybrid niche when they threatened the Ministry of 
Health with the media publicity of a strike. This is why the hybrid, not-for-profit health goals of the
NEP have been largely accomplished through the supply and return of syringes. This commercial 
activity effectively and efficiently expanded the NEP niche environment. In so doing it it expanded
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the scope and scale of peer-professional activity as representatives and policy entrepreneurs.
As the NEP environment moved from IDU grassroots and pharmacy sites to include corporate 
forms of peer organising, the connections between commercial professionalism and professional 
health goals became more politicised. This was partly because the ‘moral spaces’ (Plumridge & 
Chetwynd, 1999, 1998) and the motivations of the interactions of the IDU, commerce, 
bureaucracy, and health professionals were different, and only changed slowly if at all over the 
period in which the NEP developed. What seemed appropriate for IDU differed from the 
expectations of a official employed by a state agency, or of a health practitioner who was 
accountable to a professional body. It was also partly because of place. An IDU in a kitchen with 
friends and syringes was different from an official in a meeting room with file documents, or a 
doctor in a clinic with a patient and syringes. Even if the same person was simultaneously an IDU, 
an official, and a doctor, the material environment, appropriate technologies, meanings, and 
possible performances were different. 
This chapter has explored how two types of somewhat opposed professionalisms were made 
mutually supportive. Peer-professional health practices provided the sustaining goals and 
legitimations, while related peer-professional commercial practices provided the shaping and 
stabilising resources. The systems of transporting syringes produced a characteristic infrastructural 
stability, together with frameworks of understanding for explanatory and evaluative accounts. 
These practices of connectivity reinforced rather than eroded the institutional boundary lines which
the NEP mechanisms had been founded to partially evade and locally re-work. Some connections 
became turning points (Abbott, 2001: 296-7), or at least sufficiently intense to draw the interactants
involved from a pervasive background to a smaller and more distinctive foreground. It would seem 
that as the spaces for manoeuvring or evasion shrank, the boundary activity became intensified 
(Abbott, 2001: 292-3). This seems a partial explanation why the NEP peer-professionals remained 
hybrid without coalescing into, or being replaced by, a clearly understood profession, or by 
becoming employees in a bureaucratic infrastructure.
In the following inter-chapter I explore how such developments appeared from the perspectives of 
two individual peer-professionals. Their concerns illustrate key aspects outlined in this chapter, yet 
emphasise the complexities and differences that a more abstract overview risks overlooking. The 
following inter-chapter leads to my final section, where I make an argument for a hybrid model of 
the NEP in chapter 10, enrich this model by arguing for a specifically peer-professional principle of
organising in chapter 11, before concluding with wider sociological reflection in a Coda. 
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Intersections
Dialogue
I have presented IDU as rational actors whose attitudes to the NEP and peer-professionals have 
been conditioned by necessity. However, because IDU have resisted being evaluated and modified,
we cannot generalise beyond their substantive durability as a group and their pervasive rationales 
for distrust. Surveys carried out by the NEP produced few complaints from IDU clients. However, 
many clients would have no international experiences with which to compare the New Zealand 
NEP. We know from such surveys, and from the proportion of clients who used pharmacy 
exchanges, that IDU clients generally approved of the 'peerness' and professionalism of the peer 
groups, but we have less idea about the range of perceptions, interests, and positionings of IDU. 
For instance, no studies have selected IDU with international experience that could be compared 
with local experiences, nor for IDU with professional health or social work training. The messy 
actuality of the shop-front outlet models, the peer attempts at motivation change, the empowering 
of marginalised communities, and the commercial infrastructural capabilities are seen to be 
entangled and problematic. Previous studies have not attempted to specify how and where the peer 
and professional aspects should be mixed or held apart in analysis.
To illustrate how this issue of divergences is significant, and more so in supporting a common 
theme underlying such differences, I will present the comments of several Christchurch peer-
professionals. This 'constructed conversation' is intended to pull back from the intense problems 
and isolation of the initial Christchurch peer group by emphasising de-localised, reflective voices 
from amidst the NEP developments. These voices contain significant information which has been 
brought out by selecting particular thematic sections and placing them in juxtaposition. I selected 
the voices for their depth, coherency, relevancy of content, and being expert rather than random. 
In 1989, IDU knowledge about HIV/AIDS was surveyed (Lungley, 1989: 3-4). IDU were asked 
who they would recommend to their peers for information on HIV/AIDS. The most cited sources 
were the AIDS Clinics and the AIDS Foundation (NZAF), as well as the AIDS Hotlines, drug 
clinics, and personal doctors. Although having operated for only a few months, the Auckland Drug 
Information and Outreach peer group (ADIO) was frequently cited by Auckland IDU. The study 
concluded that: “As a rule IVDUs seemed to prefer what they saw as professional advice. However
many seem to see ex-users belonging to self-help organisations as “professionals” in their own 
way” (Lungley, 1989: 3-4).
The association of HIV/AIDS expertise with the NZAF, clinics, and treatment specialists clearly 
indicate a desire for a professional quality of health information and services. Yet during the 1990s,
the NEP’s expertise in moving injecting and educational products became comparatively more 
influential and professional than the ‘education and motivation change’ aspects of its work. 
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Because the central co-ordination and direction by state agencies began to lapse, because regional 
peer groups found that IDU lifestyle associations sometimes hindered attempts to professionalise 
NEP services, and because funding contracts prioritised those outputs that were easily measured, 
the NEP’s regional infrastructure became noticeably commercialised. As one regional peer 
administrator reminded his Trust Board: “We DO NOT just sell needles and syringes, WE SELL 
SAFETY” (DIVO, 1994e). Consequently, the ‘shop logics’ of equipment logistics became allied 
with the public health logics of providing safer material environments and motivations towards 
safety. This alliance assimilated the motivation change logics of organising formal outreach 
activities outside of the exchange premises, leaving only the informal networks of peer workers to 
effect outreach. A NENZ Trustee commented that: 
I think they do the exchange thing really well. I think the retail component in needle exchanges 
is good. ... [But] I think the people that are accessing needle exchanges generally are ... already 
converted. Outreach to me is getting to the people who aren’t converted ... [retail alone is] not 
really getting to the heart of it. (Jang, 2003. pers. com)
How is the heart of quality outcomes to be found? Retail and service competencies are often 
termed ‘professional’, even though they are achieved through bureaucratic organisation and 
commercial motivations. ‘Profession’ may refer to a particular type of social entity, or method of 
organising, yet also to general characteristics of care, quality, and accountability. That the NEP 
peer-professionals developed a commercial infrastructure seems crucial for understanding how the 
goals of outreach changed along with the capabilities negotiated between NENZ and the Ministry 
of Health. The connection of commercial to official and professional logics explains NENZ’s 
representation of a marginalised client community, partly as accountable to, yet also in opposition 
to state agencies. Producing such connections required the active participation of a multiplicity of 
actors who co-ordinated their activities through linked stories together with linking objects.
Everyday IDU perspectives can illustrate how aspects of IDU peer trust and commercial trust are 
not self-evident. For one thing, IDU do not necessarily like or trust other IDU, and are not 
necessarily opposed to orderly arrangements. Some IDU would prefer the option of a centralised, 
highly commercial, and bureaucratised service delivery. ‘Penny’, a personal friend, is a 30 plus 
New Zealander, self-assertive, well-educated, and computer-literate, who has injected drugs in 
European, Australian, and several New Zealand cities. Penny preferred to purchase drugs from 
gangs in a commercial environment than from fellow IDU in an IDU peer environment:
You went in there and you bought what you wanted and you walked out! I just loved it! ... I 
thought it was [pause] sort of nice that you could go there any time of the day, and umm, no 
hassle ... It was run by a gang [pause] a bit intimidating at first [pause] but once you found that 
they weren’t there [pause] to cause trouble, they were only there to make a flippin’ lot of 
money ... once I got into the 24 hour drug shop I didn’t need to associate with anybody else, 
and that was great! Then I didn’t need to [pause] hang around with these people that I thought 
were complete horrible arse-holes ... and pretend that I liked them ... just to get some bloody 
gear. (‘Penny’, 2003)
‘Penny’ trusted a transparently commercial situation where interactions were stable and motives 
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were overt, in contrast to the uncertainties and repelling aspects she experienced in some IDU 
social interests and interactions. She disliked the lack of social competencies she found in some 
IDU networks in a particular city. A different peer-professional identified how market problems of 
supply, which encourage small self-protective groups forming around a regular pharmaceutical 
drug source511 are compounded by the social complexities of IDU networks:
In [the same city as Penny] people gossip and back-stab in IDU circles if one is not present. 
This is a reason for reducing the number of supply circles. If you have only one you are least 
vulnerable to not being present, especially when drugs are being sold and distributed and 
shared. You rely on friends to defend you in absentia … but if it is a social situation of 
distributing drugs, they cannot be relied on very much.    (‘Nathan’ 2004)
However, Penny preferred the ‘clinical’ non-peer aspects of a European needle exchange to her 
Christchurch experience:
I hated the Needle Exchange down here [1997], hated it, absolutely thought it was full of 
bullshit. Didn’t like going there, didn’t like having anything to do with them. ... the system 
they have in Europe is so beautiful, and so brilliant .... you can go and get your syringes and 
take them away if you want to ... [but] there’s a great big cafe first of all, and you can get a 
dollar meal. You can get a great big feed for about a dollar. ... in the injecting rooms they 
always had at least one nurse, who supervised the whole thing and ... handed out your syringes 
... everything was absolutely sterilised ... what that was saying to me was ... if you want to look 
after yourself, eat, and have safe injecting, and use completely clean syringes, we can help you 
do that, you know.  (‘Penny’ 2003)
Penny seems to me to have wanted controlled and professionalised safe injecting practices. Such 
control has sometimes been associated with intermittent or recreational IDU. Jang considered that 
the people who lacked the control, or motivation, to use needle exchanges constituted an unmet 
outreach requirement. By contrast, IDU with dependence problems have often been fixed under an 
institutional, clinical gaze. Such IDU become represented in textbooks on drug treatment as 
irrational and without capabilities of choice, or inherently self-destructive, since: “Too often the act
of taking drugs is no more than acting out their desire to destroy themselves” (Grmek, 1990: 168).  
However, such perspectives require contextualising. Penny, for instance, had experienced serious 
addiction several times, suggesting recurring difficulties in her control of drug use. She disliked the
NEP site where outreach was provided by her formal peers. She would presumably have greater 
resistance to motivation-changing influences at that actual site. Yet Penny continued to use NEP 
services during 1997, purchasing from the peer exchange she disliked rather than pharmacy 
exchanges. She used the NEP services in a controlled way and wanted higher quality services. Her 
experience of the peer exchange made her uneasy and distrustful, yet she trusted pharmacy 
exchanges even less. Penny was sensitised to the risks of being forced into a system:
where, ok its just legal to have a needle exchange but everything outside of that is completely 
illegal. You can walk in there [New Zealand exchanges] and walk out and just about get 
arrested, you know, which is what they can do and still creates a little bit of that, umm, 
suspicion on the drug user’s part ... (Penny, 2003)
511. See Newbold (2004: 65, 2000: 181), Kemp (1996: 154).
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Penny and Jang expressed different perspectives on outreach priorities, yet these are aligned in 
significant ways, despite their different positioning as actors. Penny was not actually saying what 
she considered ideal in theoretical terms, but rather what in her actual experience had been the 
service that best met her needs. Jang was more professionally positioned in terms of his goals being
framed by theory, yet also drew on personal experience as an ex-IDU, as a qualified social worker, 
and as the administrator of an outreach/education/support organisation. 
Both Penny and Jang appreciated commercial effectiveness and efficiency, provided that was not 
also associated with impediments to motivation change, such as distrust. Both considered that any 
enforcement of abstinence through law and treatment regimes reduced the effectiveness of 
outreach. However, Penny thought that outreach might be usefully sited in a clinical centre, and 
this would meet her needs. For John, outreach would be ideally present wherever injection was 
taking place, rather than relying on IDU presenting themselves at a peer group’s premises:
I don’t think the person doing outreach needs to be a non-user, needs to be a non-current user. I 
think ideally they should still be users ... people that use don’t trust people that don’t use. And 
that’s even people who may have used before, ... there still is a bit of being unsure... It doesn’t 
work. You know, they’re [persons qualified as drug counsellors or coming from 12-step 
experience] sitting there, in a harm reduction agency, and they’re coming from an abstinence 
viewpoint! ... (Jang, 2003)
This ideal of outreach could not be limited to just a centre, and could not even legally occur in New
Zealand NEP premises. Penny would seem to have no objection to IDU peers providing medical 
centre service, so long as being professionally effective and efficient was more important than just 
having peer experience.
From an actor-network perspective, these participant accounts about trust illustrate how the same 
objects such as syringes are active in different ways, when moved according to different organised 
logics, in different institutional environments. Syringes are different as actants because their 
network positioning means that they act differently. The interactions between their inscriptions,512 
the people connected to them, their drugs, and their viruses, perform513 differently. Such variability 
partly derives from their participation in commercial logics and expectations. However, that 
variability also alters the commercial feasibility of exchange through affecting supply and demand 
factors in a heterogeneously networked environment. Illicit exchanges have seemed inherently 
512.  Inscription is an actor-network term that refers to two activities. One, of ‘inscribing’, is of meaningfulness, where 
an object is symbolically laden and interactive in a communicative environment of symbolic understandings. The 
other, of ‘scripts’, is of productive constraint, whereby the physical possibilities of interaction are enhanced or 
constrained, away from some goals and consequences, yet towards others.
513.  Performativity is a concept of activity related to inscribing and scripts, but done through words as processes that 
call situations into being, as in a theatrically ‘staged’ performance. Judith Butler (1990) and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
(1990), follow Austin (1962) in developing an increasingly more pervasive and less formally ‘staged’ understanding 
of performativity. In effect the ‘staging’ becomes insidiously ‘behind’ every foregrounded utterance. Cindy Patton 
and Michael Brown have been developing performativity in their approaches to queer theory. They show durable 
aspects of geographical and textual and organisational materialities. In so doing they destabilise understandings of 
‘identity’ being essential or inherent, while also destabilising ‘stages’ by introducing a hybrid tension between the 
places and the spaces that interact in the producing of a ‘stage effect’. Brown’s (1997) usage of hybridity is an area 
that might well be connected to my usage in this NEP research.
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limited or unsustainable, partly because their illegality ruled out a commercial infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, the reason for needing exchanges is that illegal markets in drugs and legal markets in 
meeting health demands are both characteristic of modern societies.514 An entanglement of crime 
and health markets is therefore only to be expected.
514. Since 'enterprise entrepreneurs' respond to the profit incentives created through prohibition by supplying a universal 
human desire for enhanced performance through appropriately modern social and material technologies. 
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Section  4
Hybrid Relations
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10
Between policy and programme: The case for a hybrid NEP 
Good rulership is equivalent to mildness… If the ruler uses force and is ready to mete out punishment and
eager to expose the faults of people… (his subjects) become fearful and depressed and seek to protect
themselves against him through lies, ruses, and deceit… If the ruler continues to keep a forceful grip on
his subjects, group feeling will be destroyed. If the ruler is mild and overlooks the bad sides of his
subjects, they will trust him and take refuge with him… Everything is then in order in the state.
(Kitab al Ibar. ibn Khaldun, (1380): 153)
In the previous chapter I described how the niche environment of the NEP’s configuration of 
representation and administration developed alongside a commercialising of its infrastructure. I 
related the NEP’s commercial control over syringes to a long-standing uncertainty over the 
regional infrastructure, policy negotiations, and representational ethos of the peer groups. I 
analysed how patterns of surveillance and trust became embodied through infrastructural 
specialisation, as an intensification of conflicts over NEP policy, while exhibiting a situational 
ethics relevant to wider aspects of harm reduction. I showed how antagonisms over NEP policy and
practice intensified into overt conflict between officials and peers, despite their prior and later 
alliances. I showed how a peer-professional character and identity has been described through such 
situations, as well as helping to understand those situations. 
My even earlier chapters of stage-by-stage social history analysis prepared the ground for the more 
structural-interactional analyses that have led into the current chapter. The historical and structural 
articulations are complementary. Both are needed for analysing the case since where the NEP 
participants recorded their immediate problems and options these were understood as much 
topologically as narratively, but not as sequences of stages, or cycles. 
In this chapter I partially pull back from tight details to discuss wider patterns of understandings, 
constraints, and motivations. These wider aspects articulate the external environment, boundaries, 
and internal cohesion of the NEP as a whole and coherent case. 
This chapter proceeds in four stages. The first section establishes the continuing relevance and 
articulation of my argument relative to the preceding and following chapters. In the next section I 
argue that the public and private capabilities of the NEP infrastructure have and continue to be 
hybrid in terms of ‘structural agency’. The third section continues these arguments by linking the 
NEP policy goals to the gaps in implementation caused by the policies of hiring peer ‘experts in 
IDU-ology’ to provide a specialist linkage between the governing and governance of illicit private 
conduct. The final section partially integrates the complexity of agency, structure, and policy into 
an argument for a whole, hybridly-articulated, NEP case.
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1   Reorientation: Progress through structural antagonisms and alliances
In 2005, an amendment to the Misuse of Drugs Act shifted the onus of proof onto the police for 
charges of possessing syringes. Previously, if anyone so charged wished to use the defence created 
by the needle and syringe legislation and regulations, they needed to establish to the Court’s 
satisfaction that they had purchased that syringe from a legitimate NEP outlet. After the 2005 
amendments, it was the police were required to prove that such syringes had not come from a 
legitimate NEP outlet. In theory this removed a troublesome gap in the legal codes. This gap 
should no longer have contributed to the shaping of the NEP, but the practical reality has been 
different, since the arrests for possessing syringes have continued.
The 2005 amendments to the Misuse of Drugs Act reinforced two sections under which people 
could be charged with possession of drug-using paraphernalia, such as pipes for smoking marijuana
and amphetamine products. Section 1(a) was aimed at criminalising the technologies and the 
property of drug users, but excluded syringes. Section 1(aa) distinguished licit from illicit syringes. 
This sub-section protected the NEP by legitimising its monopoly over supplying syringes outside 
of medically approved usage. Yet in 2007, people have been charged with the possession of 
syringes, not under section 1(aa), which had been aimed at protecting the needle exchange, but 
instead under section 1(a), in breach of the letter and spirit of the Misuse of Drugs Act. A judge 
might accept a technical defence argument for striking out the syringe possession part of such 
charges. Yet making this argument would require a degree of legal expertise, expense, and effort 
not usually exerted by arrested IDU.
The situation is complicated further by syringes being used at times for measuring liquids, and so 
being defined as ‘paraphernalia’ if used for preparing drugs. A charge under section 1(a) might 
seem warranted to a Court if only those substances that were primarily smoked or taken orally but 
not injected had been found alongside syringes. It would be no defence to claim that such drugs, for
instance amphetamines, were intended for injection, since that would be admitting to a charge of 
intending to administer an illicit substance, for which no defence is provided in the needle 
exchange legislation. The scale of this problem is indicated by the Mental Health Survey of the 
non-institutionalised New Zealand population in 2006 (Ministry of Health, 2006f). This survey 
showed that over 90% of those using illicit substances also used cannabis (Wells & McGee, 2007). 
A syringe can be used to pressurise cannabis with solvents to produce a concentrated extract, (pers.
obs. 2005) similar to how espresso coffee is made. A search of most IDU domiciles would find 
cannabis and smoking implements as well as syringes, leading to potential syringe possession 
charges, to the undercutting of the rates of returning syringes, and to distrust by IDU in the safer-
using intent of the legislative frameworks that penalised safer-using practices.
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By following the ways in which syringes are active and influence particular incidents it is seen that 
syringes are not constrained to being a single use technology, with but a single social meaning. 
Their use overlaps between injecting into bodies, measuring liquids, and moving liquids into 
narrow neck containers. Such uses are technologically normal, but become morally abnormal and 
prohibited when the substances used are illicit. When observed, such substances instantly convert 
the syringe from licit to illicit. In this conversion, the messages borne by such syringes shift from 
their capabilities for industrial and health use, to their crime related capabilities.
These problems show that the semi-legalisation of the possession of syringes does not adequately 
explain the durability, changes, capabilities, and significance of the NEP. Syringes have remained 
both illicit and defendable in Court, depending on circumstances that include the presence of other 
‘meaningful objects’ such as cannabis, and include the character of the arresting officer. The 
turning point of a law change in 1987, followed by another in 2004, does not explain how and why 
some police continue to undermine the trust of IDU and the health goals of the NEP. Nor does the 
event of the NEP becoming organised around the commercially competent supply of syringes 
explain the prior expression of peer-professional logics in the patterns of gay community 
organising after 1983. However, the law changes do help to identify gaps between the codes and 
the practices involved in moving used syringes from private situations of harm, to professional 
disposal, in the pursuit of public health.
The difficulties experienced by the NEP in ensuring the return of all syringes draws attention from 
the well-organised NEP infrastructure to the less-organised life-worlds of IDU. In this messier 
world, crime and health systems have been institutionalised through the activity of objects within a 
cultural framework of the understandings of participants. IDU and police are antagonists, appearing
as intelligent objects to each other. Their structural antagonism demonstrates the continuing need 
for the NEP to mediate a working articulation between IDU and the profession of policing. Such an
articulation involves forceful antagonisms, as expressed in the following form letter from peer-
professionals to support IDU charged with possessing syringes:
We consider that charges brought under the Misuse of Drugs Act of possessing needles and 
syringes and other injection equipment go against the intent of these regulations, are malicious 
and erode the principles of the Needle and Syringe Exchange Programme, the New Zealand 
National Drug Policy and crucial public health objectives.           (NENZFlash, 2006: 8)
These arrests illustrate the difficulties experienced by a peer-profession when attempting to alter 
the self-centred motivations and practices of both police and IDU. Police defend their institutional 
territory, including their rights to harass and to exclude competition, while IDU generally aim to 
stay out of sight and out of prison. Prohibited objects, such as drugs and paraphernalia, including 
syringes, have constituted a key connector between IDU and police. These objects motivate both 
personal and professional activities. IDU may illicitly obtain money to buy drugs, which they 
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locate by following their information network. Police follow their surveillance data on IDU 
associations, and observe incriminating objects, which are used to justify ‘following’ activities 
such as search warrants and arrests. Illicit objects such as drugs, and at times syringes, are both 
motivational and informational, attracting surveillance through the range of information systems 
involved in governance. 
The shifts in syringes I have described have been accompanied by a shift in NENZ policy as 
regards the police and the Ministry of Health. Following the strike threat in 2001, NENZ was 
attempting to regain the confidence of Ministry officials, just at the time when the police reneged 
on their prior commitment to support a Bill decriminalising all syringes (Henderson, 2007. pers. 
com.). Despite HCV incidence and other gaps in coverage remaining as significant problems, 
NENZ has increasingly relied on the goodwill of the Ministry, partly to counter an increased 
willingness by police to undercut the public health goals of the NEP. Ministry support has been 
encouraged by the peer-groups adopting new point-of-sale monitoring and data-integrating 
systems, facilitated by NENZ. These systems have reinforced the pattern of the peer groups 
providing more accurate and relevant information, for instance about the numbers of IDU charged 
with syringe possession, than has been available from the police.515 In these shifts, the combination 
of temporal eventfulness and structural effects produced from strategic boundary work have been 
re-expressed as a core pattern of the NEP’s hybrid capabilities. 
This situation illustrates how events are, of necessity, continually made into sense by the individual
and collective participants. Institutionalised motivations emerge alongside the non-human life and 
material possibilities which differentiate and complexify our accidents and purposes. In chapters 4 
to 9 the history of syringes and syringe-users has been traced in terms of events, where iterative 
overlapping cycles, turning points, path-dependencies, and trajectories have outlined the shapes of 
how changes did or did not occur. Yet to understand such changes, and to evaluate the capabilities 
for future change, it is necessary to also trace the interface of effects. Events and effects combine to
explain how, and from what forces, things changed. The following discussion co-ordinates material
from the areas that strongly influenced the NEP, in order to explicate the NEP’s character and its 
articulation of hybridity.
2   Structure, agency and hybridity
Since 1988, the NEP has maintained an almost zero level of HIV transmission via injecting drug 
use. The NEP has improved public access to health information about HCV and reduced other 
hazards from unsafe injecting, such as bacterial blood infections. Sterile syringes have been 
515. Henderson (2007, pers. com.), Blacklock (2003, pers. com.). See Blacklock (1998). See Appendix 3.
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provided and used syringes recovered, thereby improving the safety of private and public 
environments. Yet the NEP has achieved this public health goal in a seemingly counter-intuitive 
way, not primarily through overt media or other public campaigns. Instead the NEP has prioritised 
the material objects, domestic sites, and the shared meanings private to IDU while distancing these 
sites of illicit activity from public attention. 
This shifting of the NEP’s emphases between public health and private deviance has problematised
the conventional understandings of structure and agency found in the maintaining of the boundaries
between the public and private realms. Both public and private structures are observed in the codes 
and expectations that shape institutional boundaries. Public and private agencies appear in the 
motivations that propel the movements of objects and histories. Yet the nodes and webs of IDU 
interactivity have been excluded from public spaces and legitimate status. The analyses I have cited
in chapters 2 and 3 that outline the outlawing of self-injecting practices and drugs in the early 
twentieth century have not been contested in published peer reviews. However, there is also little 
academic interest in this field, or in the funding of new research projects. This normalisation of 
exclusion from public agency has produced the private markets and social networks of drug 
circulations, which have shaped the movements of syringes. Despite this non-contentious 
appearance, analytical and policy attention is challenged by the hybrid aspects of structure and 
agency. 
The institutional codes and infrastructure of the NEP environment were not the only cause of its 
developments, despite influencing the activity of the human and non-human participants in ways 
which constrained and empowered the later shapes of the NEP. The significance of human agency 
is illustrated by the way the illicit peer-professional syringe suppliers, such as Mr. Pollard’s 
pharmacy in Christchurch, first piloted, then implicitly challenged, and then facilitated the official 
programme, as described in chapters 6 and 8. Although Mr. Pollard was strategically well-
positioned to select among a number of tactical responses to the perceived needs of his customers 
and better public health, so also were many other pharmacists who chose differently. Mr Pollard, 
and a few like him, were exceptional amongst their colleagues. We have seen how Rodger Wright 
and Gary McGrath established the IV League, following Bruce Burnett, who had called publicly 
for needle exchanges to be established. 
Significant developments have followed from turning points that were influenced by such key 
individuals, which somewhat explains the timing of crucial events and the development of path-
dependencies. These individuals did not cause events and effects to be workable, because their 
viability lies more in the obduracy of two blood-borne viruses, along with institutional forms and 
forces that allocated social resources and thereby selected for and against various possibilities. But 
the individuals explain why equivalent possibilities went a particular way rather than differently, 
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and also partially explain the timing of such events.
Individuals were important, yet these individuals were also products of earlier environments, and 
depended upon institutional resources for their possibilities of action. They worked mostly with 
rather than against institutional forces and forms. They took advantage of windows and spaces of 
opportunity. Where they succeeded in working against institutional forms and forces, it was 
through competition with their colleagues who proposed different models, or who desired to not 
become involved as professionals. There was, for example, no requirement for the illicit 
pharmacists to actually test their abilities to resist the law in a struggle where significant losses 
would need to be endured. 
It is useful, in terms of querying public structure and private agency, to compare the differences 
and similarities between Wright and Kemp. Both these peer-professionals came into the area of the 
NEP as peers, then shifted towards professional goals and methods. Kemp had already begun to 
professionalise within his Methadone Clinic network when the window of opportunity for peer 
groups emerged in 1988. Wright and McGrath gained a degree of support from Department of 
Health officials, from individual medical professionals, and from individual IDU. However they 
could not develop a workable yet ‘demure’ enough model for integrating the potential antagonisms.
Even if not aware of such problems and potentialities before the passage of the NEP legislation in 
December 1987, they became so after conflicts in the working party of key stakeholders in May 
1988.
Wright was an insightful analyst of social systems, but not an effective systems operator. Nor could
he expect to be well enough to manage an organisation for very long. He was a very effective 
communicator and motivator. He wanted people to understand the harms caused by stigma and 
ignorance, and to feel greater trust, which is why he dedicated his last years to visiting schools and 
talking directly with pupils. Wright’s personal commitment and life history motivated his pointed 
critiques of the medicalising of IDU and HIV/AIDS. I consider that Wright’s direct character 
contributed to his failure to gain sufficient support from health professionals and Department 
officials to outbid Kemp’s support. In terms of persona, Wright presented his concepts as an IDU 
who was forced into stopping drug use and becoming political due to his declining health. By 
contrast, Kemp presented as a healthy ‘cured’ ex-IDU motivated by professional health goals and 
associated with the Auckland Methadone Clinic. Wright worked between individuals and 
attempted to found a grass-roots political group. He only then presented officials with a plan for 
peers to be nationally employed by state health agencies. But this was not what the key officials in 
the Department of Health promoted. National coverage and co-ordination did not fit with the 
institutionalised policy for the contracting of service organisations that ‘spontaneously emerged’ 
from local communities. Such officials would have rejected a concept of NENZ for similar 
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rationales. This ‘spontaneous emergence’ has seemed very similar, though on a smaller scale, to 
later experiences of ‘manipulated emergence’ (Harrison & Wood, 1999: 758) in the United 
Kingdom. Harrison & Wood describe manipulated emergence as:
incentives for managers and senior professionals not only to acquiesce in the innovations, but 
to volunteer to participate in their development ... [they] stood themselves to gain, to contribute 
to the plausibility of the project’s success, and to diffuse the perception that this was the 
direction which others would either be compelled to follow, or would suffer deprivation for not 
following. ... Some of these incentives were material. Early [adopters] ... were more generously 
funded than strictly required.        (Harrison & Wood, 1999: 758)
Other important factors were the autonomy of the new units, which meant that budget under-
spending was easier to retain, and early adopters could secure higher salaries (Harrison & Wood, 
1999: 758). In the case of the NEP, the salaries of the initial peer group co-ordinators were notably 
higher than those of later groups and managers. The co-ordinators’ relative control over funding in 
the founding six months caused a legacy of configurational problems within groups, and suspicions
between groups. These structural problems intersected with the persona and competencies of the 
early peer-professionals.
In 1988, Mr Pollard’s Christchurch pharmacy model was followed by Kemp’s proposal for 
ADIO.516 Kemp had greater experience of health systems than Wright. Kemp also expressed 
interest in improving methadone programmes as a separate project that usefully combined with 
HIV/AIDS prevention. Such characteristics, interests and goals did not scare the risk-averse 
officials. The interest in methadone might seem a distraction from the NEP, but it provided a strong
motivator for IDU in being a potentially achievable goal, while enrolling at least some supportive 
addiction treatment professionals in an alliance of interests. ADIO began as somewhat different 
from an inherently private pharmacy practice, yet different again from the ‘straight’ political model
of the IV League with its ‘straight up’ fully designed, yet already unfashionable outreach proposal. 
Wright, McGrath, and Kemp all added a peer component to Baker’s alignment of pharmacists and 
syringe suppliers. Despite their differences, these key individuals all worked to further articulate 
versions of peer-professional hybridity in a form of public health that offered and required trust 
with IDU. They had little choice if they wanted to be effective. Once a small peer-professional 
change was made, later choices became easier through path-dependent processes. Yet many aspects
might have been arranged differently, and if effectively peer-professional, could well have also 
worked. For instance, the timing of the technologies for testing, measuring and engaging with HIV 
and HCV have seemed highly contingent. Matters would have been very different if testing 
technologies had consolidated HCV as a policy actant and as an observable cultural actor before 
516. Kemp was probably more familiar with several Auckland pharmacists who also sold syringes illicitly, but kept a 
lower public profile and did not dent the composure of officials as much as Pollard. When the health sector began to 
fragment with ‘reforms’, the pharmacy sub-sector angled off away from the areas Kemp has seemed more interested 
in, such as improving methadone programmes.
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HIV/AIDS had emerged. Unknown trajectories of public risk would have been generated if HCV 
had preceded HIV, but such responses could not have been conditioned and channelled by the gay 
community in the same way as HIV/AIDS.
I have described how harm reduction aspects are 'carried' as a message by every syringe which 
passes over a peer exchange counter. Objects, such as syringes, have proffered their enscripted 
pragmatic logics, while being simultaneously active in different networks through the activity of 
circulating. This has permitted and encouraged the re-articulation of mechanisms and networks by 
a range of narrative 'translations'.517 The top-down 'translations' found in official documents have 
supplied the frameworks of understanding for people outside the NEP. In that translation, all the 
NEP syringes have carried messages of consensus, partnership, and minimising harm. Yet 
identically branded and labelled syringes were actually different depending on their local 
environment and associations. Peer exchanges and level 2 pharmacies effectively supplied a higher 
grade harm reduction syringes, whereas level 1 pharmacies supplied a lower grade harm reduction 
syringe, and state agency officials arranged for the supply of harm minimisation syringes. Because 
these translations have been different, gaps between known hazards of disease transmission and 
capabilities in service delivery have been apparent in some accounts, but have not appeared in 
other accounts.
From a client 'translation', syringes have carried a mixed story of benefits and accountabilities, 
partly of returning used syringes, partly of reusing syringes, and partly of disposing of syringes 
privately. From a peer-professional perspective, syringes have carried messages of licit work along 
with uncertainties about the service quality and accountabilities to the IDU being represented. For 
instance, there was no specific attempt to evaluate the benefits of increasing syringe numbers, 
compared with increases of outreach, in terms of reducing HCV prevalence and transmission. Nor 
was there solid evaluation of the benefits of increasing resources for outreach, compared with 
lowering the financial barrier to maximising syringe numbers. 
It seems necessary to focus on structural stability, since, despite the NEP being an innovation in 
1987, and considered at that time to be an exception, its goal has been to create a systemic 
mechanism for propagating an IDU norm of safer injecting. IDU agency may accordingly be 
evaluated in terms of the NEP’s durability and stability, together with its adaptive flexibility and 
enterprise. Here is seen an immediate potential for analyses drawing on processes of translation and
hybridity between antagonistic goals which have nonetheless been found in a working alliance. 
Despite the NEP being exceptional in its founding, the rationale and justification for its beginnings 
are based around stable, predictable and ‘normal’ aspects of injecting drug use. 
517. See outlines and descriptions in chapters 1, 2, and 3 and Appendix 9.4 for general usage of the term translation in 
actor-network studies.
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The official and professional agencies that have been accountable for maintaining and improving 
the NEP have not found a workable replacement for its peer-professional mechanism. This is 
because both motivation change and the facilitation of contacts between IDU and health 
professionals have depended upon peer workers being trusted by the same IDU who consciously 
avoid dependence and monitoring by health practitioners and officials. The excluding of IDU from 
public agency creates collective networks of individual illicit agency, which produces social values
of extreme privacy. Yet, despite the co-presence of windows of private opportunity, together with 
individual opportunists, any prospects of working with IDU have been associated with the 
emphases on public accountability and regular public practices which characterise professionalism.
This hybridity between public and private, not one and not the other, not both and not neither, 
explains a 20 year history of avoiding drifts towards either IDU or greater professionalisation. 
New Zealand health policy has been characterised as a messy reality (Martin & Salmond, 2001), 
which may well harbour more hybridity than generally acknowledged. However, I am studying the 
NEP, not the whole of the New Zealand transformations from the 1970s to 2000 and beyond.518 
The important point lies in the manner in which the NEP overturned the previous ‘harm 
prevention’ dogma that involved publicly harming IDU in their identity and chosen practices as 
IDU. The difference is that the NEP was created as a policy exception, despite being national in 
scope and pervading the drug injecting networks, whereas the Rogernomics revolution was 
intended to create new institutions that would turn previous policy implementation frameworks into
exceptions. Notwithstanding, the NEP was strongly influenced by the conditions of possibility 
created by the Rogernomics revolution. 
Nevertheless, the NEP did not surge, then either institutionalise or decline, in actuality or in 
popular representation. Instead, a cusp of innovatory activity was permanently deferred in the case 
of the ‘revolutionary’ NEP because of its formation as a hybrid, ‘contradictory alliance’ grounded 
in pragmatic needs, including a low profile and detailed focus of activity. In consequence, instead 
of difficulties being first defended or even celebrated as necessary costs, then later denounced as an
unwarranted, indecent public effort and sacrifice, a plateau of (semi-)permanent difficult activity 
emerged within a small locale, hidden from the general public.519 Within an invisible pocket we 
find a plateau of possibilities and significance for health work that simultaneously follows and 
crosses boundaries of stigma and deviance. The plateau emerges from the manner in which the 
refolding of institutional boundaries has been a condition and vehicle of the following and crossing 
518. For discussion of revolution in terms of New Zealand’s version of international neo-liberal changes see Easton 
(1999), Stiglitz (1999), Russell (1996), James (1986).
519. Some case study approaches would go beyond such a restricted locale, and seek in a Deleuzian mode to establish a 
whole, favouring or distinguishing between perhaps the ‘baroque’ whole of an assemblage of unique constituents, or 
the ‘romantic ideal’ whole of a single unitary conceptual form of ordering. The NEP’s multiplicity became more 
entangled and condensed, but was not made into a unitary whole. I am less sure, however, that the NEP can be 
validly described as ‘baroque’ let alone a whole. Accordingly, I have stuck with assemblages, articulations, 
configurations, antagonisms, and mechanisms. See also Appendix 9.
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processes that have characterised the NEP.
A plateau of activity might be considered static and uninteresting, of being or having been rather 
than innovatory, but this misses significant points. First, the means of maintaining the stability of 
anything durable is fascinating in an entropic reality where change is normal. Second, Deleuze & 
Guattari (2004) have pointed out the local nature of ‘libidinal economies’ (Massumi, 2004: xiv), 
whereby innovative climaxes considered normal in some locales are treated as abnormal in locales 
where deferral and prolongation are instead idealised and normalised. For 20 years the NEP has 
achieved a deferred plateau of organisational tension and problematic creativity by means of the 
same parsimonious, actual processes from which cusps of innovation have also emerged.
Due to the contingent factors, I doubt that any individual or agency could have simply designed the
NEP as the peer-professional body it had developed into 3 years after the 1987 law change. The 
NEP makes perfect sense, if one disregards the gaps and ambiguous linkages, but in many ways it 
lifted itself by its own boot-straps past the difficulties and policy frameworks of its founding 
period. It did not fully create itself, but in providing a small-scale working practice with potential 
for extension, it certainly contributed to the shaping and stabilising of its own niche environment as
a folding of institutional boundaries. It has required understanding as an eventful historical process,
as well as a structural shaping, as well as an interaction of individual biographies. So might other 
social problems, analyses, and policy be approached.
3   Policy intentions, unintended practices, and policy gaps
I have previously described how the NEP has been characterised by shifts in infrastructural 
boundaries and professional territories, yet also how these shifts have been shaped by policy 
decisions that responded to understandings of problems and to expectations of opportunities. The 
NEP infrastructure was preceded by the workings of an absent-policy of ad-hoc practices whereby 
IDU procured syringes in illicit or informal ways, while a handful of pharmacists illicitly supplied 
syringes without being prosecuted. This ‘policy of practice’ was assimilated within 2 years by a 
shift from these grounded practices and unformed policy to a committed and formal ownership of 
policy at government level. The shift was carried by the changes in the control over and status of 
syringes, which ‘translated’ the peer-professional principles of workable responses to HIV/AIDS 
that had been developed in different form by trusted gay community advocates at a time when 
homosexuality had been illegal. Yet the ad-hoc policy patterns continued to a degree within the 
formal policy package that eventuated. The NEP was made highly receptive to grounded market 
and social mechanisms, and to mid-level policy-making by autonomous peer organisations, despite 
its infrastructure and the productive sustainability being centrally regulated. 
283
Chapter 10.      Between policy and programme: The case for a hybrid NEP 
New Zealand needle exchanges seem unique in the way IDU have influenced health policy by 
means of the delivery of health services to their peers. A mutual interplay of influences between 
practice and policy has been apparent. The particular, detailed aspects of policy-making and 
analysis have contributed to an inherent problem of integrating yet also separating the private and 
the public, the local and the general. Yet the hybrid activity and the conditions of possibility of the 
NEP situation have intensified, lasting beyond the founding generations with their institutional and 
tacit knowledges, thereby drawing analytical attention to this interplay. Policy patterns have 
offered critical insights into the capabilities of the NEP in terms of its case characteristics of 
external environment, internal cohesions, and boundaries where agents and actants articulated 
crucial differentials. The policy contexts, turning points, and conflicts explain much of the NEP 
development of a hybrid mechanism and its peer-professional operating principles.
Policy intentions
Although the particulars of the New Zealand AIDS Foundation (NZAF) and NEP policy were 
unique to New Zealand, similar general principles of the methods by which governments have 
organised and motivated mid-level actors have been reported in overseas studies. These principles 
have involved the specific formulation of codes of law and directives to the employees of state 
agencies. Such codes and directives were similar to conventional government processes. However, 
although seemingly designed to produce a similar effect and intended outcome as a government 
process, the measures were achieved through more diffuse and complex means. The differences 
involved the pattern and mass of the connections that were reshaped. The new methods of 
organising did not rely on a singular authority transmitting directives across a cohesive system of 
order-takers. Instead, stakeholders were enrolled and re-configured into a different pattern of self-
surveillance, trust, and ethics. This UK shift was:
away from government through blueprint and direct service delivery dominated by public 
sector professionals, and towards governance through networks that bring different public, 
private and voluntary/community actors together to agree, plan and deliver programmes that 
often cross organisation boundaries. (Blackman, 2006: 109-110)520 
This study describes an ambiguous, market-oriented, and community-focused pattern of 
provisional relationships between health professionals and state funding agencies. The situation 
described seems similar in some ways to the New Zealand health sector and the NEP 
developments. The UK situation supports the attention I pay to the NEP’s trust relationships. One 
concerning aspect with governance ‘partnerships’ lies in their spectacular potential for abuse by 
better resourced stakeholders.521 A governance style partnership may be more open to abuse than 
520. See Stoker (1998), Kooiman (2003).
521. In a complex interactional issue of many factors, any interventions which primarily benefit private rather than public
interests can be justified by means of a dominant coterie of stakeholders insisting that evidence is not needed, being 
too slow and complex to research in a situation of claimed urgency with a window of opportunity for public funding. 
Such abuse may be covered up by a refusal to commit funds to ongoing monitoring of the intervention, and the 
distribution of benefits. For instance, I have observed such a public-private ‘mechanism of abuse’ in so-called 
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previous government systems at time dominated by official interests or political elites. Blackman 
comments:
This is an agenda that is very much about achieving the delivery of measurable outcomes 
(hence the emphasis on information), but not prescribing in detail organisational arrangements 
on the ground. The emphasis is on working differently, and tackling joined-up problems with 
joined-up solutions (Cabinet Office, 1999). Local actors are given space and incentives to 
realise the policy intent from the centre by developing the concrete organisational 
arrangements locally. Harrison and Wood (1999) call this ‘manipulated emergence’ to 
distinguish it from the tighter policy-action regime that marked an earlier post-war era in 
British public policy characterised more by technocratic blueprints.  
(Blackman, 2006: 110)
Blackman’s analysis is consistent with the early NEP developments. In fact a major participant, 
when later offering a commentary on the process, echoed official comments of the time in referring
to the emergence of the peer groups from their local milieu as “contrived spontaneity” (Kemp, 
2004). Nonetheless, despite reported problems with the state agency handling of information from 
monitoring the NEP, those early groups were remarkably successful, at least in their first years. 
Most survived the somewhat predictable problems of shifting from management by individual 
entrepreneurs to a collective Board. Yet it seems feasible that these problems would not have 
emerged if key stakeholders, such as several of the founding managers, had not been able to avoid 
scrutiny and direction by their Boards. This avoidance was a matter of policy. 
The founders were allowed and encouraged by Department officials to select the members of the 
Boards which became their nominal employer. The internal shape of the peer groups was a 
foreseeable consequence of the initial NEP policy to encourage an entrepreneurial form of 
autonomy. The reason for promoting autonomy was to encourage services to be responsive to local 
particularities of injecting drug use. However, a consequence of prioritising speed as a temporal 
factor, over accountable relations as a structural factor, was that local particularities in the founding
personnel came at times to harm the service delivery over a relatively long term, as hasty mistakes 
became structurally locked-in.
Unintended consequences of policy
The potential openness of governance partnerships to abusive outcomes featuring preventable 
‘community revitalisation’ policies in Christchurch, New Zealand from 2002-2006. Property speculators in New 
Brighton allied with local government officials and politicians to ensure that a road was put through a local open 
pedestrian mall. The opposition from thousands of residents and visitors was disrespected and rejected by Council 
staff and politicians, since the opponents did not enjoy the formal access and status that had been extended to the 
property speculators and local business elite in the ‘consultation’ and decisionmaking process. Nonetheless, the 
Christchurch City Council then proceeded to ‘rewrite history’ when describing these events in later projects. The 
Council claimed that through two charrettes and consultation delegated to a public-private agency, it had established 
that the road was an initiative initiated by the community and enjoying majority community support. As of 2007, the 
Council had not carried out any monitoring of the outcomes of its intervention or of the opinions of residents whom 
it had deceitfully misrepresented in its account of events. Instead, the Council’s public-private agency, a 
‘revitalisation Taskforce’ turned itself into a fully private corporate body that could legally evade legal requirements 
for disclosure of key documents. In this way the aspects of community health outcomes and the exclusion from 
public representation that characterises crime, became reconfigured in a mechanism of abuse created by local 
government.
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harms requires analytical attention, despite the NEP illustrating useful outcomes when all of the 
key stakeholders have been primarily publicly motivated and only moderately interested in private 
agendas. The policy framework did not directly lead to a clear, well-delineated structure of 
accountable implementation of service delivery. Instead, the policy created a challenge over the 
degree of autonomy, self-scrutiny, accountability, and commitment to be found in the group 
processes and consequent quality of service delivery. 
The peer groups met this challenge by intensifying their professional standards, first through a 
higher degree of internal stratification between Boards and employees, then by stratifying into a 
two-tier system with the formation of NENZ. The peer groups rejected the tactic of amalgamating 
into regional blocs in a reduction of local autonomy. Instead they restructured into a more effective 
and accountable form that retained an autonomous local presence within the urban-centred IDU 
networks. In consequence, the position of the NEP co-ordinator or manager, whose incumbent has 
been employed by NENZ since 1995, has benefited from the significant independence of the peer 
groups and thereby NENZ from direct employment or contractual pressures exerted by Ministry 
officials. The autonomous local embedment of the member groups strengthens the organisation as a
whole against top-down capture. If the member groups feel the co-ordinator had come to represent 
the Ministry, or other interests considered unacceptable to local interests, they can opt-out, as the 
Wellington DHDP group did for several years in the late 1990s. 
The logics of autonomy and representation help the NEP to retain its hybrid positioning. However, 
I argue that the logics of retaining their accountability to IDU also encouraged the peer groups to 
avoid alternative development trajectories such as regional blocs. The path-dependency of the 
NEP’s hybridity comes from the contingencies of the initial policy framework as much as from 
peer-professional principles of workability, despite the later developments being initially 
unpredicted and most likely initially undesired by policy owners. The policy was successfully 
implemented through the development of the ongoing ‘alliance of antagonisms’, but also due to its 
lack of clarity, of monitoring, and of direct control, along with a measure of randomness at the 
highest political levels. These ambiguities and absences in structural relations created crucial 
incentives and opportunities for the mid-level actors to reshape their working conditions and 
influence policy development from the middle of the circulation of things.
The NEP was not designed as policy to protect public health, and then simply carried out in 
practice. Instead, it developed unexpectedly and adaptively, became productive by juxtaposing 
conflicting elements, while creating a protective boundary around such elements. The NEP 
reconfigured elements of its non-human and institutional environment, while its new form of social
organisation became corporately, culturally, legally, commercially, and politically consolidated. 
That the consolidation has never become, nor aimed at becoming, a fully integrated system or a 
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modular package for replication elsewhere, is explained by the hybridity of its environment. This 
hybrid environment has influenced the policy and practice that first emerged as a limited response 
to a public threat, to then be shaped in hybrid arrangements, leading to productively, stability, and 
sustainability despite limitations on resources. In consequence, within the locality and small scale 
of New Zealand policy and practice, although also distinctly influenced by global principles of 
wellness and best practice responses to HIV/AIDS, the NEP has resisted the coalescence of its 
antagonistic elements. 
Certain IDU peers and health professionals became structurally ‘bound together’ as peer-
professionals, yet this assemblage remained hybridly antagonistic, ambiguous, uneasy, and 
problematic. The assemblage we call the NEP did not become dominated by its peers, nor by 
professionals, nor by both in partnership, nor by the emergence of a single new coherent entity. The
NEP has worked as a very successful hybrid mechanism of peer-professionalism, despite not being 
overtly planned as such in policy or practice. Instead, the hybridity was significantly self-organised
in how it drew adaptively on the forces and forms of the existing institutional boundaries, and on 
the flows of the market arrangements. Because of these discontinuities and ambiguities the NEP 
has not been singular, nor easily managed, nor completely legal, yet has been uniquely productive 
of public health. 
At places and times where inherent oppositions intensify into conflict, as in the strike threat by 
NENZ in 2001, top-down controls may be expected to be resisted at grounded and mid-levels, 
particularly at sites of decisionmaking that are significantly autonomous. The NEP created a niche 
of such sites where the things, laws, and people associated with illicit injecting activities have been 
conveniently repackaged in configurations and circulations that produced an acceptable though 
contentious degree of effectiveness and efficiency. The continuance of trust by IDU has been 
crucial for these sites and processes to be workable. This method has required empowering and 
trusting peers to work in more specialised, professional ways. Yet by also empowering the 
difference in perspectives of peers, by creating new expectations and autonomous standpoints, 
conflicts over policy directions and priorities became inevitable, as in the conventional conflicts 
between professionals and officials over the governance of health budgets and quality of care.522
522. Organisational growth may be expected from expansion in the size of the NEP activities and budget, increases in the
numbers of sites and peer-professionals, and of those with IDU experience or HCV positive. The NEP might 
develop into a normal component, or appendage, of an otherwise conventional health system.  Either through 
expansion, or through long familiarity, institutional change towards harm reduction is possible. Some change has 
been seen in drug treatment areas, although professional disputes over such changes continue. However, if harm 
reduction became completely normalised, needle exchanges and peer-professionals would not be required. The 
positioning of needle exchanges between exceptional and conventional provides an indicator for on-going 
institutional change.
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Policy Gaps
Comparisons between the expectations and the actual outcomes of policy-making have been further
shaped and intensified by both the designed and unintended gaps in policy and programmes. In 
particular, the demand for a comprehensive HCV prevention policy has drawn attention to gaps in 
the coverage of the NEP in practice, not only HIV/AIDS but for any blood-borne disease. Even in 
the cities, the pharmacy-based NEP outlets could not access and move their health materials, let 
alone attempt motivation work, in the prisons, schools, IDU households, or parental households. 
One or other of the constituents of hybridity was resisted in such sites, or the combination became 
too intense for the environment to sustain. This meant that non-urban IDU, those who did not trust 
coming to an identifiable public centre, those who did not identify as IDU because of their 
inexperience, those who were too young, and those with restrained capabilities of travel, were not 
offered services or other forms of support. Prison officers, school teachers, and parents could 
readily prevent information about the NEP being accessible in their premises. Some of those cared 
for would most likely have caught HCV from their initial injecting experiences when their 
vulnerability to sharing syringes was particularly high.
The NEP did not aim at universal coverage of people. It directly provided services only for the 
independent adults who identified as IDU. Others were left to the chances of indirect filter-down 
mechanisms. In this limited demographic space the hybrid mechanism I have described was 
sufficiently sustainable to assemble, shape and stabilise a national coverage of the urban centres. In
these limited geographical places, yet also in centralised523 policy-making forums that ‘covered’ all 
places, IDU became represented in a legally-sheltered programme that was funded partly by the 
government for providing state services, while being regulated and positioned within the health 
sector.
I have shown in previous chapters how the gaps between criminal systems, justice systems and 
health systems first created a potential problem of disease transmission. These gaps then demanded
interventions that could not be supplied from the justice or health systems. The gaps then became 
reconfigured, by means of their boundaries being altered, in an intervention to supply and recover 
syringes while facilitating greater control by individual IDUs over their management of injecting 
risks. The attempts to bridge these institutional gaps led to the initial configuration of the NEP 
becoming reshaped, redirected, and expanded in its connectivity due to the introduction of the peer 
outreach component. The peer groups, especially NENZ, have tried to further bridge such gaps by 
providing new forms of service delivery, yet have been consistently opposed throughout the 1990s 
by the same state agencies and governments which continued to permit and fund the NEP. By 
523. For discussion of the way centralisation, in the UK and North America, influences spending levels, equality, cost 
controls, standardisation, specialisation, innovations, and diversity, see Hollingsworth & Hanneman (1989), 
Hollingsworth (1983: 215-220), Hage & Hollingsworth (1977).
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moving from discrete practices to planned interventions the NEP has clashed with the Ministry 
over policy ownership. This is hardly surprising, since all health care is rationed, both by those who
allocate social resources and by those who allocate their professional time and energies.
One counter-intuitive aspect is that such gaps also constitute gaps in surveillance, whereas their 
plugging seems comparatively cost-effective. Even more surprising is the way the seemingly most 
expensive gaps have been plugged first by the funding of a free one-for-one scheme in 2004, at the 
same time as a pilot scheme for a fairly expensive bush-net model of covering rural areas was 
approved for the West Coast, (as described in Section 2 of Chapter 1, and in Appendix 7). This 
sequence and prioritisation of funding suggests that financial considerations have been less 
significant than other rationales. These other rationales would include the political difficulties of 
intruding into the sovereign territory of the Corrections Department, and the ability of the police to 
formally or informally ‘veto’ increases in the NEP’s effectiveness, either at policy level or by 
harassing clients for the possession of syringes. The ambiguities of this situation are noteworthy, 
given the number of analyses that emphasise the increasing structuring of institutions of late 
modernity around the practices of surveillance and the development of centres for the calculation 
of governance information.524
The formation of a single NEP system of national coverage eliminated the potential problem of 
pharmacists, such as Mr Pollard, undercutting the syringe prices in local areas and further 
embarrassing the official system. National coverage also minimised the chances of pockets of HIV 
developing amongst IDU in remote areas before their symptoms of AIDS became diagnosed. 
Furthermore, equality of access to health care has been a core principle of New Zealand health 
services. National coverage was considered desirable for a mix of ethical and pragmatic reasons, 
but these were simply assumed, and not clearly articulated in the initial planning documents 
between 1986 and 1988. Nevertheless, although national scope was attained from the initial stage 
of operations, national coverage was noticeably absent from later NEP operations. Particular sites, 
such as prisons and younger age groups were not covered in the initial policy framework. 
Furthermore, once the NEP became established, then intensified in terms of peer-professional 
mechanisms, the scope, scale, and coverage were not allowed to expand.
Despite holding ‘national coverage’ as an ideal, pointed to with pride in the official descriptions of 
the NEP, there were significant gaps in the earliest planning, for instance the lack of attention paid 
to the infrastructure and costs of collecting used syringes. As the NEP consolidated into a particular
form with specific boundaries, other gaps became apparent, such as the gap between approaches to 
524. For discussion of links between the generation of information and its accumulation in centres of calculation for the 
accomplishment of policing, see Andreas & Nadelmann (2006: 59-104, 134-249), Haggerty (2001), Garland (1999: 
22-23), Sheptycki (1999), Ericson & Haggerty (1997).
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HCV, as compared with HIV. Such gaps are significant because the NEP was initially designed to 
minimise such exclusions from coverage, yet was also driven by an overriding policy directive 
towards a single disease and a single preventative programme. This totalising policy directive 
conflicted with a network of blood-borne and other threats to health, and conflicted with the NEP’s 
loose assemblage of multiple policy makers. Such gaps, accordingly, illustrate disjunctures in 
policy that caused ongoing problems, while the embedment and solidifying of such disjunctures in 
a national infrastructure indicates one cause of continuing problems.
One of the most telling gaps consists of the lack of financial data on the costs of the NEP. The 
significance here lies partly in the initial state sector environment of promoting effective record-
keeping, and partly in the absence of oversight. Clearly, if the claim by the Ministry of Health that 
the NEP records were unavailable was in fact true,525 then the NEP expenditure could not have 
been monitored. This means that evaluation of outcomes could not have been carried out in any 
evidence-based, publicly accountable way. This deception of either the public and Minister of 
Health, or of the independent team carrying out the research, shows how the restraints on 
expanding the NEP services were of a political character rather than a simple circumstance. Such 
evidence of distrust, creating further reasons for distrusting, is of significance due to the way 
exchanges of trust formed the core articulation of the NEP productivity via the mechanism of peer-
professionalism.
These considerations also assist in understanding the overall sector environment. The restructuring 
of the state sector involved the elimination of a yearly regular payment to departments that did not 
feature any requirement for developing the policies and holding the records needed for strategic 
budget forecasting. Instead, accrual accounting became enforced as a basic practice throughout the 
state sector. But clearly not with the NEP expenditure given that such records were not available. It
is not feasible that such records were mislaid, since they would have been held in electronic as well
as physical forms, and would have featured in a range of different reports, with copies. Either the 
NEP has demonstrated an impressive exception to the norm of accrual accounting, or for some 
reason, interested parties have made such records disappear with no response from those agencies 
to whom they have been nominally accountable.526
Another gap has consisted of the absence of documented protocols over the ownership and 
accountability for the human tissue in the returned syringes. The NEP’s ‘mechanism of trust’ has 
been potentially influenced by the configurations of the private property and identification aspects 
of DNA, the potential for harm to IDU as a collective, the law enforcement interest in monitoring 
525. and not a cover up, possibly of unauthorised projects.
526. If so, such deviance might be found elsewhere in the delivery of health or enforcement services by state agencies. 
For instance, the Ombudsmen's’ review of the management of prisons by the Department of Corrections (Office of 
the Ombudsmen, 2005) was scathing about the quality and quantity of many records and record-keeping systems.
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traces of illicit drugs, and the epidemiological desire to monitor the threat to public health of HCV. 
Yet this situation seems similar to wider concerns about protections for general privacy, about the 
benefits of commercial productivity, and about the public health benefits of sentinel surveillance 
for many diseases, not just HCV and HIV. As genetic technologies become more capable, one 
would expect the developments of legislation and human rights protocols that focus on ‘waste’ 
human tissues that carry valuable genetic information about viruses and human hosts.527 There 
seems a gap between the NEP’s involvement with human tissue and the need to create policies 
about such material and information.
IDU had reasons to distrust more effective and efficient testing, for instance in the potential 
analyses of returned syringes for DNA identifiers and drugs. However, the peer-professionals 
agitated for 16 years for the NEP to be more effective and efficient in providing regular evaluation,
health services, and representation. For these reasons, peer-professionals have co-operated with and
even advocated biomedical testing, despite fears of destroying IDU trust, provided that researchers 
first negotiated the appropriate accesses with IDU representatives.528 Peer representatives 
effectively guaranteed, through their face-to-face reassurance, and professional capabilities, that the
testing would benefit rather than harm IDU as individuals, and as collective networks or 
communities. But, since529 no protocols over such testing have ever been formalised, the degree to 
which peer-professional representation has empowered IDU communities has been unclear. While 
information of immediate value has been gained, there may also have been longer-term costs. For 
example, practices that do not adhere to principles of informed consent in treatment or research 
would undermine such principles not only in marginal areas of research, but across whole 
populations and regulatory systems.
A long-standing gap has involved the concentrating of NEP syringe supply and client contact into a
single urban centre. This creates access barriers and inconvenience for people whose homes and 
drug markets are distant. The difficulties in overcoming such barriers privilege those who are 
mobile, urban, and adult, but penalise those who lack such social resources. These include young 
people in schools, older persons in prison, people in small towns, and those in rural areas. Due to 
such problems, a satellite exchange in Christchurch was set up in New Brighton early in 2006, in 
response to client requests and a survey of client needs. After 12 months the client numbers have 
matched the levels projected in the development plan drawn up in collaboration with the peer-
professionals on the DISC Trust. This exchange has maintained a discrete, professional 
appearance.530 Another instance lies in the formation of the ‘bush-net’ syringe supply and return 
527. The reasons that IDU might avoid having their DNA appropriated and on-sold would most likely overlap with the 
reasons that ratepayers would object to the ownership of the DNA in their body wastes transferring via the sewerage 
system to their local Council for on-sale off-shore or to the ESR, even if their rates reduced in consequence.
528. For participant perspectives on this issue see Kemp (1990), DIVO (1991a, 1991b, 1991c); Dickson, Austin et al. 
(1994); Baker (1989, 1994); Lee (1989); Baker (1988, as cited in Department of Health, 1988).
529. Attempts to further integrate this environment have been promoted at a central governance and evaluative level.
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operation on the West Coast. As briefly described in Section 2 of Chapter 1, and in Appendix 7, 
this ‘bush-net’ has relied on local peer participants to operate an ad-hoc syringe supply and return 
network in their territory of expertise, while being supplied and supported by a mobile team based 
in a larger urban centre. The embedded peer is much closer to and personally following the 
movements of drugs, yet is locally known and trusted, while having motivational support and 
material resources guaranteed to a professional standard. After having been shaped, stabilised, and 
sustainably operated for two years, the syringes supplied in the West Coast bush-net increased from
2,000 to 20,000 per annum. These figures indicate that there had been a substantial unmet demand 
for this health service. This demand would have remained unmet if the NEP peer-professionals had
not undertaken to provide the initial feasibility research out of their own budget, then organise 
several pilot programme studies, and a successful transfer of the responsibilities for funding to state
health agencies (Jang & Henderson, 2007. pers. com.).
Another gap has involved the under-utilisation of peer-professionals. Although NEP peers supply 
outreach services in informal ways through personal contacts, their numbers have been 
systematically limited. The rationales for such limitations include the administrative logics of 
reducing risk and the financial logics of reducing costs. Neither the officials dealing with the 
positioning and contracts for the NEP, nor NENZ itself, have been able to provide a training 
programme for upskilling and increasing the resource-base of peer workers.531 The professionalism 
of the peer element of the NEP has not developed to a national standard of formal training and 
qualification, despite the existence of informal systems for supervising and mentoring peer 
employees. Nevertheless, NENZ employees have contributed essential expertise to the 
development of standards of practice for the pharmacists involved in the NEP. In these and in other
aspects of health planning, NENZ has contributed significantly to collaborations between state 
agencies and professional bodies. This knowledge and collegial practice has been acknowledged 
and integrated into the health sector in a similar way to other specialised forms of professional 
expertise.
According to my account, peer-professionals are only productive when actively interfacing with 
different sets of people and institutions, including IDU, health professions, lobby groups, policy 
networks, administrations, and agencies. However, NEP harm reduction services are excluded from
access to schools and prisons, despite HCV infection rates remaining higher than cure rates and 
deaths combined. This imbalance has ensured that, unlike the extremely low prevalence of HIV, 
the everyday environment of IDU is 'dense' with HCV. Individuals identifying as IDU have access 
530. The satellite exchange noticeably exceeds the general retail standards of presentation in the area. Despite being sited
close to a school, several bars, and a party pill outlet which had attracted strong community opposition from school 
parents in 2005, no obvious problems have emerged between this satellite exchange and the local community.
531. Of the peer group Trust Boards, only DISC has instituted these goals in formal ways backed up by actual 
expenditure, and even this has been limited to on-the-job training rather than any formal qualifications.
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to NEP services, but not the neophytes who are readily infected in their initial injecting 
experiences, and who maintain the HCV-dense environment of IDU. HCV prevention throughout 
the 1990s, accordingly, has not been a public health programme focused on reducing the rate of 
transmission in the institutional areas that create greater risk. It has instead been a policy of 
aggregated private health measures that focus on the individual motivation and empowerment of 
potential transmitters and recipients. Where individuals cannot be empowered, due to institutional 
constraints as in schools and prisons, gaps in health care can be expected to become barriers against
the provision of trusted information about risks, against motivated peer engagement, and against 
access to sterile equipment.
HCV has been a 'private' disease because, after 1992, most new cases have been IDU. People with 
HCV are reluctant to disclose their seropositive status because of the stigma of associated IDU 
practices. HCV was not considered an urgent public threat, and was categorised as a private health 
issue, despite being endemic among IDU (NEP, 1997: 5). IDU are not a major population group. A 
threat to their health may have been too small to seem to qualify for public health expenditure. Yet 
HCV transmission has been defined as a private health issue, despite being transmitted through the 
practice of injection that is an IDU community norm. It seems that the criteria of public health has 
prioritised majority norms in a process that has excluded rather than included marginalised groups. 
IDU were not considered fully part of the 'public', despite the arrangements of greater inclusion that
developed around HIV/AIDS. This official attitude only began to change after economic studies in 
the late 1990s showed higher than expected financial costs of HCV.532 Such responses to HCV 
indicate that the Ottawa Charter principles have only been applied to HIV/AIDS, not HCV, which 
raises further questions as to why, how, and by whom the Charter has been interpreted. From a 
different but related perspective, the increased funding for HCV prevention raises a question over 
whether HIV/AIDS would have produced an Ottawa Charter, or large-scale funding, or policies of 
seeming consensus, if the victim numbers and social profile had been low, if the disease was 
categorised as a private health problem, and if first world economies had not been threatened.
The gaps in coverage illustrate how the difficulties of changing IDU motivations continue to 
characterise the hybrid environment of the NEP. Evaluations of the NEP need to consider whether 
a benefit, such as harm reduction outreach to pre-IDU youth, might be too difficult, or if attempted,
might be accompanied by the hazards of losing the NEP’s hybrid sustainability. This aspect is seen 
in the way the HCV Support Group in Christchurch has accomplished forms of access and 
education in schools which the DISC Trust it emerged and separated from could not provide. 
Because the HCV Support Group has been disease-centred on health care, rather than syringe-
centred on prevention in a hybrid crime-health mechanism, the HCV Support Group can more 
532. See Sheerin, Green & Sellman (2003, 2001), Easton (2002), Nesdale et al. (2000).
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readily access schools and non-IDU. In situations where maintaining the trust of parents and school
boards is necessary for access to youth, the HCV Support Group exercises a more sustainable type 
of hybridity than the NEP, because it does not so directly represent IDU or syringes.
The NEP harm reduction policy succeeded in minimising HIV prevalence among IDU. However, it
is significant that HCV control was not achieved, nor attempted, despite a similar route of shared 
syringes. HIV/AIDS was seen as a threat to public order, as well as to health, whereas HCV only 
seemed to threaten a marginalised group. The differences between HIV and HCV illustrate a 
sorting process, involving health professionals and health officials and politicians, that leads to 
some groups being marginalised and others not. The different ways risk may be understood and 
presented as a public norm is clearly involved in this sorting process. Such differences and 
difficulties contribute to explanations for a range of employment problems and gaps in service 
coverage, such as the vulnerability of young IDU experimenters to HCV transmission. 
Understanding the capabilities of the NEP requires understanding how initial gaps in public health 
arose from an interplay of ecological contingencies, institutionalised practices, and policy goals, 
yet how closing these gaps ‘locked-in’ gaps in the public health coverage of ‘private’ stigmatised 
populations.
4   Can the NEP case be integrated?
In this section I partially integrate some distinctive aspects of the NEP developments to better 
delineate its character as a case that features characteristically transgressive boundaries and hybrid 
activity. This account has shifted in its focus from a changing environment of viral, legislative, and 
institutional constituents, to the configuration of a quasi-criminal quasi-profession, then to the 
outcomes in practice of NEP policy and gaps. The NEP began with a relatively forceful though 
somewhat ambiguous policy directive. However, when attempting to carry out this directive, a 
pragmatic, grounded ethic of policy-making emerged from the interplay between the difficulties of 
environment and occupation. 
The ethos of the NEP is ‘to neither condemn nor condone injection of illicit drugs’. Nonetheless, 
this is a given code of behaviour, or normative moral, not an ethic, since it does not indicate why 
such conduct is desirable by directly specifying desired outcomes. As I describe and argue in 
chapter 9, the ethic of the NEP is that those injecting illicit drugs should be given solid evidence-
based reasons to trust, rather than distrust, health expertise in order to empower forms of self and 
community care. By identifying this ethic, which reframes the morals and codes that cause the 
problem of transmission of blood-borne diseases, my analysis necessarily transgresses those 
boundaries of the NEP that I have also described as solid. This echoes how the productivity of the 
294
Section 4:    Can the NEP case be integrated?
NEP developments, seen in the shifting of forms into new arrangements, has delineated yet also 
destabilised an interactive heterogeneous environment by developing as a single, autopoietically 
shaped case.533
I have described in previous chapters how the NEP peer-professionals acquired a hybrid 
competency in providing sterile injecting equipment of professional quality and disposing of 
returned syringes, while motivating IDU to attain greater control over injecting risks. In the 
exercise of these competencies, these peer-professionals provided public representation on behalf 
of IDU, while mediating aspects of the surveillance over IDU. Over this period injectable drugs 
became more criminalised. Nevertheless, IDU, as peers and via peers, became less excluded from 
'the public', resulting in an increase in their self-governance of health, in contrast to the general 
repression of IDU as criminals by intent. This increase in the self-governance of IDU accompanied 
a shift in the unique capabilities of the NEP. During the 1990s the NEP moved from a stand-alone, 
experimental exceptionalism towards an uneasy integration. The integration was first towards the 
regulatory system of the national health infrastructure. But this integration then shifted towards a 
greater influence and control by the justice sector, as seen in the police in 2004 shifting from 
supporting to opposing the decriminalisation of syringes. 
These movements have been uneasy for several reasons. One has been the large-scale 
unpredictability of the sectoral changes towards a ‘whole of government’534 interagency 
environment, despite evidence of ‘silo-isation’ practices and attitudes (Ministry of Health, 2006d), 
and with regard to privacy protocols (New Zealand Government, 1994b). Another has been the 
inherent hybridity of the NEP. The third, however, has been the ambiguity between crime and 
health institutional boundaries from which the NEP has drawn its necessity, forms, and force. The 
NEP was founded on a seemingly essential institutional difference that constituted such a 
boundary, yet the forms and interactivities of the NEP critiqued and weakened the rationale for 
such institutional boundaries. Such uneasiness is observed as the NEP moved from management by
a Taskforce dedicated to HIV/AIDS, then to inclusion within the funding frameworks of the mental
health policy and belated policy over HCV, yet described from 1998 to 2007 as a component of the
National Drug Policy (Ministry of Health, 2007: 17).
Along this uneasy way, the local practices and community norms of IDU also changed. IDU 
networks moved somewhat towards greater contact and participation in nation-wide systems of 
533. See Mingers (1994), Luhmann (1986b), Hejl (1984), Varela (1981a, b), Varela, Maturana, & Uribe (1974) for a 
range of applications of concepts of autopoiesis. The term generally refers to self-organisation. More specific 
aspects include a dynamic, non-equilibrium involving forms and forces in functional states. As I use the concept of 
autopoiesis, these states shape and stabilise various flows from a wider environment through the forms and 
processes of an autopoietic situation, or focus, or entity, or mechanism. The dynamic control of such flows creates 
the conditions of relative stability. Autopoiesis is an attempt to describe the core and boundary working of life 
processes in more general, systemic terms which can overlap and engage with non-living technological processes. 
See also Walley (1991), Prigogine & Stengers (1984) for related work on ways of analysing complexity and order.
534. See Ministry of Health (2006), State Services Commission (2001), IACD (1998).
295
Chapter 10.      Between policy and programme: The case for a hybrid NEP 
health-promotion and self-monitoring. Nonetheless, this change was insufficient to significantly 
decrease the hazards of blood-borne HCV transmission to the public, particularly to youth and 
future prison inmates. I have described how policies were conceptually developed, then 
implemented, then adapted in practice through cycles of infrastructural developments, leading 
eventually to conflicts over policy with the Ministry of Health. The NEP’s engagement with such 
difficulties offers an evaluation of capability. For example, the NEP managed to survive with a 
strong peer component, whereas some others AIDS service organisations in New Zealand and 
overseas have not. Nor is every health service agency been willing and capable of biting policy 
chunks from the official hand that feeds it. These eventful comparisons of capability, combined 
with the effects of peer-professionalism, address my research question on how the capabilities of 
the NEP might be best understood. 
The ability to overcome historical obstacles of founding, then of constraints to expansion in some 
areas, has been facilitated by committed personnel. But more to the point has been the way in 
which the peer-professional resources, experiences, and goals of these people interacted with a 
peer-professional institutional niche. This semi-structured, hybrid indeterminacy facilitated 
resilience, flexibility, and adaptation. By surviving for long enough, time was made for systems of 
more effective management to develop, which in turn enabled more regular collaboration with 
epidemiological and public health researchers. None of this has been a natural development that 
could be simply ‘relaxed into’.
I have argued that the NEP has developed by means of a unique hybrid mechanism of peer-
professionalism which, together with contingent factors, has produced a ‘forceful’ capability for 
protecting public health through an organised application of harm reduction logics. This protection 
applied across wide areas of New Zealand society, during the same period that comparable 
programmes developed overseas. By ‘forceful’ I emphasise how the capability of the NEP has not 
only responded to motivations from its ‘external’ environment, but has also produced its own force 
of ‘internal’ self-organisation and influence over the organising of its environment. This is the type 
of force generally associated with professions, rather than mass pressure groups, because it is 
founded upon expertise and experience that is always in short supply, not just when labour is 
withdrawn in industrial disputes. Such hybrid professionalism has been observed to constitute a 
significant aspect of the networks of agencies and accountabilities wherein the governance of 
health care has contributed to the effect of statehood.
I further argue that the NEP has developed as a way of doing state policy by other means. I touch 
here on the process of following the assemblage of policy from political and planning needs. These 
needs are very different since politics is inherently contingent, whereas planning involves a crusade
against contingencies. In this fog of planning, markets and policy seem both a form of living 
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activity and a form of undead movement. It has been seen in the NEP history that policy is an 
effect as much as a cause, and an event as much as a dated announcement. This seems significant 
when personalised health interventions by professionals, after the harm emerges to be diagnosed, is
becoming supplemented, if not replaced, by population-based wellness systems of deferring harms 
through the agency of officialdom. Yet whereas health professionals have historically enjoyed great
trust and reasonable compliance from a patient public, official systems have been generally 
disparaged, being understood as constraining rather than enabling personal projects and desires. 
This is where the crime or deviance of desires intersects with health systems in ways that, although 
less intense than the NEP and peer-professional arrangements, can nevertheless be usefully 
informed by the historical events and institutional effects in which the NEP has manoeuvred.
The NEP only worked as a mechanism because diverging aspects were maintained in alignment. 
These aspects could not be rigidly aligned because they had been assembled from different 
arrangements with opposed or different logics. Until such arrangements became adjusted, the 
alignment depended upon local work that ignored conflicting logics and goals while connecting 
seemingly unfitting elements. IDU and their logics needed to be held separate from opposing 
occupations and logics, or reframed in a new category formed by rearranging boundary lines. 
'Harm reduction' effectively separated IDU from the law enforcement of harm prevention logics, 
while 'harm minimisation' incorporated both, at a high level of funding, of regulatory permissions, 
and of abstraction. This interactivity, on a small scale, produced uncertainty. Furthermore, the NEP
environment was uncertain since many of its constituents worked at evading surveillance. Working
arrangements were inherently difficult and ambiguous because the goals and environment featured 
a multiple, partial, and divergent connectivity. 
The NEP is costing more because it is achieving more. The NEP had been underfunded and 
prevented from achieving its designed goals of national coverage. As these gaps were slowly 
closed, the costs increased. A new blood borne disease then appeared and became increasingly a 
public problem. Then a new government with different spending priorities appeared in late 1999. A
review then increased the public status of the programme. The evidence base allows the cost 
increases to be justified, unlike in some areas of mental health and many areas of addiction 
treatment. As the number and percentage of IDU increase, governments wish to have instruments 
to measure and monitor such changes, with the NEP having proven itself to be an extremely precise
and sensitive instrument.
The increasing costs of the NEP also derive from the pattern of peer-professionalism. The work of 
articulating the antagonisms of this hybrid pattern has required continual resourcing, partly from 
government funding. As either the goals increase in scope, or the activities extend in scale, or the 
difficulties otherwise increase, more resources, including funding will be required. 
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In the following chapter I close my argument on hybridity by showing how the principle of peer-
professionalism acts as the single most significant characteristic of the New Zealand NEP, rather 
than merely being an emergent aspect of the programme. I argue that not only the ‘being’ but also 
the ‘becoming’ of the NEP was locally emergent and generalised. My analysis uses two 
complementary perspectives and methods. First, I consolidate the grounded case of the NEP. 
Second, I problematise the consolidation with the peer-professional resistance to closure. This 
argument not only explicates the NEP’s complex partiality and multiplicity, but also how it may be 
approached as a singular quasi-object effect, or quasi-case.535
535. Here I use a case approach to merge postmodern attention to relationality and ambiguity with a pre and non-modern 
attention to things, by using a topological type of sociological imagination to shape and condense empirical details 
while constraining the abstract rationality which is required to connect and draw significance from such details.
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11
Between practice, pattern, and principle: The case for peer-professionals
What replaces the one big mind-independent world about which scientists were once said to discover the
truth is the variety of niches within which the practitioners of these various specialties practice their trade.
Those niches, which both create and are created by the conceptual and instrumental tools with which their
inhabitants practice upon them, are as solid, real, resistant to arbitrary change as the external world was
once said to be. But, unlike the so-called external world, they are not independent of mind and culture,
and they do not sum to a single coherent whole ...
 (The Road Since Structure. Thomas Kuhn, 2000: 120)
In the previous chapter I stepped back from the grounded detail of the NEP history by focusing on 
effects more than events. I did this by pulling together the more significant themes, or patterns, 
from which that history has been interwoven. The articulated connections of these strands 
encouraged a more structural analysis, within which abstractive methods were utilised and 
controlled by the application of sociological imagination, where: "neither the life of an individual 
nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both" (Mills, 1959: 3). I 
emphasised the hybrid pattern observed in the articulations of infrastructural goals, problems, and 
capabilities. However, I presented the articulation of such historical and hybrid logics, along with 
the organising of that infrastructure, as co-evolving. I drew attention to the unexpected outcomes of
the NEP’s policy initiative, together with its ongoing trials of control between different levels and 
sites, but did not develop the boundaries of policy analysis beyond that applicable to the whole of 
the case. 
In the current chapter I continue the emphasis on hybridity by closing my argument for the hybrid 
capabilities of the NEP being best understood as ‘the emergence of peer-professionalism’. By peer-
professionalising I mean an active and evolving way of provisionally ‘locking-together’ strong and 
continuing antagonisms between crime and health within a complex, partly indeterminate 
environment featuring key interactions between elements of institutional assumptions and 
expectation.536 I pay as much attention to the processes of emergence, influenced by gay 
community organising, as I do to the later form in which the peer-professionalising has stabilised. I
emphasise how the active working of peer-professional motivational logics has interacted with 
practices of shaping, stabilising, and sustaining. 
I have presented an account of the messy whole of the NEP as including the peer-professional 
actualities and logics as understood by participants. However, this current chapter presents an 
account of where crucial: “empirically confirmed and logically consistent statements of 
regularities” (Merton, 1973: 270)537 join in a way that explains the motivations of participants. The 
536. By a ‘pattern of peer-professionalism’ I do not refer to a deterministic cause that acts as a foundation for a 
superstructure of hybrid indeterminacy. The causality is far more complex and ambiguous. See Law (2004: 41-43), 
Watson-Verran & Turnbull (1995: 117), Deleuze & Parnet (1987, v111). See chapters 2, 3, & 4. 
537. While appropriating Merton’s prescription for good science, of ‘natural’ and ‘social’ types, I nevertheless find his 
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hybrid division of my narrative argument leads to a folding together of the two methods, these 
being the acute focus on case aspects together with the wider awareness of practices and principles,
into a whole pattern of peer-professionalism. But here I should specify what I mean by ‘principle’.
A principle is generally understood as a pattern, or abstract object, but also a likelihood of more 
general applicability and a guide to activity, including the activity of understanding. Principles, 
accordingly, extend the caseness of cases by resisting any total closure in the process of 
encasement. As an analogy with windows (casements), the fold, or hinge, argues by means of its 
design against the intention, purpose and actuality of permanent closure. So also does a latch. The 
impermanence of opening and closing is equivalent to the actuality of alternation, or iteration. A 
window of the casement mechanism, like a case, is inherently in the middle of things, between 
open and shut, inside and outside, barrier and portal.
I have chosen to close the case argument with peer-professional emergence, as both a process and a
pattern, or principle, not with the wider, more easily delineated, but more empirically located case 
of the NEP. A cautious reason is that by unduly totalising or locking-down the case I would be 
undercutting my own argument for hybridity. My chain of evidence and logics depends upon the 
problematisation by means of analytical opening up, and going no further than the evidence allows 
to be opened up, rather than privileging the closure of case boundaries. A more directly engaged 
reason is that to be convincing, my argument needs to become topologically translated into a 
concept, expressed as a more compact, categorical quasi-object. This quasi-object needs to express 
greater closure and compact portability, yet without making unevidenced claims redolent of 
universal truth-hood, and so is a more useful and appropriate way to close my NEP case and my 
case for this thesis.
I develop this argument in 4 sections. I first use the most compelling NEP case material to outline 
my key claim that peer-professionalism exists both inside and outside the hybridity of the NEP 
case. From this grounded foundation, I outline the contexts of peer-professionalism in the 
institutional conflicts, wider than the NEP, between IDU and health authorities over the territory of 
drug use, self-medication, and self-injection. I then describe the crucial articulation of peer-
professionalism which preceded and became shaped by the later NEP. In closing, I present the key 
reasons why the relationship between my source material, methods, and emergent concepts are 
persuasive. 
recommended methods to be positively counterproductive. Instead I present consistent, regular accounts by means 
of the disjunctures and inconsistencies of ‘messy realities’. See chapters 2, 3, & 4.
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1   Shaping the argument
My analytical description of the organising of the NEP has utilised an interplay between 
assemblaging and mechanism. According to concepts of ‘assemblaging’, which involves putting 
things together when needed, influenced by selection constraints but not by any predetermined 
structural plan, IDU peers were put into a site together with needs and models for professional 
practices. Yet an equally valid perspective is that the peers and sites were drawn into becoming 
actual in the same processes as they were drawn together. Furthermore, other possible shapes and 
turning-points were selected against and became correspondingly more difficult, which partially 
explains why such possibilities did not eventuate. As well as being descriptive, the pattern of peer-
professionalism has also been active in the way it has put, drawn, and selected for what works, or 
does not work, in the occupation and niche sites of NEP interactivity. 
Peer-professional activity has permeated and shaped the NEP yet did not merely emerge and 
solidify from the NEP, since it was active in the two years of illicit syringe supply that preceded 
and provoked the NEP. The preceding gay community organising did not involve syringes yet also 
was strongly peer-professional in the way crime, stigma, secrecy, and distrust of health 
professionals came to be re-articulated. In part, peer-professionalism produced the NEP by actively
problematising the environment where syringes circulated. Nevertheless, the participants in the 
NEP have maintained and reacted to this institutionalisation as they experienced its urgent demands
of the moment, and as they felt it should work in achieving directly stated goals. These participants 
placed no significant emphasis on any categorisation of a peer-professional logic that permeated a 
grounded NEP reality.538 The peer-professional pattern I describe has provoked and informed active
agency and moral understandings within its articulation of productive antagonisms and ambiguity, 
but has not been reflective or previously abstracted in the specific way as articulated by myself in 
this thesis.
I describe such peer-professionalism as an unforeseen consequence of urgent policy responses to 
the contingency of HIV/AIDS, combined with the institutionalised minimisation of the equality of 
IDU as citizens. However, such temporal turning-points in policy and the structural reshaping of 
institutional boundaries make little sense without simultaneously understanding the contexts, 
activities, agencies, objects, and motivations of the actual peer-professionals themselves. 
The NEP’s development has not been constrained to only the formal NEP, nor only syringe work, 
nor only IDU and stakeholder agency. Various types of agency have been observed to emerge from
the NEP’s network environment, including distributed and network agency, along with the co-
agency of technologies and non-human viruses, as well as individual human agency. I have pointed
538. This seems a way of occupational solidifying, of drawing positive aspects towards a surface of everyday work and 
meaningfulness, and thus solidifying that surface into an overt mechanism of circulations, yet also being a system 
that includes the invert and fluid aspects other than on the surface.
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out how humans have assisted viruses such as HIV and HCV to feed on other humans and utilise 
humans for viral reproduction. Humans have assisted such viruses by constructing technologies 
such as syringes and by criminalising injecting drug use. It may be that some viruses are evolving 
into dependence on human technologies. By creating the NEP, humans have not only added to their
control over viral co-evolution, but have created a social organism that expresses agency, in the 
sense of modifying its infrastructural and institutional environment in a quasi-rational, self-
maintaining way. 
It does not matter, from this perspective, that no single embodied individual human has carried all 
of this agency, provided that its crucial forms, motivational forces, and constitutive articulations 
can be identified. This agency has been observed and analytically identified to have been active in 
a tight cluster of practices and logics. These activities led from the gay organising and criminal 
syringe supply in 1985, to the founding of the NEP in 1988, to the deviance of the threatened strike
in 2001, and to the continuing arrests of IDU for syringe possession. Such arrests, which undercut 
the trust relationships of the NEP, illustrate how the alliance of stakeholders involves continuing 
antagonisms that resist a fixed resolution. The ambiguity of peer-professional activity derives 
partly from such distributed, antagonistic agency.
I suggest that the pattern of peer-professionalism I describe constitutes an ordering principle that 
characterises the NEP environment, rather than merely being a feature of that environment. This 
character invests the NEP with a motivational force towards the self-maintenance of its 
infrastructure and logics. Part of this force derives from the external influences of requirements 
evinced by publics, institutions, and politicians, as described in the overall social history in 
previous chapters. However, before these requirements became formalised in a policy and 
programme, such requirements have been seen in the criminal forms of local responses to HIV/
AIDS. During the course of the social history of the NEP, an internal influence has consolidated in 
the shape and interests of the new occupation of peer-professionals. These people, embedded in 
their working practices of health care, have embodied wider interests, furthered their own careers, 
and represented the publicly voiceless IDU. Peer-professionalism has been articulated through 
external and internal drives that in conjunction shaped and stabilised the configurations of the 
NEP’s occupational infrastructure, providing greater sustainability despite continuing crises. Both 
external and internal influences combined, through strong logics but not easily and not necessarily, 
to explain the overall durability and other capabilities of the NEP.
My argument relates many specific details of the social history of the NEP to a single, more 
abstract pattern of peer-professionalism. I present reasons for this pattern being the most 
explanatory, pervasive, and useful of the hybridities that support the NEP. These reasons draw on 
the previous analysis of the NEP’s general hybridity, within a generally heterogeneous 
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environment. However I argue that the multi-stranded complexities of the NEP’s hybridity and 
heterogeneity can be braided539 into a singular concept which can function as a ‘handle’ to the 
otherwise distracting multiplicities and ambiguities. 
2   Contexts of antagonisms and boundaries
In New Zealand, commonly injected drugs, such as methadone, morphine and ritalin (Brunton & 
Henderson, 2005) have often been diverted from the authorised systems of medical professionals. 
These drugs have then been injected using the tools and techniques conventionally considered to be
medical in their hazards and required skills of use. Such connections draw attention to the ways in 
which the criminalising of drug use, especially self-injection, has increased the professional 
autonomy and authority of health specialists. Professional interests have been strengthened by 
religious and government reliance on biomedical or psychological expertise to define the social 
risks of different drugs in practice and in theory. Professional interests were strengthened by 
gaining legal support from governments and moral support from religions for prohibiting lay use 
by medically appropriating recreational substances along with their associated desires and desiring 
identities. Leaving aside the rationales of professionals for such endeavours, one can draw attention
to the seizure by health professions, particularly medicine and psychiatry,540 of the means and right 
to define normality. Where normality goes, there also goes morality. The legal monopoly over 
substances and related technologies links such professional interests to the goals of state officials, 
and the projects of governance.541
IDU interactions include such institutional backgrounds because internal physiology has, for over a
century, been a medical domain, forbidden to competing professions. This domain has also been 
forbidden to lay desires for intense experiences and autonomy over the biochemical constituents of 
consciousness. IDU may not necessarily understand injection in such terms. Nevertheless, the 
539. Since a matrix may be read across, vertically and diagonally simultaneously, a matrix is closer to the simultaneous 
workings of different processes across distances with no clear connections, that characterises a ‘messy reality’. One 
can designate a matrix that includes the strands and themes of the NEP, and which does not force such simultaneous 
happenings into a linear narrative. To adequately understand the simultaneous complexity of the NEP, a matrix 
mode of understanding seems required, as I have discussed in chapters 2, 3, and 4. By connecting to every point on 
the matrix, the concept of peer-professionalism enables the simultaneous complexity of the NEP to be translocated 
and translated without deep synchronic study of its components.
540. Certain types of psychology, particularly evolutionary psychology, seem permeated by equivalent moral agendas.
541. For example, see aspects of the U.S. MK-ULTRA programme that I previously referred to on page 115. This covert 
CIA funded programme involved the use of incarcerated IDU, along with other types of inmates, in medical and 
psychiatric experiments. Accounts continue to be corroborated by ongoing research. According to Blumsohn: “MK-
ULTRA research was carried out with the quiet acquiescence of official medical bodies and with the active 
collaboration of many individual academics. Many individuals were awarded high honours, and no physicians were 
ever punished. Despite attempts to destroy MK-ULTRA records [Memorandum regarding destruction of MK-
ULTRA documents in 1973 (1975), Summary Of Agency Records Retrieval (1994), Helms (1978)] much 
documentary evidence is available and the names of many of the involved academics, universities and hospitals are 
now known. On my way through MK-ULTRA documents I noted many names. A majority were doctors.” (2007). 
Blumsohn draws particular attention to Dr Ewen Cameron, a psychiatrist who worked at the Allen Memorial 
Hospital at McGill University. Dr Cameron carried out experiments involving induced trauma with no primary 
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systemic logics of health professions and political governance are required, in terms of their own 
goals of effectiveness, efficiencies, and defence of jurisdictions, to oppose such infringements. 
Injection not only creates general health hazards, but does so in two sites that have been jealously 
guarded as medical jurisdictions. One site consists of places where medical equipment is used 
without prior professional approval. The other site involves activity intended to reach inside human
bodies and minds. Illicit privatising of these sites reduces the authority as well as the legal territory 
of health professions. Such institutional factors influence the shape and workability of boundaries 
between health and justice systems, despite becoming increasingly problematic due to modern 
body practices of altering functions and appearance for non-medical reasons that may well be 
recreational or performance enhancing.
Conventional drug treatment services have an interest in treating IDU as being irrational, 'out of 
control', incompetent as an adult and a parent, being incapable of citizenship, and with reduced 
human rights to self-determination. These ascriptions have been partly due to diagnostic protocols 
that define the breaking of drug laws as a component of mental or behavioural disorder, despite 
many drug users participating competently in ‘normal’ everyday life activities.542 Such diagnoses 
reinforce the control of IDU by health professionals, complemented by policing activities designed 
to raise illicit drug prices, to supply patients through the justice system to drug treatment industries,
and to incarcerate non-compliant IDU patients. 
Professional drug treatment frequently involves reinterpreting or discounting the content and 
meaning of a patient's speech (Curra, 2000:149-187). This silencing seems partially due to the 
incentives for drug users to mislead those who control access to drugs or therapy, combined with 
the incentives for health professionals to ration services and not be misled. The deceptions 
attempted by the CIVDURG co-ordinator on her treatment providers as well on the Medical 
Officer of Health and the District Pharmacist, as described in chapter 7, illustrate these incentives. 
Such medical and psychiatric logics seem to position IDU as equivalent to patients with mental 
health problems who may need to be committed against their will. Both sets of people have been 
treated as being incapable of autonomy in everyday life, including the autonomy of publicly 
speaking for themselves, about themselves, and have their speech taken at face value in the absence
of contradicting evidence. 
therapeutic goal and without the informed consent of the subjects. Similarly to the ‘Unfortunate Experiment’ 
conducted by Dr Green at National Womens Hospital (Cartwright, 1988), Dr Cameron’s experiments on non-
consenting patients for over 20 years were also well known to his colleagues. Some were even published, yet with 
no professional critique, no public accountability, and no comment from McGill University. This silence seems 
related to Dr Cameron having not only U.S. Government patronage, but also having been a president of the 
American Psychiatric Association, and of the Canadian Psychiatric Association, and of the World Psychiatric 
Association, and other professional bodies of status. The relations and potential relations between IDU, clinics, 
psychiatric professionalism, institutional torture, incarceration, and health research are clearly of significant 
intensity and deserve further study.
542. See, for instance, Satel (2001: 118-143), Heymann (2001: 81-117), Curra (2000: 149-159,172-173), Keene (1997: 
12-13), Courtwright (1997), Kirk & Kutchins (1992: 226).
304
Section 2:    Contexts of antagonisms and boundaries
In both drug treatment and mental health treatment, specialists can, by applying a diagnosis, gain 
control over a patient’s self-representation in public. Treatment professionals effectively represent 
their patients, by excluding or reducing the status of other forms of representation which might be 
chosen by a patient. Many such professionals would only do so reluctantly. Notwithstanding, the 
professional NEP stakeholders have complained at times about peer-professionals’ similar 
representational advocacy on behalf of IDU and their criminal activities. For instance, the 
Pharmacists’ Society spokesperson made a written complaint on this issue, on behalf of the 
profession of pharmacy, citing peer-professional condoning of "the illegal use of illicit drugs" 
(Galloway, 1998: 1).543 Whether such condoning had led to more harm or more health was not 
evidenced or argued, and seemingly irrelevant to the complaint.
The problem of representation clearly interacts with professional interests in protecting their 
private jurisdictions of care from any intrusive evaluation from outside. Pharmacists in 1988 
objected strongly to their NEP colleagues being evaluated from outside their profession according 
to how they were perceived and evaluated by their IDU clients. Such evaluations might come not 
only from other professions or officials, but from groups of service consumers, or in situations 
when peer-professionals advocated for IDU in treatment. Where IDU have been socially 
criminalised, stigmatised, and ‘put in their place’ as requiring treatment or incarceration, they have 
been supported by doctors and treated as patients, in accord with professional ethics of caring for 
individuals. Yet when IDU became collectively represented through the NEP peer-professional 
groups, boundary conflicts emerged between IDU as clients and as patients. For instance, peer-
professionals have represented and advocated for the IDU clients of doctors.544 Peer groups such as 
ADIO directly advocated for improved methadone treatment clinics. Other groups, such as DIVO, 
formed separate support groups for methadone consumers. Department officials recognised in 1988
that the peer representation of IDU was essential for the NEP to be effective. This recognition 
continued in later Ministry of Health reviews of the NEP (Walzl, 1994).
I now refocus from the general oppositions between established health professions and IDU, 
towards a closer study of the boundaries where such antagonisms are actually experienced. This 
543. Such concerns might explain why so few Level 1 pharmacists have wished to become Level 2 outlets, which are 
effectively evaluated by IDU peer-professionals on behalf of both IDU and state funding agencies. However, 30% of 
NEP pharmacists have actually complained about not receiving adequate educational or other support from NENZ 
(Sheridan et al., 2005). Professional conflicts of interest might also explain why few primary practice doctors 
initially participated in the NEP and why in 2005, the number has been zero.
544. Peer-professionals have been capable of maintaining resource bases that survive the death of any individual client on
a methadone programme. Peer-professionals have also acted as intermediaries in providing links to a wider cultural 
and institutional environment of patient rights. This area has overlapped with the feminist project of asserting 
womens' rights to subject a male dominated medical system to surveillance, and to provide alternative forms of 
health care. These movements have, from the 1960s, subjected medical professions to social scrutiny and political 
accountabilities. In New Zealand the ‘Unfortunate Experiment’ at National Woman’s Hospital established an 
awareness of misplaced trust in medical professionalism that erupted at the same time as the NEP, and continues as 
a powerful symbol of the potential dangers of ‘clinical governance’ that lacks strong peer review and direction by 
independent Ethics Committees.
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shift connects the institutional understandings of the types of expertise based upon qualifications to
the everyday practices involving local knowledges, personal experiences, and group norms. A 
crucial activity of the NEP has involved the circulation of intermediaries through regular work, in 
ways that continue to reinforce a trust that is simultaneously peer-based and professional in its 
goals. As I have shown in the chapters on the details of the historical developments, there have 
been more than a few intermediaries. This is important when I argue that the number of circulating 
intermediaries has added to the normality and stability of the peer-professional practices of the 
NEP by enrolling normal aspects of licit commercial, official, and health professional systems. 
These intermediaries have included sterile syringes, IDU, peers, drugs, knowledge of hazards, 
statistics of risk, drug using practices, funding agencies, contracts, returned syringe samples, 
money, documents, reports, claims of representation, financial statistics, and meetings. All of the 
intermediaries have been actively aligned in relatively stable arrangements, indicating the presence 
of boundary effects along with the processes of circulation. The maintenance of reasonably stable 
boundaries in the NEP has depended upon how these assemblages of circulations have been 
managed. This has provided a systemic environment that has driven and shaped activity, as in a 
fuzzy and flexible mechanism, by linking the needs of a network of stakeholders to the availability,
inscriptions, and potential meanings of syringes as actants, and to the personal needs and 
motivations of human actors. This activity can be understood as deriving not only from structural 
opportunities for interactions between interested parties, but also from the interplay of motivations 
with contingencies.
These intermediaries show how the productivity of peer-professionalism derives from the way that 
illicit and stigmatised aspects have thereby become both sanitised and useful in terms of 
conventional understandings. The NEP usefully illustrates such conceptions by being hybridly 
intense in general, and by providing the conditions for the development of IDU peer-
professionalism as an odd new form of occupation. The NEP’s hybrid goals of motivation change 
alongside the movements of syringes have necessitated peer-professional interconnections. 
Syringes have transported drugs from the outsides to the insides of bodies, while possibly 
facilitating the jumping of contagious viruses from host to host in a ‘hypersea’545 of fluids and 
policy nets. Yet syringes have also acted as the material body of such nets, blocking the 
movements of viruses. Syringes have acted as significant constituents of the generative matrix of 
this complex, partly ecological, partly institutional environment. Syringes have, in their shifts of 
545. Life developed in the sea, where compared with later land living organisms, transport of water-borne chemicals and 
nutrients was more pervasive and largely unspecified due to organisms living inside the medium. Later land living 
organisms evolved internal ‘seas’ that were much more specified and channelled, for instance the reticulation of 
blood vessels. Nonetheless, each organism carried and extended a node of a disjunctive, distributed sea. The nodes 
could connect at times, for instance in the transmission via syringes of blood-borne organisms such as HIV and 
HCV. This pattern of relationships between environment, fluidity, organic shapes, and the movements of organisms 
can explain aspects of the evolution of diseases and co-evolution of parasitism and symbiosis. See McMenamin & 
McMenamin (1994).
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meaning while circulating across institutional boundaries, constructed a tangled, stranded non-
linear matrix, which can be understood as a trapping net. This net traps the syringe users, peer-
professionals, health officials, and health professionals in a particular pattern of articulation which 
is not notably enjoyed by any of the participants, yet which continues to exist. Syringes, in other 
words, are not an alternative process that merely complements peer-professionalism. Instead, 
syringes in part constitute peer-professionalism through a distributed pattern of embodied 
interaction. Syringes have embodied peer-professional practices of motivation changing through 
material movements that have legitimised, extended, and intensified the presence of the human 
peers. This situation seems strangely unique, yet deceptively normal.
3   Where are peer-professionals coming from?
The NEP illustrates how the resourcing of illicit private activities in order to protect public health 
has been initiated, then made politically sustainable, and so become a source of on-going policy 
development. As described in previous chapters, this situation and process has been made feasible 
by a new occupation of peer-professionals who maintain trust relationships despite of and due to 
the institutional antagonisms between key groups such as IDU, police, medical professionals, and 
officials. The maintaining of trust involves ethos and ethics, by linking individual IDU motivations 
to a community identity of shared practices and normative values. However, the method of using 
‘activated’ material objects, in the sense of carrying inscribed meanings and circulating to where 
officials and professionals cannot, provides a general instrument, or design principle, potentially 
applicable in other situations. Three factors involving professionalisation have been crucial to the 
development of a specifically IDU-related hybrid assemblage, or mechanism.
First, the existing professions avoided the area of work that directly engaged with the crime and 
stigma of injecting drugs. It is understandable, despite individuals from a social work background 
finding long-lasting employment in the area, that social work as a system of organisation did not 
become the foundation of syringe supply. It is even more understandable that the addiction 
treatment industry, or sector, rejected proposals to set up syringe supply. The only professionally 
legitimate way for a medical doctor or treatment counsellor to approve of syringe supply was if it 
was under complete medical control. This option implied injecting rooms where both syringe and 
injecting would be medically supervised and counselling available. That these were introduced 
elsewhere shows they have not been intrinsically impossible, but that they have not been 
introduced or seriously discussed in NZ shows that they are extremely difficult in terms of gaining 
support from policy-stakeholder networks. With no political support, doctors and nurses could not 
establish injecting rooms to a clinical standard even had they wanted. This left many health 
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professionals with a choice between rejecting or ignoring the NEP. Although a few medical 
specialists were supportive, the numbers were insufficient.
A second factor has consisted of the development of the IDU peer employees and trust boards in a 
professional direction.546 A third factor has consisted of the need for peers to not only 
professionalise, but to remain closely engaged with IDU and crime worlds. Although the peers 
developed expertise and competencies in their new form of work, their core expertise consisted of 
their experience. Such experience was not a generalised, theorised type of expert knowledge, yet it 
was attuned to professionalism in being personally applied, by discretion rather than by rote.547
The criminal aspects of drug use prevented over-professionalising by subordination or assimilating 
into the existing specialties, but so also did the recruitment practices of the NEP. This was because 
professionals are concerned to maintain the trust of public and politicians, while nevertheless 
developing a select group of problems matched to clients who otherwise can perform as everyday 
members of the public. Since IDU clients were already existing as a problem and a labelled group, 
there was less scope for adaptability in a future development of professional boundaries. The 
boundaries were already largely set. The development of professional characteristics was required 
to make settlements and accommodations with the criminal aspects that could not be escaped from.
The peer-professionalism was limited and channelled in these key dimensions. 
The peer-professionals who founded peer exchanges were strongly self-motivated. In Auckland, 
Christchurch, and Dunedin, being the sites of the NEP groups I focus on in this thesis, each founder
actively pursued a career, though with different competencies and over the different periods. 
Others, who entered the field later, also wished to advance careers. Given the professionalising 
tendencies I have noted, along with the sheltered nature of the occupational environment, career 
development is hardly surprising. What is more interesting is that such potential careers were not 
promoted by state agencies. The initial problems of the peer groups emerged from external 
constraints that conflicted with the external pressures and career prospects for improved 
effectiveness and efficiency. I have found no records to indicate that the Department and Ministry 
officials considered this issue. It would seem that career opportunities would stabilise a field of 
work, and accordingly, might be supported. However, the overall health sector changes have 
positioned stability and careers far lower in the priorities of governance than labour flexibility and 
cost-capping.
546. Although not an argument I develop, since its influence is difficult to measure and does not clearly emerge as 
forceful, existing theories of patient-centred practice (Stewart, 2003), phenomenologies of nursing (Crotty, 1996), 
and biopsychosocial practice, have been drawn on by certain participants during the early development of the NEP 
environment. See also Beresford (2005), Double (2005), Tew (2005), Carr (2005), Frankel, Quill, & McDaniel 
(2003a, 2003b), Wynne (2003), Brown (2003), Engel (1982), Engel (1980), Engel (1977).
547. By emphasising experience I do not suggest that the NEP environment was necessarily anti-theoretical. It was 
simply under-resourced and too busy surviving to strategise theory in a strongly commercial environment featuring 
shrinking funding levels and other neo-liberal constraints on central governance. 
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Although professionalising tendencies have been observed amongst the specialised working 
practices and institutional environment of the NEP, several generally acknowledged aspects of 
professionalism seem to be missing. The conventional understandings of professionalism involve 
several key practices and logics. One is of maintaining public and clients’ trust. Another is of 
reliance on governmental support for a monopoly, despite not being a state agency. The third 
consists of an infrastructure to regularise the training, testing, and qualification process to maintain 
and improve the theoretical foundations and best practices of a profession. This infrastructure 
supports the public trust and the relations with government by providing a monitorable mechanism 
by which the cultural reputation, market impacts, and the discipline of members can be controlled.
The NEP has not featured an accountability structure organised around a professional body for 
peer-professionals, apart from their employment which initially depended more upon official 
regulations and latterly more upon corporate management requirements. There has been no direct 
peer or professional accountability to IDU networks, nor to any health professional body.548 Low 
overall numbers of peer-professionals, and expectations that career structures would be uncertain, 
have encouraged a volunteer rather than a committed work-force. Yet unlike in most professional 
situations, the market for peer-professionalism does not have to be defended and nurtured. 
Accordingly, the observed constraints on trust and accountability in the NEP have been largely due
to the lack of a professional qualification, based on monitored training. 
Attempts to provide training for NEP peers have come up against a range of problems. NENZ does 
act as a professional body by setting standards and advocacy, but is not proclaimed as such, and is 
also a contracting agency549 Throughout the NEP, and even in NENZ, there are only relatively low 
numbers of employed and volunteer personnel. This situation is unlikely to change so long as 
budget constraints are interpreted as requiring reductions in peer personnel and outreach activities. 
Yet the expansion in peer group numbers has created a need for administrators who are acceptable 
to peers as well as to Trust Boards and state funding agencies. The hybrid ambiguities of needing 
to have experience in illicit injecting practices creates significant barriers to becoming named and 
recognised as a qualified peer-professional. Lack of anonymity explains why NEP peer outlets 
have not been sustainable in small towns, whereas the ‘invisible networks’ of peers in the West 
Coast ‘bush-net’ scheme550 have proved highly successful. Peer training is further complicated by 
the absence of a cohering theory for what peer-professionals do, how they should perform, and how
problems should be addressed. Such difficulties are increased by the uncertain employment 
548. There is no Peer-Professional Association of Aotearoa/New Zealand. Such a body could link to NENZ, retain the 
histories and skills accumulated over decades of experience of harm reduction work, could provide mentoring, 
would not compete over resources and territory, and would provide a wider forum than a small number of high-level 
representatives. Such a body could fall outside a peer-professional niche.
549. Some of these have been described in chapter 7, from my experiences on the CIVDURG Trust Board where I 
attempted in 1990 to outline the training needs.
550. See Ch. 1, S2; Ch 9, S4; Ch 10, S3.3.
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prospects and the spontaneity associated with drug use, even if no dependence or abuse is involved.
IDU with appropriate professional skills experience strong incentives not to become involved in the
NEP because of the harms associated with medical and criminal stigma. However, the need for 
greater numbers of professionally skilled IDU increases as the NEP coverage and services extend. 
The gap between needs and numbers has been due to state agencies rationing the funds available 
for peer-professional types of NEP activities that, in being educational, or outreach, or 
administrative, were not directly self-funding through the user-pays syringe supply. There been no 
secure funding for employment or for the training of those employed. Nonetheless, NENZ does 
allocate funding for annual meetings for the peer group managers to liaise and share ideas 
(Henderson, 2007. pers. com.). NENZ had also been involved in a training initiative for a 
methadone treatment and maintenance system run through GPs, and not restricted to privately 
administered clinics that have monopolised the service delivery and treatment logics of methadone 
in New Zealand.551 
Certain of these problems of training for quality practices were ameliorated by the formation of 
NENZ. Furthermore, the later promotion and establishment of regional blocs, where previously 
autonomous groups and newly formed groups were established under the management of a group 
in a different region (Henderson, 2007. pers. com.) has reduced the logistical problem of finding 
suitable administrators and Trust Board members for each peer centre. Yet the regional bloc 
infrastructure differs from the NENZ infrastructure in terms of its professional autonomy and 
collegiality, versus its hierarchy and employment. Regional bloc formation also undercuts the peer 
logic of autonomous groups being dependent and responsive to local illicit drug markets and social 
conditions. Other problems of representation have emerged from each group being nominally 
autonomous and casting a separate vote on the NENZ board. 
Although the peer groups have previously been contracted to supply forms of regional 
representation, that requirement seems to have been reinterpreted by the Ministry of Health’s 
support for wide-region administration of the peer groups.552 These changes risk detaching the 
hybrid logics of peer-professionalism from their local embedment in IDU networks. This is 
because such networks are illicit, are completely autonomous, and and are unable to be controlled 
from official centres, such as the Ministry or a corporate Trust Board. The hazards and 
opportunities of such developments provide a persuasive motive to use a peer-professional 
551. This training programme was attended by three peer-professionals in management positions in the NEP. However, 
this initiative was abruptly cancelled by the Ministry of Health in 2005. The cancellation seems due to the political 
competition between senior practitioners for funding and influence over ongoing training and associated sector 
development (Henderson, 2007. pers. com.). 
552. The continuing Ministry support for a 'regional bloc by stealth' strategy suggests that the peer groups might no 
longer be desired by health officials to be constituted as separate corporate entities with separate contracts. How this 
trend combines with the changed financial arrangements consequent on free 1-4-1 supply will be interesting to 
observe.
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perspective in evaluating the potential harms. The question of where peer workers are to come 
from supports, by its compelling relevance and difficulties, arguments that peer-professionalism 
has characterised rather than merely featured, amongst others, in the capabilities of the NEP.
The founding NEP goals and subsequent developments have worked through the trust of IDU. If 
IDU were expected to participate, they needed to trust, or be offered guarantees, that state agencies 
such as the NEP would neither identify them individually, nor cause increased arrests in their 
communities. If not, IDU would be publicly presented as incompetent to evaluate and control risk, 
even though empowerment through maximising control over drug using risks has remained a core 
goal of the NEP strategy. Later government policies have promoted greater information sharing 
between health and enforcement agencies. This integration has linked the harm reduction and 
abstinence logics by means of surveillance data derived from their associated implementation and 
evaluation practices. The linking of regular NEP outputs and sporadic client surveys to 
enforcement agencies, in a seemingly unplanned policy, would seem to risk the trust relations 
which health surveillance programmes, such as the NEP, depend on for their core sustainability. 
The NEP history has offered warnings about exceeding its peer-professional parameters. Assuming
that injecting drug use remains highly criminalised, these issues provide operating points for 
evaluating where the arrangements between peer-professionalism and the more conventional 
implementational roles of the NEP are shifting towards. CIVDURG illustrated the difficulties of 
attempting to professionalise without accepting the requirements of connectivity and accountability
to multiple colleagues. When these requirements ceased to be met, the sustainability, stability, and 
shape of the group disappeared, in that order. Peers are essential for a motivation change based 
programme, and professionalism is essential for such programmes to be effective and efficient, as 
opposed to cheap in every sense. Yet peers and professionals are divided in many ways, just as the 
health and crime environments of blood-borne disease transmission are divided in related but 
different ways. After a promising beginning, CIVDURG failed to professionalise, both across its 
organisational boundaries and within its Trust Board. It failed for peer type reasons. 
4   Peer-professional hybridity: Linking case and concept
The national planning of the NEP has seemed deceptive, in that the critical boundary work was 
experienced in small and hidden sites, such as the houses of IDU, and in the illicit pharmacies 
which supplied syringes before becoming extended, formalised, and resourced through regulation 
and funding from state agencies. However, although such stages occurred, and were shaping, it 
need not necessarily have happened in the way observed. It is necessary to look at the boundary 
work to understand the causes. The developments were pushed and pulled, but not by the stages 
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themselves. However the staged shifts of environments, along with peer-professional logics, made 
some options more difficult than others. The extension of the NEP from an illicit to a state 
supported programme was eased by a staged development that began in a small-scale site of regular
activity. Within the sites of pharmacy, better supported constituents such as pharmacists and 
officials could be joined and become sufficiently stable to attract and protect more vulnerable 
constituents, such as IDU peers and peer group outlets.
The boundary reconfigurations of the NEP developments that I have described have been 
highlighted by the circulation of syringes and other objects in patterns that constitute an actor-
network. The actor-network influenced analysis presented in this thesis has described how the NEP
has been discretely influential in changing its own conditions by influencing policy while 
delivering needed health services. I have shown how a professional type of influence over 
conditions of work has been largely due to the capabilities of peer-professionals in facilitating the 
circulation of syringes and information. In this process all the constituent elements have 
contributed to a single mechanism involving articulated activity and co-ordinating stories in a 
network effect. 
The capability of acting as a single actor seems a characteristic of a profession. Yet this 
characteristic has derived from the need by state agencies and governments to involve and utilise 
IDU peers. Although the formation of a national body magnified this effect, a national body might 
also have taken another form, or worked through different logics and goals. Nor does the NEP 
seem adequately characterised merely as a single official programme, given the regional 
differences. Furthermore, developments have frequently come from below, driven by peers, yet 
aimed at professional types of goals and leading to professional types of control. 
The New Zealand NEP model saw law makers and law breakers agreeing, through shared 
pragmatic logics, on prioritising the safeguarding of individuals and populations via public health 
protections. That agreement placed health professionals in a strategic intermediary position. They 
promoted health outcomes via non-professional service delivery organisations (Alexander, 2000), 
while not needing to maintain their professional boundaries against the state control of health 
budgets.553 Governments reduced their political accountability to voters and lobby groups by 
facilitating such NGOs (Galbally, 2000: 269-270). Despite continuing competition between 
professions and NGOs for health funding, many health professions were better resourced through 
their membership numbers and infrastructure, to influence health policy, and thus long-tern 
funding. I argue that the emergence of peer-professionalism is usefully understood in such terms.
It seems significant that the peer type of boundary work has led to a degree of professional 
outcomes. This situation did not simply derive from the staged implementation, within a sector or 
553. See Immergut (1992: 226-228, 233-234, 241-244), Freddi (1989), Döhler (1989), and Freidson (1984: 2).
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profession, of a policy shift. Crucial illicit and informal activity preceded the formal policy shifts. 
This sequence of events changes understandings of what policy means and who makes it. Drugs 
and syringes made policy by acting as focal points for clashes between IDU, doctors, officials, and 
law enforcers over jurisdictions. Syringes continued to make policy by being durable and 
recyclable, and circulating across boundaries. The problematisation of boundaries initially 
preceded, and then accompanied the NEP policy and its implementation. Further NEP 
developments by peer-professionals also preceded their later legitimation through policy and 
legislative changes. Accordingly, the explanations are found more in the boundary antagonisms 
that have resisted closure than in the calculated cross-boundary collaborations that have contributed
to the construction of smoother-surfaced edifices of seeming consensus. These explanations lie as 
much in the interactional structural aspects as in the path-dependent sequences of NEP 
development. This is why I argue that peer-professionalism characterises the NEP and its 
environment, instead of arguing that the NEP merely exhibits peer-professionalism along with 
other facets and factors. Peer-professional responses were active rather than simply a feature of the 
NEP. Furthermore, the concept of shapings, as both structure and sequences, provides a wider 
conceptual framework which supports the way peer-professionalism has been both active and not 
rigidly modelled. 
The NEP began as focused on both IDU and professions, then steadily professionalised further 
while increasing its IDU peer component. The NEP goals were hybrid, with syringes desired by 
peers and motivation change desired by professionals. The siting of the NEP in pharmacies ensured
a degree of professionalism. However, the professionalism of the pharmacists did not entail control
over IDU, since the pharmacists’ service provision and attitudes were evaluated in terms of 
acceptability to the IDU customers, and by officials who relied on information from the IDU 
clients. The professional pharmacist aspects then became rapidly complemented by those 
pertaining to the peer group outlets. The NEP goal of motivation change became provided by peers 
plus syringes, with less and less concern for the details and planning of such motivation change, 
and with more and more concern for organising infrastructure and adjusting funding levels and 
strictures.
Syringes became reconfigured as official instead of either professional or illicit. This process 
joined syringes with IDU and with professionals as semi-acknowledged actants in the needle 
exchange network. A small number of IDU became equivalently reconfigured into peers who 
worked to semi-professional standards and goals. These peer-professionals obtained state funding 
while retaining a high degree of autonomy. They ran centres which combined aspects of clinics and
shops. They lobbied for improved health treatment for IDU. They represented IDU as peers, and as 
clients, and as customers. This integrated peer advocacy with health advocacy. Because injecting 
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drug use remained illegal, this peer-professionalism could not exist outside of a narrow niche, 
sheltered by health professionalism, yet also could not exist without continuing ‘attachment’ 
(Gomart & Hennion, 1999) to IDU. Movements in either direction were limited, and any 
prospective expansion was limited by health officials. By providing a workable system, with a 
degree of IDU motivation change, the peer-professionals provided preferable alternatives to the 
less effective provision of syringes through illicit methods and through health professional systems,
with the methods formally separated from the systems. 
Where IDU have become peer-professionals in their goals and methods, doctors and other health 
professionals have needed to defend or cede territorial boundaries in conventional processes that 
Abbott (1988) has characterised as jurisdictional conflicts within a ‘system of professions’. 
Because IDU are illicit, publicly proscribed persons, state agencies could only interact with them, 
at least at a community level, through the medium of the NEP’s peer representation. Peer-
professionals have increasingly provided effective and efficient services, becoming a more valued 
part of a system of state activity and agency. Needle exchanges and peer representation have 
benefited state agencies by providing effective and efficient health services. These services have 
been information producing and manageable, as both instrumentality and as ‘clinical governance’ 
(Harrison & Smith, 2004: 373-5). Such services have provided professional and corporate forms of 
commodified trust (Learmonth, 2004). Syringe supply and return carried trust relations in a 
material form that was sold as a commodity, and so was measurable and easily monitored. Discrete
devices, commodities, measurements, and monitoring all increased the trust quotient of the 
processes in which they have been located. These units conveyed meaningful messages of health 
care that mediated the expectations of trust by IDU. They also outlined the geographic shapes of 
IDU concentrations. The aggregated numbers and frequency of the syringes supplied and returned 
carried information about IDU networks and community values to health officials.
Both the abrupt turning points and the slower incremental changes might have led to collapse, or to
divergence from the currently recognisable shape of NEP. Neither of these possibilities eventuated.
The hybrid micro-environments of organised per-professional activities were retained as an 
actively hybrid niche within wider environments. IDU remained stigmatised criminals, and after a 
period when motivation change seemed taken for granted and not mentioned, motivation change 
began to regain significance due to the increased priority of HCV prevention. NEP peers could not 
corporatise or professionalise in overly dissociative ways, since their funding contracts required 
them to remain in contact with IDU, and most peers considered this a necessity. The movements of 
professionalising could not become too large, nor too overt, nor too dominating of IDU grassroots. 
Accordingly, equipment and outreach services provided by current IDU were not replaced by 
professional ‘ex-IDU’, nor by professionally qualified health experts, nor by a bureaucracy of 
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officials, nor by reliance on vending machines, nor by a deregulated convenience store.
Some significant aspects of peer needle exchange work have exhibited professional characteristics. 
The work practices, for instance, have been somewhat insulated from directives by markets, clients,
and officials, while being recognised as involving expertise unavailable elsewhere. Other aspects, 
such as accreditation, have been provided through legislation and regulation. Supplying services 
subsidised by governments has been a standard work practice for European professional models. 
There is a discretionary aspect (Freidson, 1984: 1), albeit narrow, in judging the degree of peer 
influence to be applied in outreach situations and the degree of representation of IDU to be 
promoted at policy level. Yet the peer-professionalism of the NEP in New Zealand has certainly 
not become nearly so large and autonomous as the conventional UK and North American models 
of professions which are also found in New Zealand. In those situations, the collective identity of 
professional practitioners, along with self-control of work and training, have been clearly separated
in concept from the regulation by officials and employees of state agencies. Yet such professions 
remain very connected to officialdom in practice, and depend upon national legislation and state 
agency support for maintaining their monopolies. Instead, the peer-professionalism of the NEP has 
been weaker and closer to a form of state agency public health work, similar in some ways to 
European models. Accordingly, the peer innovations need not be large nor well-defined for 
professionalising tendencies and strategies to be significant.
I consider the pattern of peer-professionalism to be persuasive in part because it is pervasive and 
repetitive at a micro-level, not only in longer-duration event cycles. This is not blind capitulation to
a form of mass ‘advertising’, where repetition leads to normalising. Instead it highlights the way in 
which repetition indicates the activity of reproductive forces that in combination with necessity and
lack of alternatives, produce the durable characteristics of experienced reality. While some aspects 
of durability come from forms or periods of physical rigidity, other types of durability come from 
dynamic processes that feature repetition along with potential aspects of cybernetic feedback. The 
significance lies in ‘resilience’ being adaptive as well as unchanging. The pattern of peer-
professionalism is even more persuasive because its solidity involves re-articulating interactive 
workings of a configurational mechanism which intermeshes a set of relatively unchanging forms 
and relatively changing forces in regular movements. These aspects satisfy the scale and scope of 
my requirements for explanatory narratives to describe actual patterns554 that contribute to actual 
causes and effects. Yet the peer-professional aspects pervade and iterate beyond the NEP, even 
while explaining its particular boundaries and constraints. These aspects are unevenly distributed, 
yet strangely fitting as an analysis of complexity.
The NEP history from 1988 to 2007 has demonstrated stability over periods of change, despite 
554. These can be considered my version of ‘social facts’. They are not ideals, nor concepts equivalent to ideals.
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unresolved antagonisms and ambiguity. I argue that the hybridity of the NEP has been constitutive 
of such sustainability. Yet the overall hybridity of the NEP would be far less, or not exist at all, 
were it not for its peer-professionalism. The peer-professional conditions of structural shape and 
resilience have produced the characteristics of the NEP, even though other aspects and patterns, for
instance the neo-liberal policy frameworks, have also been influential.
My account of the NEP’s working and character has featured internal coherence as well as 
antagonisms. I have described how a pattern of boundary differences has connected to wider 
institutional and ecological environments. I have demonstrated how particular contingencies have 
acted as both problems and opportunities. Within its heterogeneous environment, a localised and 
somewhat self-supporting pattern of peer-professionalism has emerged from environmental 
pressures and the conditions of possibility. This pattern then influenced the later emergence of 
infrastructural changes which have continued to modify the NEP’s niche environment. 
Nonetheless, the peer-professionalism has not changed. This partly cybernetic, recursive process of
activity becoming social through processes of knowing, and becoming natural through processes of
modifying material environments, has demonstrated a durable solidity and stable presence, despite 
being based on the unstable, temporary settlement of antagonisms. Furthermore, neither the wider 
institutional boundaries nor the viral actants have changed. Peer-professionalism is directly 
connected to these actants and networks, and so by not changing, can be distinguished from the 
changes that have characterised the NEP as an organisation.
The pattern of peer-professionalism I have described exhibits not only solidity when observed, but 
has also been active within my research process by helping to generate the significant re-framings 
and arguments I have been discussing. The concept of peer-professionalism has emerged from my 
research material, addressed all my questions, and answered at least a few. The concept has opened
a seemingly unexplored area of social organising to further enquiry. Peer-professionalism has 
neither ignored nor overridden the complexity of key aspects of the NEP developments. Instead, 
the concept has positioned itself within a chaotic environment as a partial consolidation of dynamic
order. These aspects are persuasive because much social theorising and structuring relies on 
creating perspectives that present an illusion of stability by hiding the instabilities. It is better 
explanatory technique to parsimoniously avoid the unnecessary workarounds involved in hiding 
instabilities. Peer-professional explanations may involve ambiguity and complexity, but are neither 
simplistic nor evasive. The concept of peer-professionalism is also persuasive because the concept 
connects closely, at many points, to analyses developed by Andrew Abbott and in actor-network 
studies. Although my application and formulation of such types of concepts is original, particularly
the emphasis I place on antagonisms being usefully sustainable, the concepts are grounded in 
existing fields of sociology, as well as in the NEP case material of repeating patterns of social 
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history and pervasive structural patterns.
My argument about peer-professional hybridity addresses key aspects of my initial research where 
I queried the capabilities of the NEP. My argument also addresses my subsequent questions about 
how forms of trust have been shaped and moved by means of the NEP environment, how the 
record of problems can be related to the record of success, whether the NEP niche has been more of
an exception or more a stage of institutional development, and how to explain the seeming absence 
of information over the protocols and transparency of the testing of returned syringes in a context 
of increasingly public concerns with the ownership of personal information, familial DNA, as well 
as the genetic information of communities and populations. These questions also problematise the 
increasing embedment of the NEP within a wider, ‘whole of government’ environment of sharing 
information about individuals and collectives between sectors and agencies. The NEP experience 
of working with the distrust and desires of a stigmatised community has contributed to the logics of
a ‘whole of government’ goal of including marginalised groups, equalising health opportunities, 
and ‘totalising’ information. Yet the productive antagonisms, observed in the NEP and more 
widely applicable in different peer-professional patterns elsewhere, seem to also destabilise the 
centralisation of an informational infrastructure of control and command. The ethos-ethics 
relationship observed in the NEP’s mid-level hybridity, and more widely applicable in peer-
professional patterns, queries the way in which ‘whole of government’ goals may be expected to 
generate top-down policy moralities of effectiveness and efficiency without antagonisms.
The NEP’s hybrid settlements have responded to shifts in government, to the structural trembling 
of the health sector, to the unique charisma of individuals, and to graunching changes in legislation.
For example, the free one-for-one scheme has shifted previous logics that depended primarily on 
the user-pays arrangements. Yet the relevance and consequences of such settlements and shifts are 
difficult to understand as sequences of events unless the peer-professional mechanism is factored in
as a hybrid logic that precedes and pervades the forms and forces of its infrastructural embedment 
and personal embodiment. State agencies were challenged, first by the gay community organisers, 
then by the pharmacists who had become somewhat ‘peer’ by illicitly supplying syringes, to 
oppose or compete with these unofficial health services. But in becoming corporatised, the NZAF 
community organisation re-articulated professional and financial competencies outside of 
conventional professional and official jurisdictions in a new direction of community configuration, 
identity, and policy de-centring. In being professionals, the pharmacists who supplied illicit 
syringes located such challenges within a territory that was both material and moral, where 
competition from an official programme would need to do more good and become more expert, in 
order to attract greater public respect and to legitimise an official monopoly over practice and 
policy. 
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Hybridity, shaped and understood as self-maintaining instabilities, clarifies these mechanisms that 
describe many particularities and paradoxes of the NEP case. Since complexity and contingency 
characterise the general case environment, hybridity does not have to describe everything at every 
time, only the most significant things at the most significant times. The peer-professional 
representation of IDU and syringes was co-produced by the NEP’s stabilising around convenient,555
predictable commercial movements. This rational process promoted a subdued accumulation of 
unmet health expectations for further change.556New cycles and circulations may be expected to 
complement the NEP and its particular shaping of peer-professionalism as the free one-for-one 
system develops and adapts to the institutional and ecological environment.
In the following conclusion chapter I reflect on what the better understandings of the NEP and 
peer-professionalism have to offer current and on-going problems in the area of the case itself, and 
in terms of research methods, since my querying of capabilities effectively involves both areas.
555. Convenience does not imply being easy. The NEP’s founding problems took considerable effort to overcome. Then 
later maintenance efforts were systematised, disguising the actual difficulties within systemic conveniences.
556.  Further research that attends to the NEP might explore how much organisational change occurs before change in 
institutional boundary lines becomes apparent. Related research might explore whether institutional boundary lines 
are usefully described as elastic, pliable, or fixed.
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12
Coda: Reflections and echoes between case and methods
“A sentence is not content with unfolding in a linear way; it opens up. This opening allows to be
arranged, extricated, spaced, and compressed, at depths on different levels, other movements of phrases,
other rhythms of words, which are related to each other according to firm considerations of structure,
though foreign to ordinary logic - the logic of subordination - which destroys the space and makes the
movement uniform. [Profound imagination] supposes a space with many dimensions and cannot be
understood except according to this spatial profundity which must be apprehended simultaneously on
different levels.”
From The Book To Come, Maurice Blanchot (trans. Charlotte Mander) (2003: 236).
The New Zealand experiences in running an underfunded, user-pays needle exchange programme 
that has successfully controlled HIV among IDU, with minimal political risk, might be applied in 
other polities. Such attempts would align with the United Nation policy on AIDS, that being to 
replicate and build on successes (Annan, 2005).557 By developing organisational expertise in a 
health provision model based on the 'whole of environment' (Smith, 1990: 2), including the social 
and motivational aspects, AIDS service organisations in New Zealand challenged the boundaries of
professional territories, influenced health and crime policy, and secured state funding. Previous 
forms of 'clinical governance' were displaced by forms of lay expertise as institutional boundaries 
were rearranged.558 Such challenges provide an organisational focus for exporting the NEP model 
as a concept of policy change, but also indicate that there would be organised opposition that 
needed to be countered or ‘enrolled’.
Hybrid mechanisms such as the NEP would be difficult to replicate as a packaged, pre-planned 
model because their multi-element, networked environment relies upon the institutionalised 
enmeshing of antagonisms. Adding to such difficulties, the necessarily urgent conditions of this 
environment have privileged contingencies in ways that could be learnt from, but not readily pre-
planned. The capabilities I have explored emerged from the dynamic configuring of a cultural and 
market environment that featured complex and unpredictable aspects which were further modified 
by the hybrid interactivity. This environment could not be readily commodified or exported. 
Nonetheless, an analysis of the peer-professional principles involved can be translated into the 
needs and risk narratives to wherever institutional logics of secrecy and stigma require an overt 
abeyance, deferral, or inversion of the normal arrangements for providing care. I suggest that peer-
professionals, using a peer-professional type of sensitivity, pay attention to situations of 
homelessness, sex-work, imprisonment, immigration, domestic abuse, mental health problems,559 
illiteracy, youth community development, residents’ associations, and under-acknowledged 
557. Export of technologies also entails risks. The export by the ESR of New Zealand’s forensics technologies  to 
Thailand (ESR Briefing, 2004) raises human rights questions over the consequent contribution to human rights 
abuses in Thailand. See Ehrlich (2004a, b), Human Rights Watch (2004), Hunt (2004), United Nations (2003).
558. See Galbally (2000: 268), Malcolm (2000: 188, 1986), Scally & Donaldson (1998).
559. See Oakley Browne, Wells, & Scott (2006), Te Rau Hinengaro: The New Zealand Mental Health Survey.
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epidemics such as hepatitis C. 
The NEP’s partnership model involved faith, or commitment, by: “government, community 
groups, medical organisations, and overseas agencies ... facilitated by political informality and, 
egalitarian principles, and by the relative absence of political and moral extremism” (Davis & 
Lichtenstein, 1996b: 223) in “working together” (Kemp 2004: 205). Yet I have shown how such 
coherence was based, as much on the coupling of antagonistic interests as on complementary 
interests, in a sequence of ‘well-organised accidents’. From an IDU perspective, being imprisoned 
for normal everyday activities and sociability with one’s drug injecting peers is extremely 
politicised and morally entrenched, neither informal nor egalitarian, and certainly not healthy. HIV/
AIDS, and later HCV/hepatitis C, underscored this theme with pragmatic rationales that, despite 
the entrenched moralities of excluding drug deviants from participatory citizenship, demanded the 
inclusion and voluntary community work by IDU peers in the niche environment of the NEP. 
These ‘raw edges’ and corresponding ‘edginess’ add to the difficulties of replicating and building 
on the NEP’s success. To overcome such difficulties requires not only commitment, but also 
strategic skills informed by precise, deep, wide, and critical analyses.
1   A way of working
My initial research questions, emergent questions, and analytical frameworks have been developed 
in each chapter as an account. The accounts have drawn on a multiplicity of sources, such as non-
human objects, official publications, participant observation, interviews, and archived 
correspondence. However, I have not offered a different argument to different questions, because 
these accounts are connected within the overall articulation of my argument by my linking together
concepts of a single case of hybrid assemblage and a single pattern of peer-professionalism. The 
analysis works by explaining case boundaries through following the activity of actants in the 
mechanisms and folded patterns made meaningful by the objects and participants, as described. 
This is ‘internal’ immanent explanation based on the layers and iterations of thick description. 
While not denying the significance of contingencies and chance, I have attempted, where persistent
patterns have emerged, to generate a parsimonious account of the mechanisms involved. 
Complementary accounts might also emerge by drawing on different points of access and 
connections to the NEP network-case. Nonetheless, I suspect that recognisably hybrid aspects 
would appear within any sufficiently detailed and questioning account.
The institutional environment of the NEP has involved forceful constitutive elements, such as 
discontinuities between health and justice systems. Yet I have not observed any fully ‘external’ 
ordering force in the sequence of development stages that I outlined and analysed in the previous 
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chapters. Instead, I observed that partial order emerged from continuing discontinuities and 
antagonisms in a complex environment. This emergence draws attention to how such order became
actual and embodied in the interactions of people, corporations, programmes, and legislation. I 
present these conditions and actants as mutually dependent, but with certain connections being 
more influential in the shorter term than others.
Understanding how the NEP became established and continued to work as a conjunction, despite 
continuing divergences between IDU and professionals, has required an extensive case study of a 
concentrated zone within the multiplicity of sources produced by a dynamic heterogeneous 
networking process. Such studies have value for exploring how concepts of ‘late-modernity’, such 
as the technological imperatives, the distributed identity, the risk economies, the aggregated 
desires, and the autonomous agency may be productively problematised, particularly in 
combinations. 
The NEP developments are intriguing because they have acted as a constituent of a modern society,
yet have emerged through the forming of a particular niche, but without requiring simultaneous 
pervasive changes across the institutions that outline whole social systems. My holistic 
environment involves multiple sites of activity which do not necessarily tie the whole rigidly 
together into one structure, and do not require simultaneous activity. Widely-distributed, durable 
institutions are not necessarily so due to being the most directly connected to underlying structural 
foundations, nor some type of instantaneous action at a distance, but may alternately be constructed
from dynamic alliances and mechanisms of articulated local antagonisms. This framing perspective
implies that institutions that seem foundational may suddenly change because their durability is an 
effect, not a source, nor an essence. Yet such change cannot be predicted, due to the complexities 
of multiple agencies, discontinuous connections, contingencies, and other non-linear aspects. 
I have invited attention to the interplay of shapes and sequence. Somewhat counter-intuitively, I 
have found it useful to consider shapes as being active, and sequences as being static 
consolidations. Any event, in such terms, is always a story560 of how something became stabilised, 
for instance as the instrumental sequence of iterations with variations in the cycles of gay, 
pharmacy, peer, and commercial organising which describe the NEP’s peer-professionalism as a 
narrative historical development. Moreover, there is the iterative aspect of any thing, any pattern, in
holding to its shape. This durability describes how things may not simply and immediately 
dissipate when their outside network influences diminish. In complex systems, circulations may 
produce cybernetic feedback that facilitates adaptive activity in the same processes that produce 
stability, but without any centre of calculation being needed, since the cybernetic articulations may 
be distributed in autopoietic561 assemblages.
560. There are no counter-cases of an event that is not associated with at least one story. 
561. See Mingers (1994), Luhmann (1986b), Hejl (1984), Varela (1981a, b), Varela, Maturana, & Uribe (1974) for a 
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A mechanism can be approached from any angle, from inside or outside, or along the interstices. 
The temporal activity of a mechanism, however, produces consequences that may not last, yet 
cannot be undone. The force that actors draw out of shaping is made immanent in the durable 
practices of activity, be those material or motivational, or both as in the NEP developments I have 
described. Mechanisms, in this sense, produce a focus on what moves and what does not, on what 
difficulties are overcome by the continuous activity of actors in their attempts to control the 
alignments of movements and to construct the illusory effect of immobility.
In my research I took up the positivist ‘tools’ of cycles, mechanisms, and models, but destabilised 
their associated quantitative positivism by using inbuilt antagonisms, contingencies, ambiguities, 
and path-dependent histories, in order to make the conglomerate similar enough to actuality to be 
able to follow and echo the case at hand, and afoot. This method engaged with the social 
imagination by following its activities using sociological imagination, ‘making a case for a case’. 
This makes my methods, project, and presentation of interest to the policy community, since 
policy-driven interventions respond to actual and predicted harms, yet notoriously produce 
unexpected consequences which are also actual. I argue that durabilities, intangibles, and social 
imaginations must be brought into conjunction within the development of policy, in order to reduce
the harms of current problems, and of future unintended policy outcomes. 
I have discussed the capabilities of the NEP in terms of a problematic yet productive mechanism I 
call peer-professionalism. These capabilities have been expressed in terms of shape (articulation of 
forms), stability (interplay of forces), objects (contingencies of durables and non-humans), and 
sustainability (self-organisation co-adapting with environmental flows). These capabilities have 
been seen to depend upon and assist in producing a niche within a heterogeneous yet patterned 
complexity. I have, accordingly, answered my initial questions about the capabilities of the NEP. I 
have achieved this by developing a grounded methodology which emerged amid my available 
sources, my question, and my intended audience. For, whatever reality may be like from a great 
distance, or from extremely close proximity, it is in the middle of things, through engagement with 
an audience, that knowledge and recognition are produced in actuality.562 Such operational methods
are useful in partly incorporating aspects of the qualitative and quantitative ontologies, while 
avoiding overly-subjective transcendence and overly-reductionist objectivism. Social imagination, 
actor-networks, and assemblages are all related in emphasising physical durability and immanence,
while becoming only partially predictable due to the excess of uncertainty produced in processes of
becoming through trials.
range of applications of concepts of autopoiesis. The term generally refers to self-organisation. More specific 
aspects include a dynamic, non-equilibrium involving forms and forces in functional states. See Chapter 10 section 
4.
562. See Latour (2004, 1999a, 1999c, 1993, 1990, 1988, 1987), Kuhn (1969). Related operational and systems precepts 
have been described from a rather different perspective as critical realism (Sayer, 2000). I do not take a critical 
realist approach.
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My conclusions do not encourage deterministic or hegemonic framings of understanding, except as
effects produced by more local and contingent activity. The NEP did not emerge as a response to 
direct institutional needs. Instead, it emerged as a response to a particular problematisation of HIV/
AIDS which threatened a majority grouping, while offering scope for creative policy entrepreneurs,
within an institutionalised environment. Large numbers of people wished to ameliorate this 
problem while changing as little else as possible. By being material and local, both as a peer-
professional occupational niche and an organisation, rather than an institution or a 'counter-
institution', the NEP rearranged boundary connections, but only within its own bounded zone of 
permitted activity. The question of whether drug treatment and law enforcement areas have been 
significantly influenced by needle exchanges in general, by the New Zealand NEP, by harm 
reduction in general, and by New Zealand versions of harm reduction, seems to remain quite 
open.563
My analysis suggests that the very success of the NEP has obscured core aspects of shaping and 
sequencing. This obscuration makes it difficult to understand how the NEP capabilities had worked
and been maintained. Such difficulties have impinged on research into the NEP, yet also, relatedly, 
will impinge on policy-making if that is to be evidence-based. For instance, I noted how in 2001 it 
had become possible to call a strike to support demands that the Ministry of Health enter genuine 
negotiations to increase the funding needed to reduce the financial barriers that constrained the 
syringe return rates and diminished the quality of the NEP services. Yet the original NEP 
Management Plan in 1987 had specified consultation while specifically excluding negotiation, in 
order to stabilise the NEP by ensuring that its financial arrangements remained rigid. Consultation 
involved a promise to listen, with an open mind. But consultation did not involve any directive for 
the Department and the later Ministry to relinquish their capabilities and accountability to 
command and control the NEP’s regulatory and funding relationships. 
The feasibility of the threatened strike demonstrated how the peer-professionals had attained 
control over the crucial everyday systems of the NEP. The aftermath of the strike threat, while 
costly for the NEP in terms of losing a skilled strategic administrator, has confirmed the 
significance of these systems in terms of peer-professional types of capabilities. Though the strike 
threat did not succeed directly, it forced the commissioning of the genuinely external review in 
2002. The review revealed that the Ministry of Health claimed to be unable to access any financial 
data on the costs of the NEP. This claim has illustrated a lack of evidence-based evaluation, which 
undercut the long-standing objections by the Ministry to proposals for service improvements. The 
review also provided a rationale for a new Minister of Health to overrule the Ministry advice to 
563. Harm reduction concepts seem to have challenged some treatment fundamentals of obligatory abstinence. I have 
noted treatment practitioners being careful to specify that they are experts in problem drug use, understood as 
evidence-based problems, rather than using language that defines all illicit drug use as abuse or misuse.
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oppose the release of funding for a one-for-one syringe exchange system. The strike threat, 
accordingly, exerted a clearly observed, forceful effect, yet was controlled sufficiently to remain in 
the private NEP policy world, outside of the public domain and media access. This combination of 
force and control somewhat explains the urgency with which the Ministry eliminated the NEP co-
ordinator who organised the strike, yet whose job depended on the continuation of Ministry 
approval and funding. The strike attempt has provided not only a key question but also an emergent
boundary to this period of NEP history. It illustrates, as the boundary of a meaningful event, both 
destabilising and nurturing capabilities. The strike helps to understand processes of structuring and 
sequencing the capabilities of the NEP in terms of professionalism, accountability, and trust. 
Nonetheless, the strike threat was only a single incident amidst a long-standing settlement where 
the contributory antagonisms were mostly underplayed.
The formation of the NEP was shaped by earlier conflicts between community organisers and 
health professionals, followed by the withdrawal of health professionals from control over the 
NEP’s new areas of work (Alexander, 2000: 161-4). Well known professional tendencies towards 
collegiality within similar areas of expertise, and collaboration between different areas, did not 
eventuate. Nor did an equally well-known overt struggle over professional territory become 
expressed once the NEP had taken solid form as a peer-inclusive set of goals and methods. I have 
described the more significant conflicts over professional territory, together with the important 
benefits to the NEP caused by the reduced levels of the professional control of health care in this 
area. 
The significant point is that, unlike the conflict between the NZAF and the sexually transmitted 
disease industry, or ‘sub-profession’ over control of HIV/AIDS policy from 1985 until at least 
1991, such conflicts did not continue beyond the formative stage in the case of the NEP. One 
reason for this has involved the differences between the IDU and gay communities in their 
relationships with STD treatment practitioners. The STD practitioners had been forced by official 
decisions on the HIV/AIDS prevention programmes to publicly acknowledge the non-compliance 
and distrust experienced by the gay community and expressed by community representatives. After
this exposure, the STD treatment profession attempted to alter their system of attitudes and 
relationships with homosexual patients, or at least claimed to be doing so to the state agencies that 
licensed, permitted, and funded their professional privileges and practices. By contrast, individual 
practitioners might be sympathetic to IDU patients and ignore certain inherent conflicts with their 
professional interests. But this tactic could not be employed by professional bodies in the case of 
patients whose drug injecting practices remained criminal and who remained opposed to the 
medical control of ‘their’ private substances. This situation with IDU contrasted with the way 
homosexual practices had been decriminalised and no longer officially labelled as harmful in 1986.
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The gap between IDU and health professions was not directly closed, due to the gap between 
criminal drug users and health professionals actually widening. Instead, the NEP indirectly and 
partially bridged this gap, somewhat hiding it and somewhat drawing attention to it.
When the NEP was being founded, New Zealand health policy was responding to low and highly 
unequal levels of the public utilisation of health care (Malcolm, 1997), by attempting to: “empower
communities both to provide and to contract for their own primary health care services” (Malcolm, 
2000: 189). However, when communities such as IDU have been marginalised, and become 
vulnerable to health problems due to stigma and secrecy, health sector policies of ‘community 
empowerment’ have conflicted with the traditional criminalisation policies of isolating the 
members and representatives of communities defined as criminal. Yet such exclusion from public 
spaces, resources, and rights has also excluded people from public health networks, except for 
additional forms of labelling these people as ‘needing treatment’. Moreover, the concept and usage 
of the concept of community has referred to a ‘settlement of differences’, since: "... 'community as 
an ideal often masks conflict, division and dissatisfaction"  according to Ryan (1991, as cited in 
Lindberg & McMorland, 1996: 117). If such communal aspects had not already come together, one
would expect to find antagonisms which resisted being assimilated and bound up so neatly to form 
a singular community entity. If the expected benefits balanced the antagonisms, a hybridly knotted 
environment or a rhizomal assemblage,564 as in my analysis of the NEP, does not seem surprising. 
In this NEP account of institutional reality, things could also be something else, depending on 
where and how the boundaries come to be drawn. The most intense example has been the strike 
threat, which was perceived by officials as sabotaging the NEP, yet driven by peer-professionals 
through a goal of restructuring the NEP to address long-standing gaps in service delivery. An 
earlier illustrative event is seen in the way that CIVDURG in 1994 was understood to be 
dysfunctional by other AIDS Service Organisations, yet was applauded by officials of the Southern
Regional Health Authority for meeting its required outputs. One can also observe shifts in the 
prioritising of outreach by three sets of actors. These have been the IDU clients, the peer-
professionals, and the officials who controlled the NEP’s funding contracts. In these arrangements, 
the capabilities that connected across several generally distinct policy areas (Murdoch, 1995: 747), 
including the regulation of markets, the regulation of professional autonomy, and the balancing of 
official privileges with accountabilities, have also shifted.
The process of forcing community development would necessarily add particular forms of order 
564. For seminal work on rhizomal models, and relationships between smooth nomadic spaces and striated 
‘institutionalised’ spaces, see Deleuze & Guattari (2004: 3-28). While appearing as cultural philosophical analysis in 
A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, concepts of rhizomal formations have been appropriated by 
certain ANT writers and applied to more detailed, empirical case studies. As I appropriate Deleuze & Guattari, 
rhizome refers to a non-geometrical and somewhat contingent dynamic structure of multiple elements, yet 
simultaneously to a convergence and consolidation of such elements into particular bodies of meaningful activity for 
change. The concept is opposed to arborescent models, such as form the underlying static logic of tree diagrams.
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and uncertainty to an already complex, messy reality. These additional programmes and 
organisations would seem like contingent events, yet also like increases in complexity, and also as 
if simplifying from multiplicity by focusing onto a single programme or named community. An 
analysis of all these together, especially as a cross-section of a longitudinal historical process, risks 
confusion. Yet a closer following of the detailed forms and forces of effects potentially resolves 
such counter-intuitive confusion into readily followed and understood events. As I have shown, 
analytic narrative offers a way of extracting relevant features and patterns from such confusion.
2   The continuing significance of the NEP’s gaps
In this thesis I have identified key concerns for the immediate future planning of the NEP, or for 
allowing it to adapt and develop without planning. Some of these issues have wide implications, 
for instance where empowered communities produce governance by other means than entering into
the hierarchies of formal state agencies. In these other, more heterarchal processes (Fougere, 2001) 
and active linkages, forms of grounded, self-help health care can both challenge and supplement 
private or public health provision, while distrust in the recording of personal and collective details 
interweaves with the proposed effectiveness and efficiencies of a ‘whole of government’ policy. 
The shifting NEP capabilities, such as electronic syringe dispensers, in the areas of regional 
infrastructure, career structure and training, and the provision of services to prisons and schools, 
seem more inherently localised to the existing NEP sites of activity. Yet other issues, such as 
population-based strategies for reducing the transmission of HCV, and links between IDU and 
conventional drug treatment services, lie ambiguously between the local case of the NEP and its 
wider constitutive environment. 
Better understandings of the NEP have been complicated by gaps in policy frameworks, in records,
and in service delivery. Such absences seem crucial rather than merely incidental, as illustrated by 
the gaps in the legal status of the syringes purchased at NEP outlets. These syringes are legal for 
peer-professionals to transport and distribute but not necessarily legal for IDU clients to ‘possess’. 
For instance, in 2007, a community newspaper casually reported an IDU being charged with the 
possession of such syringes, with no suggestion the syringes were obtained from anywhere other 
than a licit NEP outlet (Latz, 2007: A3). Such regular instances appear as patterns in the data on 
IDU held in police cells. This data was gathered by Lifelinks, a treatment-oriented agency, as a 
standard activity in their partnership with police in the Arrest Referral Scheme.565 
565. See Appendix 3. The Arrest Referral Scheme only ran for a year in Canterbury. It was funded by police and its two 
workers were organised by Lifelinks. Lifelinks is a private agency contracted by the Ministry of Health to provide 
needs assessment and service co-ordination for people with disabilities in the Canterbury region, in ways that best 
suit their individual needs. (Lifelinks, 2007). The direct approach of agency workers to people in police holding 
cells, who may not have received legal advice or been de-toxed, raises questions of the degree to which informed 
consent to release private information, and ‘hunting for clients’ practices might be involved. Without sufficient 
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According to the Arrest Referral Scheme data, in nine months during 2005, eleven people were 
held for possession of needles and syringes in the Canterbury region. This possession of needles 
and syringes charge comprised the second largest category in a 115 case sample of persons held in 
police cells. The largest category was ‘male assaults female’ at fifteen recorded arrests, and next 
lowest was procuring or possession of cannabis, at nine arrests. (See Appendix 3). 
The types of charges in this sample were commonplace, suggesting that this sample and its 
framework has been typical for longer periods, and possibly other regions. Data of this sort had 
been requested since 1995 by Needle Exchange New Zealand (NENZ) (Blacklock, 2003. pers. 
com.) but continued to be refused by police authorities, who claimed that it would or could not be 
provided (Henderson, 2007, pers. com.).566 These incidents illustrate a pattern of syringes being 
legally and culturally framed both as ‘drug-using paraphernalia’, and as a ‘licit object of NEP 
legislation’, yet in antagonistic ways depending on the agents, attitudes, and associations of the 
situational context. 
The risk of arrest or harassment creates an incentive for IDU not to keep used syringes for return to
the NEP. Yet the need for the NEP is only created by IDU being illicit and stigmatised. The NEP 
itself only exists because the police stated their support, yet the police also directly undercut the 
NEP’s public safety goals. My account has described how these patterns and incidents feature in 
the longer view of the character and landscape of the NEP.
A further gap appears in the way injectable drugs have been readily marketed in prisons, compared 
with the policy of successive governments of preventing access by inmates to sterile syringes. This 
situation forms a ‘trap’ for IDU because motivations for drug use are increased by prison 
overcrowding, boredom, fears of violence, peer drug use, and official corruption. Worsened mental
health problems, or similar ‘normal’ responses to abnormal situations (Hager, 2001), seem relevant
to prolonged exposure to traumatic prison conditions (Office of the Ombudsmen, 2005), and are 
known factors in the increased use of both licit and illicit substances. This carceral situation, no 
matter its causes or proposed benefits, has constituted a public harm, for instance from increased 
transmission of other blood-borne viruses, such as HCV. Public harms seem likely to have resulted 
from the bureaucratic boundaries which have embedded the logic of isolating inmates, as 
overriding the logic and ethic of equal health care for all, in the objects such as bars and locks that 
constitute a material prison. Nonetheless, in 2007 a national newspaper published an article 
numbers of clients, agencies such as Lifelinks have difficulties in accessing funding. Schemes such as the ARS 
generate solid client statistics for such agencies without relying on the clients’ fully voluntary participation. Links 
between law enforcement, citizen compliance, and health provision are highlighted in such areas where people find 
themselves trapped between the constraints of crime worlds and health worlds. Such difficulties may explain why 
Lifelinks personnel refused or were unable to respond to queries by the NEP co-ordinator on the syringe arrest 
statistics being gathered (Henderson, 2007. pers. com.).
566. Claims by police that information on syringe arrests was either not recorded or unable to be separated from other 
data (Henderson, 2007. pers. com.) have not been credible, as eventually demonstrated by the ease with which 
Lifelinks researchers funded and supported by the police obtained such data. 
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containing excerpts from a study undertaken in 2004, commissioned by the Ministry of Health. The
study involved a collaboration between the Christchurch School of Medicine and NENZ. The 
principal researcher was Charles Henderson, National Manager of the NEP, a peer administrator 
employed by NENZ. According to the article:
A survey of 412 clients at nine needle exchange centres around the country found 45% had 
spent time in jail and 25% had been in prison in the previous year, 40% admitting to injecting 
illegal drugs while inside, including methamphetamine ... and opiates such as heroin. ... 
Imprisonment was identified as a key risk factor for hepatitis C: 80% of respondents who had 
served time in prison tested positive for exposure, compared with 60% of users who had never 
been to prison. ... Henderson said that while there was widespread support among prison health 
workers to extend needle exchanges and other measures into prisons, it remained a political 
issue. ... Drug Foundation executive director Ross Bell [said that] inmates should have access 
to the same rehabilitation and harm reduction services available in the wider community - 
especially in view of the high rate of hepatitis C infections in the prison population.                         
(Hill, 2007:A4)
The article publicly presents the NEP as capable of ‘breaking into’ and scrutinising prisons through
contacts with illicit IDU. These IDU network connections undermine the prison boundaries that 
block epidemiological research “with rather than against” inmates (Lange, 1987).567 By carrying 
out such professional health research, the NEP co-produces contentious knowledge with forceful 
policy actancy. This capability seems innate to the NEP’s hybrid mechanism of linking syringes as 
objects with syringe-users as subjects in professionalising processes. 
At this point I invite attention to the prospect of completely removing the peer component, thereby 
testing my concept that peer-professionalism explains most of the capabilities of the NEP. Sterile 
syringes can be distributed by state agencies, for instance in electronic vending machines. Such 
electronic syringe dispensers offer several benefits. They can be used by underage IDU with no 
questions asked, which helps somewhat to address the problem of the NEP services being excluded
from schools. These dispensers can operate after-hours. They can provide impersonal services for 
those who, for whatever reason, either dislike the NEP premises or prefer impersonal interactions. 
Electronic dispensers, if used during working hours, provide a way of comparing the personalised 
outlet to a depersonalised alternative, from a client’s perspective. 
Nevertheless, there are significant problems as well as benefits. Electronic dispensers are more 
expensive to maintain than has been generally budgeted for.568 From the perspective of some IDU, 
they are just a machine, to be vandalised when malfunctioning and not delivering the expected 
services. It seems likely that the IDU who are presumed to vandalise these machines are applying 
the same logics and practices that they do to interactions with the state and professional structures 
567. “we must work closely with, rather than against, those groups that are at greater risk of acquiring and passing on 
AIDS” (Lange, 1987). 
568. From such considerations it would seem that the logics of electronic dispensers need to follow the logics of syringes 
and their supply, in the same way that syringes need to follow the drugs supply networks to the sites of injecting. As 
with syringes, the costs of maintaining such technology needs to be low, the dispensers need to be constantly 
associated with a high level of peer presence and activity, and they need to not seem to compete with peer activity. 
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they consider impersonal or antagonistic. This leads to a supposition that such machines do not 
engender trust, nor other useful motivation changes, except by providing an undesired contrast with
more welcomed aspects of peer-professionalism such as shared experiences and mutual respect. 
A second consideration lies in the networking role of peers. Peers carry out informal outreach by 
circulating drug using and health information in domestic situations outside of the NEP’s outlets. 
Yet the more the numbers of such peers decrease, the less outreach takes place. The electronic 
dispensers actually increase the harms if the ease of obtaining syringes after hours is countered by a
decease in the numbers of peers employed in the NEP. According to my analysis, technological 
solutions by themselves cannot adequately address problems of misplaced trust or inadequate 
motivation towards well-being. Electronic dispensers effectively compete with the logics of peer 
outreach and peer surveillance. The benefits of IDU accessing syringes and information at peer-
professional exchanges seem as essential as in 1987.
Sometimes IDU provided information about syringes, and sometimes syringes have been the 
subjects that told stories about IDU as objects. In either account the circulations of IDU and 
syringes in and out of particular sites are encouraged to be regular and frequent, adding to the 
practicality and rigour of studies based on IDU with prison experience attending needle exchanges. 
The symmetry of syringes and IDU, where each can stand for the other in certain circumstances 
that become more likely within the hybrid parameters of the NEP, is seen to have emerged as part 
of a more general heterogeneous network environment. 
There has only been one, singular, needle exchange programme in New Zealand. Notwithstanding 
this emergence of order from messiness, the developments were not simply driven by innate or 
essential properties of the actors nor by any properties of mutual alignment of needs. Instead, the 
developments were attracted and conditioned by mutual antagonisms that with work and sacrifices 
were persuaded into alignment. The developments were pulled by transient market processes and 
interests as much as pushed by deviant desires and health aspirations that would not go away. The 
NEP logics and mechanisms continue to be fuelled by the distrust of marginalised groups for health
authorities that enforce systems of medicalising and criminalising the use of substances.569 
3   A way of looking
I have shown how the NEP has followed the flow and eddy of the circulating syringes, while 
altering their meanings, by relying on peer engagement, applying harm reduction logics, supplying 
sterile syringes, and recovering used syringes. The NEP has achieved these goals through ‘peer-
569. For example, in joint raids with police on party drug supply shops (Christchurch Press, 2007: A5) and in promoting 
the criminalisation of mild stimulants such as BZP and nitrous oxide. 
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professional’ organisations and individuals working within and maintaining their niche 
environment. In this environment, the non-compliant motivations and illicit practices of IDU have 
‘counter-excluded’ the presence of the established health professions in any type of peer 
engagement role. The NEP has become a durably exceptional addition to the institutional 
environment which it has itself been made necessary by, and through which it has been shaped. It 
has been an innovation, certainly, but in another sense it has been an echo of institutional pain that 
has reverberated and shifted frequency into greater organisational density and force. Peer-
professionalism has overridden both harm and accusation in a celebratory ethics of resonance with 
pragmatic realism. Yet from any individual participant’s experience and perspectives, there has 
seemed far less reason for celebration. For the alternatives cannot easily be felt or seen at an 
individualist scale and scope.
Although some peers will be motivated to pursue a peer-professional career, marginalised people 
do not necessarily speak with one voice. The NZAF’s shifts towards corporate management and 
professionalism were accompanied by some distrust and resistance from the gay community 
networks which preferred the Shanti 'support model', or a gay rights activist model.570 These 
developments illustrate how problems emerge when professionalising strategies develop out of, 
then achieve, a degree of autonomy from community expectations. In this account, such problems 
emerge because the activity of hybrid systems relies on connectivity between personal, local, 
regional, and national scales of organisation. Differences of morality and motivation become 
apparent because the marginalised community differs from the corporate representation of such a 
community. Nor is a marginalised community likely to welcome the professionalisation of its 
members into expert specialists and lay ‘incompetents’, unless clearly evident net benefits are 
thereby gained. 
IDU generally know of the NEP’s logics and mechanisms through their everyday lives rather than 
through research reports that represent the application of a disciplined research imagination. These 
everyday IDU life stories and practices are a source of personal awareness, of local knowledge, and
of a collective network of motivations that operate quite independently of research, and of research 
bias. Yet conventional social and policy research has seldom inquired from such sources how 
programmes and policy shifts have influenced IDU motivations. There is even less academic 
literature on the links between the harms and motivation effects of prison environments, of IDU 
attitudes to risk-taking, and of the impact of needle exchange programmes. Research methods that 
engage with IDU ownership of their own desires and needs, rather than opposing their interests by 
framing them as abnormal, inauthentic, or otherwise unhealthy, seem needed. These methods are 
needed to engage with the motivational aspects of boundary maintaining processes among 
570. These internal conflicts led in 1990 to a breakaway by the Auckland regional branch. See Lindberg & McMorland 
(1996: 109), CASONZ (1990b).
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situations involving injecting drug use, needle exchanges, health professional territory, and state 
agency governance.
Artistic sensibilities and goals, shaped by sociological skills and craft, seem also required for 
engaging with unique and complex issues. This ‘anti-purist’ approach to social science adds craft 
and art571 to requirements for evidence and rigour of analysis. I think this because all the key 
informants in this research, when asked for explanations, have drawn attention to the NEP’s 
random aspects and unplanned developments. These might be considered narratively similar to 
inheriting a trait with unknown potentialities. Or one might consider how the hybrid metallurgy 
scripted into cast wootz steel and pattern-welded swords followed path-dependent trajectories that 
clustered alongside those of horse breeding, armour, aristocratic systems, diseases of warfare, 
infrastructures of land ownership, and hierarchal governance that feature in the histories of India 
and Japan.572 Viewed historically, clusters of narratives make sense from the way events follow 
after detailed experiences, building or detracting from contingent incidents, in temporal flows or 
steps that are always in hindsight perspective or imagined from hindsight into future possibilities. 
A synchronic perspective, where a sectional description is cut across such clustered narratives as 
perceived at the time or recounted later, makes sense of the way conceptual categories and actual 
networks of things appear configured in systems of inclusions and exclusions. I used this 
contextual awareness of narratives, sequences, and shaped configurations in my analysis, where I 
followed the stages and movements of NEP interactants through complex historical and 
institutional systems.
When such familiar and different, such old and new configurations of boundary lines are perceived 
as intersecting, has a cause resulted in something being brought into being? Or did already existing 
things become more visible and more active through a distributed collective activity constructing a 
visualising effect whereby things which had been less visible as background become 
foregrounded? The first perspective, which focuses on the beginnings and ends of events, is more 
historical, the latter perspective, which focuses on reassembling componentry, is more 
interactional. I have worked with both perspectives because the path-dependency of historical 
events better accounts for the timing, while the interactional shapes better delineate the rearranged 
institutional positionings and material contingencies. Participants were motivated by narratives to 
draw on institutional alignments and oppositions in their methods of innovating, yet shaped and 
accounted for such innovations by means of a new consensus of narratives and regulations. 
571. By art I refer to the objects, rituals, funding valuations and cultural mechanisms for reconfiguring or reinforcing 
sensibilities between individuals and wider institutions. Art valorises individual artists, curators, participants at 
showings, and owners of purchases. Its the opposite of impersonal and of institutional, which draws attention to the 
way corporate organisations display art pieces in foyers and offices, partly as trophies captured from the enemy, 
partly as a claim to a distinctive, individual corporate identity. And so art is never pure, nor should be expected as 
such, notwithstanding experiments in ‘pure technique’.
572. Refer Ch. 1 Section 3. See Untracht (1982: 364-365).
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My analysis has drawn on a nomadic strategy of working with the material at hand as much as 
possible, rather than relying on references to postulated external structures that are represented as 
explaining events without cause, conditions, or mechanism of effect. In this nomadic perspective, 
whether termed actor-network or Deleuzian, or dharmic, or historical or an institutional type of 
analysis, I have attempted to ‘twist’ problems of complexity into patterns of productivity. I worked 
by following the difficulties, treating them as opportunities, and applying symmetrical methods of 
analysis that are not ‘neutral’, because they were locally embedded in the localities of the case and 
in my participant immersion as a researcher. In this twisting, as with a moebius strip, planar 
boundaries are overcome through iteration. By means of the twist, all planes become accessible 
through linear movements of narratives, evading the need to use separate categories and privilege 
their distinctions to preserve idealist logics. Despite this navigational argument against boundaries 
being in any way essential being itself located in an abstract plane, I draw attention to how my 
methods have been reliant on demonstrable indicators such as documented accounts, and even-
handed in approach to grounded differences in the perspectives of participants.573 This perspective 
characterises a type of sociology. Whatever it may be termed,574 it might well be described as a 
criminal, nomadic, and critical sociology of co-dependent interactional materialism.
I have shown that the logics and practices of the established medical and drug treatment 
professions competed with those of the NEP. The NEP’s principles were accepted as effective and 
efficient, in a particular environment when no cures for a contagious disease existed, and where 
strong mutual distrust between IDU and professional health specialists made conventional 
prevention methods impossible or unaffordable. Yet if cures for HIV and HCV become more 
feasible than the prevention of transmission, or if greater trust developed between IDU and drug 
treatment specialists, then the key constituents of the NEP niche of interactivity would weaken.575 
If there was a cure for AIDS there would be less need to maintain the trust of deviant communities,
since members would be forced to comply with conventional health professions to be cured. If the 
NEP lost its hybrid productivity it would be more vulnerable to assimilation or subordination 
tactics by the professions that find its presence irritating. A wider environment of longer-term 
conflict between IDU and medical specialists, and between health professions and state agencies, 
has and will continue to influence the NEP.576
The influence of peers, in empowering IDU to supply safety for themselves and colleagues, has 
573. This is like braiding a rope of on-going symmetrical twists as contrasted with tying a knot of asymmetrical closure. 
The NEP itself is more like an extended knot, or asymmetrically braided rope. By contrast, I have tried to treat the 
research methods as braiding a continuing rope, as smooth as possible, yet also adequately following the contours of 
the NEP.
574. moebile sociology?
575. The financial and dependency costs of curative interventions would seem to always exceed those of well co-
ordinated prevention programmes and strategies in a stable, equitable society that actually provided health treatment.
576. Nonetheless the intensity of physiological technology and the commodification of embodied desires for 
reconfiguring identity, for feeling and becoming better, makes all predictions groundless, all singularities of identity 
suspect, like a “wave without a shore” (Cherryh, 1984).
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worked as a network approach to a network problem. The NEP’s opportunities and productivity 
emerged from a good fit between hybrid organisation and hybrid environment. Accordingly, the 
limits to expansion and change were also shaped by these factors, in a single mechanism of 
multiple interactions. In effect, IDU traded a degree of confidentiality for particular health benefits,
as was formally proposed in 1988 (Read, 1988) by Dr. Baker, the founding architect of the NEP. In
this process the peer employees gained social status and opportunities to represent IDU who, being 
illegal, could not publicly represent themselves without risking arrest or harassment. Governments 
and state agencies gained surveillance data on population demographics and practices, while 
reducing the public hazards of disease transmission. As a nomadic researcher I do not ask whether 
the changes in the NEP’s development were ‘appropriate’, but I have outlined the contexts and 
criteria for evaluating whether these changes led to greater or lesser capabilities.
The NEP did not merely respond to the constraints and pressures of its institutional surroundings. It
also modified its environment, both structurally and path-dependently, raising questions about how 
such agency became organised, distributed, and effective. The NEP formed work spaces (Hacking, 
2002) where practices involving logics of risk and trust were induced to permeate and ‘satisfy’ 
unavoidably opposed interests. This is why the health and crime institutions that set up the NEP’s 
environment and logics did not simply revert to business as normal, nor simply accept a new harm 
reduction regime by enacting appropriate legislation. In consequence, the NEP was offered an 
extended window of opportunity to commercialise, expand, and remain partially yet distinctly 
deviant. Due to fortunate circumstances, callous official neglect, and internal conflicts, such 
opportunities were taken up in dynamic rather than bureaucratic innovations, coming from the 
ground up and extending horizontally as well as from the top down. 
The NEP aligned with state policies of planning long-term benefits through population-based 
wellness methods, yet was introduced in urgency, was managed by default, and has been highly 
constrained by regulation and funding caps. Following a period of state sector fragmentation during
the 1990s, the New Zealand government has attempted to re-integrate state agency infrastructures 
in a ‘whole of government’ project. Attention is accordingly drawn to the consequences of 
integration. Since an urgent and essential productivity has emerged from the hybrid antagonisms 
and fragmentation of needle exchanges, might over-simplistic integration cause significant harms 
as well as benefits?
As well as promoting a governance perspective that is long-term, evidence-based, and focused on 
outcomes, peer-professionalism has created specific problems for policies which criminalise and 
medicalise drug use. The NEP promotes a formal policy of neither condemning nor condoning 
illicit drug use (NENZ, 2005). Yet the NEP necessarily empowers drug users more as valid 
citizens, with legitimate health expectations, who rightfully exercise a public voice. Peer-
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professionals who represent IDU effectively resist and reshape criminalising and medicalising 
processes, even while being partially state-subsidised. In this way the peer-professionals reduce 
inequalities and extend the scope of citizenship. Such a role is traditional for the professions in a 
western liberal society, at least in terms of the deviance attributed to class, religion, gender, sex 
practice, and racialised categories, provided that professional jurisdictions are not thereby 
diminished. In New Zealand, the professions have in general, after over a century of doing 
otherwise, ponderously supported the decriminalisation of practices that seem distinctly private and
do not exploit others. For instance, no profession in 2007 publicly opposes recreational sex outside 
marriage, sex-work, and the complementing of religious marriage codes by secular marriage and 
civil-unions. Peer-professionalism is in accord with such wider professional tendencies that 
mediate between public and private, but barely touch on the NEP sites and practices.577
Health professionals, officials, and IDU all needed the NEP to professionalise, but within 
constraining boundaries. The occupational and geographical niche that emerged from its 
workability in practice was largely shaped by its ‘potential’ occupational population remaining 
relatively incapable, non-established, and non-threatening. By contrast, the jurisdictions of the full 
professions such as medicine and psychiatry were shaped from struggles among more established 
and capable occupational groups (Abbott, 1999, 1992a, 1988). As the NEP professionalised, with 
no occupational competition, its struggles to control its boundaries became focused towards the 
area of policy. By developing capabilities that partly competed with official systems and logics, the
forms of deviance that specialised in illicit drugs, then as carriers of contagious diseases, co-
produced and became overlaid with small and specialised forms of industrial action, made even 
more capable by a market monopoly over syringe exchange services. This occupational positioning
from formal incompetence to acknowledged competencies has shaped the NEP’s capabilities for 
sustainability and quality of care as becoming characteristically provisional, yet strangely fitting.
577. Safe sex supplies and educational materials are available at every peer group outlet as part of HIV/AIDS and general
health promotion programmes.
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3   Arrest Referral Scheme Data: 2005
Chart 1: Arrests for syringes in 2004-5. (from Arrest Referral Scheme, 2005: 3.)578
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In this diagram the number of those arrested is on the vertical axis. The charges are laid out along 
the horizontal axis, seemingly in no particular order except the numbers being charged.
Key to Chart 1:
From left to right the charges consist of:
Male assaults female. 15
Possess needle/syringe 11
Procure/possess cannabis 9
Unspecified 9
Breach of bail 8
Disorderly behaviour 6
Shoplifts 6
Wilful damage 6
Misc. offence against justice 5
Detox 5
Contravenes protection order 4
Liquor offence 4
Burgles (other property) under $500 by night 4
578. Bold ‘N/S arrest data’ caption inserted, and N/S arrest data column highlighted, for legibility.
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Unlawful takes motor vehicle 4
Unlawfully in building 4
Common assault manually 3
Possess offensive weapon 3
Resist Police 3
Burglary under $500 by day 3
Drove while disqualified 3rd or subsequent 3
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5   Blood Awareness Education and Outreach Material
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by NENZ.
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Safer Injecting
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by NENZ.
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Section 5:    Blood Awareness Education and Outreach Material
Hepatitis C Health Information Leaflet
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by NENZ.
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Rodger Wright Centre Outreach Programme Pamphlet
focused on general infection precautions
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by DISC Trust.
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Health Promotion-Harm Reduction Education Pamphlet for Tattooists
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by NENZ and Hepatitis C Resource Centre
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Tattooist Information Pamphlet P2
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by NENZ.
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Tattooist Information Pamphlet p3
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by NENZ.
349
Chapter 13.      Appendices
Tattooist Information Pamphlet p4
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by NENZ.
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Veintenance Booklet
 physiological-technological information about injecting
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by NENZ.
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Veintenance
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by NENZ.
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Veintenance
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by NENZ.
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Combined Agency Description and Health Promotion Pamphlet
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by DISC Trust.
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Combined Agency Description and Health Promotion Pamphlet  cont.
Copyright and Intellectual Property held by DISC Trust.
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6   Syringe Containers
The original 1988 container for returning used syringes.
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The 2007 container for returning used syringes.
357
Chapter 13.      Appendices
The 2007 returns container from a different angle.
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There is a significant difference in size between the earliest and the current returns container.
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7   Chronology and statistical parameters of the NEP
The prevention of HIV transmission in marginalised communities was organised through state 
policies implemented largely by corporate AIDS service organisations, such as the NEP peer 
groups, the New Zealand Prostitutes Collective (NZPC), and the New Zealand AIDS Foundation 
(NZAF). The NZAF emerged first in the mid-1980s from a network of community groups to form 
a single corporate trust, which became increasingly professionalised (Lindberg & McMorland, 
1996). The NZPC and the NEP peer groups corporatised and professionalised to a less intense 
degree, in ways that responded to different community environments and cultural expectations. 
The NEP has supplied syringes through two types of outlet, but initially there was only one type. 
This consisted of the pharmacies that had volunteered to register into the NEP. In September 1988, 
seven months after the NEP began, there were 149 of these registered pharmacy outlets (Kemp, 
2004). Between that time and 2004, the number of registered pharmacies varied between 100 and 
200. In late 2004 there were 170 pharmacies registered with the NEP out of the 900 pharmacies in 
total throughout New Zealand.579 This enrolment provided a modicum of national coverage, except 
for towns and rural areas. However, in a sprawling city such as Auckland, it was possible for 
pharmacy numbers to drop in some suburbs, creating local gaps in services. 
Five months after the NEP pharmacies began operating in May 1988, an initial set of IDU peer 
groups were contracted by the Department of Health. These experimental service contracts 
specified outputs that included the provision of educational material, the expectation of peer-to-
peer communication with IDU, the supply of syringes, and the collection of returned syringes. The 
initial descriptions580 of these contracts include a concept of IDU being represented by these peer 
groups. However, this aspect was underplayed in public descriptions of the NEP. Furthermore, the 
references to advocacy were quickly removed from the formal contracts, amidst controversy and 
resistance by the peer groups. During this period the number of these peer groups increased to five 
by 1990, then remained unchanged until late 1994,581 when one publicly collapsed, but was rapidly 
replaced.582 This episode marked the end of the foundational, and the post-foundational plateau era.
579. See Sheridan, Henderson, Greenhill, & Smith (2005).
580. As found in several Department reports.
581. See Auerbach (1994); Walzl (1994). The groups were ADIO, IV Union, WIDE, CIVDURG, and DIVO. Auerbach 
and Walzl do not name more than these five. It may be that some different groups started but soon disappeared. The 
extremely poor quality record keeping by state agency officials during this period makes an extra group appearing in 
a count at any one time quite feasible. However, Kemp (2004) reports there being six peer groups in 1993, and ten in 
1995, but does not name them. Ten groups would have provided far better regional coverage of outreach, but would 
have used funding that was prioritised elsewhere by officials, and desperately lobbied for by the five underfunded 
publicly known groups. By contrast, in 1999, in a guide to HIV/AIDS for health professionals, Prince & Meech 
(1999: 97) report only five peer groups when there were at least 11. However, the authors have not acknowledged 
any consultation with NENZ in the preparation of their authoritative guide, which might explain such inaccuracy 
over the details of the NEP. In 2000, a Ministry memo lists 11 groups by name (Ministry of Health, 2000). I leave it 
to the reader to decide what these discrepancies might indicate.
582. By public I mean there was widespread knowledge within the HIV/AIDS, IDU, and addiction treatment networks. 
However, there was no media publicity. Other groups had at times been forced to change personnel, or reconstitute 
Trust Boards, but never so drastically or publicly.
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The incident coincided with the founding of a new pattern of national co-ordination achieved 
through the autonomous trust called Needle Exchange New Zealand (NENZ). NENZ overlaid the 
regional autonomy of the five peer groups, partly weakening yet largely supporting that autonomy.
The five peer groups formed NENZ as a national federation in 1995. Due to the support from this 
federation, new peer groups of a similar type to the initial five began to be established. By 2004 
there were twelve full-time centres, two part-time centres, and one de-centred service on the West 
Coast (Sheridan, Henderson, Greenhill, & Smith, 2005). In addition, the larger cities of Auckland 
and Christchurch had begun to establish suburban satellite outlets. In 1995 the outlets were 
reclassified as either Level 1 or Level 2. The Level 2 outlets were 'dedicated' exchanges, which 
included all the peer group centres and a small number of pharmacies. These Level 2 outlets 
provided a peer-professional level of specialised services. These services emphasised the agency of
IDU clients by offering choices. The selection on offer focused on increasing the degree of control 
over the risks of injecting. Level 1 outlets only provided a basic, 'one size fits all', level of syringe 
exchange. Level 1 outlets relied on pamphlets to offer information on advisory and referral 
services. In both types of outlet the supply side was completely commercial, with the price of the 
syringes, paid by the IDU client at the time of the transaction, providing a professional service fee 
and reimbursement for labour. 
By 1990, the regular patterns of attendance and usage by IDU customers were being recorded as a 
contractual output to satisfy the official funding and registration agencies. The peer groups which 
had been founded in 1989 and 1990 had all formally joined the NEP by 1991. The initial 
governance issues between peer group Trust Boards and their founding co-ordinators had mostly 
been resolved by 1995. Moreover, the number of syringes distributed through the NEP increased 
steadily to over 1 million per annum by 2000. Of these, 64% were supplied through peer groups 
(Kemp, 2004). The original goal of reducing HIV-related harms in IDU had been achieved by the 
peer groups becoming as significant as the pharmacies, though in different ways, for the supply of 
syringes. Yet despite the increased access to sterile syringes, HCV remained prevalent among IDU.
About 1,300 New Zealanders have been estimated to become newly infected with HCV per annum,
while estimations based on standard disease modelling are in the order of 1280 cases acquired per 
year.583 A study of HCV incidence in new injectors in the mid-1990s in a single city indicated a 
13% per annum acquisition rate (Brunton et al., 2000). Assuming that 5% of the population over 
this period were IDU, and projecting the 13% acquisition rate onto the consequent estimate of 
2,204 new injectors, approximately 386 consequent cases of HCV per annum would be expected. 
However, only 60 to 100 infections have been notified annually after acute cases of hepatitis C 
became legally notifiable in 1996. This discrepancy may be due to many instances of infection 
583. See Hepatitis C Resource Centre (2007), Brunton (2005. pers. com.), Easton (2002), Brunton (2000), Nesdale, 
Baker, Gane, Kemp, Brunton, Law, & Garrett (2000).
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leading to chronic infection, or clearance without treatment, yet with no acute phase that could be 
easily diagnosed and notified.
It is likely that many people will not be tested for HCV. There is no population-wide sentinel 
testing. GPs do not promote testing without significant symptoms to justify the expense of a test to 
the state agencies that provide diagnostic testing funding. Given the limited means of transmission 
after the national blood bank supply began to be tested for HCV, a request for a test by a patient is 
effectively a disclosure of IDU practices. Such disclosure is hazardous to individual IDU in terms 
of insurance coverage, custody disputes, social reputation, overseas travel, pain relief in 
emergencies, and bigotry from many medical professionals. Any non-disclosure, or non-
compliance with testing, is significant in explaining how the estimated incidence of HCV might 
greatly exceed the notified rate, and even exceed the recorded rate of initiation to injecting drug 
use.
The situation as regards HCV also illustrates the significance of stigma and secrecy in the zones 
between crime and health systems. The estimated HCV transmission rate is directly evidenced not 
by epidemiological survey, nor by doctor-patient compliance and notification, but by the level of 
demand for syringes and the testing of NEP attendees. Both the studies of HCV prevalence and the 
records of the supply of syringes are reliable measurements because the volunteers being studied 
are not motivated to deceive, and IDU are not motivated to alter their rate of exchanging syringes. 
Since the use of sterile syringes reduces HCV transmission, and has not been shown to increase 
rates of initiation to injecting drug use, it seems likely that greater numbers of people have been 
injecting substances than general population surveys have indicated.584 The lowering of syringe 
prices, and increased coverage by a greater number of peer group NEP outlets, would explain how 
a relatively stable IDU population might increase its syringe circulation rate. For instance, the 
proportion of syringes returned for disposal improved from recorded national averages of 37% of 
sales between 1990 and 1994, to 52.9% of sales in 2000.585 Moreover, the discrepancies between 
the types of indicators may be due to increased levels of recreational injection that were not 
admitted by participants in the telephone-based Comparison Surveys of illicit drug use. The self-
reporting of criminal activities seems inherently biased towards an unknown degree of 
underestimation. Nonetheless, these quantitative numerical data certainly hint at the scale and 
significance of the injecting and HCV situation addressed by the NEP.
Quantitative data directly describes the numerical size of a category of measurement. Such 
estimates lead more indirectly to an account of a narrowly measured segment of actual life 
phenomena. By comparison, qualitative information directly indicates the forms of relationships, as
584. For instance, steroids and stimulants have become more generally used and more commonly injected than in 1989, 
according to the National Drug Policy (Ministry of Health, 1998a).
585. See Ministry of Health (2002); NENZ (2005).
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understood by those who participate in such relationships. Both quantitative and qualitative 
information are useful in understanding the injecting and HCV situations faced by the NEP. For 
example, bleach has been relied on as an approved backup method of sterilising syringes, since the 
user-pays aspect of the NEP has given IDU an incentive to economise by reusing syringes. Bleach 
was sufficiently effective against HIV for this pragmatic compromise to be acceptable by expert 
medical authorities, such as the AIDS Advisory Committee.586 However, by 1998, quantitative 
studies indicated that bleach was less effective than thought against HIV and relatively ineffective 
against HCV. With no effective backup method of sterilisation, the gaps in the efficacy of the NEP 
increased in significance. A qualitative analysis, as here, describes how such gaps required 
decreasing the barriers and increasing the incentives for IDU to always use new syringes. By 
combining the counting and motivational processes the situation becomes clearer. We understand 
better from the accounts and stories how the pressures on the NEP budgeting and on its range of 
governance systems increased to a critical level. Yet when the funding for the counting research 
requires a story of urgency to establish its legitimacy, the qualitative research needs to come first, 
as in this thesis which among other things, outlines the structural relationships that constitute NEP 
activities.
The national federated body of the peer groups and the dedicated pharmacy outlets is a Trust called
Needle Exchange New Zealand (NENZ). NENZ is a co-ordinating and umbrella body which meets 
twice yearly.587 NENZ elects representatives to the NEP Stakeholder Group, which also meets 
twice yearly to monitor governance and policy issues. The Stakeholder Group includes 
representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Pharmaceutical Society of New Zealand Inc., and the 
Pharmacy Guild of New Zealand Inc. (NENZ, 2005).
This structure of the NEP has been maintained since the incorporation of NENZ in early 1995. 
However, NENZ was preceded by five co-ordinating agencies which were disestablished by 
mid-1995. These were the IV League,588 the AIDS Taskforce,589 the Community AIDS Service 
586. For instance, in a context of the National Council on AIDS recommending that needle exchanges be provided in 
prisons, Dr. Meech disagreed and stated that according to the AIDS Advisory Committee which he chaired, bleach 
and needle exchange were equally effective (National Council on AIDS, 1989a: 3). This dissent weakened the health 
rationale for exchanging syringes in prisons.
587. Each local trust selects two representatives to the national board. In practice, one of these delegates has been the 
outlet manager (Henderson, 2005 pers. com.). This creates a situation where managers exert a collective influence, 
and accountability, over their own work conditions. The other half of the NENZ Board are Trustees of peer groups. 
Government policy has been for peer group managers to not have undue direct influence over their own employment 
conditions through sitting on their own Trust Boards, since such situations led to problems after the NEP began. 
This is one of the few areas where state agencies have directly exerted control over the private peer groups.
588. The IV League was a lobbying organisation representing IDU. It was active from 1986 to 1988. It collapsed after it 
succeeded in promoting new political goals and new organisational models for IDU and the NEP. Its collapse was 
precipitated by withdrawal of government funding by the AIDS Task Force in 1988, at the same time as the 
Auckland Drug Information Outreach (ADIO) peer group received its first contract (National Council on AIDS, 
1988b).
589. The AIDS Task Force was the final of a succession of similarly named organisations dating from an Auckland 
Hospital based organisation of medical professionals that self-organised, supposedly independently of state 
officialdom, in 1983 (Lichtenstein, 1996: 407a). The last two versions of an AIDS Task Force were dedicated units, 
fully within the Department of Health, that were active from 1989 to 1990 (National Council on AIDS, 1989b: 4), 
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Organisations of New Zealand,590 the National Council on AIDS,591 and the Public Health 
Commission.592 The continuing sustainability and effectiveness of NENZ has been indicated by its 
management of two significant issues over the nine years after its founding. In the first situation, 
NENZ threatened the Ministry of Health with a nation-wide strike by the peer-professional groups 
in 2001 (Ministry of Health, 2001). In the second situation, the adherence by the Ministry of Health
to rigid funding limits was 'by-passed' through direct intervention by the Associate Minister of 
Health. This by-pass led to state funding of free syringes in 2004 (Henderson, 2005 pers. com.).
The regulatory environment of the NEP has been durable but not particularly adaptive. In 
November 1987 changes to the Health Act legalised the provision of syringes, and changes to the 
Misuse of Drugs Act partly decriminalised the possession of syringes. The Health (Needles and 
Syringes) Regulations 1987 were in place by early 1988. Despite significant changes in the NEP’s 
infrastructure and commodities, these regulations remained unchanged for ten years until an 
amendment to the Misuse of Drugs Act replaced the Health (Needles and Syringes) Regulations 
1998. Further amendment to the Misuse of Drugs Act occurred in 2004 with the introduction of a 
free one-for-one exchange system, and again in 2005 when the onus of proof in charges of 
possession of syringes shifted from the defendant to the prosecution.
The NEP’s relatively stable regulatory environment is partly explained by the rapid halting of HIV 
transmission among IDU. The sharing of syringes, as self-reported, reduced from 50% in 1994 to 
6% in 2002 (Aitken, 2002). Between 1985 and 2003, those diagnosed with HIV numbered less than
ten per annum, a rate which included infections acquired overseas (Saxton & Hughes, 2004: 8). 
Peer-professionalism in relation to HIV has influenced the timing of the NEP’s delayed regulatory 
changes by being effective and efficient. However, the accounts and stories of HCV have been 
different. The differences between the studies of sample populations, and the incidents reported 
through notification, illustrate the significance of HCV being a disease of secret, marginalised 
practices and networks. HCV is similar to HIV in being unable to be feasibly prevented by standard
then from 1990 to to 1991 (Fithian, 2004 pers. com.), when it was disestablished.
590.  CASONZ became organised by September 1989 (CASONZ, 1990a; National Council on AIDS, 1989d: 2; 
CIVDURG, 1989) as a local version of the International Community AIDS Service Organisations, which had been 
intended as an international model for community AIDS Service Organisations (National Council on AIDS, 1989d: 
2). CASONZ was positioned as a potential vehicle to improve the uniformity of coverage of outreach, a problem 
acknowledged by the National Council on AIDS (1989c). CASONZ had increasingly criticised government policies, 
especially integration of STD services with specialised HIV/AIDS services such as provided by the NZAF. 
CASONZ had also criticised increasing cutbacks in HIV/AIDS prevention services, which were implemented and 
represented by the AIDS TaskForce. Integration with STD services and funding cutbacks both threatened the ability 
of peer groups to provide outreach services. CASONZ collapsed after its funding was reduced in 1991, then 
withdrawn by the AIDS TaskForce in 1992.
591. The National Council on AIDS was a policy co-ordinating 'think-tank' that represented a broad cross-section of New
Zealand society. It was formed to complement the AIDS Advisory Committee in 1988, becoming formally 
constituted in 1989, in a process that also formed the majority of the AIDS Advisory Committee into a separate 
Medical and Scientific Subcommittee of the National Council on AIDS. The process made political differences 
within the AIDS Advisory Committee more formal and manageable from a Government perspective.
592. The Public Health Commission was a mid to high level central funding and co-ordination agency sited under the 
governance level Ministry of Health after the Department of Health was disestablished in 1993. The Public Health 
Commission retained a HIV/AIDS services co-ordinating committee until the Commission was disestablished in 
364
Section 7:    Chronology and statistical parameters of the NEP
health promotion methods. This has led to 'harm minimising' changes to the NEP regulations and 
policy in 1998 and 2004. Since the transmission of HCV is associated with the exclusion and 
stigma of IDU, the requirement for empowerment of IDU communities and increases in individual 
self-esteem has led to an increased harm reduction emphasis, at least at the instrumental level of 
NEP activities, since 1988.
1995.
365
Chapter 13.      Appendices
8   Harm reduction and harm minimisation
The NEP was originally described by Cabinet members such as Judy Keall (1987), and the 
Department of Health (Baker, 1987c: 2), as 'reducing' the risk of disease while increasing 
enforcement measures. The Explanatory Note attached to the Health (Needles and Syringes) 
Regulations 1987 (New Zealand Government, 1987) referred to 'minimising' the risk of disease. 
The intent seems equivalent in both usages. The NEP Management Plan of the same period aimed 
to 'significantly reduce' the spread of HIV/AIDS, yet positioned abstinence alongside sexual 
monogamy as linked ideals (Baker, 1987c: 2).593 The imputation that both were ideals that could 
not be reached or enforced appears to be understood as a harm minimising approach.
Nevertheless, the agency (the activity, not an organisation) associated with both sexual and drug 
desires appears to be imputed in a harm reduction manner. The way these aims were to be 
implemented in the Plan strongly promoted IDU agency through raising the self-esteem of IDU 
while they continued their illicit drug use. IDU were referred to as exerting will and motivation 
(Baker, 1987c: 3, 7, 29, 56, 65). A positive, non-judgemental approach by NEP workers was 
defined as being essential, in what appears to be a harm reduction approach.
The NEP form of harm reduction was only partly modelled on a doctor-patient relationship of 
individual patient compliance. It has also been modelled on the prevention of viral transmission in 
interactive long-term social environments. As socially interactive and representative, rather than 
fixated on a particular disease or group of blood-borne diseases, the NEP has aligned with modern 
holistic nursing, as well as with community oriented public health promotion policies.594
In 1990, Dr. Baker and Stephen Lungley were commissioned to evaluate the NEP. They concluded 
by advocating for a change in national drug policy from 'harm prevention to harm reduction' 
(Lungley & Baker, 1990: 79). A separate review of the NEP peer groups in 1990 did not refer to 
harm minimising or reducing, but did promote a 'harm reduction' type of argument based on 
increasing the self-esteem of IDU (Robinson, 1990: 26). Neither term appears in the later NEP 
reviews by Walzl (1994) and Auerbach (1994d). By 1995, the terms 'minimise' and 'minimisation' 
become more apparent, as in 'minimising risks of infection', that appears in a review of the NEP 
management issues (Fitzgerald, 1995: 2). The term 'harm minimisation' gained increased exposure 
with the release of New Zealand’s National Drug Policy in 1998.
The National Drug Policy is described as being a 'harm minimising' health policy situated within 
the Ministry of Health.595 The NEP became included within the National Drug Policy as an: 
593. This was because IDU acquisition of HIV did not threaten the non-IDU heterosexual population unless IDU 
practiced unsafe sex with non-IDU. The two acquisition routes needed to be combined for a threat to materialise. 
Prevention programmes were consequently aimed at simultaneously addressing both routes.
594. See Galbally (2000: 271-272), Neuman & Fawcett (2002), Ramsden (1991), Giorgi, (1985).
595. See Webb & Marriot-Lloyd (2002: 496, 500). It is unclear whether the National Drug Policy is wholly or partly 
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“attempt to minimise harm to the users and the community, even if some drug use continues and 
drug-related harm cannot be totally avoided” (Ministry of Health, 1998a: 43). The National Drug 
Policy (Ministry of Health, 1998a: 39) directs the NEP to improve the provision of health 
information and advice to at-risk groups, such as IDU, and including young people and prison 
inmates. However, the National Drug Policy also calls for increased investigation and prevention 
of the supply of drugs to at-risk groups, such as youth (Ministry of Health, 1998a: 39). Attention is 
thereby drawn to how information from the NEP might assist the directive to further develop 
intelligence systems and technologies to counter the availability of drugs (Ministry of Health, 
1998a: 38). 
The NEP is public health oriented. It neither condones nor condemns drug use, whereas the 
National Drug Policy includes attempts by enforcement agencies to condemn drug use by 
prosecuting and incarcerating drug users. Yet describing the NEP as harm minimisation is partly 
justified, though not because the NEP has changed from being 'harm reduction' in practice. Rather, 
it is justified because bureaucratic boundaries have shifted so that the NEP has become closer to 
policing activities within a collaborative assemblage of state agencies. The NEP had initially been 
focused on disease types of harms and syringes, before becoming strongly influenced by IDU 
morals, norms and interests. However, 'harm minimisation', defined as a national policy of 
integrating different elements in a pragmatic framework that included harm reduction (Ministry of 
Health, 1998a: 28), regrouped the NEP within the drug policy area of mental health,596 rather than 
in a distinct area of disease prevention. 
As I have used the terms, harm minimisation involves links to official interests, formal policies, or 
the mission statements of state funded programmes.597 Harm reduction refers to engagement with 
IDU in outreach, and to the enhancement of their motivation by peers. In any actual use by others, 
the degree of imputed agency might vary. In my usage, the degree of agency referred to in harm 
reduction is significant, as are the official associations referred to in harm minimisation. I do not 
wish to extend an outline of the context of these terms much further, since my goal has been to 
explore, from the inside, how the NEP is characteristically active. The terms make better sense 
when the history and working systems of the NEP are better understood.
within the territory of the Ministry of Health. In some ways it seems a semi-independent entity, actually governed by 
one or several interagency committees. There are many stakeholders, but no clear accountability links. This is 
similar in many ways to the NEP systems, if we exchange the IDU for officials, and syringes for policy.
596. In 2002, drug treatment programmes were merged with mental health programmes, indicating professional turf 
wars, as well as government dissatisfaction with outcomes in either or both areas being treated separately (New 
Zealand Drug Foundation, 2002).
597. From 1998 the phrase ‘harm reduction’ in the preamble to the National Drug Policy was replaced by ‘problem 
limitation’, described as the ‘treatment’ of drug users rather than empowerment. The influence of the Ottawa Charter 
on New Zealand’s drug policy has been systematically reversed, at least in terminology, since the late 1980s and 
1990s. This is because the term ‘problem’ is far less evidence-based and far more open to interpretation in favour of 
dominant ideologies than is the term ‘harm’. Furthermore, the term limitation is far less committed than the term 
‘reduction’, since any limit, no matter how small, is still a limit, yet reduction implies a goal of continuing to reduce 
This is seen in the draft of the proposed new National Drug Policy (Ministry of Health, 2006b) .
367
Chapter 13.      Appendices
The distrust created by enforcing the prohibition of drugs provided the basic logic that drove the 
need for harm reduction.598 Law enforcement is difficult to legitimise in harm reduction terms, 
because those enforced tend not to participate voluntarily through self-control. Accordingly, they 
will be just as much a danger to themselves and their social environment when no longer being 
enforced.599 This is why their motivations are as important as the safety of their material 
environments. However, the more the peer aspects of the NEP are acknowledged as effective and 
efficient, the more the conflicts intensify between reduction and minimisation within the logics of 
the National Drug Policy. These aspects illustrate how a study of NEP history and capabilities is 
also a study of an interagency environment of collaborating interests. The study of connections 
between different components of separate areas of activity, such as motivation and bureaucracy, 
requires the selection of analytical tools which engage with the sequencing and contingency of 
policy changes.600
598. See O'Malley (1999: 191-212) for a governmentality analysis of reduction and minimisation strategies. 
599. However, O'Malley (1999) notes that harm reduction practices can promote individualism at the expense of control 
of environments.
600. See Howlett & Ramesh (1995: 3, 12-14).
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9   Framing concepts
Boundary lines
One method that I have used to test my data and concepts is to diagram (Rotman, 1999) the shapes 
of forms, or putative forms of interactional patterns, for instance institutionalisations. I then would 
explore and critique the diagram, asking myself questions about its relevance, and how it might be 
extended, or be redrawn as more informative using different techniques of representation. The 
critique has two components. First the diagram is checked to see where random instances and 
factors relate to the shape drawn, if at all. Then, historical changes are used to problematise the 
relationships as drawn. How would a diagram from 1989 be redrawn in 1992? What requires 
change? Are there changes that escape the diagram? Why? How meaningful is the diagram? 
This exercise involves a formalisation of everyday reflection. The formalisation permits and 
encourages clarification. The exercise also leads to illustrative aids to the presentation of concepts, 
provided it is always kept in mind that an isolated illustration is designed to provoke meaning, not 
to provide an argument in itself. 
The analytic exercise of topologically mapping the institutional environment of the NEP can 
produce a diagram of boundary lines. Visualising these imagined and expected boundaries can 
index a kinaesthetic, meaningful story. The indexing relies on encasing the detail and complexity 
of cultural narratives in lines and planes that as a single, more easily talked about yet composite 
shape, resists becoming a single category or object like a ‘black-box’. The apparent simplicity of 
such shapes is provoked by drawing a formal symbologism601, as also a portrait of character, as 
well as a cross-sectional ideogram of a story of development.
In the diagrams on the following page, the two lines are drawn as separate, because the 
expectations and practices involved were organised, funded, and understood as different sets of 
categories. Each set depicts a boundary effect between perceived problems and responses. These 
effects were not just divisive, since each boundary acted as a bridging zone where cross-border as 
well as transgressive and borderline work took place. 
We note how IDU broke laws, causing police to increase their information that profiled and 
defined IDU. In a separate set of boundary situations, viral diseases moved into and challenged 
health systems, which caused health professionals to monitor the physiological and demographic 
viral boundaries. Such work involved categorising, labelling, applying technologies, marketing, 
moving objects, and transferring information.
601. A hybrid artefact of shape, discourse, and scientific research. Not a symbology, which is a whole system rather than 
a particular drawing. Nor a symbol, which is too referential.
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Boundary Line Attraction Diagram  3: 
Crime & Policing
Disease &
 Public Health
The advent of HIV/AIDS altered this arrangement by attracting aspects of the boundary situations, 
and attaching them to each other at those aspects. At the zone of attachment, aspects of previous 
assemblages became juxtaposed in new unpredictable arrangements, while connected to two 
conventional boundary situations that remained predictable away from the zone of attachment. The 
constituent aspects of the boundaries attached at the locus of harm reduction programmes delivered
by representatives of marginalised communities to those whom they represented. One version of 
such connections and distinctions is presented as Diagram 2. IDU 'crossed' boundaries into health 
logics, causing their relationship with police to be modified by health professionals. In a 
simultaneous exchange, viruses 'crossed' boundaries into legal logics. Police withdrew from these 
boundaries because they could not arrest viruses; health professionals withdrew from these 
boundaries because they could not arrest viral transmission.
Boundary Line Attachment Diagram  4: 
HIV/AIDS 
Prevention 
Organisations
This model focuses attention on significant issues through its simplicity, as well as its obvious 
shortcomings. For instance, the lines were not initially fully separated, since medical professionals 
co-operated with police in law enforcement, and police had enforced quarantine and public health 
regulations (Gray, 2006). Furthermore, illicit drug use had been treated as a contagious disorder. 
However, the lines represent institutionalised expectations, not a graph-like summation of 
measured numbers. In this sense the lines were distinctly different. The intersection zone associated
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with HIV was part of at least two lines which remained largely distinct and resisted integration. 
Again, the diagram’s shortcomings provokes analytical narratives. How might one represent the 
intersection as story lines? Did they merge, or knot or attract? Were they tied together by other 
factors? How far along each line might the effects of local intersections be represented?
The attention I pay to shapes and stories has focused more precisely on how movements of 
institutional structures and shapes extend longitudinally to how effects worked out as temporal 
sequences of events. Flat structural relations and long temporal events can be conveyed in accounts
and stories which can be arranged by means of a single narrative in the combined logos and logic 
of a case. In the case of the NEP, the partly resultant partly self-maintaining combination of 
shaping and sequencing also describes how peer-professionalism interacted with its environments 
of health promotion and drug prohibition. 
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Mechanisms
I have used concepts of ‘mechanisms’ and ‘active networks’ to delineate aspects of the NEP. In my
usage, which emerged from this research, mechanisms can be identified by a significant degree of 
regularity, internal structure, feedback, and coherent movements of components. The significance 
of such a mechanism lies in its capabilities of explaining how organised patterns of interactivity 
can be co-ordinated on a wide scale, while not requiring any central individual or group to carry 
out planning at the scale of the effects being observed and modelled. 
A mechanism distributes agency across a network of participants, similar to how on the bridge of a 
modern warship, individual qualified specialists, with computerised information systems, and 
official protocols of hierarchal feedback from the whole floating configuration of componentry, are
all required for a competent direction of the vessel’s course. Mechanisms of this sort, in the context
of policy courses, construct effects such as forms of health care, trust, and knowledge, where 
complex interactions create continual opportunities for adaptive reconfigurations. How the 
specialised and sheltered expertise of the NEP was produced is usefully grasped as a mechanism 
where different elements produced a joint effect. 
The metaphors of complexity I employ to describe hybridity, for instance in section 5 that follows, 
draw attention to how phenomena such as the NEP can be more readily grasped and usefully 
understood. I have found both aspects in the relationship between the NEP and what I call peer-
professionalism. The complexity of interfaces between motivations and activities, where both 
patterns and contingencies abound, are also a “matter of ‘simplexity’ and ‘complicity’. 
Simplexity is the tendency of simple rules to emerge from underlying disorder and complexity, 
in systems whose large-scale structure is independent of the fine details of their substructure. 
Complicity is the the tendency of interacting systems to coevolve in a manner that changes 
both, leading to a growth of complexity from simple beginnings ... unpredictable in detail, but 
whose general course is comprehensible and foreseeable.   (Cohen & Stewart, 1995: 3)
There seems no single, clear resolution to the complex agency at work, creating and occupying 
spaces among and between the NEP, its peer-professionals, and its networked environment. 
However the concept of ‘mechanism’ offers a way of presenting this key issue of the relationships 
between case studies and network activity.
Mechanisms, like actor-network methods, resist prior categorisation and entity boundaries by 
inherently destabilising essentialist presumptions of a normal status-quo. Mechanisms encourage 
analyses that locate the activity of control, the working out of difficulties, the way different 
directions and perspectives lead to different representations, and the ways in which forms of 
authority become more or less sustainable. My earlier accounts were improved by trying to tell a 
range of stories linked by a single component rather than a single account. I increasingly utilised 
the concept of ‘mechanism’ to explain regular patterns that appeared in all the stories. Mechanisms,
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as I use the term, generate effects through the co-ordination of regular movements, actants, and 
constraints in a system that includes feedback. Movement necessarily involves temporality, but in a
mechanism many things happen effectively at the same time, or in delayed responses to 
environmental responses, rather than in simple, predetermined causal sequences. Mechanisms can 
involve random and switching elements602 to generate effects not intended to be predictable, or are 
unpredictable in practice due to the complexity of cybernetic feedback loops. I find mechanisms 
more lifelike than systems. Mechanisms express a greater reliance on their own boundaries, 
locality, modularities, and intersections. These resist assumptions common to systems logics that 
outcomes are better if the scope is totalising, the initial and default states are uncontested, and the 
evaluation is functional.
My analysis of the NEP was sensitised by actor-network approaches and Deleuzian concepts that 
have a lot to say about deviant experiences. These shaped experiences articulate the production of 
effects from the ‘surfaces of operational activity’ rather than depending upon the assumed inner 
essence and cohesive processes of social organisations. The activity of surfaces between 
boundaries, or processes, or circulations of object movements, as in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts of ‘machinic assemblages’603, seemed to fit well with hybridity. Yet I use the term 
‘mechanism’ because it is less localised, not so commodified nor denigrated as a gadget, and less 
inherently material than ‘machine’. Mechanism carries more sense of unexceptional, though 
unpredictable, iterations of innovation604. Mechanism emphasises how work is seen in actual 
movements, whereas 'structure', and even 'pattern', emphasise rigidity and constraint. Moreover, 
where the model-metaphor of ‘machine’ is extended, as in ‘political machine’, the tone is generally
denigrating and dismissive. ‘Mechanism’ seems to express a more appropriate ambiguity between 
desire and distaste in a postmodern western culture. Blaikie distinguishes between narrative 
mechanisms that explain and retroductive mechanisms that “generate the regularity to be 
explained” (2000: 169). I use the strong latter sense to explain the regular cycle effect and 
structural boundary work effects of the NEP. Yet I consider that both meanings are usefully 
602. Of course, if any feedback element is introduced the mechanism starts counting time and inscribing time into the 
products of its operations. The products might include personal identity as ‘age’, and social identity as ‘times’.
603. Lacan claimed to have invented the term ‘machinic assemblage’ (Seigworth 2005: 162), but I see no evidence for 
that. More importantly, the usage of machinic assemblages’ by Deleuze and Guattari is very different from Lacan’s.  
I use the version of Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 4, 18, 24-25, 38, 79-80, 98-99, 234, 282, 378, 382, 480-481), 
Seigworth (2005), Surin (2005: 25-28). Bogue (2002: 117-119, 121, 125, 130), Colebrook (2002: xx, 79, 140-144). 
For a nuanced critique see 'i(ek (2004: 19-32). For an ideologically hostile critique see Bricmont & Sokal (1999). 
Meshwork’ is a term used in preference by De Landa (1999: 36), but seems to indicate too much neutrality and 
form, though I appreciate the ambiguity between a mesh as worked on at the same time as working on. I offer an 
alternate metaphor of gastronomy, where taste, texture, and technology are digested together, sometimes as a ‘flat’ 
banquet and other times as a sequence of courses.
604. Deleuze, critiquing historicist analytical methods, considered that anything new necessarily emerges from adaptive 
iteration. Since any newness of human significance results from overcoming the material conditions of the time, yet 
in a way that is neither completely out of or in time. Deleuze conceptualises ‘excess’ as a type of freedom that by 
changing human conditions may change the causation of events as perceived and signified. Such grounded, 
immanent agency entwines with actual situations producing both histories and hope (1995: 170-171). See 
commentary by 'i(ek (2004: 10-12, 14-15). I use aspects of Deleuze, but as commentary or insightful metaphor, not 
framing.
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combined in the form and method of analogy and metaphor. 
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Encasement logics
This is embodied research, featuring ethnographic elements where the researcher’s physical and 
emotional participation has been used as an instrument, alongside culturally inscribed meanings, 
institutional codes of behaviour, and historical accounts. However, somatic bodies do not live as 
words, nor easily grasp institutional bodies and boundaries, let alone historical sequence patterns, 
and least of all the articulated surfaces of structural forms and forces of meaning. This is partly 
why I have linked somatic bodies to networks of distributed identities, organisations, non-human 
organisms, and objects. Yet the complicated sequence of events and complex interaction of factors 
involved in such linkages raise a problem of selecting the most useful information and frameworks 
for clarifying the causal patterns and contingencies of an inherently messy reality.605 Exploratory 
case studies can identify founding moments, critical turning points, fractional trajectories, and 
current possibilities.
My approach has been to explore the NEP as a case by mixing and matching my own methodology
(Midgley, 2000: 146-148), linking empirical and abstract accounts606 (Bourdieu, 2004, 1999, 1977),
and informed by wide sociological reading. I used three general selection principles. The first was 
appropriateness to the movements and restrictions in the work of maintaining the configurational 
boundaries of systems.607 The second was appropriateness to my available source material and 
goals (Crotty, 1998: 214-216), using a bricolage608 toolset made up of what combined and worked 
best from whatever was available. The third was to follow and question contingencies in 
methodical strategies (Midgley, 2000: 106-112). I attempted to be receptive to connections of 
convenience, since these are well-suited to exploring unique or unknown cases (Ragin, 1992: 
9-11). My following approach does not imply that just anything was acceptable, since the logic of 
analysis needs to be well-matched to the method of gathering information.
I gathered, from all the sources available to me, all the information that seemed related to the 
tentative case and interactants I was following. Yet I would not claim to have followed all the 
strands that might have been included, nor obtained a rigourously representative sample of such 
information. Instead, my method selected for the most meaningful segments of information by 
following the partial and participatory meanings at hand, informed by my previous participant 
engagement. I moved across physical and infrastructural configurations, and probed where solid 
605. See Latour (1993: 10-11), and Law (2004: 1-2, 61, 82). Fougere (2001) analyses New Zealand health systems as 
‘messy heterarchies’, with implicit horizontal connectivity that is shaped and constrained with an absence of 
‘vertical’ hierarchic boundaries. Martin & Salmond (2001) term New Zealand health policy a messy reality.
606. However, Bourdieu (2004: 4) dislikes Latour’s actor-network approach to linking empirical and abstract stories.
607. See Leigh Star & Griesemer (1989), Gieryn (1983). See Fougere (2001) for New Zealand health systems as ‘messy’ 
heterarchies. A heterarchy implies horizontal connectivity and lack of ‘vertical’ hierarchic boundaries.
608. See Lévi-Strauss (1972: 16-36) for original usage, adapted from French meanings of ‘pottering about, doing odd 
jobs’. For later social science use see Campbell (2004: 65, 69-74), Mackenzie (2003), Hess (1997), Preston (1996), 
Katovich (1995), Denzin & Lincoln (1994), Weinstein (1991), Weinstein & Weinstein (1993, 1991), Turkle & 
Papert (1990), Law, 1987. Usage shifted from accusation of lack of deep structure, to praise for skilled, resourceful 
local knowledge. See a New Zealand study of consumer responses to a type of contraceptive pill (Hester, 2005).
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path-determined ‘bones’ became ‘decision-making joints’ on which networks of motivations and 
interests hinged. The research trail that I followed laid down a ‘signature of significance’ that 
branched and looped back, outlining a twisty path back to and adding to my starting questions. 
Similarly to drawing a map, the sources and strands which I followed ‘configured’ into a stranded 
portrait of the NEP. However, I could never be sure of whether the emergent surface being outlined
was on the inside or outside of my fugitive case until a critical degree of texture, and contexture 
had become established. What initially seemed foreground might later seem background, or vice-
versa. Since I included all of the information available from a source, the criteria of configuration 
derived partly from the selection of the source, and partly from the logical rationale used to relate 
segments of information. The logic required was detective in nature (Latour, 1996), making and 
rejecting cases based on evidence and motivations. I consider that the strands I followed and the 
sources I accessed were adequate for the logic of my analysis.
My search for identifiable patterns in the NEP developments was quite different from a deductive 
process of hypothesis proposing and testing. I used a best-fit, abductive process of assembling 
narrative, loose models, and articulated mechanisms. I used Blaikie’s version of abduction as a:
different logic to the other three [inductive, deductive, retroductive]. ... The starting point is the 
social world of the social actors being investigated: their construction of reality, their way of 
conceptualising and giving meaning to their social world, their tacit knowledge. This can only 
be discovered from accounts which social actors provide. Their reality, the way they have 
constructed and interpreted their activities together, is embedded in their language. Hence, the 
researcher has to enter their world in order to discover the motives and reasons that accompany 
social activities. The task is then to re-describe these motives and actions, and the situations in 
which they occur, in the technical language of social scientific discourse.       (2000: 25)
Abduction attempts to grasp and encase unknown, possibly counter-intuitive causal aspects of 
divergent interests. I attempted a version of this process, partly from my previous participation in 
deviant and IDU networks, and partly by extending my reach to larger frameworks of cultural 
expectations and sociological imagination (Mills, 1959: 5-6), where I found stories of processes 
that articulate divergent interests. Similarly, when technologies and objects became strongly 
significant, as did syringes, then those actancies where motivations and materialities could be fitted
and grasped together were followed as ‘inscribed meaningful objects’. My abductive strategy of 
grasping motivations to describe shifts in meanings thereby built up from separate incidents as 
described, towards the explanations that linked these separated incidents and enabled them to be 
written about meaningfully. 
This writing might be considered a retroductive phase of analysis, itself open to critique if used to 
explain too much, too deeply, or too widely. According to Blaikie, retroduction starts with an 
observed regularity, like deduction: 
but seeks a different type of explanation. In this strategy, explanation is achieved by locating 
the real underlying structure or mechanism that is responsible for producing the observed 
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regularity. To discover a structure or mechanism that has been previously unknown, the 
researcher has first to construct a hypothetical model of it, and then proceed to establish its 
existence. This may need to be done by indirect methods, as the structure or mechanism may 
not be directly observable. The search is for evidence of the consequences of its existence; 
should it exist, certain events can be expected to occur. Retroduction uses creative imagination 
and analogy to work back from data to an explanation. (2000: 25).
The abductive-retroductive aspect involved constructing an explanatory account of NEP 
developments. Yet because this was model has not been directly observable, I approached it by 
means of a combination of abducted motivations of actants and institutional logics, in conjunction 
with inducted categories of grouped incidents and relationships across different places and different
times. The inductive aspect involved looking for patterns and putative categories in the multiplicity
of events and effects that the account required to be valid, precise, and significant. My description 
of a motivational mechanism of hybrid antagonisms and my case model of peer-professionalism 
gathered greater inductive validity from the many instances, described in the social history chapters
that follow, of a single hybrid pattern offering explanations across the multiple sites of the NEP 
operations, over 20 years of hectic health sector changes (Gauld, 2001a). My abductive and 
inductive logics were held together by the singularity of the case, by treating objects as both active 
and meaningful, by my approach of following rather than prescribing, and by the reflexivity of my 
narrative analysis. These logics worked in conjunction rather than competition609 due to the story-
telling logics and the actant-following approach of my actor-network version of a single case 
methodology. 
Because my peer-professional concept is sufficiently abstract to be potentially generalised, I have 
tentatively positioned this peer-professionalism concept as a formal mid-range theory, open to 
critique from counter-evidence or better-fitting explanation. Nonetheless, its relevance relies upon 
the rigour and logics of my selection and configuration of source information. 
Abductive logics draw attention to how participants think and feel as actors and actants. My 
experiences of living and socialising with IDU have suggested to me that peer actors did not try to 
complexify their situations more than they felt necessary. I have also assumed that IDU, 
Department officials, and health professionals all pursued both rational and irrational goals in 
complex messy environments where they were motivated to simplify their choices (Luhmann, 
1986a, 1986b, 1993, 1998). Yet in so doing, actors also further complexify their networks and 
general environment (ibid). Moreover, the social science and policy management areas are 
permeated by questions about how and why analysts develop confidence in the meanings of 
patterns of phenomena that cannot be directly touched or envisioned (Cooper & Burgoyne, 2006: 
144-147) until socially imagined (Mills, 1959). My abductive descriptions of the NEP drew on 
what actors presented as making sense, particularly the categorical boundaries that structured and 
609. See Blaikie (2000: 262-276) on the difficulties of mixing different measurements or methods.
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simplified complexity by naming and expecting specialisation from institutions and organisations. 
My case study610 approach has invited the emergence of analytical insight from messy network 
complexities611 by incorporating direct numerical measurements, topological articulation, and 
narrative sequences. These methods suited the NEP’s small size and isolated situation, as well as its
record of existing for 20 years as an ‘exceptional’ policy intervention. I sought to portray the 
character and context of the NEP’s identity (White, 1992: 91-92) as a case in order to better 
understand its capabilities. The structural component of my analysis began and continued using my
versions of actor-network approaches, where a case is initially treated as an effect that is a 
combination of effects rather than an essential, singular entity that ‘counts as one’ (Badiou, 2007). 
Such approaches have been developed from case studies of material technologies and scientific 
expertise and so seemed suited to a social technology based on syringes and expressed in a formal 
programme. Nonetheless, as I explored connections and followed activity from the inside of the 
case, I minimised my conceptual repertoire to the minimum of what the described material required
to make sense. This mixed boundary analysis work (White, 1992: 93-94) engages with the crucial 
question of reconstructing the relationship of internal to external processes in the making and 
maintaining of what makes a case whole in activity, even if partial and multiple in constitution.
Case studies are useful because they can include a mix of interactions, where environments and 
motivations shift with time, entangled with the abstractive concepts and symbols that enable 
spoken and written communication. When actual outcomes, managerial methods, or inputs to 
policy intervention are being researched, it is cases that are studied. Single cases relate to reality, 
not by shifting from generalities to the correlation of a few key specifics, but by performing a range
and depth of solid, durable existence. Cases can affirm, by means of their immanence as quasi-
objects, their own actuality of boundaries, causes, and sequences of events. Cases are always 
constituted from ‘wrapping-up’ the abstract interpretations and categorisations of solid boundary 
elements. This is done somewhere between the case actants and a researcher who is also an unfixed
actor moving in and out of ‘the case’, trailing narrative threads. Yet researchers cannot be certain 
that a full set of case documents has been accessed, or that the case contexts of meanings have not 
changed imperceptibly, resisting any quick and easy fix. Cases are never fixed, which keeps the 
question of prioritising sources, and their degree of saturation, always potentially open, like a 
coffin with an inside latch. 
I came to describe the NEP case in terms of an accumulation of self-modifying repeating patterns, 
610. For discussion of cases studies, see Van Evera (1997: 51-55), Ragin (1992), Abbott (1990, 1992b), Becker (1992).
611. I mostly use qualitative methods, but these do not in themselves explain how I understand and articulate the 
constituent contexts, coherencies, and boundaries of a case, nor why I value a case approach, since quantitative 
methods can be used with case studies and are appropriate for particular questions and sources. For discussions of 
case studies and complex systems, see Blackman (2006), Stinchcombe (2005: 144-152), Stacey (2003), Sweeney & 
Griffiths (2002), Higginbotham, Albrecht, & Connor (2001), Byrne (1998), Clarke & Stewart (1997), Eve, Horsfall 
& Lee (1997). See also Klir (2006), Ragin (2000) on fuzzy-set methodology.
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or cycles. I conceived of these cycles as describing actual events, not as determining or 
foundational structures. These ‘cycle stories’ explained how longer-term institutional factors 
contributed to similar responses to contingent factors, thus drawing analytic attention to 
relationships between structural, temporal, and contingent aspects. Such partial and multiple 
aspects, along with unexpected sources and re-prioritisation of information, ‘queered’ the NEP case
for being singular. Instead of trying to formally ‘straighten and fix’ the case boundaries and source 
material, I attempted to utilise these ambiguities as a source of analytical insight. My analytical 
method used narrative to associate the boundaries of object movements and human motivations, 
within a context of the inherent ‘interests’ of viruses612 in growth, and institutional ‘interests’ in the 
fixing of boundaries.
Some criticisms of case studies (Blaikie, 2000: 213-225) include the claim that case research 
cannot be replicated due to the high degree of input from the researcher (Blaikie, 2000: 218) into 
selecting its boundaries and description. Yet this criticism is only partly valid, since case studies 
are intended to be compared, constellated, and re-approached, not replicated, nor compared with a 
placebo situation. The material and relational features of the NEP case, for instance, can always be 
reappraised from another research approach. Even the most rigourous research methods are 
influenced by motives, and cannot be fully duplicated unless the report contains the raw data, 
making much longer documents and harder to read text in support of research arguments.
Case studies have also been criticised for being resource hungry and producing embarrassing large 
data-sets (Cooper & Burgoyne, 2006: 151). Yet I prefer excess amounts to over-controlled 
information, since assumptions that limit information prior to searching prevent that actually used 
being challenged during analysis by the unknown absent data, adding rather than subtracting from 
the self-limiting circularity featuring in any analysis. 
Case studies have also been considered unsuited for generalisation. However, this is not a problem 
with case study methods as such, but rather with the degree of abstraction and strength of the 
universalism of the general claims being made. Furthermore, a case study is completely 
generalisable within its own boundaries, the character and positioning of such being a key 
component of case analysis. Generalising can be potentially achieved by extending the case 
boundaries. The ‘lack of generality’ critique seems more aimed at relational sociology in general.
612. It may be objected that viruses do not have interests. From my perspective, I am hunting viruses for information. To 
do so I need to identify with viruses, to understand their perceptive surfaces, to move towards an open meeting place 
in order to achieve instances of closure. In such a strategic configuring, interests cannot be safely specialised, but 
rather assumed to be distributed across interacting species. A ‘human’ virus may be assumed to ‘have’ interests in 
humans. More to the point is whether currently unknown viruses outside testing regimes have interests outside their 
hosts. That seems another story.
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Narrative Logics
I have presented a set of stories as I came to understand them, while looking for shifts in the 
understandings, expectations, key connections, and conflicts which the NEP actors themselves 
represented, along with objects and viruses, as accounting for events. This ‘translation approach’613 
parallels the way Latour's concept of processes of consolidation, which work through objects such 
as documents, engage with processes that oppose consolidation. I have described how syringes 
have acted in the NEP network by resisting being limited to a single meaning and a single 
organisational response, and by retaining a capability for deviant action even when formally 
decriminalised. As actants, the syringes connected the blood circulation systems of individual 
bodies into a distributed network of viruses, cells, drugs, stories of trust, and stories of acceptable 
risk. This could not be consolidated, except partially, in a set of stories. Yet as stories that 
translated other stories, the IDU in this network became more normalised as a community, 
especially the peer-professionals who had been initially recruited to normalise the motivations of 
IDU through outreach techniques. In one story, I use processes of actancy and translation to explain
how these IDU peers gained in social status, through working inside the boundaries of the 
institution of the NEP, while their drugs in the same networks became more criminalised outside 
these boundaries.
Networks are not time-bound in the same way as are single causal sequences, since multiple factors
are simultaneously present and active in producing effects. Such effects differ from those produced 
by the activity of a preceding effect. The complexity of network embedment explains the necessity 
and problems of narrative analysis (Midgley, 2000: 70-78, Crotty, 1998: 48-51,105-111). 
Narratives feature “the organization of material in a chronologically sequential order and the 
focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with sub-plots” (Stone, 2001: 281). 
Simple sequences 'demand' to be narrated through the mutual affinity of their organising logics, yet
complex embedments in networks 'need' to be translated into narrative form to be accessible and 
useful to social participants. Since narrativity cannot be avoided in social life, social agents are 
encouraged to separate out and neutralise non-sequential aspects that may be carried as paradoxical
elements along with stories into everyday life and policy arenas. Accordingly, the things that 
'normalise' in invisible forms of social action through not appearing to change, and the things that 
happen in complex interactions where sequence is unclear, are prone to be left out of stories.
If the material constraints and informative stories permeate a case, then their activity may be 
613. ‘Translation’ describes processes whereby information and motivation becomes changed in meaning by being 
moved, perhaps across distances, perhaps into a bounded locale, or perhaps in terms of changes in the connectivity 
of assemblages. These are all types of movement, or resistance to movement, which are likely to occur in 
combinations. Such processes align the participating actors and agencies into a mutual though disjunctive sense of a 
consolidated understanding, despite the changes and differences produced during the process. Callon locates 
‘translation’ in a sequence of stages of ‘problematisation’, ‘interessement’, ‘enrolment’, and ‘mobilisation’ (1999).
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expected to be well-evidenced with overt consequences, automatically selecting for relevance, so 
long as the 'things themselves' are relentlessly engaged with. A sequenced, explanatory account 
produced by researchers will try to shift around, excusing its weak points. This actancy between the
demands of the research account and the situation of the hapless researcher attracts a reflexive 
attention towards the gaps that outline missing stories and actants in the patterns of network 
activity. The activity being sought can be thought of as an 'environmental mechanism', because 
effects are produced and selected for in partly regular, repeating ways, through shaped and aligned 
activity. This perspective aligns with the 'followability' concepts of Gallie (1968, as cited in 
Abbott, 1992b). This methodology focuses on how things actually happened. Narrative is 
considered: “itself explanatory by virtue of truth, consistent chronology, and a coherent central 
subject ... to combine things that are determined by general laws with things that are contingent, 
producing a plausible, because followable, story” (Abbott, 1992b: 68). 
The power of case analysis lies in using narratives to simplify more complex processes and to 
grasp useful packages from unwieldy amounts of potential information, regardless of where and 
when those processes and information sources ramify. Following what is seen to connect, to be 
proximate in being contingent, seems not only a convenient but also a productive case study 
technique. A researcher will go as far as they are able, before presenting the latest of their 
provisional descriptions of the boundaries not only of ‘a case’ but also of ‘the research’ (Opie, 
1994: 67-69, 77-81).
The critical point here is that narratives act to group occurrences and events in a range of ways, yet 
which are all dependent on sequential ordering along a temporal axis (Tilly 2002: ix), and which all
involving a mutual dependency on the unidirectional sequencing of speech. Causation is 
experienced as strongly narrativised in the way in which that which convincingly comes first 
strongly influences what can be said and understood later. Furthermore, causation is required to be 
accounted for in this way in order to make sense as a story that links a wider collective audience. 
Such causative connections might be simple and linear; or more likely, might produce complex 
effects by altering environments that are constituted through interactions of path-constrained 
options, amid niches of opportunity, in network conjunctions. The complex articulation of the local
environment, like a ‘soft machine’ (Burroughs, 1992), resists unidirectional narrativity in an 
explanation of how it works. Accordingly, a useful account must necessarily compress some 
aspects into a pretence of a single simple effect, and leave other things out,614 whereas stories are 
not so accountable. 
Actor-networks
614. See Tilly (2002: xiii). Leaving things out is accepted providing the more significant things remain. Yet significance 
in research cannot be assumed, since changes in significance would seem the most valuable finding of any study.
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I have used actor-network methods of following the representational processes of empowerment 
and enrolment to reposition the NEP as an active effect emerging from multiple elements of 
different types, and from the timing of activity. The actor-network methods have also been used to 
re-present the NEP as a categorised entity with the capabilities and vulnerabilities of a condensed, 
narrow zone of action, yet deliberately and reflectively. The connections between various actants, 
including non-human viruses, contributed as a distributed activity to the more narrowly focused 
effect of destabilised institutional and professional boundaries. These were encouraged to realign in
a different form of organisational interaction which a small number of strategically influential 
policy entrepreneurs found more useful than the previous arrangements.
The initial boundaries did not break, nor disappear, but rather folded and kinked into a new shape 
which then became stabilised as an organisational and occupational niche, before consolidating 
somewhat further into an ambiguous institutional knotted niche. For instance, the illicit pharmacy 
syringe supply which directly and narrowly responded to HIV/AIDS provided a new and bent set 
of ‘working boundaries’. These boundaries of successful practice destabilised the other approaches 
which were only being negotiated between interest groups at that time. The workable boundaries 
confronted the legal approaches to prohibiting drug use, as well as competing with the evidence 
backing the medical approaches to preventing HIV/AIDS through increases in counselling 
treatment. Yet such illicit success did not immediately threaten to extend and get out of control. 
The boundaries have been effects maintained by imagination and shaped by the circulations of 
objects and information. These movements are seen to bind in time on a tight circulatory mode, yet 
also in a longer duration mode of events that can be identified by changes in boundaries and the 
patterns of circulation. These distinctions and iteration could be described mathematically, for 
instance in set theory (Badiou, 2007), or in diagrams, as well as accounts, stories, poetry and iconic
images.
This framing echoes the Buddhist dharmic concepts and experience of ‘dependent origination’ also 
translated as ‘co-dependent origination’ or ‘causal interdependence’. These terms refer to a 
situation where an illusory effect of an essential self identity (arguably also a thing identity as an 
objectified self) is experienced by means of embodied meditational practices as ‘empty’ of such 
essential qualities. The classic Buddhist concept of dependent causes or conditions has been 
expressed as ‘With this as condition, That arises. With this NOT as condition, That does NOT 
arise.’ I interpret the negation used in this expression as being four-fold, in describing relationships 
that are ‘neither the same, nor different, nor both the same and different, nor neither the same nor 
different’. Similarly, my actor-network analysis has avoided causes based on mass effects of 
similarity, also avoided simple contradictions such as in forms of internal critique, avoided 
postulating a single thing with contradictory aspects, and avoid a ‘nothingness’ that cannot be 
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usefully and empirically described. 
Having avoided these four tempting but inadequate analytical models, I have pursued a model 
based on antagonisms rather than differences or similarities, on multiplicity rather than singularity 
or ‘nothingness’, and on circulating rather than ‘doing or ‘going’ in subjective or objective 
routines. I consider both Buddhism and actor-network to express a renouncing, nomadic character. 
Nonetheless, although informed and sensitised by these concepts, I did not follow them, because I 
instead followed the actants wherever the actants led.
Hybridity
The use of hybridity in this thesis refers to an unfixed, provisionally stable and productive 
arrangement of a small number615 of antagonisms, held together through organised effort and 
becoming a form of systemic work. The Buddhist analytical tactic of four-fold negation which 
matched a pattern I observed in the NEP of ‘not this, not that, not both, not neither’. Yet this 
hybridity, as I apply the concept, is not ‘transcendent’ in any sense of its meaning and activity 
being reliant on its ‘standing outside’ experienced reality in some domain of metaphysical ideals. 
My hybridity also does not refer to joining in the sense of merging, or of producing a well-defined, 
internally stable product` exhibiting a boundary only with externalities from some accumulation or 
re-arrangement of differences. Instead, the internal boundary conflicts do not cease and are 
observed to be directly linked to the processes through which the external boundaries are 
formulated, and re-formulated. Both contributing elements and consolidated effect can appear 
simultaneously from a more complex background of co-events which may not become 
foregrounded.
This type of hybridity forms a selective mechanism that explains how things last and seem to 
participants to be workable. Such hybridity also becomes more durational, as involving a process 
that involves continual maintenance work of overcoming the difficulties caused by the joining of 
antagonisms. Actor-network concepts do not assume a simple natural 'fixing' of a product as an 
entity, which the actuality and metaphor of hybrid heterosexual reproduction might suggest. 
Instead, even a 'locked-in' material form may always change in its activity and significance, for 
instance by changing in its communicative meanings as experienced by the actors to which it is 
connected.
The elements in this hybrid assemblage are recognisably different, and move in relation to each 
other rather than in unison. However, the movement of elements is somewhat co-ordinated, as in 
615. Hybridity frequently refers to mixtures of only two different things. Its duality seems to derive from its original use 
in heterosexual breeding of plants and animals. My concept of hybridity shifts from dual to multiple.
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the activity of a flexible mechanism. For so long as the elements resist coalescing into a single 
package, this hybridity contains an aspect of inherent ambiguity and multi-partiality. If the system 
coalesces into a singularity, or stops activity, or separates into unattached entities, it is no longer 
hybrid. This is not an organising logic of aggregation, where basically similar elements become 
more active through greater mass. It is not a method of partnership, where elements are juxtaposed 
through their similarities then their differences explained away. Nor is it a technique of hierarchy, 
where differences are subsumed or remodelled into a singularity of purpose and method. For 
instance, an illegal syringe/user hybrid in 1986 was significantly different from a legal syringe/
illegal user hybrid after the NEP began operations as a licit public health organisation in 1988.
The NEP’s pharmacy-model boundaries could extend only with support from and dependence upon
state agencies and state funding. Yet if not extended, any inadequacies in the NEP would be 
magnified in significance by the threat of HIV/AIDS, which would undermine the evidence-base 
and accountability of licit stakeholders, especially politicians. Such threats to well-established 
institutions might be shrugged off, but less so at a time of public urgency and potential panic, when
trust in medical and official authority most required buttressing. Accordingly, the local illicit 
pharmacy boundaries coalesced with the boundaries of the World Health Organisation’s global 
health model of community empowerment. Within these boundaries, the activities of moving 
syringes and somehow engaging with IDU became formally reshaped in a management plan and in 
a list of shop outlets. This activity of selecting and linking within a guiding set of boundaries, by a 
network of stakeholders, led to the consolidation into the NEP as a particular expression of a harm 
reduction institution. Once established as an entity, the NEP appeared within distinctive public 
boundaries. It acted as if following a career, with goals and chance affecting its course, while 
aligning its objects with people interested in maintaining its direction. Yet it also expressed a 
character which remains notably partial, multiple, and hybrid.
An intriguing hybrid presentation of some concepts of ‘articulation with innovation’ has been 
offered by Deleuze and Guattari in their mischievous appropriation of H.P Lovecraft (1991), Sir 
Arthur Conan Doyle (2005), and Foucault (1972) in a framework, or mode, of ‘stratified meaning’ 
as ‘abominable history’.616 In their techno-professional myth of origins: 
An organism befalls the body of the smith, by virtue of a machine or machinic assemblage that 
stratifies it. “The shock of the hammer and the anvil broke his arms and legs at the elbows and 
knees, which until that moment he had not possessed. In this way he received the articulations 
specific to the new human form that was to spread across the earth, a form dedicated to work. 
... His arm became folded with a view to work”.  (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 46-47)
Such joints were later presented at times as ‘invisible hands’ of markets, and ‘invisible elbows’. 
Just as the hand has been associated with cunning agency rather than limited mobility, so the elbow
616. See 10,000 B.C.: The Geology of Morals (Who Does The Earth Think It Is?) (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 44-82). 
When the World Screamed (Doyle, 2005), At the Mountains of Madness (Lovecraft, 1991).
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has been associated with clumsiness, as in inadvertently knocking things over (Jacobs, 1991) due to
its invisibility. Tilly (1996) drew attention to the role of elbows in the error corrections of 
repertoires of social action. Rather than valorise a structurally individualised model of a ‘rational’ 
though invisible hand (agency) coherently configuring the ‘rational’ market (brains and eyes), Tilly
drew attention to clumsy recovery performances as locally individualised, skilled, socially-
argumentative, yet inherently incomplete adaptive responses to interactive environments. Tilly 
linked claims about markets being self-planned and not needing to be accounted for due to 
‘invisible hands’, to observations about how market exchanges are actually performed.617 
For Tilly, reason and reality link through mechanisms and interactional patterns that directly 
express a relational ontology. Tilly (1997a) rejects over-individualising and over-holising 
ontologies as unreal. He considers that reality becomes ontologically divided into micro-
narrativised and macro-narrativised worlds by being presented as dependent on narrative, rather 
than employing narrative epistemologically to communicate knowledge about how structural 
mechanisms work. Since these worlds are not connected through evidence, he argues, their linkage 
through narrative alone causes ‘headaches’, aptly illustrating how the poor matching of systems of 
articulation and explanation creates the systemic and personal distress experienced in messy 
realities.
These metaphoric models of articulated mechanisms draw attention to the linkages between actual 
cycles of activity and the structures of expected motivation with capability, which together 
constitute my research focus on the NEP.618 My approach shows actual antagonisms which 
hybridly connect to actual syringes in ways made more complex, yet also more intriguing and 
productive, by the disjointed narratives circulating and being translated across boundaries. Such 
considerations led to tracing the differences back and forwards through glacial movements in their 
organisational forms, to where those forms suddenly emerged or changed. The identification of 
such turning points provided starting and end points, as well as a set of critical institutional 
contexts for tracing the development of incidents forward as they became grouped and sequenced 
into narratively meaningful events. During this time I worked on identifying and selecting different
activity and locality categories for the types of work done by the authors of archival documents, or 
those mentioned in such documents. 
617. In terms of planning, the precision implied by the hand was over-rated, the scope and speed of the elbow was 
presented as more germane in practice, yet the invisibility of such elbowing was of a more intense degree than that 
of the hand, even though the hand would be disconnected, as a dangling appendage, were it not for the articulation 
inhering to the elbow.
618. Relationships of predator and prey between human, animals, and plants would form a prior cycle of articulatory 
innovation and a continuing source of meaning contributing to technological innovations. Relationships with unseen 
bacteria and viruses, such as HIV and HCV, transported through syringes and observed through testing technologies, 
would be formed in a later cycle, again dependent on uncertain performances within an existing structured 
repertoire. Extending such models of articulation leads to concepts of the zones and boundaries of performative 
action, which may thereby be positioned in relation to the zones and boundaries of scripts and repertoires.
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In the NEP case, the institutional boundaries were not active apart from being experienced and 
expressed. They did not exist 'elsewhere' in a ‘structural foundational’ or ‘predetermined attractor’ 
sense, despite having a delineated articulation and location. The NEP mechanisms have been 
somewhat object-like, but are not machines as commonly understood since they have not merely 
followed a prior design. Nor are they simply living organisms where a pattern of a whole has been 
sketched out through genetic inheritance prior to an organism’s biological separation from parents 
or predecessors. Because mechanisms have an articulated object nature as well as an adaptive, 
intelligent nature, they connect objects and institutions with nature and society. Such mechanisms 
may be non-human, or unconscious, or autopoietic,619 as well as designed for implementing policy 
in programmes.
The NEP case emerged as far more hybrid than I initially conjectured. The turning point of the 
research involved the realisation that the systematic productivity of the NEP as a complex620 entity 
constituted the inverse of the systematic problems associated with the isolation and specialisation 
of the NEP peer personnel. Neither the productivity nor the problems could be considered a thing, 
or range of things, but instead were more usefully treated as effects. This led to identifying the 
links of a relational mechanism that could braid such a continuous, many-stranded effort through 
organised activity and agency. An uneasy, ambiguous, interlinking of differences articulated both 
the effort and effect which has characterised the NEP case.
The concept of hybridity resembles a collaboration of competing actors in an internally unstable 
alliance that is encouraged into stability due to external boundary constraints and strong 
motivations to produce621 essential services with minimal structural organisation. The external 
boundary effects are simultaneously stabilised by means of the internal alliances. The co-
production of both types of instability produces a dynamic stability for the whole system, which 
becomes expressed as a tenuous sustainability. This conceptual model explains how the NEP has 
been simultaneously stable and unstable, both solid and full of gaps, both shaped and shaping. In so
doing the model engages with the way associations, collaborations, collusions, alliances, 
619. After initially utilising the hybrid mechanism concept loosely, in order to grasp an overall sense of critical objects, 
legal boundaries, duration, cycles, and productivity of the NEP, I then extended the concept by drawing on writings 
on autopoioesis by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, and Niklas Luhmann to explain the NEP’s durability 
and self-maintaining aspects. However, I rejected overly ‘strong’ and overly universal systemic conceptualisations 
since I wished to utilise the benefits of a structural approach to objects while minimising the attendant harms of 
objectification, foundationalism, universalism, and functionalism. Accordingly, I emphasised the ‘gadget’ approach 
of a ‘tool kit’ by emphasising object-hood and variability in form, setting, inscription, and meaning. See Maturana 
(1999), Varela (1981a, 1981b), Varela, Maturana & Uribe (1974), Luhmann 1986a, 1986b, 1993, 1998, 2002). I 
consider that science and scientific analysis are matters of gadgets rather than theory, since science is done through 
gadgets, has a mark of institutional success and status by becoming the science of ‘working devices’, such as can 
openers and research programmes that can be commodified and sold to individuals and governments.
620. Much synchronic, non-longitudinal conventional sociology attempts to correlate quantitative relationships between 
assigned qualities, termed variables. Statistical modelling and quantitative sampling of the operationalised variables 
of such models determines the strength and relevance of the purported qualitative relationships. Abbott (2001) terms 
this the General Linear Model’, and reviews it unfavourably for being unsuited to much research it is employed for. 
621. Produce, not provide, since these services are not obtainable anywhere else.
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partnerships and unions actually work, and are experienced by participants.
Collaborations between groups which pursue overlapping needs have been central to the health 
models produced and reaffirmed by the World Health Organisation, such as the Alma Ata 
Declaration and Health for All (Fear & Barnett, 2003: 5). A different though related aspect of this 
concept of hybridity involves a biological model. This model describes how external ‘varieties’, 
from an external categorising perspective, become genetically internalised in a single living system
in which self-maintaining aspects of homeostasis and autopoiesis may be observed. I have 
entwined these biological concepts with systemic concepts of a dynamically networked, 
heterogeneity. By heterogeneous I mean that a single system, or interactional mechanism, includes 
different actors, such as viruses and syringes, drugs and ideologies, criminals and health 
organisations; and that the interactivities characterise the system, because of rather than in spite of 
the differences in the performance of effects. Moreover, the system, in maintaining its 
sustainability for a time, helps to keep these entity effects separated in terms of their understood 
boundaries. The system does this through its constant activity in linking sites into neighbourhoods 
of circulation. This hybridity is interpreted as partly collusive and partly competitive, with no 
clearly singular agents or objects or essential foundations in the web of actancy.
The NEP situation was intensely hybrid because in the very action of combination, raw differences 
were required by wider spread agencies and logics to become insulated by boundary lines and 
silences. In the process, adaptations were being worked out in sequences of occurrences, in 
repetitive cycles of innovatory events, expressed as synchronic structuring. The intensity, 
differences, and maintenance work required by the hybridity and commitment, in a situation of 
urgency, led to the NEP environment being problematic because it was productive, and vice-versa. 
From a research perspective, the putative hybrid mechanisms needed to last long enough for their 
operations and products to be observable, but no longer, nor any deeper. They needed to be similar 
enough to other mechanisms to be recognisable by a researcher and later readers, but not identical. 
In actuality they involved iterative activity of periodicising flows from and to their environment. 
The development cycles showed that the patterns of interaction were sustainable and solid. These 
were ‘soft machines’ (Burroughs, 1992), distributed in their working across systems, focused on 
particular syringe-professional products that were packaged into the NEP locale. As the syringes 
and viruses entangled and overflowed, they organised and made coherent the resilience of obdurate
materialities while producing chronologies from the intangible overflowing sequencing of temporal
moments.622
622. Such mechanisms might be intelligent if feedback measurement-control loops created a self-referential type of 
operation. If boundaries were sufficiently important and maintained through the machinic operations along with 
informational interactions, I considered that a cybernetic organism had become active as a cyborg. Here I drew on 
Donna Haraway’s concepts and case studies of cyborg unpredictability and productivity (1991a, 1991b, 1997, 
2000a, 2000b, 2000c).
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Temporalities
The NEP case
Historical conceptions, such as discussed by Abbott (2001), involve categorising event sequences 
as largely stable and somewhat predictable 'trajectories', combined with far less stable and 
unpredictable 'turning points'. The concept of 'turning points' means that any and all 'past' 
occurrences need to be considered as if, in an analytical space, they are currently active as critical 
moments, as sources of explanations, and as continuing influences. However, some past events are 
more active, at any time, in particular networks and bounded locations of the present, than others. 
Abbott (2001: 261) has suggested a more structural conceptualisation by asking if 'boundary lines 
of difference'623 might come first, and only later become consolidated and diversified in 
developmental forms of expansion, connection, differentiation, and strategic alignment (2001: 
271). Such a concept joins provisional contingencies to durable patterns, without requiring a 
totalising schema. From this perspective, turning points can be explored by asking how a 
potentially viable change actually happened at a particular time and place, and with what means of 
shaping. I use turning points to help explain how occurrences and events become mutually 
constituting.
I combined Abbott's analysis of shifting professional boundaries with the actor-network analyses 
that by following and describing activity, lead to better understandings about expert authority, 
techniques of control, and hybrid articulations. I described how concepts of professional 
boundaries, along with legal boundaries, helped participants to define themselves as at least two 
distinct constituents, as peers and as quasi-professionals, which became contingently assembled 
and remained uneasily connected in the NEP. I showed how IDU were constituted from their 
resistance to being subjected to the treatment professions and to the medical control of drugs. In my
analysis I combined these descriptions with concepts of boundaries to postulate the presence of 
hybrid stabilising mechanisms involving expertise, accountability, exclusiveness, and trust by NEP 
clients. 
Social studies of scientific developments have shown the significance of the cultural contexts and 
goals of research (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). Actor network methodologies have been highly 
successful in case studies dealing with the production of specialised knowledge and knowledge 
systems, especially biomedical expertise. In actor-network approaches, biological, biomedical and 
health knowledge is not only actual, but has also been constructed alongside the authority of expert 
systems and occupational roles to represent reality, by means of network effects.624
623. Abbott’s boundary lines can be crossed, and effects emerge, due to effort and strategic agency (Abbott 2001: 271). 
Being both positively and interactionally inclined, Abbott is seen to be grappling for a more rigourous form of 
analysis which nevertheless is not determinist. Similar goals appear in actor-network methodology. Further research 
might read Abbott’s boundaries across Deleuze’s ‘articulated breakages’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 46-47). 
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‘Obligatory passage point’ is a classic military, political, and hunting mechanism used to describe 
the causal processes and integrate contingencies in actor-network methods.625 The NEP’s policy 
resisters, policy objects, and policy benders together implemented coupling arrangements between 
IDU and official networks through negotiations, syringe objects, and information exchanging 
practices (Murdoch, 1995: 752). Inasmuch as these couplings became sustainable hybrid 
arrangements, they became increasingly stable, eventually becoming obligatory passage points. 
Such passage points feature in the regular and mandatory movement of syringes and returns that 
support the expectations and durability of the NEP network. The actors who overcome resistance 
and successfully control obligatory passage points become ‘obligatory antagonists’ to other 
stakeholders, as seen in the peer-professional strike threat in 2001 which emerged from increasing 
peer control of information and peer influence over NEP funding.
Longer-term patterns of implementing syringe exchanges and regular services, if stabilised by 
obligatory passage points, seem likely to become formal occupations. Even if such occupations are 
demand-driven by client needs, any that are supply-directed are potential sites for 
professionalising, due to the mutual interests of a specialised and more easily organised collective 
of suppliers of syringes, services, funding, protocols, and permissions. Passage point mechanisms 
may act cybernetically if their informational products, such as trust expressions, ethical protocols, 
and health messages, alter the shapings that such events partly depend on, in a motivation-altering 
feedback loop. The opportunities and constraints of Abbott's 'lines of division' connect to the 
obligatory passage points of actor-network approaches, in a flexible cybernetic mechanism leading 
to a professionalising of expertise as a contestable ethic and ethos.
I found cycles to be useful as a conceptual device that integrated my shorter-term interactionist and
actor-network sensitivities with my longer-term sensitivities to chance trajectories, contingencies, 
and path-determinations. Cycles also allowed for a wider, event-focused framework than the more 
localised effect-focused environment associated with actor-network case studies. Actor-network 
type precautions about conceptual assumptions in advance of case exploration reduced certain risks
of using cycles causally, rather than descriptively. These risks involved attributing unwarranted 
causal power to the phases and cycles that none of the participants themselves talked about. The 
NEP’s participants did however talk about effects constituted from interactional networks, though 
in a fragmented, dis-articulated way. I consider my re-articulation and partial integration to be 
warranted.
My event sequences, despite the partial, unfixed, and cross-linking aspects of my research, 
involved a ‘first exploration, memo-making during, heuristic last’ method. These are abductive 
sequencings suited to a following approach that might lead to inductive categorising. This is not an 
624. See Latour (1999a, 1999c, 1988, 1987), Callon (1999), Gomart (2002a, 2002b), Gomart & Hennion (1999).
625. See Callon (1991, 1999), Callon et al. (1997), Latour (1988: 43).
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approach founded upon a strict requirement for predictive falsifiability.626 Yet any counter-data or 
better explanations unrelated to a peer-professional mechanism would weaken the articulated 
coherence of my argument. The theoretical framing is both relativist and grounded. It is 
constructionist but not structural, nor subjectivist (Midgley, 2000: 124-128; Crotty (1998: 63). Nor 
does it claim universal scope and predictability. Yet because I have looked in empirical information
for significant connections, represented such patterns in formal ways, and outlined causal 
sequences where these can be demonstrated, this research is evidence-based. It can be contradicted 
in its constituent parts, and alternatives can be produced to challenge its whole. It is both social 
science and narrative history, while not fitting dependently into either category alone.
My account of the NEP has engaged with the inductive problem of the policy emergences being 
less predictable than the events involving various linear relationships of causes and effect. A 'peer-
professional' perspective seems somewhat relevant to any professionalising environment where 
secrecy and stigma are involved in the health outcomes. The NEP’s peer-professional arrangements
appear localised within a niche of specialised activity, carefully not noticed except by those 
required to pay attention. Yet the patterned IDU deviance that necessitates the NEP’s institutional 
response to HIV/AIDS proffers analogies to other marginal life situations. The intensity of the 
differentials in the NEP environment highlight its case with dazzling camouflage, thereby 
illustrating a wider field. 
Temporal Frameworks
I draw attention to the trinary melding of temporality, materiality, and information. Without 
temporal change, nothing is significant, and in all thermodynamic measurements it is observed that 
nothing evades change. Materialities are significant because their potential durability can slow 
temporal change and thereby explain durability or its absence in particular local cases. Information 
also constitutes reality in observer-dependent ways by being carried between or linking parts of 
temporal-material systems, as is measurable in the phenomena of quantum entanglement. The 
‘system background’ pattern of information is directly communicative, and can also be modified to 
carry conversations, as seen in the way syringes ‘converse knowledge’ between IDU, peer-
professionals, health professionals, police, and health officials.627 Temporalities, materialities and 
information cannot be ignored in the problematising of discontent and opportunity by policy actors,
626. The convincingness of a coherence-based scientific argument does not depend purely upon the falsifying of counter-
hypotheses. Nor does a coherence-based scientific argument depend upon prior, universal foundations assumed to 
lie beyond the purview of observed experience. The type of social science I am doing is immanent, not transcendent.
627. I do not consider that information requires a specific observer, or a self-conscious observer, since cybernetic systems
of cause and effect are both part of reality and a system of observational location. Feedback loops of form and force 
create the potential for self-control of a mechanism. Cybernetic systems carry information. But information does not 
have to be predictive. Its activity can be simply reactive and situated. Since information is inherently interactive, 
articulated across differences, perhaps  types of information cannot exist except in being part of cybernetic systems.
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or in explaining a policy intervention. 
There are no satisfactory models of temporality, but some are worse than others. I use a 3D instead 
of a 4D model of space-time (Sattig, 2006) because I observe no persuasive evidence that objects 
‘have’ temporal dimensions. Objects do not act as 4-dimensional things or effects that simply 
continue of their ‘own’ nature. Instead, I observe interactions and sequences of 3-dimensional 
objects, all slightly different, that follow each other. I am persuaded towards this model by the 
difficulties in determining the boundaries of a 4D object compared with its environment and with 
its internal constituents. Given these ambiguities, the 3D model seems simpler, involves fewer 
leaps of faith, and less complexity in articulating the temporal distinctions assumed to be involved. 
I act as if temporal flows and dimensions are effects produced by hard-to-observe aspects of 
reality, combined with self-deceiving aspects of consciousness, along with narrative techniques that
require and valorise a problematic ‘sense of flow’. The significance of this model is that identity 
does not continue in an essential manner, as if flowing through time. Instead, identity is assumed to
be constructed at a particular moment by means of the interactions of whole environment, 
especially in the location where an object is active in expressing boundaries. This allows for 
somatic change and reflexive agency, against concepts of human nature being determinist.628 
Nonetheless, I have assumed that the NEP’s participants used conventional models of temporal 
flow.
I use certain terms in specific senses. ‘Incident’ is a narrative commodification, a description of an 
aspect of reality, presented as if isolated and unique. By contrast, ‘event’ is the meaning of a 
pattern in a narrative sequence of incidents, as understood interactively by a dominant group or 
within an influential local environment. Events express form through the shape of their pattern. 
Events also express force by answering ‘why’ questions and helping to cohere individual 
motivations towards collective goals. In such projects, earlier ‘periods’ and ‘era’ act as durational 
cases that are bounded or made coherent by later actors. These durations embody both 
chronology629 and interpretation as everyday history. ‘Path-dependencies’ express how earlier 
events change the environments of constraints and opportunities that influence later decisions over 
long durations, not being limited to immediate causes and effects. This mechanism explains how 
forces can be exerted by events after all the initial actors are dead and their rationales forgotten, yet
a trajectory of some sort continues, although without any temporal flow.
‘Trajectories’ describe a type of path-dependency involving relatively consistent, adaptive change. 
Trajectories are events presented narratively as if from the perspective of an object that moves 
sequentially within an environment that is assumed to be largely static, but sufficiently active to 
628. For example, religiously in dogma over essential souls, genetically in concepts of race, or in the gender role 
determinism prevalent in evolutionary psychology.
629. ‘Chronology’ is the order of incidents, as mapped and enumerated in calendars and lists.
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somewhat influence the object movement. The object has motivation to move due to some type of 
force, has inertia due to its form of durability and solidity, but has an shifting interface with the 
environment where changes in angle, speed, cohesion, and appearance may appear. Another form 
of path-dependency is found in cycles, understood as folding, iterating events, where change is 
more acute than adaptive, but not random, nor chaotically complex. In this NEP history I treat such
‘folds’ and ‘cycles’ as recurved trajectories where a similar pattern is triggered by contingencies, 
yet is notably path-dependent. The path-dependency, which describes how a single cause has 
multiple and repeating consequences, intersecting with the similarity of environmental features, 
together describe how the repeating pattern of folds and cycles came about. This situational history 
offers a model for other repeating and intermeshing patterns.630 For instance, when the NEP strike 
erupted in 2001, and when the police in 2004 reversed their previous commitment to support the 
further decriminalising of syringes, such models can be usefully questioned. These models of 
trajectories, stoppage, reversal, and cycles can assist in understanding differences in participant 
perspectives and enable many perspectives to be integrated as a single account.
The regular movements of objects and pseudo-objects can describe historical trajectories. The 
sudden shifts of object movements can both highlight and identify historical turning points. When 
regularities partially continue in changed form after a shift, it can be useful to explore (quirk and 
queer) the phenomena through the metaphor of cycles. The adaptive cyclic framework I have 
presented can be thought of as variations on a theme, involving structural repetition as well as 
narrative progression. A certain structure is offered, simultaneous with variations, adaptations and 
ad-hoc adjustments. It can never be repeated exactly as a living performance, but can retain 
influence beyond its once and only performance by becoming inscribed into material arrangements.
Furthermore, the processes and mechanisms involved might be generalisable. The conceptual 
instrument of ‘a cycle’ is useful in research because it is a way of selecting or tuning one’s 
perceptions for recurrence. If cycles are found, there is an increased likelihood of there being a 
mechanism of some description at work.
Cycles have assisted in my appropriating previous conceptualisations of HIV/AIDS and HCV 
policy responses and adapting them to better fit the NEP situation. I explored my area and materials
at hand first, then developed the cycles as a presentation device. This is not to say that such cycles 
are not 'real', but rather, that they are partial and do not encompass the whole case. They are a 
narrative device that translates aspects of a complex, recurring mechanism, and presents those 
aspects as a model framework (Tilly, 1997: 7-9). The indigestible mass of research material is 
630. Reflection on these metaphors of folds and cycles emphasises how they are directionally different and similar. They 
differ in that a fold becomes angled into a stoppage and reversal, whereas a cycle rotates in the same direction, 
creating a sense of linear temporal progress. They are alike in being a form and a motion motivated by a force. They 
are topologically similar in a cycle being a ‘double fold’ that has been smoothed-out and extended or repeated, while 
a fold is a cycle squashed flat. By turning a folded pattern into a cyclic pattern, the stoppage and reversals inherent 
in messy realities become an invisible background to a singular event from a hindsight perspective.
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thereby transformed into a more portable and accessible product. Provided the cycle metaphor, as a
heuristic, does not contradict my body of material, it is acceptable for the less significant materials 
and themes to be left out (Tilly, 2002: xiii; Brown, 1999: 84). This allows me to focus on and 
identify a particular recurring mechanism by comparing similarities and differences between the 
cycles (McAdam et al., 2001: 30, 33). Instead of constructing consent, this mechanism constructs 
conflict. This is recurring because it is based on a sustainable environment, is triggered by success, 
and compelling reasons exist for participants to persevere.
My use of cycles631 has been restricted to identifying types of events, not to accumulating or 
analysing an array of pre-defined events. The furthest I go in such a macro direction is to argue that
during the NEP developments, large scale institutions of justice and health changed significantly in 
their structure. But they changed little in their associated professional aspirations, particularly in 
the defining and distinguishing of their jurisdictions of problems and expertise. Furthermore, social
cycle theory suggests possibilities of a linear sequence of cycles, each separated by a reversal, or 
collapse of the growth aspect of the cyclic pattern. This possibility is theoretically relevant to my 
argument since the concept of ‘AIDS exceptionalism’ is effectively a relative brief single cycle 
from professional control to community control and back to professional control.632 Yet the New 
Zealand peer-professional cycles have not collapsed.
In the peer-professional case there is a part-cycle of gay community organising, from grass-roots to
peer-professional to corporate. This initial part-cycle split into staggered, parallel components of a 
pattern that repeated with the Prostitutes Collective and the NEP. Each community version of this 
pattern exhibited similar tendencies, yet each has been significantly modified by contingencies, as 
well as by the path-dependent aspects of the previous cyclic consolidations of policy and 
knowledge. These cycles are not presented as determining future events by constraining choices, 
nor even as describing such constraints on the resources needed to continue particular forms of 
social action. Instead, the alignment of variant sub-cycles is presented as a form of movement 
which indicates the presence of similar forces acting in a shared environment that contains 
631. My use of historical cycles of micro-scale localised programmes needs to be clearly distinguished from social cycle 
theory of macro-scale processes involving socially large or total systems. See Rosenthal’s (1958) translation of the 
Kitab al Ibar of ibn Khaldun (1380), Pareto’s (1963) Trattato di Sociologia Generale from 1916, and Sorokin’s 
Society, Culture and Personality: Their Structure and Dynamics, a System of General Sociology (1947); for seminal 
sociological work. See also Vico’s (1984) Principj di scienza nuova di Giambattista Vico d'intorno alla comune 
natura delle nazioni, 3rd ed. from 1744, Postan’s Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the 
Medieval Economy (1973), and Braudel’s Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800 (1973) for classical historical or 
periodising analyses. My usage also is different from ‘event sequence’ and other historical methods that rely on 
mathematical modelling and may involve cycles. I make no attempt toward mathematical modelling, partly because 
I do not use large enough numbers of participants, or states, or variables, and the duration separating them is too 
indistinct. The detail I work with in narrative social history is too fine, individualising, and localising of meaning for 
the the large data-sets and universalising character of a mathematical model. Mathematical modelling seems 
possible if larger numbers of participants or NEP cases were studied. See Turchin, Grinin, Munck, & Korotayev 
(2007), Nefedov (2004), Blossfeld & Rohwer (2002), Chu & Lee (1994), Usher (1989). Nonetheless, it may detract 
and distract from the goals of sociology, as argued by Mills (1959: 71-75). Instead, I use a logical mechanism.
632. Repetitions of a cycle of exceptionalism would be expected in the case of new diseases which resisted cures and 
quarantine and were considered a major threat to the public.
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contingent discontinuities and variation. As I use cycles, they are a research device to delineate and
count the outcomes of alignments of forces that are actual, but otherwise too distributed, or 
discontinuous, or disguised, or not engaged with human sensory apparatus, to be easily visible. 
They focus on the topological ‘image’ aspect of a sociological ‘image’-ination (Mills, 1959), 
linking immediate troubles to historical issues.
Boundaries of various sorts have been established through codes of law and conventional 
expectations, Such boundaries were passed through and worked around in everyday practices. 
These boundaries were modified in urgency in the exceptional instance of the NEP but only in 
specific geographical and legislative sites. Boundary work, clearly, has been crucial in the actuality
and our better understanding of the NEP.
History and sociology
History is clearly related to sociology by its focus on social change, its characterising of patterns of
human interactivity, and its narrative methodologies, yet often presents a smooth, misleading 
account.633 My argument does not treat history as smoothly continuous flow, since ‘nothing’ is 
observed to flow and disjunctures are common. Actual incidents seem disconnected and 
discontinuous in a temporal sense, joined by strands of narrative, remembrance, categories, and 
particularly by the material durabilities of ecologies, landscape, architecture and technologies. 
History is particular and periodised into a sequence of incidents exhibiting one direction, called the 
past, in which things once done cannot be undone. A thing once done is totally fixed, and transfers 
a portion of such durability to the path-dependent constraints on the options for later occurrences. 
But these transferrals begin abruptly then fade at greater or lesser rates rather than being pushed or 
pulled towards the end, or ends, of history. This sequence of incidents can be called the history of 
incidents, dates, and things, but it is not the history of events and objects. Events are always 
looking ‘back’ to the past, in a hind-sight perspective of interpretation and projection where 
633. 19th century sociologists attempted to move their methods away from historical studies and re-institutionalise as a 
new social science discipline, using positivist methodologies to address topics of a politically and personally 
meaningful nature (Austrin & Farnsworth, 2007). Yet there are difficulties relating individual human experience of 
change to the size of modern data-sets where the meaning of change is calculated but not humanly experienced. See, 
for example Lloyd (2007). Sociological methodologies also struggle with historical durations within which the 
meaning of terms may change, yet such terms are used to document troubles, organise data-sets and underlie claims 
to statistical rigour assumed to be timeless. Several significant problems with the relevance and productivity of 
sociological methods involve historical types of difficulty (Abbott, 2000) . History is somewhat different from 
sociology in its genres of writing, its data sources being preselected by fate and interested intermediary parties. 
Historians have frequently sought the turning points that distinguish periods, while sociologists often seek consistent 
patterns. Furthermore sociologists are trained to focus on the present, where information is messy but prevalent, 
whereas historians are encouraged to avoid large data-sets and work in the past. Perhaps closer to the uneasiness that 
at times is found between history and sociology is the attitude to self. Historians write in the self, or persona, of the 
researcher, but skilfully, whereas sociologists seem trained in the skills of disguising or writing the self out (Erikson, 
1973). Although the linguistic turn in social sciences, together with ethnographic, phenomenological, and critical 
theories all resisted the writing out of the self from research, much sociology still presents an arcane language of 
abstraction, numericism, and methodological mysticism rather than the grounded resonance of people and things. 
History might be called ‘the world echoed in text. History alters the ordering of the actual world (logos) through 
human writing and science methods ( -logy, as in socio-logy). Yet whereas a ‘foundational history’ replaces general 
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meanings are inscribed into chronological periods and the boundedness of material objects. 
Historians account for a multitude of braided event sequences in a single ledger which opens and 
hinges on the current common concerns. Yet each consolidation into a singularity is also a 
particularisation, as the account becomes one of many, all equally evidence-based, yet all differing 
in coherency, elements, emphases and relevancy. Historians use selection, grouping, and 
categorising to bring an echo of the actual past into the actual present as a single account which 
seems to travel against the actual sequencing of life. Yet in such bringing, the historian must stop, 
must express discontinuity, in order to fold a living perspective into a perspective ‘of life’, a 
reverse perspective. Walter Benjamin has incorporated such concepts into a memorable image of 
western history: 
this is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned to the past. Where we perceive 
a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage 
and hurls it in front of his feet. (Benjamin, 1999: 249)
Benjamin’s colleagues rebuked his redemptive emphasis on historical ‘recovery’ at later stages of a
‘single event’. Horkheimer argued: “Past injustice has occurred and is done with. The slain really 
are slain ... the injustice, horror, and pain of the past are irreparable” (Wolin, 1994: xlix). Benjamin
replied: “The corrective to this way of thinking lies in the conviction that history is not only a 
science but also a form of remembrance. What science has ‘established’ can be modified by 
remembrance” (ibid). Elsewhere Benjamin argued that: “There is no document of civilization that 
is not at the same time a document of barbarism” (1999: 248).634 These sensitivities to unfixed 
consequences of conflicts and decisions led Benjamin to encourage the reading of history ‘against 
the grain’, as I also do in part when evaluating formal NEP history. 
Benjamin urged that later history be put aside to better understand how things had been earlier, 
since later events gathered together the politicised meanings imposed by the victors of struggles. I 
differ slightly, by utilising such shifts to gather material on how and why a policy changed. Yet 
Benjamin also denied that historical articulation represented how things had been: “The true picture
of the past flits by ... seized only as an image ... every image of the past that is not recognized by 
the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably (Benjamin, 1999: 247). 
My argument follows critical aspects of Benjamin’s complex and ambiguous thought. For instance:
“The concept of life is given its due only if everything that has a history of its own, and not merely 
the setting for history, is credited with life.” (Benjamin, 1999: 72). This concept overlaps with 
anthropological and actor-network sensitivities to the activity and meaningfulness of material 
knowledge, subsidiary histories reinforce such foundations by adding to the store of general knowledge. The 
arguments of Kuhn (1969) and Foucault (1980, 1970), following Bachelard (1984) suggest that ‘foundational 
histories’ and ‘paradigms of scientific knowledge’ are similar and overlapping, though differing in their stance on 
the internal conflicts and locality of historic periods of knowledge.
634. This history is like Schrödinger's cat, not an active agent nor solid except in interactional ‘observation’ 
(Schrödinger, 1935). 
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objects in patterns of movement.635 
Benjamin’s critical theory from his Nazi-era reflections on the shifts between the fragility and 
solidity of history writings seem relevant in later periods of modernity when drug users may be 
sacrificed to creeds of abstinence founded on a binary ideology of purity and contagion. Yet the 
NEP and its peer-professionalism offer a celebratory account and argument, differing from 
Benjamin’s historical analysis of system-wide catastrophe. By contrast to a ‘progressive 
destructuring’ story, I trace how the NEP’s stability and structure emerged from unfixed and 
ambiguous moments. The first moments involved key actors making commitments due to their 
reasonable expectations of the NEP’s stability. Yet these early moments altered the institutional 
and policy landscape, setting the scene for later changes. The maintenance of stability emerged 
from the ‘solid’ productivity that engaged usefully with other areas of ecological and social 
systems. This productivity is observable in the everyday interactivities, where the forces that 
motivate actual historical change636 can be analysed through the movements of key objects and 
actor motivations. Any tendency to hide the actual movements of human bodies and text bodies, in 
actual sites such as houses, offices, and archives has been countered by my actor-network approach
of even-handed symmetry and attention to material objects. 
635. However I differ with Benjamin on his immediately following point: “In the final analysis, the range of life must be 
determined by history rather than by nature ... the philosopher’s task consists in comprehending all of natural life 
through the more encompassing life of history” (ibid). First, I do not accept any ‘final analysis’. All analyses that are 
observable and demonstrable are firmly in the messy middle of things. Second, this perspective privileges human-
centredness for no justifiable reason. Certainly it is often more convenient and relevant to be human-centred, but at 
the start of any enquiry it is more precise and parsimonious to assume the symmetry of all factors. Third, I find some 
aspects of particular histories less persuasive than experiencing ‘reality’ as part of somatically embodied, non-
narrative processes, though I refer to ‘actual’ rather than ‘natural’, and feel that what Benjamin understands by 
‘nature’, and ‘life’ are distinctly ambiguous. Such issues, I suspect, lies at the heart of Horkheimer’s criticism of 
Benjamin’s so-called transcendentalist tendencies. Hanssen comments that Benjamin may have been emphasising an 
opposition to ‘vitalist’ theories that mystified ‘natural life’, while simultaneously affirming an interest in romantic 
understandings of texts becoming a form of life which, through successive translations, could reproduce (Hanssen, 
2000: 33). Nonetheless, Wolin (1994: 85) points out that Benjamin followed Lukács in celebrating the fragmentary 
nature of the essay form as a means of forcefully rejecting the conventional western ideal of an all-encompassing, 
systemic approach. Benjamin’s ‘transcendence’ is likely to be better understood as abstractive analysis, since 
Benjamin’s character is forcefully immanent as well as redemptionist.
636. While I employ historical sensitivities and techniques, I also take pains to avoid the positivist aspects of history 
writing (Steedman, 2001: para 42) as much as the positivism of biomedical accounts. My standpoint is critical and 
grounded, which I interpret as events and structures emerging from an information-saturated material environment, 
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Risk
I utilised an actor-network type of approach of describing mechanisms to explain how a pattern of 
peer-professionalism involved the personal experiencing of trust, of activity by non-human viruses,
and of the enscripting and logistics of syringes with drugs, amidst an institutional niche where 
crime and health worlds mixed. Mechanism and niche combined to outline the case as more hybrid,
of longer duration, and more pervasive than the NEP had conventionally been described. Peer-
professionalism described a unique occupation, but also a site of articulation wherein the NEP’s 
unique productivity was maintained. Yet such a mechanism might conceivably not have existed. It 
was risky and localised rather than universal, and thereby focuses attention on exceptionalism 
rather than systemic normality.
An actor-network sensitivity to sites and stories of activity has offered a way of integrating the 
sequential and structural accounts I have offered. Such activity is found in the movements of 
objects and information, and in the strategic shapings, such as of meanings and expectations, 
whereby both physical place and understood space entwine to constitute a lived environment. This 
environment was threatened by viruses and has been termed a ‘risk environment’. Yet risk is a 
statistical description of past harm, expressed as a probability. Risk is not an actual harm itself, nor 
a general likelihood of future harm, except as a projection of harms that have been measured in the 
different environment of the past.637 Prospects of future harm are hazards, not risks, because they 
cannot be measured and calculated accurately. Hazards can only be projected and turned into risks 
by assuming that the conditions of past calculation will continue to apply. 
These aspects of harm, hazard and risk are important distinctions because ‘risk’ is a potent, 
politically-laden term. A so-called ‘risk environment’ points to conflicts over knowledge because 
future risk does not exist. Yet by drawing on the ‘scientistic’ associations of risk statistics, claims 
may be made for one perspective to take priority over others. Risks are a form of information, yet 
according to some understandings, information is less representative, less valid, and less relevant if 
self-reported. Accordingly, risk information tends to be produced through the intrusive surveillance
of inaccessible or resistant practices and people. 
but is not positivist. A problem with much historical positivism is that its assumptions and absences cause it to 
privilege a foreground analysis of the history as an already constructed effect. The method of doing this evades 
drawing attention to the actual research context of the researcher in the process of writing. Such positivism seems 
biased in presenting history as a ‘thing’ in the past, instead of also presenting the material or other contextual aspects 
of the archives being worked at and in. Accordingly, I do not consider historical positivism to be an inappropriate 
methodology for a sociological analysis where greater reflexivity to researcher positioning and the consequences of 
framing narratives is called for. Not all history-writing is positivist, however. Some is sociological, and it becomes 
so by expressing concern for methodology and consequences, as in the histories by Thucydides (1994) and ibn 
Khaldun (1958). See Shanske (2007), Dewald (2005), Butterworth (2001), Shapin (1988), Abraham (1983), Munz 
(1977), Merton (1973, 1957). Some historical methods present contextless overviews as well as suffering from 
positivism.
637. To be precise and determinate, a risk calculation needs to be applied to known past events, as a description of what 
people at that time were experiencing in terms of the proportions of harm.
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The concept of ‘environmental harm’ seems preferable, as a framework for service delivery, to 
‘harmful practices’ and ‘groups vulnerable to harm’. This is because many aspects of harm from 
viral disease can be socially constructed into human environments, yet such social connections 
become invisible when harm and hazard are reduced to isolated categories such as ‘risk’ practices, 
and to particular, vulnerable ‘risk’ groups. For example, among other routes, HIV is easily 
transmitted through men having sex with men unsafely, yet not all such men identify as gay. 
Services that have focused predominantly on ‘gayness’ have bolstered the health and 
empowerment of gay communities. But such services have also covered up the more private sexual
connections between those men who do not identify as gay. The actual environments of harm 
involve divisions and a contestability made more complex and rigid through undue reliance on 
‘risk discourse’.
Projections of future risk necessarily assume that the future will be the same as the past, and 
accordingly, may reproduce some effects they assume. Yet the nature of epidemics is such that the 
reason they are so lethal, and create such exceptional responses in social systems, is that their 
activity differs from the past. They are new, or cyclic. They are not normal. Stable laws and 
medical treatments may be described in terms of risks, and discretionary decisions made by judges 
and doctors. Hazards, by contrast, are active in challenging and overturning such stability of 
knowable risk information, as has been shown in the NEP history. The NEP occupied new sites and
spaces by creating a new occupation at a time when HIV/AIDS hazards were feared, yet research 
into secret IDU populations was not possible. Accordingly, there could be no calculation of risk, no
system of risk management, only a mechanism of experimental, empirical monitoring. 
As I have shown in the main text, the NEP that resulted, and especially the peer groups, enabled 
better access for research and the consequent calculations of risk. These activities ‘drew’ this field 
of health work in professional directions, at the same time as it was ‘pushed’ from the boundaries 
with professions. This health field was ‘grown’ through the career aspirations and the desires by 
IDU peers for more advantageous political positioning to lobby, using representational and human 
rights discourses, for better health care for IDU. 
The problematisation of ‘future risk’ requires a temporally engaged and sensitive method of 
exploration, together with methods of exploring local institutional structures and organisations. 
This is because historical understandings and accounts set the framework for the policy decisions 
which create risk by attempting to reduce risk. If more persuasive histories encourage a greater 
reliance on predicting the future, significant risk is entailed, since with more confidence comes 
greater hubris, leading to more dire consequences when the larger and more authoritative plans fail 
(Scott, 1988).
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